scientist；　even　if　in　what　they　say　they　seem　to　the　latter　to　go
  wildly　astray　from　them。　All；　then；　are　engaged　in　refutation；　for
  they　take　a　hand　as　amateurs　in　the　same　task　with　which　dialectic
  is　concerned　professionally；　and　he　is　a　dialectician　who　examines
  by　the　help　of　a　theory　of　reasoning。　Now　there　are　many　identical
  principles　which　are　true　of　everything；　though　they　are　not　such　as
  to　constitute　a　particular　nature；　i。e。　a　particular　kind　of　being；
  but　are　like　negative　terms；　while　other　principles　are　not　of　this
  kind　but　are　special　to　particular　subjects；　accordingly　it　is
  possible　from　these　general　principles　to　hold　an　examination　on
  everything；　and　that　there　should　be　a　definite　art　of　so　doing；
  and；　moreover；　an　art　which　is　not　of　the　same　kind　as　those　which
  demonstrate。　This　is　why　the　contentious　reasoner　does　not　stand　in
  the　same　condition　in　all　respects　as　the　drawer　of　a　false　diagram：
  for　the　contentious　reasoner　will　not　be　given　to　misreasoning　from
  any　definite　class　of　principles；　but　will　deal　with　every　class。
  These；　then；　are　the　types　of　sophistical　refutations：　and　that　it
  belongs　to　the　dialectician　to　study　these；　and　to　be　able　to　effect
  them；　is　not　difficult　to　see：　for　the　investigation　of　premisses
  comprises　the　whole　of　this　study。
  12
  So　much；　then；　for　apparent　refutations。　As　for　showing　that　the
  answerer　is　committing　some　fallacy；　and　drawing　his　argument　into
  paradox…for　this　was　the　second　item　of　the　sophist's　programme…in　the
  first　place；　then；　this　is　best　brought　about　by　a　certain　manner　of
  questioning　and　through　the　question。　For　to　put　the　question
  without　framing　it　with　reference　to　any　definite　subject　is　a　good
  bait　for　these　purposes：　for　people　are　more　inclined　to　make　mistakes
  when　they　talk　at　large；　and　they　talk　at　large　when　they　have　no
  definite　subject　before　them。　Also　the　putting　of　several　questions；
  even　though　the　position　against　which　one　is　arguing　be　quite
  definite；　and　the　claim　that　he　shall　say　only　what　he　thinks；
  create　abundant　opportunity　for　drawing　him　into　paradox　or　fallacy；
  and　also；　whether　to　any　of　these　questions　he　replies　'Yes'　or
  replies　'No'；　of　leading　him　on　to　statements　against　which　one　is
  well　off　for　a　line　of　attack。　Nowadays；　however；　men　are　less　able　to
  play　foul　by　these　means　than　they　were　formerly：　for　people　rejoin
  with　the　question；　'What　has　that　to　do　with　the　original　subject？'　It
  is；　too；　an　elementary　rule　for　eliciting　some　fallacy　or　paradox　that
  one　should　never　put　a　controversial　question　straight　away；　but　say
  that　one　puts　it　from　the　wish　for　information：　for　the　process　of
  inquiry　thus　invited　gives　room　for　an　attack。
  A　rule　specially　appropriate　for　showing　up　a　fallacy　is　the
  sophistic　rule；　that　one　should　draw　the　answerer　on　to　the　kind　of
  statements　against　which　one　is　well　supplied　with　arguments：　this　can
  be　done　both　properly　and　improperly；　as　was　said　before。'　Again；　to
  draw　a　paradoxical　statement；　look　and　see　to　what　school　of
  philosophers　the　person　arguing　with　you　belongs；　and　then　question
  him　as　to　some　point　wherein　their　doctrine　is　paradoxical　to　most
  people：　for　with　every　school　there　is　some　point　of　that　kind。　It
  is　an　elementary　rule　in　these　matters　to　have　a　collection　of　the
  special　'theses'　of　the　various　schools　among　your　propositions。　The
  solution　recommended　as　appropriate　here；　too；　is　to　point　out　that
  the　paradox　does　not　come　about　because　of　the　argument：　whereas
  this　is　what　his　opponent　always　really　wants。
  Moreover；　argue　from　men's　wishes　and　their　professed　opinions。
  For　people　do　not　wish　the　same　things　as　they　say　they　wish：　they　say
  what　will　look　best；　whereas　they　wish　what　appears　to　be　to　their
  interest：　e。g。　they　say　that　a　man　ought　to　die　nobly　rather　than　to
  live　in　pleasure；　and　to　live　in　honest　poverty　rather　than　in
  dishonourable　riches；　but　they　wish　the　opposite。　Accordingly；　a　man
  who　speaks　according　to　his　wishes　must　be　led　into　stating　the
  professed　opinions　of　people；　while　he　who　speaks　according　to　these
  must　be　led　into　admitting　those　that　people　keep　hidden　away：　for
  in　either　case　they　are　bound　to　introduce　a　paradox；　for　they　will
