auty　or　health　of　soul　or　body；　very　well：　but　surely　not　ugliness；　disease；　weakness；　incapacity。　In　a　word；　is　powerlessness　a　power？　　　　　It　may　be　urged　that　these　are　qualities　in　so　far　as　qualia　are　also　named　after　them：　but　may　not　the　qualia　be　so　called　by　analogy；　and　not　in　the　strict　sense　of　the　single　principle？　Not　only　may　the　term　be　understood　in　the　four　ways　＇of　Aristotle＇；　but　each　of　the　four　may　have　at　least　a　twofold　significance。　　　　　In　the　first　place；　Quality　is　not　merely　a　question　of　action　and　passion；　involving　a　simple　distinction　between　the　potentially　active　＇quality＇　and　the　passive：　health；　disposition　and　habit；　disease；　strength　and　weakness　are　also　classed　as　qualities。　It　follows　that　the　common　ground　is　not　power；　but　something　we　have　still　to　seek。　　　　　Again；　not　all　qualities　can　be　regarded　as　Reason…Principles：　chronic　disease　cannot　be　a　Reason…Principle。　Perhaps；　however；　we　must　speak　in　such　cases　of　privations；　restricting　the　term　〃Quantities〃　to　Ideal…Forms　and　powers。　Thus　we　shall　have；　not　a　single　genus；　but　reference　only　to　the　unity　of　a　category。　Knowledge　will　be　regarded　as　a　Form　and　a　power；　ignorance　as　a　privation　and　powerlessness。　　　　　On　the　other　hand；　powerlessness　and　disease　are　a　kind　of　Form；　disease　and　vice　have　many　powers　though　looking　to　evil。　　　　　But　how　can　a　mere　failure　be　a　power？　Doubtless　the　truth　is　that　every　quality　performs　its　own　function　independently　of　a　standard；　for　in　no　case　could　it　produce　an　effect　outside　of　its　power。　　　　　Even　beauty　would　seem　to　have　a　power　of　its　own。　Does　this　apply　to　triangularity？　　　　　Perhaps；　after　all；　it　is　not　a　power　we　must　consider；　but　a　disposition。　Thus；　qualities　will　be　determined　by　the　forms　and　characteristics　of　the　object　qualified：　their　common　element；　then；　will　be　Form　and　ideal　type；　imposed　upon　Substance　and　posterior　to　it。　　　　　But　then；　how　do　we　account　for　the　powers？　We　may　doubtless　remark　that　even　the　natural　boxer　is　so　by　being　constituted　in　a　particular　way；　similarly；　with　the　man　unable　to　box：　to　generalize；　the　quality　is　a　characteristic　non…essential。　Whatever　is　seen　to　apply　alike　to　Being　and　to　non…Being；　as　do　heat　and　whiteness　and　colours　generally；　is　either　different　from　Being…　is；　for　example；　an　Act　of　Being…　or　else　is　some　secondary　of　Being；　derived　from　it；　contained　in　it；　its　image　and　likeness。　　　　　But　if　Quality　is　determined　by　formation　and　characteristic　and　Reason…Principle；　how　explain　the　various　cases　of　powerlessness　and　deformity？　Doubtless　we　must　think　of　Principles　imperfectly　present；　as　in　the　case　of　deformity。　And　disease…　how　does　that　imply　a　Reason…Principle？　Here；　no　doubt；　we　must　think　of　a　principle　disturbed；　the　Principle　of　health。　　　　　But　it　is　not　necessary　that　all　qualities　involve　a　Reason…Principle；　it　suffices　that　over　and　above　the　various　kinds　of　disposition　there　exist　a　common　element　distinct　from　Substance；　and　it　is　what　comes　after　the　substance　that　constitutes　Quality　in　an　object。　　　　　But　triangularity　is　a　quality　of　that　in　which　it　is　present；　it　is　however　no　longer　triangularity　as　such；　but　the　triangularity　present　in　that　definite　object　and　modified　in　proportion　to　its　success　in　shaping　that　object。　　　　　11。　But　if　these　considerations　are　sound；　why　has　Quality　more　than　one　species？　What　is　the　ground　for　distinguishing　between　habit　and　disposition；　seeing　that　no　differentia　of　Quality　is　involved　in　permanence　and　non…permanence？　A　disposition　of　any　kind　is　sufficient　to　constitute　a　quality；　permanence　is　a　mere　external　addition。　It　might　however　be　urged　that　dispositions　are　but　incomplete　〃forms〃…　if　the　term　may　pass…　habits　being　complete　ones。　But　incomplete；　they　are　not　qualities；　if　already　qualities；　the　permanence　is　an　external　addition。　　　　　How　do　physical　powers　form　a　distinct　species？　If　they　are　classed　as　qualities　in　virtue　of　being　powers；　power；　we　have　seen；　is　not　a　necessary　concomitant　of　qualities。　If；　however；　we　hold　that　the　natural　boxer　owes　his　quality　to　a　particular　disposition；　power　is　something　added　and　does　not　contribute　to　the　quality；　since　power　is　found　in　habits　also。　　　　　Another　point：　why　is　natural　ability　to　be　distinguished　from　that　acquired　by　learning？　Surely；　if　both　are　qualities；　they　cannot　be　differentiae　of　Quality：　gained　by　practice　or　given　in　nature；　it　is　the　same　ability；　the　differentia　will　be　external　to　Quality；　it　cannot　be　deduced　from　the　Ideal　Form　of　boxing。　