supposes　in　the　people　whom　it　is　meant　to　govern。　　The　government　of　the　Union　depends　entirely　upon　legal　fictions；　the　Union　is　an　ideal　nation　which　only　exists　in　the　mind；　and　whose　limits　and　extent　can　only　be　discerned　by　the　understanding。
  When　once　the　general　theory　is　comprehended；　numberless　difficulties　remain　to　be　solved　in　its　application；　for　the　sovereignty　of　the　Union　is　so　involved　in　that　of　the　States　that　it　is　impossible　to　distinguish　its　boundaries　at　the　first　glance。　　The　whole　structure　of　the　Government　is　artificial　and　conventional；　and　it　would　be　ill　adapted　to　a　people　which　has　not　been　long　accustomed　to　conduct　its　own　affairs；　or　to　one　in　which　the　science　of　politics　has　not　descended　to　the　humblest　classes　of　society。　I　have　never　been　more　struck　by　the　good　sense　and　the　practical　judgment　of　the　Americans　than　in　the　ingenious　devices　by　which　they　elude　the　numberless　difficulties　resulting　from　their　Federal　Constitution。　　I　scarcely　ever　met　with　a　plain　American　citizen　who　could　not　distinguish；　with　surprising　facility；　the　obligations　created　by　the　laws　of　Congress　from　those　created　by　the　laws　of　his　own　State；　and　who；　after　having　discriminated　between　the　matters　which　come　under　the　cognizance　of　the　Union　and　those　which　the　local　legislature　is　competent　to　regulate；　could　not　point　out　the　exact　limit　of　the　several　jurisdictions　of　the　Federal　courts　and　the　tribunals　of　the　State。
  The　Constitution　of　the　United　States　is　like　those　exquisite　productions　of　human　industry　which　ensure　wealth　and　renown　to　their　inventors；　but　which　are　profitless　in　any　other　hands。　　This　truth　is　exemplified　by　the　condition　of　Mexico　at　the　present　time。　　The　Mexicans　were　desirous　of　establishing　a　federal　system；　and　they　took　the　Federal　Constitution　of　their　neighbors；　the　Anglo…Americans；　as　their　model；　and　copied　it　with　considerable　accuracy。　*s　But　although　they　had　borrowed　the　letter　of　the　law；　they　were　unable　to　create　or　to　introduce　the　spirit　and　the　sense　which　give　it　life。　　They　were　involved　in　ceaseless　embarrassments　between　the　mechanism　of　their　double　government；　the　sovereignty　of　the　States　and　that　of　the　Union　perpetually　exceeded　their　respective　privileges；　and　entered　into　collision；　and　to　the　present　day　Mexico　is　alternately　the　victim　of　anarchy　and　the　slave　of　military　despotism。
  ＇Footnote　s：　See　the　Mexican　Constitution　of　1824。＇
  The　second　and　the　most　fatal　of　all　the　defects　I　have　alluded　to；　and　that　which　I　believe　to　be　inherent　in　the　federal　system；　is　the　relative　weakness　of　the　government　of　the　Union。　　The　principle　upon　which　all　confederations　rest　is　that　of　a　divided　sovereignty。　　The　legislator　may　render　this　partition　less　perceptible；　he　may　even　conceal　it　for　a　time　from　the　public　eye；　but　he　cannot　prevent　it　from　existing；　and　a　divided　sovereignty　must　always　be　less　powerful　than　an　entire　supremacy。　　The　reader　has　seen　in　the　remarks　I　have　made　on　the　Constitution　of　the　United　States　that　the　Americans　have　displayed　singular　ingenuity　in　combining　the　restriction　of　the　power　of　the　Union　within　the　narrow　limits　of　a　federal　government　with　the　semblance　and；　to　a　certain　extent；　with　the　force　of　a　national　government。　　By　this　means　the　legislators　of　the　Union　have　succeeded　in　diminishing；　though　not　in　counteracting　the　natural　danger　of　confederations。
  It　has　been　remarked　that　the　American　Government　does　not　apply　itself　to　the　States；　but　that　it　immediately　transmits　its　injunctions　to　the　citizens；　and　compels　them　as　isolated　individuals　to　comply　with　its　demands。　But　if　the　Federal　law　were　to　clash　with　the　interests　and　the　prejudices　of　a　State；　it　might　be　feared　that　all　the　citizens　of　that　State　would　conceive　themselves　to　be　interested　in　the　cause　of　a　single　individual　who　should　refuse　to　obey。　　If　all　the　citizens　of　the　State　were　aggrieved　at　the　same　time　and　in　the　same　manner　by　the　authority　of　the　Union；　the　Federal　Government　would　vainly　attempt　to　subdue　them　individually；　they　would　instinctively　unite　in　a　common　defence；　and　they　would　derive　a　ready…prepared　organization　from　the　share　of　sovereignty　which　the　institution　of　their　State　allows　them　to　enjoy。　　Fiction　would　give　way　to　reality；　and　an　organized　portion　of　the　territory　might　then　contest　the　central　authority。　*t　The　same　observation　holds　good　with　regard　to　the　Federal　jurisdiction。　　If　the　courts　of　the　Union　violated　an　important　law　of　a　State　in　a　private　case；　the　real；　if　not　the　apparent；　contest　would　arise　between　the　aggrieved　State　represented　by　a　citizen　and　the　Union　represented　by　its　courts　of　justice。　*u
