adopted　in　refutations　on　side　issues。
  28
  Also；　those　refutations　that　bring　one　to　their　conclusion　through
  the　consequent　you　should　show　up　in　the　course　of　the　argument
  itself。　The　mode　in　which　consequences　follow　is　twofold。　For　the
  argument　either　is　that　as　the　universal　follows　on　its
  particular…as　（e。g。）　'animal'　follows　from　'man'…so　does　the
  particular　on　its　universal：　for　the　claim　is　made　that　if　A　is　always
  found　with　B；　then　B　also　is　always　found　with　A。　Or　else　it
  proceeds　by　way　of　the　opposites　of　the　terms　involved：　for　if　A
  follows　B；　it　is　claimed　that　A's　opposite　will　follow　B's　opposite。
  On　this　latter　claim　the　argument　of　Melissus　also　depends：　for　he
  claims　that　because　that　which　has　come　to　be　has　a　beginning；　that
  which　has　not　come　to　be　has　none；　so　that　if　the　heaven　has　not
  come　to　be；　it　is　also　eternal。　But　that　is　not　so；　for　the　sequence
  is　vice　versa。
  29
  In　the　case　of　any　refutations　whose　reasoning　depends　on　some
  addition；　look　and　see　if　upon　its　subtraction　the　absurdity　follows
  none　the　less：　and　then　if　so；　the　answerer　should　point　this　out；　and
  say　that　he　granted　the　addition　not　because　he　really　thought　it；　but
  for　the　sake　of　the　argument；　whereas　the　questioner　has　not　used　it
  for　the　purpose　of　his　argument　at　all。
  30
  To　meet　those　refutations　which　make　several　questions　into　one；　one
  should　draw　a　distinction　between　them　straight　away　at　the　start。　For
  a　question　must　be　single　to　which　there　is　a　single　answer；　so　that
  one　must　not　affirm　or　deny　several　things　of　one　thing；　nor　one　thing
  of　many；　but　one　of　one。　But　just　as　in　the　case　of　ambiguous　terms；
  an　attribute　belongs　to　a　term　sometimes　in　both　its　senses；　and
  sometimes　in　neither；　so　that　a　simple　answer　does　one；　as　it　happens；
  no　harm　despite　the　fact　that　the　question　is　not　simple；　so　it　is
  in　these　cases　of　double　questions　too。　Whenever；　then；　the　several
  attributes　belong　to　the　one　subject；　or　the　one　to　the　many；　the
  man　who　gives　a　simple　answer　encounters　no　obstacle　even　though　he
  has　committed　this　mistake：　but　whenever　an　attribute　belongs　to　one
  subject　but　not　to　the　other；　or　there　is　a　question　of　a　number　of
  attributes　belonging　to　a　number　of　subjects　and　in　one　sense　both
  belong　to　both；　while　in　another　sense；　again；　they　do　not；　then　there
  is　trouble；　so　that　one　must　beware　of　this。　Thus　（e。g。）　in　the
  following　arguments：　Supposing　to　be　good　and　B　evil；　you　will；　if　you
  give　a　single　answer　about　both；　be　compelled　to　say　that　it　is　true
  to　call　these　good；　and　that　it　is　true　to　call　them　evil　and　likewise
  to　call　them　neither　good　nor　evil　（for　each　of　them　has　not　each
  character）；　so　that　the　same　thing　will　be　both　good　and　evil　and
  neither　good　nor　evil。　Also；　since　everything　is　the　same　as　itself
  and　different　from　anything　else；　inasmuch　as　the　man　who　answers
  double　questions　simply　can　be　made　to　say　that　several　things　are
  'the　same'　not　as　other　things　but　'as　themselves'；　and　also　that　they
  are　different　from　themselves；　it　follows　that　the　same　things　must　be
  both　the　same　as　and　different　from　themselves。　Moreover；　if　what　is
  good　becomes　evil　while　what　is　evil　is　good；　then　they　must　both
  become　two。　So　of　two　unequal　things　each　being　equal　to　itself；　it
  will　follow　that　they　are　both　equal　and　unequal　to　themselves。
  Now　these　refutations　fall　into　the　province　of　other　solutions　as
  well：　for　'both'　and　'all'　have　more　than　one　meaning；　so　that　the
  resulting　affirmation　and　denial　of　the　same　thing　does　not　occur；
  except　verbally：　and　this　is　not　what　we　meant　by　a　refutation。　But　it
  is　clear　that　if　there　be　not　put　a　single　question　on　a　number　of
  points；　but　the　answerer　has　affirmed　or　denied　one　attribute　only
  of　one　subject　only；　the　absurdity　will　not　come　to　pass。
  31
  With　regard　to　those　who　draw　one　into　repeating　the　same　thing　a
  number　of　times；　it　is　clear　that　one　must　not　grant　that　predications
  of　relative　terms　have　any　meaning　in　abstraction　by　themselves；
  e。g。　that　'double'　is　a　significant　term　apart　from　the　whole　phrase
  'double　of　half'　merely　on　the　ground　that　it　figures　in　it。　For　ten
  figures　in　'ten　minus　one'　and　in　'not　do'；　and　generally　the