Whether　some　qualities　as　distinguished　from　others　are　derived　from　experience　is　immaterial；　the　source　of　the　quality　makes　no　difference…　none；　I　mean；　pointing　to　variations　and　differences　of　Quality。　　　　　A　further　question　would　seem　to　be　involved：　If　certain　qualities　are　derived　from　experience　but　here　is　a　discrepancy　in　the　manner　and　source　of　the　experience；　how　are　they　to　be　included　in　the　same　species？　And　again；　if　some　create　the　experience；　others　are　created　by　it；　the　term　Quality　as　applied　to　both　classes　will　be　equivocal。　　　　　And　what　part　is　played　by　the　individual　form？　If　it　constitutes　the　individual's　specific　character；　it　is　not　a　quality；　if；　however；　it　is　what　makes　an　object　beautiful　or　ugly　after　the　specific　form　has　been　determined；　then　it　involves　a　Reason…Principle。　　　　　Rough　and　smooth；　tenuous　and　dense　may　rightly　be　classed　as　qualities。　It　is　true　that　they　are　not　determined　by　distances　and　approximations；　or　in　general　by　even　or　uneven　dispositions；　of　parts；　though；　were　they　so　determined；　they　might　well　even　then　be　qualities。　　　　　Knowledge　of　the　meaning　of　〃light〃　and　〃heavy〃　will　reveal　their　place　in　the　classification。　An　ambiguity　will　however　be　latent　in　the　term　〃light；〃　unless　it　be　determined　by　comparative　weight：　it　would　then　implicate　leanness　and　fineness；　and　involve　another　species　distinct　from　the　four　＇of　Aristotle＇。　　　　　12。　If　then　we　do　not　propose　to　divide　Quality　in　this　＇fourfold＇　manner；　what　basis　of　division　have　we？　　　　　We　must　examine　whether　qualities　may　not　prove　to　be　divisible　on　the　principle　that　some　belong　to　the　body　and　others　to　the　soul。　Those　of　the　body　would　be　subdivided　according　to　the　senses；　some　being　attributed　to　sight；　others　to　hearing　and　taste；　others　to　smell　and　touch。　Those　of　the　soul　would　presumably　be　allotted　to　appetite；　emotion；　reason；　though；　again；　they　may　be　distinguished　by　the　differences　of　the　activities　they　condition；　in　so　far　as　activities　are　engendered　by　these　qualities；　or　according　as　they　are　beneficial　or　injurious；　the　benefits　and　injuries　being　duly　classified。　This　last　is　applicable　also　to　the　classification　of　bodily　qualities；　which　also　produce　differences　of　benefit　and　injury：　these　differences　must　be　regarded　as　distinctively　qualitative；　for　either　the　benefit　and　injury　are　held　to　be　derived　from　Quality　and　the　quale；　or　else　some　other　explanation　must　be　found　for　them。　　　　　A　point　for　consideration　is　how　the　quale；　as　conditioned　by　Quality；　can　belong　to　the　same　category：　obviously　there　can　be　no　single　genus　embracing　both。　　　　　Further；　if　〃boxer〃　is　in　the　category　of　Quality；　why　not　〃agent〃　as　well？　And　with　agent　goes　〃active。〃　Thus　〃active〃　need　not　go　into　the　category　of　Relation；　nor　again　need　〃passive；〃　if　〃patient〃　is　a　quale。　Moreover；　agent〃　is　perhaps　better　assigned　to　the　category　of　Quality　for　the　reason　that　the　term　implies　power；　and　power　is　Quality。　But　if　power　as　such　were　determined　by　Substance　＇and　not　by　Quality＇；　the　agent；　though　ceasing　to　be　a　quale；　would　not　necessarily　become　a　relative。　Besides；　〃active〃　is　not　like　〃greater〃：　the　greater；　to　be　the　greater；　demands　a　less；　whereas　〃active〃　stands　complete　by　the　mere　possession　of　its　specific　character。　　　　　It　may　however　be　urged　that　while　the　possession　of　that　character　makes　it　a　quale；　it　is　a　relative　in　so　far　as　it　directs　upon　an　external　object　the　power　indicated　by　its　name。　Why；　then；　is　not　〃boxer〃　a　relative；　and　〃boxing〃　as　well？　Boxing　is　entirely　related　to　an　external　object；　its　whole　theory　pre…supposes　this　external。　And　in　the　case　of　the　other　arts…　or　most　of　them…　investigation　would　probably　warrant　the　assertion　that　in　so　far　as　they　affect　the　soul　they　are　qualities；　while　in　so　far　as　they　look　outward　they　are　active　and　as　being　directed　to　an　external　object　are　relatives。　They　are　relatives　in　the　other　sense　also　that　they　are　thought　of　as　habits。　　　　　Can　it　then　be　held　that　there　is　any　distinct　reality　implied　in　activity；　seeing　that　the　active　is　something　distinct　only　according　as　it　is　a　quale？　It　may　perhaps　be　held　that　the　tendency　towards　action　of　living　beings；　and　especially　of　those　having　freewill；　implies　a　reality　of　activity　＇as　well　as　a　reality　of　Quality＇。　　　　　But　what　is　the　function　of　the　active　in　connection　with　those　non…living　powers　which　we　have　classed　as　qualities？　Doubtless　to　recruit　any　object　it　encounters；　making　the　object　a　participant　in　its　content。　　　　　But　if　one　same　object　both　acts　and　is　acted　upon；　how　do　we　then　explain　the　active？　Observe　also　that　the　greater…　in　itself　perhaps　a　fixed　three　yards'　lengt