unwilling　to　go　to　war；　which　is　a　good　and　honourable　thing？
  The　cowards；　he　replied。
  And　what　is　good　and　honourable；　I　said；　is　also　pleasant？
  It　has　certainly　been　acknowledged　to　be　so；　he　replied。
  And　do　the　cowards　knowingly　refuse　to　go　to　the　nobler；　and
  pleasanter；　and　better？
  The　admission　of　that；　he　replied；　would　belie　our　former
  admissions。
  But　does　not　the　courageous　man　also　go　to　meet　the　better；　and
  pleasanter；　and　nobler？
  That　must　be　admitted。
  And　the　courageous　man　has　no　base　fear　or　base　confidence？
  True；　he　replied。
  And　if　not　base；　then　honourable？
  He　admitted　this。
  And　if　honourable；　then　good？
  Yes。
  But　the　fear　and　confidence　of　the　coward　or　foolhardy　or　madman；　on
  the　contrary；　are　base？
  He　assented。
  And　these　base　fears　and　confidences　originate　in　ignorance　and
  uninstructedness？
  True；　he　said。
  Then　as　to　the　motive　from　which　the　cowards　act；　do　you　call　it
  cowardice　or　courage？
  I　should　say　cowardice；　he　replied。
  And　have　they　not　been　shown　to　be　cowards　through　their　ignorance
  of　dangers？
  Assuredly；　he　said。
  And　because　of　that　ignorance　they　are　cowards？
  He　assented。
  And　the　reason　why　they　are　cowards　is　admitted　by　you　to　be
  cowardice？
  He　again　assented。
  Then　the　ignorance　of　what　is　and　is　not　dangerous　is　cowardice？
  He　nodded　assent。
  But　surely　courage；　I　said；　is　opposed　to　cowardice？
  Yes。
  Then　the　wisdom　which　knows　what　are　and　are　not　dangers　is
  opposed　to　the　ignorance　of　them？
  To　that　again　he　nodded　assent。
  And　the　ignorance　of　them　is　cowardice？
  To　that　he　very　reluctantly　nodded　assent。
  And　the　knowledge　of　that　which　is　and　is　not　dangerous　is
  courage；　and　is　opposed　to　the　ignorance　of　these　things？
  At　this　point　he　would　no　longer　nod　assent；　but　was　silent。
  And　why；　I　said；　do　you　neither　assent　nor　dissent；　Protagoras？
  Finish　the　argument　by　yourself；　he　said。
  I　only　want　to　ask　one　more　question；　I　said。　I　want　to　know　whether
  you　still　think　that　there　are　men　who　are　most　ignorant　and　yet
  most　courageous？
  You　seem　to　have　a　great　ambition　to　make　me　answer；　Socrates；　and
  therefore　I　will　gratify　you；　and　say；　that　this　appears　to　me　to　be
  impossible　consistently　with　the　argument。
  My　only　object；　I　said；　in　continuing　the　discussion；　has　been　the
  desire　to　ascertain　the　nature　and　relations　of　virtue；　for　if　this
  were　clear；　I　am　very　sure　that　the　other　controversy　which　has　been
  carried　on　at　great　length　by　both　of　us…you　affirming　and　I　denying
  that　virtue　can　be　taught…would　also　become　clear。　The　result　of　our
  discussion　appears　to　me　to　be　singular。　For　if　the　argument　had　a
  human　voice；　that　voice　would　be　heard　laughing　at　us　and　saying：
  〃Protagoras　and　Socrates；　you　are　strange　beings；　there　are　you；
  Socrates；　who　were　saying　that　virtue　cannot　be　taught；
  contradicting　yourself　now　by　your　attempt　to　prove　that　all　things
  are　knowledge；　including　justice；　and　temperance；　and　courage；…which
  tends　to　show　that　virtue　can　certainly　be　taught；　for　if　virtue
  were　other　than　knowledge；　as　Protagoras　attempted　to　prove；　then
  clearly　virtue　cannot　be　taught；　but　if　virtue　is　entirely
  knowledge；　as　you　are　seeking　to　show；　then　I　cannot　but　suppose
  that　virtue　is　capable　of　being　taught。　Protagoras；　on　the　other　hand；
  who　started　by　saying　that　it　might　be　taught；　is　now　eager　to　prove
  it　to　be　anything　rather　than　knowledge；　and　if　this　is　true；　it
  must　be　quite　incapable　of　being　taught。〃　Now　I；　Protagoras；
  perceiving　this　terrible　confusion　of　our　ideas；　have　a　great　desire
  that　they　should　be　cleared　up。　And　I　should　like　to　carry　on　the
  discussion　until　we　ascertain　what　virtue　is；　whether　capable　of　being
  taught　or　not；　lest　haply　Epimetheus　should　trip　us　up　and　deceive
  us　in　the　argument；　as　he　forgot　us　in　the　story；　I　prefer　your
  Prometheus　to　your　Epimetheus；　for　of　him　I　make　use；　whenever　I　am
  busy　about　these　questions；　in　Promethean　care　of　my　own　life。　And
  if　you　have　no　objection；　as　I　said　at　first；　I　should　like　to　have
  your　help　in　the　enquiry。
  Protagoras　replied：　Socrates；　I　am　not　of　a　base　nature；　and　I　am
  the　last　man　in　the　world　to　be　envious。　I　cannot　but　applaud　your
  energy　and　your　conduct　of　an　argument。　As　I　have　often　said；　I　admire
  you　above　all　men　whom　I　know；　and　far　above　all　men　of　your　age；
  and　I　believe　that　you　will　become　very　eminent　in　philosophy。　Let
  us　come　back　to　the　subject　at　some　future　time；　at　present　we　had
  better　turn　to　something　else。
  By　all　means；　I　said；　if　that　is　your　wish；　for　I　too　ought　long
  since　to　have　kept　the　engagement　of　which　I　spoke　before；　and　only
  tarried　because　I　could　not　refuse　the　request　of　the　noble　Callias。
  So　the　conversation　ended；　and　we　went　our　way。
  …THE　END…
  。