in　a　democratic　government　eluded　by　the　Federal　legislators；　and　increased　by　the　legislators　of　the　States。
  The　Federal　Constitution　differs　essentially　from　that　of　the　States　in　the　ends　which　it　is　intended　to　accomplish；　but　in　the　means　by　which　these　ends　are　promoted　a　greater　analogy　exists　between　them。　　The　objects　of　the　Governments　are　different；　but　their　forms　are　the　same；　and　in　this　special　point　of　view　there　is　some　advantage　in　comparing　them　together。
  I　am　of　opinion　that　the　Federal　Constitution　is　superior　to　all　the　Constitutions　of　the　States；　for　several　reasons。
  The　present　Constitution　of　the　Union　was　formed　at　a　later　period　than　those　of　the　majority　of　the　States；　and　it　may　have　derived　some　ameliorations　from　past　experience。　　But　we　shall　be　led　to　acknowledge　that　this　is　only　a　secondary　cause　of　its　superiority；　when　we　recollect　that　eleven　new　States　*n　have　been　added　to　the　American　Confederation　since　the　promulgation　of　the　Federal　Constitution；　and　that　these　new　republics　have　always　rather　exaggerated　than　avoided　the　defects　which　existed　in　the　former　Constitutions。
  ＇Footnote　n：　＇The　number　of　States　has　now　risen　to　46　（1874）；　besides　the　District　of　Columbia。＇＇
  The　chief　cause　of　the　superiority　of　the　Federal　Constitution　lay　in　the　character　of　the　legislators　who　composed　it。　　At　the　time　when　it　was　formed　the　dangers　of　the　Confederation　were　imminent；　and　its　ruin　seemed　inevitable。　　In　this　extremity　the　people　chose　the　men　who　most　deserved　the　esteem；　rather　than　those　who　had　gained　the　affections；　of　the　country。　　I　have　already　observed　that　distinguished　as　almost　all　the　legislators　of　the　Union　were　for　their　intelligence；　they　were　still　more　so　for　their　patriotism。　　They　had　all　been　nurtured　at　a　time　when　the　spirit　of　liberty　was　braced　by　a　continual　struggle　against　a　powerful　and　predominant　authority。　　When　the　contest　was　terminated；　whilst　the　excited　passions　of　the　populace　persisted　in　warring　with　dangers　which　had　ceased　to　threaten　them；　these　men　stopped　short　in　their　career；　they　cast　a　calmer　and　more　penetrating　look　upon　the　country　which　was　now　their　own；　they　perceived　that　the　war　of　independence　was　definitely　ended；　and　that　the　only　dangers　which　America　had　to　fear　were　those　which　might　result　from　the　abuse　of　the　freedom　she　had　won。　　They　had　the　courage　to　say　what　they　believed　to　be　true；　because　they　were　animated　by　a　warm　and　sincere　love　of　liberty；　and　they　ventured　to　propose　restrictions；　because　they　were　resolutely　opposed　to　destruction。　*o
  ＇Footnote　o：　At　this　time　Alexander　Hamilton；　who　was　one　of　the　principal　founders　of　the　Constitution；　ventured　to　express　the　following　sentiments　in　〃The　Federalist；〃　No。　71：　…
  〃There　are　some　who　would　be　inclined　to　regard　the　servile　pliancy　of　the　Executive　to　a　prevailing　current；　either　in　the　community　or　in　the　Legislature；　as　its　best　recommendation。　　But　such　men　entertain　very　crude　notions；　as　well　of　the　purposes　for　which　government　was　instituted　as　of　the　true　means　by　which　the　public　happiness　may　be　promoted。　　The　Republican　principle　demands　that　the　deliberative　sense　of　the　community　should　govern　the　conduct　of　those　to　whom　they　entrust　the　management　of　their　affairs；　but　it　does　not　require　an　unqualified　complaisance　to　every　sudden　breeze　of　passion；　or　to　every　transient　impulse　which　the　people　may　receive　from　the　arts　of　men　who　flatter　their　prejudices　to　betray　their　interests。　　It　is　a　just　observation；　that　the　people　commonly　intend　the　public　good。　　This　often　applies　to　their　very　errors。　　But　their　good　sense　would　despise　the　adulator　who　should　pretend　that　they　always　reason　right　about　the　means　of　promoting　it。　　They　know　from　experience　that　they　sometimes　err；　and　the　wonder　is　that　they　so　seldom　err　as　they　do；　beset；　as　they　continually　are；　by　the　wiles　of　parasites　and　sycophants；　by　the　snares　of　the　ambitious；　the　avaricious；　the　desperate；　by　the　artifices　of　men　who　possess　their　confidence　more　than　they　deserve　it；　and　of　those　who　seek　to　possess　rather　than　to　deserve　it。　　When　occasions　present　themselves　in　which　the　interests　of　the　people　are　at　variance　with　their　inclinations；　it　is　the　duty　of　persons　whom　they　have　appointed　to　be　the　guardians　of　those　interests　to　withstand　the　temporary　delusion；　in　order　to　give　them　time　and　opportunity　for　more　cool　and　sedate　reflection。　　Instances　might　be　cited　in　which　a　conduct　of　this　kind　has　saved　the　people　from　very　fatal　consequences　of　their　own　mistakes；　and　has　procured　lasting　monuments　of　their　gratitude　to　the　men　who　had　courage　and　magnanimity　enough　to　serve　them　at　the　peril　of　their　displeasure。〃＇
