iven　case　attacks　a　law　relating　to　that　case；　he　extends　the　circle　of　his　customary　duties；　without　however　stepping　beyond　it；　since　he　is　in　some　measure　obliged　to　decide　upon　the　law　in　order　to　decide　the　case。　　But　if　he　pronounces　upon　a　law　without　resting　upon　a　case；　he　clearly　steps　beyond　his　sphere；　and　invades　that　of　the　legislative　authority。
  The　second　characteristic　of　judicial　power　is　that　it　pronounces　on　special　cases；　and　not　upon　general　principles。　　If　a　judge　in　deciding　a　particular　point　destroys　a　general　principle；　by　passing　a　judgment　which　tends　to　reject　all　the　inferences　from　that　principle；　and　consequently　to　annul　it；　he　remains　within　the　ordinary　limits　of　his　functions。　　But　if　he　directly　attacks　a　general　principle　without　having　a　particular　case　in　view；　he　leaves　the　circle　in　which　all　nations　have　agreed　to　confine　his　authority；　he　assumes　a　more　important；　and　perhaps　a　more　useful；　influence　than　that　of　the　magistrate；　but　he　ceases　to　be　a　representative　of　the　judicial　power。
  The　third　characteristic　of　the　judicial　power　is　its　inability　to　act　unless　it　is　appealed　to；　or　until　it　has　taken　cognizance　of　an　affair。　This　characteristic　is　less　general　than　the　other　two；　but；　notwithstanding　the　exceptions；　I　think　it　may　be　regarded　as　essential。　　The　judicial　power　is　by　its　nature　devoid　of　action；　it　must　be　put　in　motion　in　order　to　produce　a　result。　　When　it　is　called　upon　to　repress　a　crime；　it　punishes　the　criminal；　when　a　wrong　is　to　be　redressed；　it　is　ready　to　redress　it；　when　an　act　requires　interpretation；　it　is　prepared　to　interpret　it；　but　it　does　not　pursue　criminals；　hunt　out　wrongs；　or　examine　into　evidence　of　its　own　accord。　A　judicial　functionary　who　should　open　proceedings；　and　usurp　the　censorship　of　the　laws；　would　in　some　measure　do　violence　to　the　passive　nature　of　his　authority。
  The　Americans　have　retained　these　three　distinguishing　characteristics　of　the　judicial　power；　an　American　judge　can　only　pronounce　a　decision　when　litigation　has　arisen；　he　is　only　conversant　with　special　cases；　and　he　cannot　act　until　the　cause　has　been　duly　brought　before　the　court。　　His　position　is　therefore　perfectly　similar　to　that　of　the　magistrate　of　other　nations；　and　he　is　nevertheless　invested　with　immense　political　power。　　If　the　sphere　of　his　authority　and　his　means　of　action　are　the　same　as　those　of　other　judges；　it　may　be　asked　whence　he　derives　a　power　which　they　do　not　possess。　　The　cause　of　this　difference　lies　in　the　simple　fact　that　the　Americans　have　acknowledged　the　right　of　the　judges　to　found　their　decisions　on　the　constitution　rather　than　on　the　laws。　　In　other　words；　they　have　left　them　at　liberty　not　to　apply　such　laws　as　may　appear　to　them　to　be　unconstitutional。
  I　am　aware　that　a　similar　right　has　been　claimed　…　but　claimed　in　vain　…by　courts　of　justice　in　other　countries；　but　in　America　it　is　recognized　by　all　authorities；　and　not　a　party；　nor　so　much　as　an　individual；　is　found　to　contest　it。　　This　fact　can　only　be　explained　by　the　principles　of　the　American　constitution。　　In　France　the　constitution　is　（or　at　least　is　supposed　to　be）　immutable；　and　the　received　theory　is　that　no　power　has　the　right　of　changing　any　part　of　it。　　In　England　the　Parliament　has　an　acknowledged　right　to　modify　the　constitution；　as；　therefore；　the　constitution　may　undergo　perpetual　changes；　it　does　not　in　reality　exist；　the　Parliament　is　at　once　a　legislative　and　a　constituent　assembly。　　The　political　theories　of　America　are　more　simple　and　more　rational。　　An　American　constitution　is　not　supposed　to　be　immutable　as　in　France；　nor　is　it　susceptible　of　modification　by　the　ordinary　powers　of　society　as　in　England。　It　constitutes　a　detached　whole；　which；　as　it　represents　the　determination　of　the　whole　people；　is　no　less　binding　on　the　legislator　than　on　the　private　citizen；　but　which　may　be　altered　by　the　will　of　the　people　in　predetermined　cases；　according　to　established　rules。　　In　America　the　constitution　may　therefore　vary；　but　as　long　as　it　exists　it　is　the　origin　of　all　authority；　and　the　sole　vehicle　of　the　predominating　force。　*a
  ＇Footnote　a：　＇The　fifth　article　of　the　original　Constitution　of　the　United　States　provides　the　mode　in　which　amendments　of　the　Constitution　may　be　made。　Amendments　must　be　proposed　by　two…thirds　of　both　Houses　of　Congress；　and　ratified　by　the　Legislatures　of　three…fourths　of　the　several　States。　　Fifteen　amendments　of　the　Constitution　have　been　made　at　different　times　since　1789；　the　most　important　of　which　are　the　Thirteenth；　Fourteenth；　and　Fifteenth；　framed　and　ratified　after　the　Civil　War。　　The　original　Constitution　of　the　United　States；　followed　by　these　fifteen　amendments；　is　printed　at　the　end　of　this　edition。　…　Translator's　Note；　1874。＇＇
