is　the　same　thing；　about　reason；　we　shall　not　find　the　want　of　an
  academic　definition　hinder　us　from　a　reasonable　conclusion。　　What
  nurse　or　mother　will　doubt　that　her　infant　child　can　reason　within
  the　limits　of　its　own　experience；　long　before　it　can　formulate　its
  reason　in　articulately　worded　thought？　　If　the　development　of　any
  given　animal　is；　as　our　opponents　themselves　admit；　an　epitome　of
  the　history　of　its　whole　anterior　development；　surely　the　fact　that
  speech　is　an　accomplishment　acquired　after　birth　so　artificially
  that　children　who　have　gone　wild　in　the　woods　lose　it　if　they　have
  ever　learned　it；　points　to　the　conclusion　that　man's　ancestors　only
  learned　to　express　themselves　in　articulate　language　at　a
  comparatively　recent　period。　　Granted　that　they　learn　to　think　and
  reason　continually　the　more　and　more　fully　for　having　done　so；　will
  common　sense　permit　us　to　suppose　that　they　could　neither　think　nor
  reason　at　all　till　they　could　convey　their　ideas　in　words？
  I　will　return　later　to　the　reason　of　the　lower　animals；　but　will　now
  deal　with　the　question　what　it　is　that　constitutes　language　in　the
  most　comprehensive　sense　that　can　be　properly　attached　to　it。　　I
  have　said　already　that　language　to　be　language　at　all　must　not　only
  convey　fairly　definite　coherent　ideas；　but　must　also　convey　them　to
  another　living　being。　　Whenever　two　living　beings　have　conveyed　and
  received　ideas；　there　has　been　language；　whether　looks　or　gestures
  or　words　spoken　or　written　have　been　the　vehicle　by　means　of　which
  the　ideas　have　travelled。　　Some　ideas　crawl；　some　run；　some　fly；　and
  in　this　case　words　are　the　wings　they　fly　with；　but　they　are　only
  the　wings　of　thought　or　of　ideas；　they　are　not　the　thought　or　ideas
  themselves；　nor　yet；　as　Professor　Max　Muller　would　have　it；
  inseparably　connected　with　them。　　Last　summer　I　was　at　an　inn　in
  Sicily；　where　there　was　a　deaf　and　dumb　waiter；　he　had　been　born　so；
  and　could　neither　write　nor　read。　　What　had　he　to　do　with　words　or
  words　with　him？　　Are　we　to　say；　then；　that　this　most　active；　amiable
  and　intelligent　fellow　could　neither　think　nor　reason？　　One　day　I
  had　had　my　dinner　and　had　left　the　hotel。　　A　friend　came　in；　and　the
  waiter　saw　him　look　for　me　in　the　place　I　generally　occupied。　　He
  instantly　came　up　to　my　friend；　and　moved　his　two　forefingers　in　a
  way　that　suggested　two　people　going　about　together；　this　meant　〃your
  friend〃；　he　then　moved　his　forefingers　horizontally　across　his　eyes；
  this　meant；　〃who　wears　divided　spectacles〃；　he　made　two　fierce　marks
  over　the　sockets　of　his　eyes；　this　meant；　〃with　the　heavy　eyebrows〃；
  he　pulled　his　chin；　and　then　touched　his　white　shirt；　to　say　that　my
  beard　was　white。　　Having　thus　identified　me　as　a　friend　of　the
  person　he　was　speaking　to；　and　as　having　a　white　beard；　heavy
  eyebrows；　and　wearing　divided　spectacles；　he　made　a　munching
  movement　with　his　jaws　to　say　that　I　had　had　my　dinner；　and　finally；
  by　making　two　fingers　imitate　walking　on　the　table；　he　explained
  that　I　had　gone　away。　　My　friend；　however；　wanted　to　know　how　long　I
  had　been　gone；　so　he　pulled　out　his　watch　and　looked　inquiringly。
  The　man　at　once　slapped　himself　on　the　back；　and　held　up　the　five
  fingers　of　one　hand；　to　say　it　was　five　minutes　ago。　　All　this　was
  done　as　rapidly　as　though　it　had　been　said　in　words；　and　my　friend；
  who　knew　the　man　well；　understood　without　a　moment's　hesitation。
  Are　we　to　say　that　this　man　had　no　thought；　nor　reason；　nor
  language；　merely　because　he　had　not　a　single　word　of　any　kind　in　his
  head；　which　I　am　assured　he　had　not；　for；　as　I　have　said；　he　could
  not　speak　with　his　fingers？　　Is　it　possible　to　deny　that　a　dialogue…
  …an　intelligent　conversationhad　passed　between　the　two　men？　　And
  if　conversation；　then　surely　it　is　technical　and　pedantic　to　deny
  that　all　the　essential　elements　of　language　were　present。　　The　signs
  and　tokens　used　by　this　poor　fellow　were　as　rude　an　instrument　of
  expression；　in　comparison　with　ordinary　language；　as　going　on　one's
  hands　and　knees　is　in　comparison　with　walking；　or　as　walking
  compared　with　going　by　train；　but　it　is　as　great　an　abuse　of　words
  to　limit　the　word　〃language〃　to　mere　words　written　or　spoken；　as　it
  would　be　to　limit　the　idea　of　a　locomotive　to　a　railway　engine。
  This　may　indeed　pass　in　ordinary　conversation；　where　so　much　must　be
  suppressed　if　talk　is　to　be　got　through　at　all；　but　it　is
  intolerable　when　we　are　inquiring　about　the　relations　between
  thought　and　words。　　To　do　so　is　to　let　words　become　as　it　were　the
  masters　of　thought；　on　the　ground　that　the　fact　of　their　being　only