  The　greater　number　of　the　Constitutions　of　the　States　assign　one　year　for　the　duration　of　the　House　of　Representatives；　and　two　years　for　that　of　the　Senate；　so　that　members　of　the　legislative　body　are　constantly　and　narrowly　tied　down　by　the　slightest　desires　of　their　constituents。　　The　legislators　of　the　Union　were　of　opinion　that　this　excessive　dependence　of　the　Legislature　tended　to　alter　the　nature　of　the　main　consequences　of　the　representative　system；　since　it　vested　the　source；　not　only　of　authority；　but　of　government；　in　the　people。　　They　increased　the　length　of　the　time　for　which　the　representatives　were　returned；　in　order　to　give　them　freer　scope　for　the　exercise　of　their　own　judgment。
  The　Federal　Constitution；　as　well　as　the　Constitutions　of　the　different　States；　divided　the　legislative　body　into　two　branches。　　But　in　the　States　these　two　branches　were　composed　of　the　same　elements；　and　elected　in　the　same　manner。　　The　consequence　was　that　the　passions　and　inclinations　of　the　populace　were　as　rapidly　and　as　energetically　represented　in　one　chamber　as　in　the　other；　and　that　laws　were　made　with　all　the　characteristics　of　violence　and　precipitation。　　By　the　Federal　Constitution　the　two　houses　originate　in　like　manner　in　the　choice　of　the　people；　but　the　conditions　of　eligibility　and　the　mode　of　election　were　changed；　to　the　end　that；　if；　as　is　the　case　in　certain　nations；　one　branch　of　the　Legislature　represents　the　same　interests　as　the　other；　it　may　at　least　represent　a　superior　degree　of　intelligence　and　discretion。　A　mature　age　was　made　one　of　the　conditions　of　the　senatorial　dignity；　and　the　Upper　House　was　chosen　by　an　elected　assembly　of　a　limited　number　of　members。
  To　concentrate　the　whole　social　force　in　the　hands　of　the　legislative　body　is　the　natural　tendency　of　democracies；　for　as　this　is　the　power　which　emanates　the　most　directly　from　the　people；　it　is　made　to　participate　most　fully　in　the　preponderating　authority　of　the　multitude；　and　it　is　naturally　led　to　monopolize　every　species　of　influence。　　This　concentration　is　at　once　prejudicial　to　a　well…conducted　administration；　and　favorable　to　the　despotism　of　the　majority。　　The　legislators　of　the　States　frequently　yielded　to　these　democratic　propensities；　which　were　invariably　and　courageously　resisted　by　the　founders　of　the　Union。
  In　the　States　the　executive　power　is　vested　in　the　hands　of　a　magistrate；　who　is　apparently　placed　upon　a　level　with　the　Legislature；　but　who　is　in　reality　nothing　more　than　the　blind　agent　and　the　passive　instrument　of　its　decisions。　　He　can　derive　no　influence　from　the　duration　of　his　functions；　which　terminate　with　the　revolving　year；　or　from　the　exercise　of　prerogatives　which　can　scarcely　be　said　to　exist。　　The　Legislature　can　condemn　him　to　inaction　by　intrusting　the　execution　of　the　laws　to　special　committees　of　its　own　members；　and　can　annul　his　temporary　dignity　by　depriving　him　of　his　salary。　　The　Federal　Constitution　vests　all　the　privileges　and　all　the　responsibility　of　the　executive　power　in　a　single　individual。　　The　duration　of　the　Presidency　is　fixed　at　four　years；　the　salary　of　the　individual　who　fills　that　office　cannot　be　altered　during　the　term　of　his　functions；　he　is　protected　by　a　body　of　official　dependents；　and　armed　with　a　suspensive　veto。　In　short；　every　effort　was　made　to　confer　a　strong　and　independent　position　upon　the　executive　authority　within　the　limits　which　had　been　prescribed　to　it。
  In　the　Constitutions　of　all　the　States　the　judicial　power　is　that　which　remains　the　most　independent　of　the　legislative　authority；　nevertheless；　in　all　the　States　the　Legislature　has　reserved　to　itself　the　right　of　regulating　the　emoluments　of　the　judges；　a　practice　which　necessarily　subjects　these　magistrates　to　its　immediate　influence。　　In　some　States　the　judges　are　only　temporarily　appointed；　which　deprives　them　of　a　great　portion　of　their　power　and　their　freedom。　　In　others　the　legislative　and　judicial　powers　are　entirely　confounded；　thus　the　Senate　of　New　York；　for　instance；　constitutes　in　certain　cases　the　Superior　Court　of　the　State。　　The　Federal　Constitution；　on　the　other　hand；　carefully　separates　the　judicial　authority　from　all　external　influences；　and　it　provides　for　the　independence　of　the　judges；　by　declaring　that　their　salary　shall　not　be　altered；　and　that　their　functions　shall　be　inalienable。
  The　practical　consequences　of　these　different　systems　may　easily　be　perceived。　　An　attentive　observer　will　so