  ＇Footnote　t：　＇This　is　precisely　what　occurred　in　1862；　and　the　following　paragraph　describes　correctly　the　feelings　and　notions　of　the　South。　　General　Lee　held　that　his　primary　allegiance　was　due；　not　to　the　Union；　but　to　Virginia。＇＇
  ＇Footnote　u：　For　instance；　the　Union　possesses　by　the　Constitution　the　right　of　selling　unoccupied　lands　for　its　own　profit。　　Supposing　that　the　State　of　Ohio　should　claim　the　same　right　in　behalf　of　certain　territories　lying　within　its　boundaries；　upon　the　plea　that　the　Constitution　refers　to　those　lands　alone　which　do　not　belong　to　the　jurisdiction　of　any　particular　State；　and　consequently　should　choose　to　dispose　of　them　itself；　the　litigation　would　be　carried　on　in　the　names　of　the　purchasers　from　the　State　of　Ohio　and　the　purchasers　from　the　Union；　and　not　in　the　names　of　Ohio　and　the　Union。　But　what　would　become　of　this　legal　fiction　if　the　Federal　purchaser　was　confirmed　in　his　right　by　the　courts　of　the　Union；　whilst　the　other　competitor　was　ordered　to　retain　possession　by　the　tribunals　of　the　State　of　Ohio？＇
  He　would　have　but　a　partial　knowledge　of　the　world　who　should　imagine　that　it　is　possible；　by　the　aid　of　legal　fictions；　to　prevent　men　from　finding　out　and　employing　those　means　of　gratifying　their　passions　which　have　been　left　open　to　them；　and　it　may　be　doubted　whether　the　American　legislators；　when　they　rendered　a　collision　between　the　two　sovereigns　less　probable；　destroyed　the　cause　of　such　a　misfortune。　　But　it　may　even　be　affirmed　that　they　were　unable　to　ensure　the　preponderance　of　the　Federal　element　in　a　case　of　this　kind。　　The　Union　is　possessed　of　money　and　of　troops；　but　the　affections　and　the　prejudices　of　the　people　are　in　the　bosom　of　the　States。　The　sovereignty　of　the　Union　is　an　abstract　being；　which　is　connected　with　but　few　external　objects；　the　sovereignty　of　the　States　is　hourly　perceptible；　easily　understood；　constantly　active；　and　if　the　former　is　of　recent　creation；　the　latter　is　coeval　with　the　people　itself。　　The　sovereignty　of　the　Union　is　factitious；　that　of　the　States　is　natural；　and　derives　its　existence　from　its　own　simple　influence；　like　the　authority　of　a　parent。　　The　supreme　power　of　the　nation　only　affects　a　few　of　the　chief　interests　of　society；　it　represents　an　immense　but　remote　country；　and　claims　a　feeling　of　patriotism　which　is　vague　and　ill　defined；　but　the　authority　of　the　States　controls　every　individual　citizen　at　every　hour　and　in　all　circumstances；　it　protects　his　property；　his　freedom；　and　his　life；　and　when　we　recollect　the　traditions；　the　customs；　the　prejudices　of　local　and　familiar　attachment　with　which　it　is　connected；　we　cannot　doubt　of　the　superiority　of　a　power　which　is　interwoven　with　every　circumstance　that　renders　the　love　of　one's　native　country　instinctive　in　the　human　heart。
  Since　legislators　are　unable　to　obviate　such　dangerous　collisions　as　occur　between　the　two　sovereignties　which　coexist　in　the　federal　system；　their　first　object　must　be；　not　only　to　dissuade　the　confederate　States　from　warfare；　but　to　encourage　such　institutions　as　may　promote　the　maintenance　of　peace。　　Hence　it　results　that　the　Federal　compact　cannot　be　lasting　unless　there　exists　in　the　communities　which　are　leagued　together　a　certain　number　of　inducements　to　union　which　render　their　common　dependence　agreeable；　and　the　task　of　the　Government　light；　and　that　system　cannot　succeed　without　the　presence　of　favorable　circumstances　added　to　the　influence　of　good　laws。　　All　the　peoples　which　have　ever　formed　a　confederation　have　been　held　together　by　a　certain　number　of　common　interests；　which　served　as　the　intellectual　ties　of　association。
  But　the　sentiments　and　the　principles　of　man　must　be　taken　into　consideration　as　well　as　his　immediate　interests。　　A　certain　uniformity　of　civilization　is　not　less　necessary　to　the　durability　of　a　confederation　than　a　uniformity　of　interests　in　the　States　which　compose　it。　　In　Switzerland　the　difference　which　exists　between　the　Canton　of　Uri　and　the　Canton　of　Vaud　is　equal　to　that　between　the　fifteenth　and　the　nineteenth　centuries；　and；　properly　speaking；　Switzerland　has　never　possessed　a　federal　government。　　The　union　between　these　two　cantons　only　subsists　upon　the　map；　and　their　discrepancies　would　soon　be　perceived　if　an　attempt　were　made　by　a　central　authority　to　prescribe　the　same　laws　to　the　whole　territory。
  One　of　the　circumstances　which　most　powerfully　contribute　to　support　the　Federal　Government　in　America　is　that　the　States　have　not　only