whom　wealth　is　likely　to　continue　longer　in　the　same　families。
  Birth　and　fortune　are　evidently　the　two　circumstances　which
  principally　set　one　man　above　another。　They　are　the　two　great
  sources　of　personal　distinction；　and　are　therefore　the　principal
  causes　which　naturally　establish　authority　and　subordination
  among　men。　Among　nations　of　shepherds　both　those　causes　operate
  with　their　full　force。　The　great　shepherd　or　herdsman；　respected
  on　account　of　his　great　wealth；　and　of　the　great　number　of　those
  who　depend　upon　him　for　subsistence；　and　revered　on　account　of
  the　nobleness　of　his　birth；　and　of　the　immemorial　antiquity　of
  his　illustrious　family；　has　a　natural　authority　over　all　the
  inferior　shepherds　or　herdsmen　of　his　horde　or　clan。　He　can
  command　the　united　force　of　a　greater　number　of　people　than　any
  of　them。　His　military　power　is　greater　than　that　of　any　of　them。
  In　time　of　war　they　are　all　of　them　naturally　disposed　to　muster
  themselves　under　his　banner；　rather　than　under　that　of　any　other
  person；　and　his　birth　and　fortune　thus　naturally　procure　to　him
  some　sort　of　executive　power。　By　commanding；　too；　the　united
  force　of　a　greater　number　of　people　than　any　of　them；　he　is　best
  able　to　compel　any　one　of　them　who　may　have　injured　another　to
  compensate　the　wrong。　He　is　the　person；　therefore；　to　whom　all
  those　who　are　too　weak　to　defend　themselves　naturally　look　up　for
  protection。　It　is　to　him　that　they　naturally　complain　of　the
  injuries　which　they　imagine　have　been　done　to　them；　and　his
  interposition　in　such　cases　is　more　easily　submitted　to；　even　by
  the　person　complained　of；　than　that　of　any　other　person　would　be。
  His　birth　and　fortune　thus　naturally　procure　him　some　sort　of
  judicial　authority。
  It　is　in　the　age　of　shepherds；　in　the　second　period　of
  society；　that　the　inequality　of　fortune　first　begins　to　take
  place；　and　introduces　among　men　a　degree　of　authority　and
  subordination　which　could　not　possibly　exist　before。　It　thereby
  introduces　some　degree　of　that　civil　government　which　is
  indispensably　necessary　for　its　own　preservation：　and　it　seems　to
  do　this　naturally；　and　even　independent　of　the　consideration　of
  that　necessity。　The　consideration　of　that　necessity　comes　no
  doubt　afterwards　to　contribute　very　much　to　maintain　and　secure
  that　authority　and　subordination。　The　rich；　in　particular；　are
  necessarily　interested　to　support　that　order　of　things　which　can
  alone　secure　them　in　the　possession　of　their　own　advantages。　Men
  of　inferior　wealth　combine　to　defend　those　of　superior　wealth　in
  the　possession　of　their　property；　in　order　that　men　of　superior
  wealth　may　combine　to　defend　them　in　the　possession　of　theirs。
  All　the　inferior　shepherds　and　herdsmen　feel　that　the　security　of
  their　own　herds　and　flocks　depends　upon　the　security　of　those　of
  the　great　shepherd　or　herdsman；　that　the　maintenance　of　their
  lesser　authority　depends　upon　that　of　his　greater　authority；　and
  that　upon　their　subordination　to　him　depends　his　power　of　keeping
  their　inferiors　in　subordination　to　them。　They　constitute　a　sort
  of　little　nobility；　who　feel　themselves　interested　to　defend　the
  property　and　to　support　the　authority　of　their　own　little
  sovereign　in　order　that　he　may　be　able　to　defend　their　property
  and　to　support　their　authority。　Civil　government；　so　far　as　it　is
  instituted　for　the　security　of　property；　is　in　reality　instituted
  for　the　defence　of　the　rich　against　the　poor；　or　of　those　who
  have　some　property　against　those　who　have　none　at　all。
  The　judicial　authority　of　such　a　sovereign；　however；　far
  from　being　a　cause　of　expense；　was　for　a　long　time　a　source　of
  revenue　to　him。　The　persons　who　applied　to　him　for　justice　were
  always　willing　to　pay　for　it；　and　a　present　never　failed　to
  accompany　a　petition。　After　the　authority　of　the　sovereign；　too；
  was　thoroughly　established；　the　person　found　guilty；　over　and
  above　the　satisfaction　which　he　was　obliged　to　make　to　the　party；
  was　likewise　forced　to　pay　an　amercement　to　the　sovereign。　He　had
  given　trouble；　he　had　disturbed；　he　had　broke　the　peace　of　his
  lord　the　king；　and　for　those　offences　an　amercement　was　thought
  due。　In　the　Tartar　governments　of　Asia；　in　the　governments　of
  Europe　which　were　founded　by　the　German　and　Scythian　nations　who
  overturned　the　Roman　empire；　the　administration　of　justice　was　a
  considerable　source　of　revenue；　both　to　the　sovereign　and　to　all
  the　lesser　chiefs　or　lords　who　exercised　under　him　any　particular
