eral　government；　but　imperfectly　comprehend　the　distinction　　between　the　legislative　and　executive　departments　of　that　　Government；　and　are　far　more　familiar　with　party　tactics　than　　with　constitutional　law。
  It　would　be　difficult　to　imagine　any　thing　more　unconstitutional；　　more　crude；　or　more　glaringly　impolitic　than　the　mode　of　　reconstruction　indicated　by　the　various　executive　proclamations　　that　have　been　issued；　bearing　on　the　subject；　or　even　by　the　　bill　for　guaranteeing　the　States　republican　governments；　that　　passed　310　　　　　　　　Congress；　but　which　failed　to　obtain　the　President's　　signature。　　It　is；　in　some　measure；　characteristic　of　the　　American　government　to　understand　how　things　ought　to　be　done　　only　when　they　are　done　and　it　is　too　late　to　do　them　in　the　　right　way。　　Its　wisdom　comes　after　action；　as　if　engaged　in　a　　series　of　experiments。　　But；　happily　for　the　nation；　few　blunders　　are　committed　that　with　our　young　life　and　elasticity　are　　irreparable；　and　that；　after　all；　are　greater　than　are　ordinarily　　committed　by　older　and　more　experienced　nations。　　They　are　not　of　　the　most　fatal　character；　and　are；　for　the　most　part；　such　as　are　　incident　to　the　conceit；　the　heedlessness；　the　ardor；　and　the　　impatience　of　youth；　and　need　excite　no　serious　alarm　for　the　　future。
  There　has　been　no　little　confusion　in　the　public　mind；　and　in　　that　of　the　government　itself；　as　to　what　reconstruction　is；　who　　has　the　power　to　reconstruct；　and　how　that　power　is　to　be　　exercised。　　Are　the　States　that　seceded　States　in　the　Union；　with　　no　other　disability　than　that　of　having　no　legal　governments？　or　　are　they　Territories　subject　to　the　Union？　　Is　their　　reconstruction　their　erection　into　new　States；　or　their　　restoration　as　States　previously　in　the　Union？　　Is　the　power　to　　reconstruct　in　the　States　themselves？　or　is　it　in　the　General　　government？　311　　　　　　　　　　　　　　If　partly　in　the　people　and　partly　in　the　General　　government；　is　the　part　in　the　General　government　in　Congress；　or　　in　the　Executive？　　If　in　Congress；　can　the　Executive；　without　the　　authority　of　Congress；　proceed　to　reconstruct；　simply　leaving　it　　for　Congress　to　accept　or　reject　the　reconstructed　State？　　　If　　the　power　is　partly　in　the　people　of　the　disorganized　States　who　　or　what　defines　that　people；　decides　who　may　or　may　not　vote　in　　the　reorganization？　　On　all　these　questions　there　has　been　much　　crude；　if　not　erroneous；　thinking；　and　much　inconsistent　and　　contradictory　action。
  The　government　started　with　the　theory　that　no　State　had　seceded　　or　could　secede；　and　held　that；　throughout；　the　States　in　　rebellion　continued　to　be　States　in　the　Union。　　That　is；　it　held　　secession　to　be　a　purely　personal　and　not　a　territorial　　insurrection。　　Yet　it　proclaimed　eleven　States　to　be　in　　insurrection　against　the　United　States；　blockaded　their　ports；　　and　interdicted　all　trade　and　intercourse　of　any　kind　with　them。　　　The　Supreme　Court；　in　order　to　sustain　the　blockade　and　interdict　　as　legal；　decided　the　war　to　be　not　a　war　against　simply　　individual　or　personal　insurgents　but　〃a　territorial　civil　war。〃　　　This　negatived　the　assumption　that　the　States　that　took　up　arms　　against　　312　　　　　　　　　the　United　States　remained　all　the　while　peaceable　and　　loyal　States；　with　all　their　political　rights　and　powers　in　the　　Union。　　The　States　in　the　Union　are　integral　elements　of　the　　political　sovereignty；　for　the　sovereignty　of　the　American　nation　　vests　in　the　States　finite；　and　it　is　absurd　to　pretend　that　the　　eleven　States　that　made　the　rebellion　and　were　carrying　on　a　　formidable　war　against　the　United　States；　were　in　the　Union；　an　　integral　element　of　that　sovereign　authority　which　was　carrying　　on　a　yet　more　formidable　war　against　them。　　Nevertheless；　the　　government　still　held　to　its　first　assumption；　that　the　States　in　　rebellion　continued　to　be　States　in　the　Unionloyal　States；　with　　all　their　rights　and　franchises　unimpaired！
  That　the　government　should　at　first　have　favored　or　acquiesced　in　　the　doctrine　that　no　State　had　ceased　to　be　a　State　in　the　Union；　　is　not　to　be　wondered　at。　　The　extent　and　determination　of　the　　secession　movement　were　imperfectly　understood；　and　the　belief　　among　the　supporters　of　the　government；　and；　perhaps；　of　the　　government　itself；　was；　that　it　was　a　spasmodic　movement　for　a　　temporary　purpose；　rather　than　a　fixed　determination　to　found　an　　independent　separate　nationality；　that　it　was　and　would　be　　sustained　by　the　real　majority　313　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　people　of　none　of　the　　States；　with　perhaps　the　exception　of　South　Carolina；　that　the　　true　policy　of　the　government　would　be　to　treat　the　seceders　with　　great　forbearance；　to　avoid　all　measures　likely　to　exasperate　　them　or　to　embarrass　their　loyal　fellow…citizens；　to　act　simply　　on　the　defensive；　and　to　leave　the　Union　men　in　the　several　　seceding　States　to　gain　a　political　victory　at　the　polls　over　the　　secessionists；　and　to　return　their　States　to　their　normal　　position　in　the　Union。