  its　servants　and　appendages　is　so　obvious　that　it　is　generally
  allowed　to　go　without　saying。
  If　all　that　Professor　Max　Muller　means　to　say　is；　that　no　animal　but
  man　commands　an　articulate　language；　with　verbs　and　nouns；　or　is
  ever　likely　to　command　one　（and　I　question　whether　in　reality　he
  means　much　more　than　this）；　no　one　will　differ　from　him。　　No　dog　or
  elephant　has　one　word　for　bread；　another　for　meat；　and　another　for
  water。　　Yet；　when　we　watch　a　cat　or　dog　dreaming；　as　they　often
  evidently　do；　can　we　doubt　that　the　dream　is　accompanied　by　a　mental
  image　of　the　thing　that　is　dreamed　of；　much　like　what　we　experience
  in　dreams　ourselves；　and　much　doubtless　like　the　mental　images　which
  must　have　passed　through　the　mind　of　my　deaf　and　dumb　waiter？　　If
  they　have　mental　images　in　sleep；　can　we　doubt　that　waking；　also；
  they　picture　things　before　their　mind's　eyes；　and　see　them　much　as
  we　dotoo　vaguely　indeed　to　admit　of　our　thinking　that　we　actually
  see　the　objects　themselves；　but　definitely　enough　for　us　to　be　able
  to　recognise　the　idea　or　object　of　which　we　are　thinking；　and　to
  connect　it　with　any　other　idea；　object；　or　sign　that　we　may　think
  appropriate？
  Here　we　have　touched　on　the　second　essential　element　of　language。
  We　laid　it　down；　that　its　essence　lay　in　the　communication　of　an
  idea　from　one　intelligent　being　to　another；　but　no　ideas　can　be
  communicated　at　all　except　by　the　aid　of　conventions　to　which　both
  parties　have　agreed　to　attach　an　identical　meaning。　　The　agreement
  may　be　very　informal；　and　may　pass　so　unconsciously　from　one
  generation　to　another　that　its　existence　can　only　be　recognised　by
  the　aid　of　much　introspection；　but　it　will　be　always　there。　　A
  sayer；　a　sayee；　and　a　convention；　no　matter　what；　agreed　upon
  between　them　as　inseparably　attached　to　the　idea　which　it　is
  intended　to　conveythese　comprise　all　the　essentials　of　language。
  Where　these　are　present　there　is　language；　where　any　of　them　are
  wanting　there　is　no　language。　　It　is　not　necessary　for　the　sayee　to
  be　able　to　speak　and　become　a　sayer。　　If　he　comprehends　the　sayer
  that　is　to　say；　if　he　attaches　the　same　meaning　to　a　certain　symbol
  as　the　sayer　doesif　he　is　a　party　to　the　bargain　whereby　it　is
  agreed　upon　by　both　that　any　given　symbol　shall　be　attached
  invariably　to　a　certain　idea；　so　that　in　virtue　of　the　principle　of
  associated　ideas　the　symbol　shall　never　be　present　without
  immediately　carrying　the　idea　along　with　it；　then　all　the　essentials
  of　language　are　complied　with；　and　there　has　been　true　speech　though
  never　a　word　was　spoken。
  The　lower　animals；　therefore；　many　of　them；　possess　a　part　of　our
  own　language；　though　they　cannot　speak　it；　and　hence　do　not　possess
  it　so　fully　as　we　do。　　They　cannot　say　〃bread；〃　〃meat；〃　or　〃water；〃
  but　there　are　many　that　readily　learn　what　ideas　they　ought　to
  attach　to　these　symbols　when　they　are　presented　to　them。　　It　is　idle
  to　say　that　a　cat　does　not　know　what　the　cat's…meat　man　means　when
  he　says　〃meat。〃　　The　cat　knows　just　as　well；　neither　better　nor
  worse　than　the　cat's…meat　man　does；　and　a　great　deal　better　than　I
  myself　understand　much　that　is　said　by　some　very　clever　people　at
  Oxford　or　Cambridge。　　There　is　more　true　employment　of　language；
  more　bona　fide　currency　of　speech；　between　a　sayer　and　a　sayee　who
  understand　each　other；　though　neither　of　them　can　speak　a　word；　than
  between　a　sayer　who　can　speak　with　the　tongues　of　men　and　of　angels
  without　being　clear　about　his　own　meaning；　and　a　sayee　who　can
  himself　utter　the　same　words；　but　who　is　only　in　imperfect　agreement
  with　the　sayer　as　to　the　ideas　which　the　words　or　symbols　that　he
  utters　are　intended　to　convey。　　The　nature　of　the　symbols　counts　for
  nothing；　the　gist　of　the　matter　is　in　the　perfect　harmony　between
  sayer　and　sayee　as　to　the　significance　that　is　to　be　associated　with
  them。
  Professor　Max　Muller　admits　that　we　share　with　the　lower　animals
  what　he　calls　an　emotional　language；　and　continues　that　we　may　call
  their　interjections　and　imitations　language　if　we　like；　as　we　speak
  of　the　language　of　the　eyes　or　the　eloquence　of　mute　nature；　but　he
  warns　us　against　mistaking　metaphor　for　fact。　　It　is　indeed　mere
  metaphor　to　talk　of　the　eloquence　of　mute　nature；　or　the　language　of
  winds　and　waves。　　There　is　no　intercommunion　of　mind　with　mind　by
  means　of　a　covenanted　symbol；　but　it　is　only　an　apparent；　not　a
  real；　metaphor　to　say　that　two　pairs　of　eyes　have　spoken　when　they
  have　signalled　to　one　another　something　which　they　both　understand。
  A　schoolboy　at　home　for　the　holidays　wants　another　plate　of　pudding；
  and　does　not　lik