  jurisdiction；　either　over　some　particular　tribe　or　clan；　or　over
  some　particular　territory　or　district。　Originally　both　the
  sovereign　and　the　inferior　chiefs　used　to　exercise　this
  jurisdiction　in　their　own　persons。　Afterwards　they　universally
  found　it　convenient　to　delegate　it　to　some　substitute；　bailiff；
  or　judge。　This　substitute；　however；　was　still　obliged　to　account
  to　his　principal　or　constituent　for　the　profits　of　the
  jurisdiction。　Whoever　reads　the　instructions　which　were　given　to
  the　judges　of　the　circuit　in　the　time　of　Henry　II　will　see
  clearly　that　those　judges　were　a　sort　of　itinerant　factors；　sent
  round　the　country　for　the　purpose　of　levying　certain　branches　of
  the　king's　revenue。　In　those　days　the　administration　of　justice
  not　only　afforded　a　certain　revenue　to　the　sovereign；　but　to
  procure　this　revenue　seems　to　have　been　one　of　the　principal
  advantages　which　he　proposed　to　obtain　by　the　administration　of
  justice。
  This　scheme　of　making　the　administration　of　justice
  subservient　to　the　purposes　of　revenue　could　scarce　fail　to　be
  productive　of　several　very　gross　abuses。　The　person　who　applied
  for　justice　with　a　large　present　in　his　hand　was　likely　to　get
  something　more　than　justice；　while　he　who　applied　for　it　with　a
  small　one　was　likely　to　get　something　less。　Justice；　too；　might
  frequently　be　delayed　in　order　that　this　present　might　be
  repeated。　The　amercement；　besides；　of　the　person　complained　of；
  might　frequently　suggest　a　very　strong　reason　for　finding　him　in
  the　wrong；　even　when　he　had　not　really　been　so。　That　such　abuses
  were　far　from　being　uncommon　the　ancient　history　of　every　country
  in　Europe　bears　witness。
  When　the　sovereign　or　chief　exercised　his　judicial　authority
  in　his　own　person；　how　much　soever　he　might　abuse　it；　it　must
  have　been　scarce　possible　to　get　any　redress；　because　there　could
  seldom　be　anybody　powerful　enough　to　call　him　to　account。　When　he
  exercised　it　by　a　bailiff；　indeed；　redress　might　sometimes　be
  had。　If　it　was　for　his　own　benefit　only　that　the　bailiff　had　been
  guilty　of　any　act　of　injustice；　the　sovereign　himself　might　not
  always　be　unwilling　to　punish　him；　or　to　oblige　him　to　repair　the
  wrong。　But　if　it　was　for　the　benefit　of　his　sovereign；　if　it　was
  in　order　to　make　court　to　the　person　who　appointed　him　and　who
  might　prefer　him；　that　he　had　committed　any　act　of　oppression；
  redress　would　upon　most　occasions　be　as　impossible　as　if　the
  sovereign　had　committed　it　himself。　In　all　barbarous　governments；
  accordingly；　in　all　those　ancient　governments　of　Europe　in
  particular　which　were　founded　upon　the　ruins　of　the　Roman　empire；
  the　administration　of　justice　appears　for　a　long　time　to　have
  been　extremely　corrupt；　far　from　being　quite　equal　and　impartial
  even　under　the　best　monarchs；　and　altogether　profligate　under　the
  worst。
  Among　nations　of　shepherds；　where　the　sovereign　or　chief　is
  only　the　greatest　shepherd　or　herdsman　of　the　horde　or　clan；　he
  is　maintained　in　the　same　manner　as　any　of　his　vassals　or
  subjects；　by　the　increase　of　his　own　herds　or　flocks。　Among　those
  nations　of　husbandmen　who　are　but　just　come　out　of　the　shepherd
  state；　and　who　are　not　much　advanced　beyond　that　state；　such　as
  the　Greek　tribes　appear　to　have　been　about　the　time　of　the　Trojan
  war；　and　our　German　and　Scythian　ancestors　when　they　first
  settled　upon　the　ruins　of　the　western　empire；　the　sovereign　or
  chief　is；　in　the　same　manner；　only　the　greatest　landlord　of　the
  country；　and　is　maintained；　in　the　same　manner　as　any　other
  landlord；　by　a　revenue　derived　from　his　own　private　estate；　or
  from　what；　in　modern　Europe；　was　called　the　demesne　of　the　crown。
  His　subjects；　upon　ordinary　occasions；　contributed　nothing　to　his
  support；　except　when；　in　order　to　protect　them　from　the
  oppression　of　some　of　their　fellow…subjects；　they　stand　in　need
  of　his　authority。　The　presents　which　they　make　him　upon　such
  occasions　constitute　the　whole　ordinary　revenue；　the　whole　of　the
  emoluments　which；　except　perhaps　upon　some　very　extraordinary
  emergencies；　he　derives　from　his　dominion　over　them。　When
  Agamemnon；　in　Homer；　offers　to　Achilles　for　his　friendship　the
  sovereignty　of　seven　Greek　cities；　the　sole　advantage　which　he
  mentions　as　likely　to　be　derived　from　it　was　that　the　people
  would　honour　him　with　presents。　As　long　as　such　presents；　as　long
  as　the　emoluments　of　justice；　or　what　may　be　called　the　fees　of
  court；　constituted　in　this　manner　the　w