as　a　genus　neither　of　the　primary　genera…　since　the　unity　of　Being　is　as　much　a　plurality　as　a　unity；　and　none　of　the　other　＇primary＇　genera　is　a　unity　to　the　entire　exclusion　of　plurality…　nor　of　things　posterior　to　Being；　for　these　most　certainly　are　a　plurality。　In　fact；　no　genus　with　all　its　items　can　be　a　unity；　so　that　unity　to　become　a　genus　must　forfeit　its　unity。　The　unit　is　prior　to　number；　yet　number　it　must　be；　if　it　is　to　be　a　genus。　　　　　Again；　the　unit　is　a　unit　from　the　point　of　view　of　number：　if　it　is　a　unit　generically；　it　will　not　be　a　unit　in　the　strict　sense。　　　　　Again；　just　as　the　unit；　appearing　in　numbers；　not　regarded　as　a　genus　predicated　of　them；　but　is　thought　of　as　inherent　in　them；　so　also　unity；　though　present　in　Being；　cannot　stand　as　genus　to　Being　or　to　the　other　genera　or　to　anything　whatever。　　　　　Further；　as　the　simplex　must　be　the　principle　of　the　non…simplex；　though　not　its　genus…　for　then　the　non…simplex　too　would　be　simplex；…　so　it　stands　with　unity；　if　unity　is　a　Principle；　it　cannot　be　a　genus　to　its　subsequents；　and　therefore　cannot　be　a　genus　of　Being　or　of　other　things。　If　it　is　nevertheless　to　be　a　genus；　everything　of　which　it　is　a　genus　must　be　taken　as　a　unit…　a　notion　which　implies　the　separation　of　unity　from　substance：　it　will　not；　therefore；　be　all…embracing。　just　as　Being　is　not　a　genus　of　everything　but　only　of　species　each　of　which　is　a　being；　so　too　unity　will　be　a　genus　of　species　each　of　which　is　a　unity。　But　that　raises　the　question　of　what　difference　there　is　between　one　thing　and　another　in　so　far　as　they　are　both　units；　corresponding　to　the　difference　between　one　being　and　another。　　　　　Unity；　it　may　be　suggested；　is　divided　in　its　conjunction　with　Being　and　Substance；　Being　because　it　is　so　divided　is　considered　a　genus…　the　one　genus　manifested　in　many　particulars；　why　then　should　not　unity　be　similarly　a　genus；　inasmuch　as　its　manifestations　are　as　many　as　those　of　Substance　and　it　is　divided　into　as　many　particulars？　　　　　In　the　first　place；　the　mere　fact　that　an　entity　inheres　in　many　things　is　not　enough　to　make　it　a　genus　of　those　things　or　of　anything　else：　in　a　word；　a　common　property　need　not　be　a　genus。　The　point　inherent　in　a　line　is　not　a　genus　of　lines；　or　a　genus　at　all；　nor　again；　as　we　have　observed；　is　the　unity　latent　in　numbers　a　genus　either　of　the　numbers　or　of　anything　else：　genus　demands　that　the　common　property　of　diverse　objects　involve　also　differences　arising　out　of　its　own　character；　that　it　form　species；　and　that　it　belong　to　the　essence　of　the　objects。　But　what　differences　can　there　be　in　unity？　What　species　does　it　engender？　If　it　produces　the　same　species　as　we　find　in　connection　with　Being；　it　must　be　identical　with　Being：　only　the　name　will　differ；　and　the　term　Being　may　well　suffice。　　　　　11。　We　are　bound　however　to　enquire　under　what　mode　unity　is　contained　in　Being。　How　is　what　is　termed　the　〃dividing〃　effected…　especially　the　dividing　of　the　genera　Being　and　unity？　Is　it　the　same　division；　or　is　it　different　in　the　two　cases？　　　　　First　then：　In　what　sense；　precisely；　is　any　given　particular　called　and　known　to　be　a　unity？　Secondly：　Does　unity　as　used　of　Being　carry　the　same　connotation　as　in　reference　to　the　Absolute？　　　　　Unity　is　not　identical　in　all　things；　it　has　a　different　significance　according　as　it　is　applied　to　the　Sensible　and　the　Intellectual　realms…　Being　too；　of　course；　comports　such　a　difference…　and　there　is　a　difference　in　the　unity　affirmed　among　sensible　things　as　compared　with　each　other；　the　unity　is　not　the　same　in　the　cases　of　chorus；　camp；　ship；　house；　there　is　a　difference　again　as　between　such　discrete　things　and　the　continuous。　Nevertheless；　all　are　representations　of　the　one　exemplar；　some　quite　remote；　others　more　effective：　the　truer　likeness　is　in　the　Intellectual；　Soul　is　a　unity；　and　still　more　is　Intellect　a　unity　and　Being　a　unity。　　　　　When　we　predicate　Being　of　a　particular；　do　we　thereby　predicate　of　it　unity；　and　does　the　degree　of　its　unity　tally　with　that　of　its　being？　Such　correspondence　is　accidental：　unity　is　not　proportionate　to　Being；　less　unity　need　not　mean　less　Being。　An　army　or　a　choir　has　no　less　Being　than　a　house；　though　less　unity。　　　　　It　would　appear；　then；　that　the　unity　of　a　particular　is　related　not　so　much　to　Being　as　to　a　standard　of　perfection：　in　so　far　as　the　particular　attains　perfection；　so　far　it　is　a　unity；　and　the　degree　of　unity　depends　on　this　attainment。　The　particular　aspires　not　simply　to　Being；　but　to　Being…in…perfection：　it　is　in　this　strain　towards　their　perfection　that　such　beings　as　do　not　possess　unity　strive　their　utmost　to　achieve　it。　　　　　