nsion　of　elective　offices：　if　these　two　institutions　do　not　go　hand　in　hand；　the　State　must　fall　into　anarchy　or　into　subjection。
  It　has　always　been　remarked　that　habits　of　legal　business　do　not　render　men　apt　to　the　exercise　of　administrative　authority。　　The　Americans　have　borrowed　from　the　English；　their　fathers；　the　idea　of　an　institution　which　is　unknown　upon　the　continent　of　Europe：　I　allude　to　that　of　the　Justices　of　the　Peace。　　The　Justice　of　the　Peace　is　a　sort　of　mezzo　termine　between　the　magistrate　and　the　man　of　the　world；　between　the　civil　officer　and　the　judge。　A　justice　of　the　peace　is　a　well…informed　citizen；　though　he　is　not　necessarily　versed　in　the　knowledge　of　the　laws。　　His　office　simply　obliges　him　to　execute　the　police　regulations　of　society；　a　task　in　which　good　sense　and　integrity　are　of　more　avail　than　legal　science。　　The　justice　introduces　into　the　administration　a　certain　taste　for　established　forms　and　publicity；　which　renders　him　a　most　unserviceable　instrument　of　despotism；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　he　is　not　blinded　by　those　superstitions　which　render　legal　officers　unfit　members　of　a　government。　　The　Americans　have　adopted　the　system　of　the　English　justices　of　the　peace；　but　they　have　deprived　it　of　that　aristocratic　character　which　is　discernible　in　the　mother…country。　　The　Governor　of　Massachusetts　*p　appoints　a　certain　number　of　justices　of　the　peace　in　every　county；　whose　functions　last　seven　years。　*q　He　further　designates　three　individuals　from　amongst　the　whole　body　of　justices　who　form　in　each　county　what　is　called　the　Court　of　Sessions。　　The　justices　take　a　personal　share　in　public　business；　they　are　sometimes　entrusted　with　administrative　functions　in　conjunction　with　elected　officers；　*r　they　sometimes　constitute　a　tribunal；　before　which　the　magistrates　summarily　prosecute　a　refractory　citizen；　or　the　citizens　inform　against　the　abuses　of　the　magistrate。　　But　it　is　in　the　Court　of　Sessions　that　they　exercise　their　most　important　functions。　　This　court　meets　twice　a　year　in　the　county　town；　in　Massachusetts　it　is　empowered　to　enforce　the　obedience　of　the　greater　number　*s　of　public　officers。　*t　It　must　be　observed；　that　in　the　State　of　Massachusetts　the　Court　of　Sessions　is　at　the　same　time　an　administrative　body；　properly　so　called；　and　a　political　tribunal。　　It　has　been　asserted　that　the　county　is　a　purely　administrative　division。　　The　Court　of　Sessions　presides　over　that　small　number　of　affairs　which；　as　they　concern　several　townships；　or　all　the　townships　of　the　county　in　common；　cannot　be　entrusted　to　any　one　of　them　in　particular。　*u　In　all　that　concerns　county　business　the　duties　of　the　Court　of　Sessions　are　purely　administrative；　and　if　in　its　investigations　it　occasionally　borrows　the　forms　of　judicial　procedure；　it　is　only　with　a　view　to　its　own　information；　*v　or　as　a　guarantee　to　the　community　over　which　it　presides。　　But　when　the　administration　of　the　township　is　brought　before　it；　it　always　acts　as　a　judicial　body；　and　in　some　few　cases　as　an　official　assembly。
  ＇Footnote　p：　We　shall　hereafter　learn　what　a　Governor　is：　I　shall　content　myself　with　remarking　in　this　place　that　he　represents　the　executive　power　of　the　whole　State。＇
  ＇Footnote　q：　See　the　Constitution　of　Massachusetts；　chap。　II。　sect。　1。　Section　9；　chap。　III。　Section　3。＇
  ＇Footnote　r：　Thus；　for　example；　a　stranger　arrives　in　a　township　from　a　country　where　a　contagious　disease　prevails；　and　he　falls　ill。　　Two　justices　of　the　peace　can；　with　the　assent　of　the　selectmen；　order　the　sheriff　of　the　county　to　remove　and　take　care　of　him。　…　Act　of　June　22；　1797；　vol。　i。　p。　540。
  In　general　the　justices　interfere　in　all　the　important　acts　of　the　administration；　and　give　them　a　semi…judicial　character。＇　　＇Footnote　s：　I　say　the　greater　number；　because　certain　administrative　misdemeanors　are　brought　before　ordinary　tribunals。　　If；　for　instance；　a　township　refuses　to　make　the　necessary　expenditure　for　its　schools　or　to　name　a　school…committee；　it　is　liable　to　a　heavy　fine。　　But　this　penalty　is　pronounced　by　the　Supreme　Judicial　Court　or　the　Court　of　Common　Pleas。　　See　Act　of　March　10；　1827；　Laws　of　Massachusetts；　vol。　iii。　p。　190。　　Or　when　a　township　neglects　to　provide　the　necessary　war…stores。　…　Act　of　February　21；　1822：　Id。；　vol。　ii。　p。　570。＇
  ＇Footnote　t：　In　their　individual　capacity　the　justices　of　the　peace　take　a　part　in　the　business　of　the　counties　and　townships。＇　　＇Footnote　u：　These　affairs　may　be　brought　under　the　following　heads：　…　1。　The　erection　of　prisons　and　courts　of　justice。　　2。　The　county　budget；　which　is　afterwards　voted　by　the　State。　　3。　The　distribution　of　the　taxes　so　voted。　4。　Grants　of　certain　patents。　　5。　The　laying　down　and　repairs　of　the　country　roads。＇