  It　is　easy　to　perceive　in　what　manner　these　differences　must　act　upon　the　position　and　the　rights　of　the　judicial　bodies　in　the　three　countries　I　have　cited。　　If　in　France　the　tribunals　were　authorized　to　disobey　the　laws　on　the　ground　of　their　being　opposed　to　the　constitution；　the　supreme　power　would　in　fact　be　placed　in　their　hands；　since　they　alone　would　have　the　right　of　interpreting　a　constitution；　the　clauses　of　which　can　be　modified　by　no　authority。　　They　would　therefore　take　the　place　of　the　nation；　and　exercise　as　absolute　a　sway　over　society　as　the　inherent　weakness　of　judicial　power　would　allow　them　to　do。　　Undoubtedly；　as　the　French　judges　are　incompetent　to　declare　a　law　to　be　unconstitutional；　the　power　of　changing　the　constitution　is　indirectly　given　to　the　legislative　body；　since　no　legal　barrier　would　oppose　the　alterations　which　it　might　prescribe。　　But　it　is　better　to　grant　the　power　of　changing　the　constitution　of　the　people　to　men　who　represent　（however　imperfectly）　the　will　of　the　people；　than　to　men　who　represent　no　one　but　themselves。
  It　would　be　still　more　unreasonable　to　invest　the　English　judges　with　the　right　of　resisting　the　decisions　of　the　legislative　body；　since　the　Parliament　which　makes　the　laws　also　makes　the　constitution；　and　consequently　a　law　emanating　from　the　three　powers　of　the　State　can　in　no　case　be　unconstitutional。　　But　neither　of　these　remarks　is　applicable　to　America。
  In　the　United　States　the　constitution　governs　the　legislator　as　much　as　the　private　citizen；　as　it　is　the　first　of　laws　it　cannot　be　modified　by　a　law；　and　it　is　therefore　just　that　the　tribunals　should　obey　the　constitution　in　preference　to　any　law。　　This　condition　is　essential　to　the　power　of　the　judicature；　for　to　select　that　legal　obligation　by　which　he　is　most　strictly　bound　is　the　natural　right　of　every　magistrate。
  In　France　the　constitution　is　also　the　first　of　laws；　and　the　judges　have　the　same　right　to　take　it　as　the　ground　of　their　decisions；　but　were　they　to　exercise　this　right　they　must　perforce　encroach　on　rights　more　sacred　than　their　own；　namely；　on　those　of　society；　in　whose　name　they　are　acting。　In　this　case　the　State…　motive　clearly　prevails　over　the　motives　of　an　individual。　　In　America；　where　the　nation　can　always　reduce　its　magistrates　to　obedience　by　changing　its　constitution；　no　danger　of　this　kind　is　to　be　feared。　　Upon　this　point；　therefore；　the　political　and　the　logical　reasons　agree；　and　the　people　as　well　as　the　judges　preserve　their　privileges。
  Whenever　a　law　which　the　judge　holds　to　be　unconstitutional　is　argued　in　a　tribunal　of　the　United　States　he　may　refuse　to　admit　it　as　a　rule；　this　power　is　the　only　one　which　is　peculiar　to　the　American　magistrate；　but　it　gives　rise　to　immense　political　influence。　　Few　laws　can　escape　the　searching　analysis　of　the　judicial　power　for　any　length　of　time；　for　there　are　few　which　are　not　prejudicial　to　some　private　interest　or　other；　and　none　which　may　not　be　brought　before　a　court　of　justice　by　the　choice　of　parties；　or　by　the　necessity　of　the　case。　　But　from　the　time　that　a　judge　has　refused　to　apply　any　given　law　in　a　case；　that　law　loses　a　portion　of　its　moral　cogency。　The　persons　to　whose　interests　it　is　prejudicial　learn　that　means　exist　of　evading　its　authority；　and　similar　suits　are　multiplied；　until　it　becomes　powerless。　One　of　two　alternatives　must　then　be　resorted　to：　the　people　must　alter　the　constitution；　or　the　legislature　must　repeal　the　law。　　The　political　power　which　the　Americans　have　intrusted　to　their　courts　of　justice　is　therefore　immense；　but　the　evils　of　this　power　are　considerably　diminished　by　the　obligation　which　has　been　imposed　of　attacking　the　laws　through　the　courts　of　justice　alone。　　If　the　judge　had　been　empowered　to　contest　the　laws　on　the　ground　of　theoretical　generalities；　if　he　had　been　enabled　to　open　an　attack　or　to　pass　a　censure　on　the　legislator；　he　would　have　played　a　prominent　part　in　the　political　sphere；　and　as　the　champion　or　the　antagonist　of　a　party；　he　would　have　arrayed　the　hostile　passions　of　the　nation　in　the　conflict。　　But　when　a　judge　contests　a　law　applied　to　some　particular　case　in　an　obscure　proceeding；　the　importance　of　his　attack　is　concealed　from　the　public　gaze；　his　decision　bears　upon　the　interest　of　an　individual；　and　if　the　law　is　slighted　it　is　only　collaterally。　　Moreover；　although　it　is　censured；　it　is　not　abolished；　its　moral　force