Things　of　nature　tend　by　their　very　nature　to　coalesce　with　each　other　and　also　to　unify　each　within　itself；　their　movement　is　not　away　from　but　towards　each　other　and　inwards　upon　themselves。　Souls；　moreover；　seem　to　desire　always　to　pass　into　a　unity　over　and　above　the　unity　of　their　own　substance。　Unity　in　fact　confronts　them　on　two　sides：　their　origin　and　their　goal　alike　are　unity；　from　unity　they　have　arisen；　and　towards　unity　they　strive。　Unity　is　thus　identical　with　Goodness　＇is　the　universal　standard　of　perfection＇；　for　no　being　ever　came　into　existence　without　possessing；　from　that　very　moment；　an　irresistible　tendency　towards　unity。　　　　　From　natural　things　we　turn　to　the　artificial。　Every　art　in　all　its　operation　aims　at　whatsoever　unity　its　capacity　and　its　models　permit；　though　Being　most　achieves　unity　since　it　is　closer　at　the　start。　　　　　That　is　why　in　speaking　of　other　entities　we　assert　the　name　only；　for　example　man；　when　we　say　〃one　man；〃　we　have　in　mind　more　than　one；　and　if　we　affirm　unity　of　him　in　any　other　connection；　we　regard　it　as　supplementary　＇to　his　essence＇：　but　when　we　speak　of　Being　as　a　whole　we　say　it　is　one　Being　without　presuming　that　it　is　anything　but　a　unity；　we　thereby　show　its　close　association　with　Goodness。　　　　　Thus　for　Being；　as　for　the　others；　unity　turns　out　to　be；　in　some　sense；　Principle　and　Term；　not　however　in　the　same　sense　as　for　things　of　the　physical　order…　a　discrepancy　leading　us　to　infer　that　even　in　unity　there　are　degrees　of　priority。　　　　　How；　then；　do　we　characterize　the　unity　＇thus　diverse＇　in　Being？　Are　we　to　think　of　it　as　a　common　property　seen　alike　in　all　its　parts？　In　the　first　place；　the　point　is　common　to　lines　and　yet　is　not　their　genus；　and　this　unity　we　are　considering　may　also　be　common　to　numbers　and　not　be　their　genus…　though；　we　need　hardly　say；　the　unity　of　Unity…Absolute　is　not　that　of　the　numbers；　one；　two　and　the　rest。　Secondly；　in　Being　there　is　nothing　to　prevent　the　existence　of　prior　and　posterior；　simple　and　composite：　but　unity；　even　if　it　be　identical　in　all　the　manifestations　of　Being；　having　no　differentiae　can　produce　no　species；　but　producing　no　species　it　cannot　be　a　genus。　　　　　12。　Enough　upon　that　side　of　the　question。　But　how　does　the　perfection　＇goodness＇　of　numbers；　lifeless　things；　depend　upon　their　particular　unity？　Just　as　all　other　inanimates　find　their　perfection　in　their　unity。　　　　　If　it　should　be　objected　that　numbers　are　simply　non…existent；　we　should　point　out　that　our　discussion　is　concerned　＇not　with　units　as　such；　but＇　with　beings　considered　from　the　aspect　of　their　unity。　　　　　We　may　again　be　asked　how　the　point…　supposing　its　independent　existence　granted…　participates　in　perfection。　If　the　point　is　chosen　as　an　inanimate　object；　the　question　applies　to　all　such　objects：　but　perfection　does　exist　in　such　things；　for　example　in　a　circle：　the　perfection　of　the　circle　will　be　perfection　for　the　point；　it　will　aspire　to　this　perfection　and　strive　to　attain　it；　as　far　as　it　can；　through　the　circle。　　　　　But　how　are　the　five　genera　to　be　regarded？　Do　they　form　particulars　by　being　broken　up　into　parts？　No；　the　genus　exists　as　a　whole　in　each　of　the　things　whose　genus　it　is。　　　　　But　how；　at　that；　can　it　remain　a　unity？　The　unity　of　a　genus　must　be　considered　as　a　whole…in…many。　　　　　Does　it　exist　then　only　in　the　things　participating　in　it？　No；　it　has　an　independent　existence　of　its　own　as　well。　But　this　will；　no　doubt；　become　clearer　as　we　proceed。　　　　　13。　We　turn　to　ask　why　Quantity　is　not　included　among　the　primary　genera；　and　Quality　also。　　　　　Quantity　is　not　among　the　primaries；　because　these　are　permanently　associated　with　Being。　Motion　is　bound　up　with　Actual　Being　＇Being…in…Act＇；　since　it　is　its　life；　with　Motion；　Stability　too　gained　its　foothold　in　Reality；　with　these　are　associated　Difference　and　Identity；　so　that　they　also　are　seen　in　conjunction　with　Being。　But　number　＇the　basis　of　Quantity＇　is　a　posterior。　It　is　posterior　not　only　with　regard　to　these　genera　but　also　within　itself；　in　number　the　posterior　is　divided　from　the　prior；　this　is　a　sequence　in　which　the　posteriors　are　latent　in　the　priors　＇and　do　not　appear　simultaneously＇。　Number　therefore　cannot　be　included　among　the　primary　genera；　whether　it　constitutes　a　genus　at　all　remains　to　be　examined。　　　　　Magnitude　＇extended　quantity＇　is　in　a　still　higher　degree　posterior　and　composite；　for　it　contains　within　itself　number；　line　and　surface。　Now　if　continuous　magnitude　derives　its　quantity　from　number；　and　number　is　not　a　genus；　how　can　magnitude　hold　that　status