But　as　we　descend　towards　the　South；　to　those　States　in　which　the　constitution　of　society　is　more　modern　and　less　strong；　where　instruction　is　less　general；　and　where　the　principles　of　morality；　of　religion；　and　of　liberty　are　less　happily　combined；　we　perceive　that　the　talents　and　the　virtues　of　those　who　are　in　authority　become　more　and　more　rare。
  Lastly；　when　we　arrive　at　the　new　South…western　States；　in　which　the　constitution　of　society　dates　but　from　yesterday；　and　presents　an　agglomeration　of　adventurers　and　speculators；　we　are　amazed　at　the　persons　who　are　invested　with　public　authority；　and　we　are　led　to　ask　by　what　force；　independent　of　the　legislation　and　of　the　men　who　direct　it；　the　State　can　be　protected；　and　society　be　made　to　flourish。
  There　are　certain　laws　of　a　democratic　nature　which　contribute；　nevertheless；　to　correct；　in　some　measure；　the　dangerous　tendencies　of　democracy。　　On　entering　the　House　of　Representatives　of　Washington　one　is　struck　by　the　vulgar　demeanor　of　that　great　assembly。　　The　eye　frequently　does　not　discover　a　man　of　celebrity　within　its　walls。　　Its　members　are　almost　all　obscure　individuals　whose　names　present　no　associations　to　the　mind：　they　are　mostly　village　lawyers；　men　in　trade；　or　even　persons　belonging　to　the　lower　classes　of　society。　　In　a　country　in　which　education　is　very　general；　it　is　said　that　the　representatives　of　the　people　do　not　always　know　how　to　write　correctly。
  At　a　few　yards'　distance　from　this　spot　is　the　door　of　the　Senate；　which　contains　within　a　small　space　a　large　proportion　of　the　celebrated　men　of　America。　　Scarcely　an　individual　is　to　be　perceived　in　it　who　does　not　recall　the　idea　of　an　active　and　illustrious　career：　the　Senate　is　composed　of　eloquent　advocates；　distinguished　generals；　wise　magistrates；　and　statesmen　of　note；　whose　language　would　at　all　times　do　honor　to　the　most　remarkable　parliamentary　debates　of　Europe。
  What　then　is　the　cause　of　this　strange　contrast；　and　why　are　the　most　able　citizens　to　be　found　in　one　assembly　rather　than　in　the　other？　　Why　is　the　former　body　remarkable　for　its　vulgarity　and　its　poverty　of　talent；　whilst　the　latter　seems　to　enjoy　a　monopoly　of　intelligence　and　of　sound　judgment？　Both　of　these　assemblies　emanate　from　the　people；　both　of　them　are　chosen　by　universal　suffrage；　and　no　voice　has　hitherto　been　heard　to　assert　in　America　that　the　Senate　is　hostile　to　the　interests　of　the　people。　　From　what　cause；　then；　does　so　startling　a　difference　arise？　　The　only　reason　which　appears　to　me　adequately　to　account　for　it　is；　that　the　House　of　Representatives　is　elected　by　the　populace　directly；　and　that　the　Senate　is　elected　by　elected　bodies。　　The　whole　body　of　the　citizens　names　the　legislature　of　each　State；　and　the　Federal　Constitution　converts　these　legislatures　into　so　many　electoral　bodies；　which　return　the　members　of　the　Senate。　　The　senators　are　elected　by　an　indirect　application　of　universal　suffrage；　for　the　legislatures　which　name　them　are　not　aristocratic　or　privileged　bodies　which　exercise　the　electoral　franchise　in　their　own　right；　but　they　are　chosen　by　the　totality　of　the　citizens；　they　are　generally　elected　every　year；　and　new　members　may　constantly　be　chosen　who　will　employ　their　electoral　rights　in　conformity　with　the　wishes　of　the　public。　　But　this　transmission　of　the　popular　authority　through　an　assembly　of　chosen　men　operates　an　important　change　in　it；　by　refining　its　discretion　and　improving　the　forms　which　it　adopts。　　Men　who　are　chosen　in　this　manner　accurately　represent　the　majority　of　the　nation　which　governs　them；　but　they　represent　the　elevated　thoughts　which　are　current　in　the　community；　the　propensities　which　prompt　its　nobler　actions；　rather　than　the　petty　passions　which　disturb　or　the　vices　which　disgrace　it。
  The　time　may　be　already　anticipated　at　which　the　American　Republics　will　be　obliged　to　introduce　the　plan　of　election　by　an　elected　body　more　frequently　into　their　system　of　representation；　or　they　will　incur　no　small　risk　of　perishing　miserably　amongst　the　shoals　of　democracy。
  And　here　I　have　no　scruple　in　confessing　that　I　look　upon　this　peculiar　system　of　election　as　the　only　means　of　bringing　the　exercise　of　political　power　to　the　level　of　all　classes　of　the　people。　　Those　thinkers　who　regard　this　institution　as　the　exclusive　weapon　of　a　party；　and　those　who　fear；　on　the　other　hand；　to　make　use　of　it；　seem　to　me　to　fall　into　as　great　an　error　in　the　one　case　as　in　the　other。
  Influence　Which　The　American　Democracy　Has　Exercised　On　The　Laws　Relating　To　Elections