  speak　contrary　either　to　men's　professed　or　to　their　hidden　opinions。
  The　widest　range　of　common…place　argument　for　leading　men　into
  paradoxical　statement　is　that　which　depends　on　the　standards　of　Nature
  and　of　the　Law：　it　is　so　that　both　Callicles　is　drawn　as　arguing　in
  the　Gorgias；　and　that　all　the　men　of　old　supposed　the　result　to　come
  about：　for　nature　（they　said）　and　law　are　opposites；　and　justice　is
  a　fine　thing　by　a　legal　standard；　but　not　by　that　of　nature。
  Accordingly；　they　said；　the　man　whose　statement　agrees　with　the
  standard　of　nature　you　should　meet　by　the　standard　of　the　law；　but　the
  man　who　agrees　with　the　law　by　leading　him　to　the　facts　of　nature：　for
  in　both　ways　paradoxical　statements　may　be　committed。　In　their　view
  the　standard　of　nature　was　the　truth；　while　that　of　the　law　was　the
  opinion　held　by　the　majority。　So　that　it　is　clear　that　they；　too；　used
  to　try　either　to　refute　the　answerer　or　to　make　him　make　paradoxical
  statements；　just　as　the　men　of　to…day　do　as　well。
  Some　questions　are　such　that　in　both　forms　the　answer　is
  paradoxical；　e。g。　'Ought　one　to　obey　the　wise　or　one's　father？'　and
  'Ought　one　to　do　what　is　expedient　or　what　is　just？'　and　'Is　it
  preferable　to　suffer　injustice　or　to　do　an　injury？'　You　should　lead
  people；　then；　into　views　opposite　to　the　majority　and　to　the
  philosophers；　if　any　one　speaks　as　do　the　expert　reasoners；　lead　him
  into　opposition　to　the　majority；　while　if　he　speaks　as　do　the
  majority；　then　into　opposition　to　the　reasoners。　For　some　say　that
  of　necessity　the　happy　man　is　just；　whereas　it　is　paradoxical　to　the
  many　that　a　king　should　be　happy。　To　lead　a　man　into　paradoxes　of　this
  sort　is　the　same　as　to　lead　him　into　the　opposition　of　the　standards
  of　nature　and　law：　for　the　law　represents　the　opinion　of　the　majority；
  whereas　philosophers　speak　according　to　the　standard　of　nature　and　the
  truth。
  13
  Paradoxes；　then；　you　should　seek　to　elicit　by　means　of　these
  common…place　rules。　Now　as　for　making　any　one　babble；　we　have
  already　said　what　we　mean　by　'to　babble'。　This　is　the　object　in　view
  in　all　arguments　of　the　following　kind：　If　it　is　all　the　same　to　state
  a　term　and　to　state　its　definition；　the　'double'　and　'double　of
  half'　are　the　same：　if　then　'double'　be　the　'double　of　half'；　it
  will　be　the　'double　of　half　of　half'。　And　if；　instead　of　'double'；
  'double　of　half'　be　again　put；　then　the　same　expression　will　be
  repeated　three　times；　'double　of　half　of　half　of　half'。　Also　'desire
  is　of　the　pleasant；　isn't　it？'　desire　is　conation　for　the　pleasant：
  accordingly；　'desire'　is　'conation　for　the　pleasant　for　the　pleasant'。
  All　arguments　of　this　kind　occur　in　dealing　（1）　with　any　relative
  terms　which　not　only　have　relative　genera；　but　are　also　themselves
  relative；　and　are　rendered　in　relation　to　one　and　the　same　thing；　as
  e。g。　conation　is　conation　for　something；　and　desire　is　desire　of
  something；　and　double　is　double　of　something；　i。e。　double　of　half：
  also　in　dealing　（2）　with　any　terms　which；　though　they　be　not
  relative　terms　at　all；　yet　have　their　substance；　viz。　the　things　of
  which　they　are　the　states　or　affections　or　what　not；　indicated　as　well
  in　their　definition；　they　being　predicated　of　these　things。　Thus
  e。g。　'odd'　is　a　'number　containing　a　middle'：　but　there　is　an　'odd
  number'：　therefore　there　is　a　'number…containing…a…middle　number'。
  Also；　if　snubness　be　a　concavity　of　the　nose；　and　there　be　a　snub
  nose；　there　is　therefore　a　'concave…nose　nose'。
  People　sometimes　appear　to　produce　this　result；　without　really
  producing　it；　because　they　do　not　add　the　question　whether　the
  expression　'double'；　just　by　itself；　has　any　meaning　or　no；　and　if　so；
  whether　it　has　the　same　meaning；　or　a　different　one；　but　they　draw
  their　conclusion　straight　away。　Still　it　seems；　inasmuch　as　the　word
  is　the　same；　to　have　the　same　meaning　as　well。
  14
  We　have　said　before　what　kind　of　thing　'solecism'　is。'　It　is
  possible　both　to　commit　it；　and　to　seem　to　do　so　without　doing　so；　and
  to　do　so　without　seeming　to　do　so。　Suppose；　as　Protagoras　used　to
  say　that　menis　（'wrath'）　and　pelex　（'helmet'）　are　masculine：
  according　to　him　a　man　who　calls　wrath　a　'destructress'　（oulomenen）
  commits　a　solecism；　though　he　does　not　seem　to　do　so　to　other
  people；　where　he　who　calls　it　a　'destructor'