第 46 节
作者:嘟嘟      更新:2021-04-30 16:07      字数:9320
  much beyond what was necessary for the payment of the tax。 The
  final payment; instead of falling upon the shopkeeper; would have
  fallen upon the consumer; with a considerable overcharge to the
  profit of the shopkeeper。 For these reasons the project of a tax
  upon shops was laid aside; and in the room of it was substituted
  the subsidy; 1759。
  What in France is called the personal taille is; perhaps;
  the most important tax upon the profits of stock employed in
  agriculture that is levied in any part of Europe。
  In the disorderly state of Europe during the prevalence of
  the feudal government; the sovereign was obliged to content
  himself with taxing those who were too weak to refuse to pay
  taxes。 The great lords; though willing to assist him upon
  particular emergencies; refused to subject themselves to any
  constant tax; and he was not strong enough to force them。 The
  occupiers of land all over Europe were; the greater part of them;
  originally bondmen。 Through the greater part of Europe they were
  gradually emancipated。 Some of them acquired the property of
  landed estates which they held by some base or ignoble tenure;
  sometimes under the king; and sometimes under some other great
  lord; like the ancient copy…holders of England。 Others without
  acquiring the property; obtained leases for terms of years of the
  lands which they occupied under their lord; and thus became less
  dependent upon him。 The great lords seem to have beheld the
  degree of prosperity and independency which this inferior order
  of men had thus come to enjoy with a malignant and contemptuous
  indignation; and willingly consented that the sovereign should
  tax them。 In some countries this tax was confined to the lands
  which were held in property by an ignoble tenure; and; in this
  case; the taille was said to be real。 The land…tax established by
  the late King of Sardinia; and the taille in the provinces of
  Languedoc; Provence; Dauphine; and Brittany; in the generality of
  Montauban; and in the elections of Agen and Comdom; as well as in
  some other districts of France; are taxes upon lands held in
  property by an ignoble tenure。 In other countries the tax was
  laid upon the supposed profits of all those who held in farm or
  lease lands belonging to other people; whatever might be the
  tenure by which the proprietor held them; and in this case the
  taille was said to be personal。 In the greater part of those
  provinces of France which are called the Countries of Elections
  the taille is of this kind。 The real taille; as it is imposed
  only upon a part of the lands of the country; is necessarily an
  unequal; but it is not always an arbitrary tax; though it is so
  upon some occasions。 The personal taille; as it is intended to be
  proportioned to the profits of a certain class of people which
  can only be guessed at; is necessarily both arbitrary and
  unequal。
  In France the personal taille at present (1775) annually
  imposed upon the twenty generalities called the Countries of
  Elections amounts to 40;107;239 livres; 16 sous。 The proportion
  in which this sum is assessed upon those different provinces
  varies from year to year according to the reports which are made
  to the king's council concerning the goodness or badness of the
  crops; as well as other circumstances which may either increase
  or diminish their respective abilities to pay。 Each generality it
  divided into a certain number of elections; and the proportion in
  which the sum imposed upon the whole generality is divided among
  those different elections varies likewise from year to year
  according to the reports made to the council concerning their
  respective abilities。 It seems impossible that the council; with
  the best intentions; can ever proportion with tolerable exactness
  either of those two assessments to the real abilities of the
  province or district upon which they are respectively laid。
  Ignorance and misinformation must always; more or less; mislead
  the most upright council。 The proportion which each parish ought
  to support of what is assessed upon the whole election; and that
  which each individual ought to support of what is assessed upon
  his particular parish; are both in the same manner varied; from
  year to year; according as circumstances are supposed to require。
  These circumstances are judged of; in the one case; by the
  officers of the election; in the other by those of the parish;
  and both the one and the other are; more or less; under the
  direction and influence of the intendant。 Not only ignorance and
  misinformation; but friendship; party animosity; and private
  resentment are said frequently to mislead such assessors。 No man
  subject to such a tax; it is evident; can ever be certain; before
  he is assessed; of what he is to pay。 He cannot even be certain
  after he is assessed。 If any person has been taxed who ought to
  have been exempted; or if any person has been taxed beyond his
  proportion; though both must pay in the meantime; yet if they
  complain; and make good their complaints; the whole parish is
  reimposed next year in order to reimburse them。 If any of the
  contributors become bankrupt or insolvent; the collector is
  obliged to advance his tax; and the whole parish is reimposed
  next year in order to reimburse the collector。 If the collector
  himself should become bankrupt; the parish which elects him must
  answer for his conduct to the receiver general of the election。
  But; as it might be troublesome for the receiver to prosecute the
  whole parish; he takes at his choice five or six of the richest
  contributors and obliges them to make good what had been lost by
  the insolvency of the collector。 The parish is afterwards
  reimposed in order to reimburse those five or six。 Such
  reimpositions are always over and above the taille of the
  particular year in which they are laid on。
  When a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock in a
  particular branch of trade; the traders are all careful to bring
  no more goods to market than what they can sell at a price
  sufficient to reimburse them for advancing the tax。 Some of them
  withdraw a part of their stocks from the trade; and the market is
  more sparingly supplied than before。 The price of the goods
  rises; and the final payment of the tax falls upon the consumer。
  But when a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock employed in
  agriculture; it is not the interest of the farmers to withdraw
  any part of their stock from that employment。 Each farmer
  occupies a certain quantity of land; for which hi pays rent。 For
  the proper cultivation of this land a certain quantity of stock
  is necessary; and by withdrawing any part of this necessary
  quantity; the farmer is not likely to be more able to pay either
  the rent or the tax。 In order to pay the tax; it can never be his
  interest to diminish the quantity of his produce; nor
  consequently to supply the market more sparingly than before。 The
  tax; therefore; will never enable him to raise the price of his
  produce so as to reimburse himself by throwing the final payment
  upon the consumer。 The farmer; however; must have his reasonable
  profit as well as every other dealer; otherwise he must give up
  the trade。 After the imposition of a tax of this kind; he can get
  this reasonable profit only by paying less rent to the landlord。
  The more he is obliged to pay in the way of tax the less he can
  afford to pay in the way of rent。 A tax of this kind imposed
  during the currency of a lease may; no doubt; distress or ruin
  the farmer。 Upon the renewal of the lease it must always fall
  upon the landlord。
  In the countries where the personal taille takes place; the
  farmer is commonly assessed in proportion to the stock which he
  appears to employ in cultivation。 He is; upon this account;
  frequently afraid to have a good team of horses or oxen; but
  endeavours to cultivate with the meanest and most wretched
  instruments of husbandry that he can。 Such is his distrust in the
  justice of his assessors that he counterfeits poverty; and wishes
  to appear scarce able to pay anything for fear of being obliged
  to pay too much。 By this miserable policy he does not; perhaps;
  always consult his own interest in the most effectual manner; and
  he probably loses more by the diminution of his produce than he
  saves by that of his tax。 Though; in consequence of this wretched
  cultivation; the market is; no doubt; somewhat worse supplied;
  yet the small rise of price which may occasion; as it is not
  likely even to indemnify the farmer for the diminution of his
  produce; it is still less likely to enable him to pay more rent
  to the landlord。 The public; the farmer; the landlord; all suffer
  more or less by this degraded cultivation。 That the personal
  taille tends; in many different ways; to discourage cultivation;
  and consequently to dry up the principal source of the wealth of
  every great country; I have already had occasion to observe in
  the third book of this Inquiry。