  When　elections　are　rare；　they　expose　the　State　to　a　violent　crisis　…　When　they　are　frequent；　they　keep　up　a　degree　of　feverish　excitement　…　The　Americans　have　preferred　the　second　of　these　two　evils　…　Mutability　of　the　laws　…Opinions　of　Hamilton　and　Jefferson　on　this　subject。
  When　elections　recur　at　long　intervals　the　State　is　exposed　to　violent　agitation　every　time　they　take　place。　　Parties　exert　themselves　to　the　utmost　in　order　to　gain　a　prize　which　is　so　rarely　within　their　reach；　and　as　the　evil　is　almost　irremediable　for　the　candidates　who　fail；　the　consequences　of　their　disappointed　ambition　may　prove　most　disastrous；　if；　on　the　other　hand；　the　legal　struggle　can　be　repeated　within　a　short　space　of　time；　the　defeated　parties　take　patience。　　When　elections　occur　frequently；　their　recurrence　keeps　society　in　a　perpetual　state　of　feverish　excitement；　and　imparts　a　continual　instability　to　public　affairs。
  Thus；　on　the　one　hand　the　State　is　exposed　to　the　perils　of　a　revolution；　on　the　other　to　perpetual　mutability；　the　former　system　threatens　the　very　existence　of　the　Government；　the　latter　is　an　obstacle　to　all　steady　and　consistent　policy。　　The　Americans　have　preferred　the　second　of　these　evils　to　the　first；　but　they　were　led　to　this　conclusion　by　their　instinct　much　more　than　by　their　reason；　for　a　taste　for　variety　is　one　of　the　characteristic　passions　of　democracy。　　An　extraordinary　mutability　has；　by　this　means；　been　introduced　into　their　legislation。　　Many　of　the　Americans　consider　the　instability　of　their　laws　as　a　necessary　consequence　of　a　system　whose　general　results　are　beneficial。　　But　no　one　in　the　United　States　affects　to　deny　the　fact　of　this　instability；　or　to　contend　that　it　is　not　a　great　evil。
  Hamilton；　after　having　demonstrated　the　utility　of　a　power　which　might　prevent；　or　which　might　at　least　impede；　the　promulgation　of　bad　laws；　adds：　〃It　might　perhaps　be　said　that　the　power　of　preventing　bad　laws　includes　that　of　preventing　good　ones；　and　may　be　used　to　the　one　purpose　as　well　as　to　the　other。　　But　this　objection　will　have　little　weight　with　those　who　can　properly　estimate　the　mischiefs　of　that　inconstancy　and　mutability　in　the　laws　which　form　the　greatest　blemish　in　the　character　and　genius　of　our　governments。〃　（Federalist；　No。　73。）　And　again　in　No。　62　of　the　same　work　he　observes：　〃The　facility　and　excess　of　law…making　seem　to　be　the　diseases　to　which　our　governments　are　most　liable。　。　。　。　The　mischievous　effects　of　the　mutability　in　the　public　councils　arising　from　a　rapid　succession　of　new　members　would　fill　a　volume：　every　new　election　in　the　States　is　found　to　change　one…half　of　the　representatives。　　From　this　change　of　men　must　proceed　a　change　of　opinions　and　of　measures；　which　forfeits　the　respect　and　confidence　of　other　nations；　poisons　the　blessings　of　liberty　itself；　and　diminishes　the　attachment　and　reverence　of　the　people　toward　a　political　system　which　betrays　so　many　marks　of　infirmity。〃
  Jefferson　himself；　the　greatest　Democrat　whom　the　democracy　of　America　has　yet　produced；　pointed　out　the　same　evils。　　〃The　instability　of　our　laws；〃　said　he　in　a　letter　to　Madison；　〃is　really　a　very　serious　inconvenience。　　I　think　that　we　ought　to　have　obviated　it　by　deciding　that　a　whole　year　should　always　be　allowed　to　elapse　between　the　bringing　in　of　a　bill　and　the　final　passing　of　it。　　It　should　afterward　be　discussed　and　put　to　the　vote　without　the　possibility　of　making　any　alteration　in　it；　and　if　the　circumstances　of　the　case　required　a　more　speedy　decision；　the　question　should　not　be　decided　by　a　simple　majority；　but　by　a　majority　of　at　least　two…thirds　of　both　houses。〃
  Public　Officers　Under　The　Control　Of　The　Democracy　In　America　　Simple　exterior　of　the　American　public　officers　…　No　official　costume　…　All　public　officers　are　remunerated　…　Political　consequences　of　this　system　…　No　public　career　exists　in　America　…　Result　of　this。
  Public　officers　in　the　United　States　are　commingled　with　the　crowd　of　citizens；　they　have　neither　palaces；　nor　guards；　nor　ceremonial　costumes。　This　simple　exterior　of　the　persons　in　authority　is　connected　not　only　with　the　peculiarities　of　the　American　character；　but　with　the　fundamental　principles　of　that　society。　　In　the　estimation　of　the　democracy　a　government　is　not　a　benefit；　but　a　necessary　evil。　　A　certain　degree　of　power　must　be　granted　to　public　officers；　for　they　would　be　of　no　use　without　it。　　But　the　ostensible　semblance　of　authority　is　by　no　means　indispensable　to　the　conduct　of　affairs；　and　it　is　needlessly　offensive　to　the　susceptibility　of　the　public。　　The　public　officers　themselves　are　well　aware　that　they　only