  The　government　may　not　have　had　much　faith　in　this　policy；　and　　Mr。　Lincoln's　personal　authority　might　be　cited　to　the　effect　　that　it　had　not；　but　it　was　urged　strongly　by　the　Union　men　of　　the　Border　States。　　The　administration　was　hardly　seated　in　　office；　and　its　members　were　new　men；　without　administrative　　experience；　the　President；　who　had　been　legally　elected　indeed；　　but　without　a　majority　of　the　popular　votes；　was　far　from　having　　the　full　confidence　even　of　the　party　that　elected　him；　opinions　　were　divided；　party　spirit　ran　high；　the　excitement　was　great；　　the　crisis　was　imminent；　the　government　found　itself　left　by　its　　predecessor　without　an　army　or　a　navy；　and　almost　without　arms　or　　ordnance；　it　knew　not　how　far　it　could　count　on　popular　support；　　and　314　　　　　was　hardly　aware　whom　it　could　trust　or　should　distrust；　all　　was　hurry　and　confusion；　and　what　could　the　government　do　but　to　　gain　time；　keep　off　active　war　as　long　as　possible；　conciliate　　all　it　could；　and　take　ground　which　at　the　time　seemed　likely　to　　rally　the　largest　number　of　the　people　to　its　support？　　There　　were　men　then；　warm　friends　of　the　administration；　and　still　　warmer　friends　of　their　country；　who　believed　that　a　bolder；　a　　less　timid；　a　less　cautious　policy　would　have　been　wiser；　that　in　　revolutionary　times　boldness；　what　in　other　times　would　be　　rashness；　is　the　highest　prudence；　on　the　side　of　the　government　　as　well　as　on　the　side　of　the　revolution；　that　when　once　it　has　　shown　itself；　the　rebellion　that　hesitates；　deliberates；　consults；　　is　defeated　and　so　is　the　government。　　The　seceders　owed　from　the　　first　their　successes　not　to　their　superior　organization；　to　　their　better　preparation；　or　to　the　better　discipline　and　　appointment　of　their　armies；　but　to　their　very　rashness；　to　their　　audacity　even；　and　the　hesitancy；　cautious　and　deliberation　of　　the　government。　　Napoleon　owed　his　successes　as　general　and　　civilian　far　more　to　the　air　of　power　he　assumed；　and　the　　conviction　he　produced　of　his　invincibility　in　the　minds　of　his　　opponents；　than　to　his　civil　or　315　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　military　strategy　and　tactics；　　admirable　as　they　both　were。　　But　the　government　believed　it　　wisest　to　adopt　a　conciliatory　and；　in　many　respects；　a　　temporizing　policy；　and　to　rely　more　on　weakening　the　　secessionists　in　their　respective　States　than　on　strengthening　　the　hands　and　hearts　of　its　own　staunch　and　uncompromising　　supporters。　　It　must　strengthen　the　Union　party　in　the　　insurrectionary　States；　and　as　this　party　hoped　to　succeed　by　　political　manipulation　rather　than　by　military　force；　the　　government　must　rely　rather　on　a　show　of　military　power　than　on　　gaining　any　decisive　battle。　　As　it　hoped；　or　affected　to　hope；　　to　suppress　the　rebellion　in　the　States　that　seceded　through　　their　loyal　citizens；　it　was　obliged　to　assume　that　secession　was　　the　work　of　a　faction；　of　a　few　ambitious　and　disappointed　　politicians；　and　that　the　States　were　all　in　the　Union；　and　　continued　in　the　loyal　portion　of　their　inhabitants。　　Hence　its　　aid　to　the　loyal　Virginians　to　organize　as　the　State　of　Virginia；　　and　its　subsequent　efforts　to　organize　the　Union　men　in　　Louisiana；　Arkansas；　and　Tennessee；　and　its　disposition　to　　recognize　their　organization　in　each　of　those　States　as　the　State　　itself；　though　including　only　a　small　minority　of　the　territorial　　people。　　Had　the　facts　been　316　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　as　assumed；　the　government　might　have　　treated　the　loyal　people　of　each　State　as　the　State　itself；　　without　any　gross　usurpation　of　power；　but；　unhappily；　the　facts　　assumed　were　not　facts；　and　it　was　soon　found　that　the　Union　　party　in　all　the　States　that　seceded；　except　the　western　part　of　　Virginia　and　the　eastern　section　of　Tennessee；　after　secession　　had　been　carried　by　the　popular　vote；　went　almost　unanimously　　with　the　secessionists；　for　they　as　well　as　the　secessionists　　held　the　doctrine　of　State　sovereignty；　and　to　treat　the　handful　　of　citizens　that　remained　loyal　in　each　State　as　the　State　　itself；　became　ridiculous；　and　the　government　should　have　seen　　and　acknowledged　it。
  The　rebellion　being　really　territorial；　and　not　personal；　the　　State　that　seceded　was　no　more　continued　in　the　lo