  affirmation　in　the　negation；　but　for　all　that；　suppose　any　one　were　to
  say；　'This　is　not　white'；　he　does　not　say　that　it　is　white。　The　bare
  word　'double'；　one　may　perhaps　say；　has　not　even　any　meaning　at　all；
  any　more　than　has　'the'　in　'the　half'：　and　even　if　it　has　a　meaning；
  yet　it　has　not　the　same　meaning　as　in　the　combination。　Nor　is
  'knowledge'　the　same　thing　in　a　specific　branch　of　it　（suppose　it；
  e。g。　to　be　'medical　knowledge'）　as　it　is　in　general：　for　in　general　it
  was　the　'knowledge　of　the　knowable'。　In　the　case　of　terms　that　are
  predicated　of　the　terms　through　which　they　are　defined；　you　should　say
  the　same　thing；　that　the　term　defined　is　not　the　same　in　abstraction
  as　it　is　in　the　whole　phrase。　For　'concave'　has　a　general　meaning
  which　is　the　same　in　the　case　of　a　snub　nose；　and　of　a　bandy　leg；
  but　when　added　to　either　substantive　nothing　prevents　it　from
  differentiating　its　meaning；　in　fact　it　bears　one　sense　as　applied
  to　the　nose；　and　another　as　applied　to　the　leg：　for　in　the　former
  connexion　it　means　'snub'　and　in　the　latter　'bandyshaped'；　i。e。　it
  makes　no　difference　whether　you　say　'a　snub　nose'　or　'a　concave　nose'。
  Moreover；　the　expression　must　not　be　granted　in　the　nominative　case：
  for　it　is　a　falsehood。　For　snubness　is　not　a　concave　nose　but
  something　（e。g。　an　affection）　belonging　to　a　nose：　hence；　there　is
  no　absurdity　in　supposing　that　the　snub　nose　is　a　nose　possessing
  the　concavity　that　belongs　to　a　nose。
  32
  With　regard　to　solecisms；　we　have　previously　said　what　it　is　that
  appears　to　bring　them　about；　the　method　of　their　solution　will　be
  clear　in　the　course　of　the　arguments　themselves。　Solecism　is　the
  result　aimed　at　in　all　arguments　of　the　following　kind：　'Is　a　thing
  truly　that　which　you　truly　call　it？'　'Yes'。　'But；　speaking　of　a　stone；
  you　call　him　real：　therefore　of　a　stone　it　follows　that　〃him　is
  real〃。'　No：　rather；　talking　of　a　stone　means　not　saying　which'　but
  'whom'；　and　not　'that'　but　'him'。　If；　then；　any　one　were　to　ask；　'Is　a
  stone　him　whom　you　truly　call　him？'　he　would　be　generally　thought
  not　to　be　speaking　good　Greek；　any　more　than　if　he　were　to　ask；　'Is　he
  what　you　call　her？'　Speak　in　this　way　of　a　'stick'　or　any　neuter　word；
  and　the　difference　does　not　break　out。　For　this　reason；　also；　no
  solecism　is　incurred；　suppose　any　one　asks；　'Is　a　thing　what　you　say
  it　to　be？'　'Yes'。　'But；　speaking　of　a　stick；　you　call　it　real：
  therefore；　of　a　stick　it　follows　that　it　is　real。'　'Stone'；　however；
  and　'he'　have　masculine　designations。　Now　suppose　some　one　were　to
  ask；　'Can　〃he〃　be　a　she〃　（a　female）？'；　and　then　again；　'Well；　but　is
  not　he　Coriscus？'　and　then　were　to　say；　'Then　he　is　a　〃she〃；'　he　has
  not　proved　the　solecism；　even　if　the　name　'Coriscus'　does　signify　a
  'she'；　if；　on　the　other　hand；　the　answerer　does　not　grant　this：　this
  point　must　be　put　as　an　additional　question：　while　if　neither　is　it
  the　fact　nor　does　he　grant　it；　then　the　sophist　has　not　proved　his
  case　either　in　fact　or　as　against　the　person　he　has　been
  questioning。　In　like　manner；　then；　in　the　above　instance　as　well　it
  must　be　definitely　put　that　'he'　means　the　stone。　If；　however；　this
  neither　is　so　nor　is　granted；　the　conclusion　must　not　be　stated：
  though　it　follows　apparently；　because　the　case　（the　accusative）；
  that　is　really　unlike；　appears　to　be　like　the　nominative。　'Is　it
  true　to　say　that　this　object　is　what　you　call　it　by　name？'　'Yes'。　'But
  you　call　it　by　the　name　of　a　shield：　this　object　therefore　is　〃of　a
  shield〃。'　No：　not　necessarily；　because　the　meaning　of　'this　object'　is
  not　'of　a　shield'　but　'a　shield'：　'of　a　shield'　would　be　the　meaning
  of　'this　object's'。　Nor　again　if　'He　is　what　you　call　him　by　name'；
  while　'the　name　you　call　him　by　is　Cleon's'；　is　he　therefore
  'Cleon's'：　for　he　is　not　'Cleon's'；　for　what　was　said　was　that　'He；
  not　his；　is　what　I　call　him　by　name'。　For　the　question；　if　put　in
  the　latter　way；　would　not　even　be　Greek。　'Do　you　know　this？'　'Yes。'
  'But　this　is　he：　therefore　you　know　he'。　No：　rather　'this'　has　not　the
  same　meaning　in　'Do　you　know　this？'　as　in　'This　is　a　stone'；　in　the
  first　it　stands　for　an　accusative；　in　the　second　for　a　nominative
  case。　'When　you　have　understanding　of　anything；　do　you　understand　it？