judges　indeed　might；　in　this　case；　be　under　the　temptation　of
  multiplying　unnecessarily　the　proceedings　upon　every　cause；　in
  order　to　increase；　as　much　as　possible；　the　produce　of　such　a
  stamp…duty。　It　has　been　the　custom　in　modern　Europe　to　regulate；
  upon　most　occasions；　the　payment　of　the　attorneys　and　clerks　of
  court　according　to　the　number　of　pages　which　they　had　occasion　to
  write；　the　court；　however；　requiring　that　each　page　should
  contain　so　many　lines；　and　each　line　so　many　words。　In　order　to
  increase　their　payment；　the　attorneys　and　clerks　have　contrived
  to　multiply　words　beyond　all　necessity；　to　the　corruption　of　the
  law　language　of；　I　believe；　every　court　of　justice　in　Europe。　A
  like　temptation　might　perhaps　occasion　a　like　corruption　in　the
  form　of　law　proceedings。
  But　whether　the　administration　of　justice　be　so　contrived　as
  to　defray　its　own　expense；　or　whether　the　judges　be　maintained　by
  fixed　salaries　paid　to　them　from　some　other　fund；　it　does　not
  seem　necessary　that　the　person　or　persons　entrusted　with　the
  executive　power　should　be　charged　with　the　management　of　that
  fund；　or　with　the　payment　of　those　salaries。　That　fund　might
  arise　from　the　rent　of　landed　estates；　the　management　of　each
  estate　being　entrusted　to　the　particular　court　which　was　to　be
  maintained　by　it。　That　fund　might　arise　even　from　the　interest　of
  a　sum　of　money；　the　lending　out　of　which　might；　in　the　same
  manner；　be　entrusted　to　the　court　which　was　to　be　maintained　by
  it。　A　part；　though　indeed　but　a　small　part；　of　the　salary　of　the
  judges　of　the　Court　of　Session　in　Scotland　arises　from　the
  interest　of　a　sum　of　money。　The　necessary　instability　of　such　a
  fund　seems；　however；　to　render　it　an　improper　one　for　the
  maintenance　of　an　institution　which　ought　to　last　for　ever。
  The　separation　of　the　judicial　from　the　executive　power
  seems　originally　to　have　arisen　from　the　increasing　business　of
  the　society；　in　consequence　of　its　increasing　improvement。　The
  administration　of　justice　became　so　laborious　and　so　complicated
  a　duty　as　to　require　the　undivided　attention　of　the　persons　to
  whom　it　was　entrusted。　The　person　entrusted　with　the　executive
  power　not　having　leisure　to　attend　to　the　decision　of　private
  causes　himself；　a　deputy　was　appointed　to　decide　them　in　his
  stead。　In　the　progress　of　the　Roman　greatness；　the　consul　was　too
  much　occupied　with　the　political　affairs　of　the　state　to　attend
  to　the　administration　of　justice。　A　praetor；　therefore；　was
  appointed　to　administer　it　in　his　stead。　In　the　progress　of　the
  European　monarchies　which　were　founded　upon　the　ruins　of　the
  Roman　empire；　the　sovereigns　and　the　great　lords　came　universally
  to　consider　the　administration　of　justice　as　an　office　both　too
  laborious　and　too　ignoble　for　them　to　execute　in　their　own
  persons。　They　universally；　therefore；　discharged　themselves　of　it
  by　appointing　a　deputy；　bailiff；　or　judge。
  When　the　judicial　is　united　to　the　executive　power；　it　is
  scarce　possible　that　justice　should　not　frequently　be　sacrificed
  to　what　is　vulgarly　called　polities。　The　persons　entrusted　with
  the　great　interests　of　the　state　may；　even　without　any　corrupt
  views；　sometimes　imagine　it　necessary　to　sacrifice　to　those
  interests　the　rights　of　a　private　man。　But　upon　the　impartial
  administration　of　justice　depends　the　liberty　of　every
  individual；　the　sense　which　he　has　of　his　own　security。　In　order
  to　make　every　individual　feel　himself　perfectly　secure　in　the
  possession　of　every　right　which　belongs　to　him；　it　is　not　only
  necessary　that　the　judicial　should　be　separated　from　the
  executive　power；　but　that　it　should　be　rendered　as　much　as
  possible　independent　of　that　power。　The　judge　should　not　be
  liable　to　be　removed　from　his　office　according　to　the　caprice　of
  that　power。　The　regular　the　good…will　or　even　upon　the　good
  economy　payment　of　his　salary　should　not　depend　upon　of　that
  power。
  PART　3
  Of　the　Expense　of　Public　Works　and　Public　Institutions
  THE　third　and　last　duty　of　the　sovereign　or　commonwealth　is
  that　of　erecting　and　maintaining　those　public　institutions　and
  those　public　works；　which；　though　they　may　be　in　the　highest
  degree　advantageous　to　a　great　society；　are；　however；　of　such　a
  nature　that　the　profit　could　never　repay　the　expense　to　any
  individual　or　small　number　of　individuals；　and　which　it　therefore
  cannot　be　expected　that　any　individual　or　small　number　of