  ＇Footnote　v：　Thus；　when　a　road　is　under　consideration；　almost　all　difficulties　are　disposed　of　by　the　aid　of　the　jury。＇
  The　first　difficulty　is　to　procure　the　obedience　of　an　authority　as　entirely　independent　of　the　general　laws　of　the　State　as　the　township　is。　We　have　stated　that　assessors　are　annually　named　by　the　town…meetings　to　levy　the　taxes。　　If　a　township　attempts　to　evade　the　payment　of　the　taxes　by　neglecting　to　name　its　assessors；　the　Court　of　Sessions　condemns　it　to　a　heavy　penalty。　*w　The　fine　is　levied　on　each　of　the　inhabitants；　and　the　sheriff　of　the　county；　who　is　the　officer　of　justice；　executes　the　mandate。　Thus　it　is　that　in　the　United　States　the　authority　of　the　Government　is　mysteriously　concealed　under　the　forms　of　a　judicial　sentence；　and　its　influence　is　at　the　same　time　fortified　by　that　irresistible　power　with　which　men　have　invested　the　formalities　of　law。
  ＇Footnote　w：　See　Act　of　February　20；　1786；　Laws　of　Massachusetts；　vol。　i。　p。　217。＇
  These　proceedings　are　easy　to　follow　and　to　understand。　　The　demands　made　upon　a　township　are　in　general　plain　and　accurately　defined；　they　consist　in　a　simple　fact　without　any　complication；　or　in　a　principle　without　its　application　in　detail。　*x　But　the　difficulty　increases　when　it　is　not　the　obedience　of　the　township；　but　that　of　the　town　officers　which　is　to　be　enforced。　　All　the　reprehensible　actions　of　which　a　public　functionary　may　be　guilty　are　reducible　to　the　following　heads：
  ＇Footnote　x：　There　is　an　indirect　method　of　enforcing　the　obedience　of　a　township。　　Suppose　that　the　funds　which　the　law　demands　for　the　maintenance　of　the　roads　have　not　been　voted；　the　town　surveyor　is　then　authorized；　ex　officio；　to　levy　the　supplies。　　As　he　is　personally　responsible　to　private　individuals　for　the　state　of　the　roads；　and　indictable　before　the　Court　of　Sessions；　he　is　sure　to　employ　the　extraordinary　right　which　the　law　gives　him　against　the　township。　　Thus　by　threatening　the　officer　the　Court　of　Sessions　exacts　compliance　from　the　town。　　See　Act　of　March　5；　1787；　Id。；　vol。　i。　p。　305。＇
  He　may　execute　the　law　without　energy　or　zeal；
  He　may　neglect　to　execute　the　law；
  He　may　do　what　the　law　enjoins　him　not　to　do。
  The　last　two　violations　of　duty　can　alone　come　under　the　cognizance　of　a　tribunal；　a　positive　and　appreciable　fact　is　the　indispensable　foundation　of　an　action　at　law。　　Thus；　if　the　selectmen　omit　to　fulfil　the　legal　formalities　usual　at　town　elections；　they　may　be　condemned　to　pay　a　fine；　*y　but　when　the　public　officer　performs　his　duty　without　ability；　and　when　he　obeys　the　letter　of　the　law　without　zeal　or　energy；　he　is　at　least　beyond　the　reach　of　judicial　interference。　　The　Court　of　Sessions；　even　when　it　is　invested　with　its　official　powers；　is　in　this　case　unable　to　compel　him　to　a　more　satisfactory　obedience。　　The　fear　of　removal　is　the　only　check　to　these　quasi…offences；　and　as　the　Court　of　Sessions　does　not　originate　the　town　authorities；　it　cannot　remove　functionaries　whom　it　does　not　appoint。　Moreover；　a　perpetual　investigation　would　be　necessary　to　convict　the　officer　of　negligence　or　lukewarmness；　and　the　Court　of　Sessions　sits　but　twice　a　year　and　then　only　judges　such　offences　as　are　brought　before　its　notice。　The　only　security　of　that　active　and　enlightened　obedience　which　a　court　of　justice　cannot　impose　upon　public　officers　lies　in　the　possibility　of　their　arbitrary　removal。　　In　France　this　security　is　sought　for　in　powers　exercised　by　the　heads　of　the　administration；　in　America　it　is　sought　for　in　the　principle　of　election。
  ＇Footnote　y：　Laws　of　Massachusetts；　vol。　ii。　p。　45。＇
  Thus；　to　recapitulate　in　a　few　words　what　I　have　been　showing：　If　a　public　officer　in　New　England　commits　a　crime　in　the　exercise　of　his　functions；　the　ordinary　courts　of　justice　are　always　called　upon　to　pass　sentence　upon　him。　　If　he　commits　a　fault　in　his　official　capacity；　a　purely　administrative　tribunal　is　empowered　to　punish　him；　and；　if　the　affair　is　important　or　urgent；　the　judge　supplies　the　omission　of　the　functionary。　*z　Lastly；　if　the　same　individual　is　guilty　of　one　of　those　intangible　offences　of　which　human　justice　has　no　cognizance；　he　annually　appears　before　a　tribunal　from　which　there　is　no　appeal；　which　can　at　once　reduce　him　to　insignificance　and　deprive　him　of　his　charge。　　This　system　undoubtedly　possesses　great　advantages；　but　its　execution　is　attended　with　a　practical　difficulty　which　it　is　important　to　point　out。
  ＇Footnote　z：　If；