charity　of　the　ancient　clergy；　accordingly；　are　said　to　have　been
  very　great。　They　not　only　maintained　almost　the　whole　poor　of
  every　kingdom；　but　many　knights　and　gentlemen　had　frequently　no
  other　means　of　subsistence　than　by　travelling　about　from
  monastery　to　monastery；　under　pretence　of　devotion；　but　in
  reality　to　enjoy　the　hospitality　of　the　clergy。　The　retainers　of
  some　particular　prelates　were　often　as　numerous　as　those　of　the
  greatest　lay…lords；　and　the　retainers　of　all　the　clergy　taken
  together　were；　perhaps；　more　numerous　than　those　of　all　the
  lay…lords。　There　was　always　much　more　union　among　the　clergy　than
  among　the　lay…lords。　The　former　were　under　a　regular　discipline
  and　subordination　to　the　papal　authority。　The　latter　were　under
  no　regular　discipline　or　subordination；　but　almost　always　equally
  jealous　of　one　another；　and　of　the　king。　Though　the　tenants　and
  retainers　of　the　clergy；　therefore；　had　both　together　been　less
  numerous　than　those　of　the　great　lay…lords；　and　their　tenants
  were　probably　much　less　numerous；　yet　their　union　would　have
  rendered　them　more　formidable。　The　hospitality　and　charity　of　the
  clergy；　too；　not　only　gave　them　the　command　of　a　great　temporal
  force；　but　increased　very　much　the　weight　of　their　spiritual
  weapons。　Those　virtues　procured　them　the　highest　respect　and
  veneration　among　all　the　inferior　ranks　of　people；　of　whom　many
  were　constantly；　and　almost　all　occasionally；　fed　by　them。
  Everything　belonging　or　related　to　so　popular　an　order；　its
  possessions；　its　privileges；　its　doctrines；　necessarily　appeared
  sacred　in　the　eyes　of　the　common　people；　and　every　violation　of
  them；　whether　real　or　pretended；　the　highest　act　of　sacrilegious
  wickedness　and　profaneness。　In　this　state　of　things；　if　the
  sovereign　frequently　found　it　difficult　to　resist　the　confederacy
  of　a　few　of　the　great　nobility；　we　cannot　wonder　that　he　should
  find　it　still　more　so　to　resist　the　united　force　of　the　clergy　of
  his　own　dominions；　supported　by　that　of　the　clergy　of　all　the
  neighbouring　dominions。　In　such　circumstances　the　wonder　is；　not
  that　he　was　sometimes　obliged　to　yield；　but　that　he　ever　was　able
  to　resist。
  The　privilege　of　the　clergy　in　those　ancient　times　（which　to
  us　who　live　in　the　present　times　appear　the　most　absurd）；　their
  total　exemption　from　the　secular　jurisdiction；　for　example；　or
  what　in　England　was　called　the　benefit　of　the　clergy；　were　the
  natural　or　rather　the　necessary　consequences　of　this　state　of
  things。　How　dangerous　must　it　have　been　for　the　sovereign　to
  attempt　to　punish　a　clergyman　for　any　crime　whatever；　if　his　own
  order　were　disposed　to　protect　him；　and　to　represent　either　the
  proof　as　insufficient　for　convicting　so　holy　a　man；　or　the
  punishment　as　too　severe　to　be　inflicted　upon　one　whose　person
  had　been　rendered　sacred　by　religion？　The　sovereign　could；　in
  such　circumstances；　do　no　better　than　leave　him　to　be　tried　by
  the　ecclesiastical　courts；　who；　for　the　honour　of　their　own
  order；　were　interested　to　restrain；　as　much　as　possible；　every
  member　of　it　from　committing　enormous　crimes；　or　even　from　giving
  occasion　to　such　gross　scandal　as　might　disgust　the　minds　of　the
  people。
  In　the　state　in　which　things　were　through　the　greater　part
  of　Europe　during　the　tenth；　eleventh；　twelfth；　and　thirteenth
  centuries；　and　for　some　time　both　before　and　after　that　period；
  the　constitution　of　the　Church　of　Rome　may　be　considered　as　the
  most　formidable　combination　that　ever　was　formed　against　the
  authority　and　security　of　civil　government；　as　well　as　against
  the　liberty；　reason；　and　happiness　of　mankind；　which　can　flourish
  only　where　civil　government　is　able　to　protect　them。　In　that
  constitution　the　grossest　delusions　of　superstition　were
  supported　in　such　a　manner　by　the　private　interests　of　so　great　a
  number　of　people　as　put　them　out　of　all　danger　from　any　assault
  of　human　reason：　because　though　human　reason　might　perhaps　have
  been　able　to　unveil；　even　to　the　eyes　of　the　common　people；　some
  of　the　delusions　of　superstition；　it　could　never　have　dissolved
  the　ties　of　private　interest。　Had　this　constitution　been　attacked
  by　no　other　enemies　but　the　feeble　efforts　of　human　reason；　it
  must　have　endured　for　ever。　But　that　immense　and　well…built
  fabric；　which　all　the　wisdom　and　virtue　of　man　could　never　have
  shaken；　much　less　have　overturned；　was　by　the　natural　course　of
  things；　first　weakened；　and　afterwards　in　part　destroyed；　and　is