  individuals　should　erect　or　maintain。　The　performance　of　this
  duty　requires；　too；　very　different　degrees　of　expense　in　the
  different　periods　of　society。
  After　the　public　institutions　and　public　works　necessary　for
  the　defence　of　the　society；　and　for　the　administration　of
  justice；　both　of　which　have　already　been　mentioned；　the　other
  works　and　institutions　of　this　kind　are　chiefly　those　for
  facilitating　the　commerce　of　the　society；　and　those　for　promoting
  the　instruction　of　the　people。　The　institutions　for　instruction
  are　of　two　kinds：　those　for　the　education　of　youth；　and　those　for
  the　instruction　of　people　of　all　ages。　The　consideration　of　the
  manner　in　which　the　expense　of　those　different　sorts　of　public；
  works　and　institutions　may　be　most　properly　defrayed　will　divide
  this　third　part　of　the　present　chapter　into　three　different
  articles。
  ARTICLE　1
  Of　the　Public　Works　and　Institutions　for　facilitating　the
  Commerce　of　the　Society
  And；　first；　of　those　which　are　necessary　for　facilitating
  Commerce　in　general。
  That　the　erection　and　maintenance　of　the　public　works　which
  facilitate　the　commerce　of　any　country；　such　as　good　roads；
  bridges；　navigable　canals；　harbours；　etc。；　must　require　very
  different　degrees　of　expense　in　the　different　periods　of　society
  is　evident　without　any　proof。　The　expense　of　making　and
  maintaining　the　public　roads　of　any　country　must　evidently
  increase　with　the　annual　produce　of　the　land　and　labour　of　that
  country；　or　with　the　quantity　and　weight　of　the　goods　which　it
  becomes　necessary　to　fetch　and　carry　upon　those　roads。　The
  strength　of　a　bridge　must　be　suited　to　the　number　and　weight　of
  the　carriages　which　are　likely　to　pass　over　it。　The　depth　and　the
  supply　of　water　for　a　navigable　canal　must　be　proportioned　to　the
  number　and　tonnage　of　the　lighters　which　are　likely　to　carry
  goods　upon　it；　the　extent　of　a　harbour　to　the　number　of　the
  shipping　which　are　likely　to　take　shelter　in　it。
  It　does　not　seem　necessary　that　the　expense　of　those　public
  works　should　be　defrayed　from　that　public　revenue；　as　it　is
  commonly　called；　of　which　the　collection　and　application　is　in
  most　countries　assigned　to　the　executive　power。　The　greater　part
  of　such　public　works　may　easily　be　so　managed　as　to　afford　a
  particular　revenue　sufficient　for　defraying　their　own　expense；
  without　bringing　any　burden　upon　the　general　revenue　of　the
  society。
  A　highway；　a　bridge；　a　navigable　canal；　for　example；　may　in
  most　cases　be　both　made　and　maintained　by　a　small　toll　upon　the
  carriages　which　make　use　of　them：　a　harbour；　by　a　moderate
  port…duty　upon　the　tonnage　of　the　shipping　which　load　or　unload
  in　it。　The　coinage；　another　institution　for　facilitating
  commerce；　in　many　countries；　not　only　defrays　its　own　expense；
  but　affords　a　small　revenue　or　seignorage　to　the　sovereign。　The
  post…office；　another　institution　for　the　same　purpose；　over　and
  above　defraying　its　own　expense；　affords　in　almost　all　countries
  a　very　considerable　revenue　to　the　sovereign。
  When　the　carriages　which　pass　over　a　highway　or　a　bridge；
  and　the　lighters　which　sail　upon　a　navigable　canal；　pay　toll　in
  proportion　to　their　weight　or　their　tonnage；　they　pay　for　the
  maintenance　of　those　public　works　exactly　in　proportion　to　the
  wear　and　tear　which　they　occasion　of　them。　It　seems　scarce
  possible　to　invent　a　more　equitable　way　of　maintaining　such
  works。　This　tax　or　toll　too；　though　it　is　advanced　by　the
  carrier；　is　finally　paid　by　the　consumer；　to　whom　it　must　always
  be　charged　in　the　price　of　the　goods。　As　the　expense　of　carriage；
  however；　is　very　much　reduced　by　means　of　such　public　works；　the
  goods；　notwithstanding　the　toll　come　cheaper　to　the　consumer　than
  the；　could　otherwise　have　done；　their　price　not　being　so　much
  raised　by　the　toll　as　it　is　lowered　by　the　cheapness　of　the
  carriage。　The　person　who　finally　pays　this　tax；　therefore；　gains
  by　the　application　more　than　he　loses　by　the　payment　of　it。　His
  payment　is　exactly　in　proportion　to　his　gain。　It　is　in　reality　no
  more　than　a　part　of　that　gain　which　he　is　obliged　to　give　up　in
  order　to　get　the　rest。　It　seems　impossible　to　imagine　a　more
  equitable　method　of　raising　a　tax。
  When　the　toll　upon　carriages　of　luxury　upon　coaches；
  post…chaises；　etc。；　is　made　somewhat　higher　in　proportion　to
  their　weight　than　upon　carriages　of　necessary　use；　such　as　carts；