第 37 节
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公主站记 更新:2021-04-30 17:05 字数:9322
ted States; are the people of the particular States united。 The solidarity of the members constitutes the unity of the body。 The difference between this view and Mr。 Madison's is; that while his view supposes the solidarity to be conventional; originating and existing in compact; or agreement; this supposes it to be real; living; and prior to the convention; as much the work of Providence as the existence in the human body of the living solidarity of its members。 One law; one life; circulates through all the members; constituting them a living organism; binding them in living union; all to each and each to all。
Such is the sovereign people; and so far the original unwritten constitution。 The sovereign; 247 in order to live and act; must have an organ through which be expresses his will。 This organ under the American system; is primarily the Convention。 The convention is the supreme political body; the concrete sovereign authority; and exercises practically the whole sovereign power of the people。 The convention persists always; although not in permanent session。 It can at any time be convened by the ordinary authority of the government; or; in its failure; by a plebiscitum。
Next follows the Government created and constituted by the convention。 The government is constituted in such manner; and has such and only such powers; as the convention ordains。 The government has; in the strict sense; no political authority under the American system; which separates the government from the convention。 All political questions proper; such as the elective franchise; eligibility; the constitution of the several departments of government; as the legislative; the judicial; and the executive; changing; altering; or amending the constitution of government; enlarging; or contracting its powers; in a word; all those questions that arise on which it is necessary to take the immediate orders of the sovereign; belong not to the government; but to the convention; and where the will of the sover… 248 eign is not sufficiently expressed in the constitution; a new appeal to the convention is necessary; and may always be had。 The constitution of Great Britain makes no distinction between the convention and the government。 Theoretically the constitution of Great Britain is feudal; and there is; properly speaking; no British state; there are only the estates; king; lords; and commons; and these three estates constitute the Parliament; which is held to be omnipotent; that is; has the plenitude of political sovereignty。 The British Parliament; composed of the three estates; possesses in itself all the powers of the convention in the American constitution; and is at once the convention and the government。 The imperial constitution of France recognizes no convention; but clothes the senate with certain political functions; which; in some respects; subjects theoretically the sovereign to his creature。 The emperor confessedly holds his power by the grace of God and the will of the nation; which is a clear acknowledgment that the sovereignty vests in the French people as the French state; but the imperial constitution; which is the constitution of the government; not of the state; studies; while acknowledging the sovereignty of the people; to render it nugatory; by 249 transferring it; under various subtle disguises; to the government; and practically to the emperor as chief of the government。 The senate; the council of state; the legislative body; and the emperor; are all creatures of the French state; and have properly no political functions; and to give them such functions is to place the sovereign under his own subjects! The real aim of the imperial constitution is to secure despotic power under the guise of republicanism。 It leaves and is intended to leave the nation no way of practically asserting its sovereignty but by either a revolution or a plebiscitum; and a plebiscitum is permissible only where there is no regular government。
The British constitution is consistent with itself; but imposes no restriction on the power of the government。 The French imperial constitution is illogical; inconsistent with itself as well as with the free action of the nation。 The American constitution has all the advantages of both; and the disadvantages of neither。 The convention is not the government like the British Parliament; nor a creature of the state like the French senate; but the sovereign state itself; in a practical form。 By means of the convention the government is restricted to its delegated powers; and these; if found in practice either 250 too great or too small; can be enlarged or contracted in a regular; orderly way; without resorting to a revolution or to a plebiscitum。 Whatever political grievances there may be; there is always present the sovereign convention competent to redress them。 The efficiency of power is thus secured without danger to liberty; and freedom without danger to power。 The recognition of the convention; the real political sovereign of the country and its separation from and independence of the ordinary government; is one of the most striking features of the American constitution。
The next thing to be noted; after the convention; is the constitution by the convention of the government。 This constitution; as Mr。 Madison well observes; divides the powers conceded by the convention to government between the General Government and the particular State governments。 Strictly speaking; the government is one; and its powers only are divided and exercised by two sets of agents or ministries。 This division of the powers of government could never have been established by the convention if the American people had not been providentially constituted one people; existing and acting through particular State organizations。 Here the unwritten constitution; or the constitution 251 written in the people themselves; rendered practicable and dictated the written constitution; or constitution ordained by the convention and engrossed on parchment。 It only expresses in the government the fact which pre…existed in the national organization and life。
This division of the powers of government is peculiar to the United States; and is an effective safeguard against both feudal disintegration and Roman centralism。 Misled by their prejudices and peculiar interests; a portion of the people of the United States; pleading in their justification the theory of State sovereignty; attempted disintegration; secession; and national independence separate from that of the United States; but the central force of the constitution was too strong for them to succeed。 The unity of the nation was too strong to be effectually broken。 No doubt the reaction against secession and disintegration will strengthen the tendency to centralism; but centralism can succeed no better than disintegration has succeeded because the General government has no subsistentia; no suppositum; to borrow a theological term; outside or independent of the States。 The particular governments are stronger; if there be any difference; to protect the States against centralism than the General government is to protect the 252 Union against disintegration; and after swinging for a time too far toward one extreme and then too far toward the other; the public mind will recover its equilibrium; and the government move on in its constitutional path。
Republican Rome attempted to guard against excessive centralism by the tribunitial veto; or by the organization of a negative or obstructive power。 Mr。 Calhoun thought this admirable; and wished to effect the same end here; where it is secured by other; more effective; and less objectionable means; by a State veto on the acts of Congress; by a dual executive; and by substituting concurrent for numerical majorities。 Imperial Rome gradually swept away the tribunitial veto; concentrated all power in the hands of the emperor; became completely centralized; and fell。 The British constitution seeks the same end by substituting estates for the state; and establishing a mixed government; in which monarchy; aristocracy; and democracy temper; check; or balance each other; but practically the commons estate has become supreme; and the nobility govern not in the house of lords; and can really influence public affairs only through the house of commons。 The principle of the British constitution is not the division of the powers of government; but the an… 253 tagonism of estates; or rather of interests; trusting to the obstructive influence of that antagonism to preserve the government from pure centralism。 Hence the study of the British statesman is to manage diverse and antagonistic parties and interests so as to gain the ability to act; which he can do only by intrigue; cajolery; bribery in one form or another; and corruption of every sort。 The British government cannot be carried on by fair; honest; a