  now　likely；　in　the　course　of　a　few　centuries　more；　perhaps；　to
  crumble　into　ruins　altogether。
  The　gradual　improvements　of　arts；　manufactures；　and
  commerce；　the　same　causes　which　destroyed　the　power　of　the　great
  barons；　destroyed　in　the　same　manner；　through　the　greater　part　of
  Europe；　the　whole　temporal　power　of　the　clergy。　In　the　produce　of
  arts；　manufactures；　and　commerce；　the　clergy；　like　the　great
  barons；　found　something　for　which　they　could　exchange　their　rude
  produce；　and　thereby　discovered　the　means　of　spending　their　whole
  revenues　upon　their　own　persons；　without　giving　any　considerable
  share　of　them　to　other　people。　Their　charity　became　gradually
  less　extensive；　their　hospitality　less　liberal　or　less　profuse。
  Their　retainers　became　consequently　less　numerous；　and　by　degrees
  dwindled　away　altogether。　The　clergy　too；　like　the　great　barons；
  wished　to　get　a　better　rent　from　their　landed　estates；　in　order
  to　spend　it；　in　the　same　manner；　upon　the　gratification　of　their
  own　private　vanity　and　folly。　But　this　increase　of　rent　could　be
  got　only　by　granting　leases　to　their　tenants；　who　thereby　became
  in　a　great　measure　independent　of　them。　The　ties　of　interest
  which　bound　the　inferior　ranks　of　people　to　the　clergy　were　in
  this　manner　gradually　broken　and　dissolved。　They　were　even　broken
  and　dissolved　sooner　than　those　which　bound　the　same　ranks　of
  people　to　the　great　barons：　because　the　benefices　of　the　church
  being；　the　greater　part　of　them；　much　smaller　than　the　estates　of
  the　great　barons；　the　possessor　of　each　benefice　was　much　sooner
  able　to　spend　the　whole　of　its　revenue　upon　his　own　person。
  During　the　greater　part　of　the　fourteenth　and　fifteenth　centuries
  the　power　of　the　great　barons　was；　through　the　greater　part　of
  Europe；　in　full　vigour。　But　the　temporal　power　of　the　clergy；　the
  absolute　command　which　they　had　once　had　over　the　great　body　of
  the　people；　was　very　much　decayed。　The　power　of　the　church　was　by
  that　time　very　nearly　reduced　through　the　greater　part　of　Europe
  to　what　arose　from　her　spiritual　authority；　and　even　that
  spiritual　authority　was　much　weakened　when　it　ceased　to　be
  supported　by　the　charity　and　hospitality　of　the　clergy。　The
  inferior　ranks　of　people　no　longer　looked　upon　that　order；　as
  they　had　done　before；　as　the　comforters　of　their　distress；　and
  the　relievers　of　their　indigence。　On　the　contrary；　they　were
  provoked　and　disgusted　by　the　vanity；　luxury；　and　expense　of　the
  richer　clergy；　who　appeared　to　spend　upon　their　own　pleasures
  what　had　always　before　been　regarded　as　the　patrimony　of　the
  poor。
  In　this　situation　of　things；　the　sovereigns　in　the　different
  states　of　Europe　endeavoured　to　recover　the　influence　which　they
  had　once　had　in　the　disposal　of　the　great　benefices　of　the
  church；　by　procuring　to　the　deans　and　chapters　of　each　diocese
  the　restoration　of　their　ancient　right　of　electing　the　bishop；
  and　to　the　monks　of　each　abbacy　that　of　electing　the　abbot。　The
  re…establishing　of　this　ancient　order　was　the　object　of　several
  statutes　enacted　in　England　during　the　course　of　the　fourteenth
  century；　particularly　of　what　is　called　the　Statute　of　Provisors；
  and　of　the　Pragmatic　Sanction　established　in　France　in　the
  fifteenth　century。　In　order　to　render　the　election　valid；　it　was
  necessary　that　the　sovereign　should　both　consent　to　it
  beforehand；　and　afterwards　approve　of　the　person　elected；　and
  though　the　election　was　still　supposed　to　be　free；　he　had；
  however；　all　the　indirect　means　which　his　situation　necessarily
  afforded　him　of　influencing　the　clergy　in　his　own　dominions。
  Other　regulations　of　a　similar　tendency　were　established　in　other
  parts　of　Europe。　But　the　power　of　the　pope　in　the　collation　of
  the　great　benefices　of　the　church　seems；　before　the　Reformation；
  to　have　been　nowhere　so　effectually　and　so　universally　restrained
  as　in　France　and　England。　The　Concordat　afterwards；　in　the
  sixteenth　century；　gave　to　the　kings　of　France　the　absolute　right
  of　presenting　to　all　the　great；　or　what　are　called　the
  consistorial；　benefices　of　the　Gallican　Church。
  Since　the　establishment　of　the　Pragmatic　Sanction　and　of　the
  Concordat；　the　clergy　of　France　have　in　general　shown　less
  respect　to　the　decrees　of　the　papal　court　than　the　clergy　of　any
  other　Catholic　country。　In　all　the　disputes　which　their　sovereign
  has　had　with　the　pope；　they　have　almost　constantly　taken　party
  with　the　former。　This　independency　of　the　clergy　of　France　up