considerable　loss。　　It　was　nearly　mid…day　before　a　passage　through
  Charleroi　was　secured　by　the　French　army；　and　General　Zieten　continued
  his　retreat　upon　Fleurus；　where　he　took　up　his　position　for　the　night。
  Upon　Zieten's　abandoning；　in　the　course　of　his　retreat；　the　chaussee
  which　leads　to　Brussels　through　Quatre　Bras；　Marshal　Ney；　who　had　only
  just　been　put　in　command　on　the　left　of　the　French　army；　was　ordered　to
  advance　by　this　road　upon　Gosselies；　and　found　at　Frasnes　part　of　the
  Duke　of　Wellington's　army；　composed　of　Nassau　troops　under　the　command　of
  Prince　Bernard　of　Saxe…Weimar；　who；　after　some　skirmishing；　maintained
  his　position。　　〃Notwithstanding　all　the　exertions　of　the　French　at　a
  moment　when　time　was　of　such　importance；　they　had　only　been　able　to
  advance　about　fifteen　English　miles　during　the　day；　with　nearly　fifteen
  hours　of　daylight。〃
  It　was　the　intention　of　Napoleon　during　his　operations　on　this　day　to
  effect　a　separation　between　the　English　and　Prussian　armies；　in　which　he
  had　nearly　succeeded。　　Napoleon's　plan　for　this　purpose；　and　the
  execution　of　it　by　his　army；　were　alike　admirable；　but　it　is　hardly
  probable　that　the　Allied　generals　were　taken　by　surprise；　as　it　was　the
  only　likely　course　which　Napoleon　could　have　taken。　　His　line　of
  operation　was　on　the　direct　road　to　Brussels；　and　there　were　no　fortified
  works　to　impede　his　progress；　while　from　the　nature　of　the　country　his
  numerous　and　excellent　cavalry　could　be　employed　with　great　effect。
  In　the　French　accounts　Marshal　Ney　was　much　blamed　for　not　occupying
  Quatre　Bras　with　the　whole　of　his　force　on　the　evening　of　the　16th。　　〃Ney
  might　probably　have　driven　back　the　Nassau　troops　at　Quatre　Bras；　and
  occupied　that　important　position；　but　hearing　a　heavy　cannonade　on　his
  right　flank；　where　General　Zieten　had　taken　up　his　position；　he　thought
  it　necessary　to　halt　and　detach　a　division　in　the　direction　of　Fleurus。
  He　was　severely　censured　by　Napoleon　for　not　having　literally　followed
  his　orders　and　pushed　on　to　Quatre　Bras。〃　　This　accusation　forms　a
  curious　contrast　with　that　made　against　Grouchy；　upon　whom　Napoleon　threw
  the　blame　of　the　defeat　at　Waterloo；　because　he　strictly　fulfilled　his
  orders；　by　pressing　the　Prussians　at　Wavre；　unheeding　the　cannonade　on
  his　left；　which　might　have　led　him　to　conjecture　that　the　more　important
  contest　between　the　Emperor　and　Wellington　was　at　that　moment　raging。
  It　was　at　six　o'clock　in　the　evening　of　the　16th　that　the　Drake　of
  Wellington　received　the　first　information　of　the　advance　of　the　French
  army；　but　it　was　not；　however；　until　ten　o'clock　that　positive　news
  reached　him　that　the　French　army　had　moved　upon　the　line　of　the　Sambre。
  This　information　induced　him　to　push　forward　reinforcements　on　Quatre
  Bras；　at　which　place　he　himself　arrived　at　an　early　hour　on　the　16th；　and
  immediately　proceeded　to　Bry；　to　devise　measures　with　Marshal　Blucher　in
  order　to　combine　their　efforts。　　From　the　movement　of　considerable　masses
  of　the　French　in　front　of　the　Prussians　it　was　evident　that　their　first
  grand　attack　would　be　directed　against　them。　　That　this　was　Napoleon's
  object　on　the　16th　maybe　seen　by　his　orders　to　Ney　and　Grouchy　to　turn
  the　right　of　the　Prussians；　and　drive　the　British　from　their　position　at
  Quatre　Bras；　and　then　to　march　down　the　chaussee　upon　Bry　in　order
  effectually　to　separate　the　two　armies。　　Ney　was　accordingly　detached　for
  this　purpose　with　43；000　men。　　In　the　event　of　the　success　of　Marshal　Ney
  he　would　have　been　enabled　to　detach　a　portion　of　his　forces　for　the
  purpose　of　making　a　flank　attack　upon　the　Prussians　in　the　rear　of　St。
  Amend；　whilst　Napoleon　in　person　was　directing　his　main　efforts　against
  that　village　the　strongest　in　the　Prussian　position。　　Ney's　reserve　was
  at　Frasnes；　disposable　either　for　the　purpose　of　supporting　the　attack　on
  Quatre　Bras　or　that　at　St。　Amand；　and　in　case　of　Ney's　complete　success
  to　turn　the　Prussian　right　flank　by　marching　on　Bry。
  CHAPTER　IX。
  1815
  THE　BATTLE　OF　WATERLOO。
  One　of　the　most　important　struggles　of　modern　times　was　now　about　to
  commencea　struggle　which　for　many　years　was　to　decide　the　fate　of
  Europe。　　Napoleon　and　Wellington　at　length　stood　opposite　one　another。
  They　had　never　met；　the　military　reputation　of　each　was　of　the　highest
  kind；
  ＇For　full　details　of　the　Waterloo　campaign　see　Siborne's　History
  of　the　War　in　France　and　Belgium　in　1815；　giving　the　English
  contemporary　account；　Chesney's　Waterloo　Lectures；　the　best　English
  modern　account；　which　has　been　accepted　by　the　Prussians　as　pretty
  nearly　representing　their　view；　and　Waterloo　by　Lieutenant…Colonel
  Prince　Edouard　de　la　Tour　d'Auvergne　（Paris；　Plon；　1870）；　which　may
  be　taken　as　the　French　modern　account。
  In　judging　this　campaign　the　reader　must　guard　himself　from　looking
  on　it　as　fought　by　two　different　armies…the　English　and　the
  Prussian…whose　achievements　are　to　be　weighed　against　one　another。
  Wellington　and　Blucher　were　acting　in　a　complete　unison　rare　even
  when　two　different　corps　of　the　same　nation　are　concerned；　but
  practically　unexampled　in　the　case　of　two　armies　of　different
  nations。　　Thus　the　two　forces　became　one　army；　divided　into　two
  wings；　one；　the　left　（or　Prussian　wing）　having　been　defeated　by　the
  main　body　of　the　French　at　Ligny　on　the　16th　of　June；　the　right　（or
  English　wing）　retreated　to　hold　the　position　at　Waterloo；　where　the
  left　（or　Prussian　wing）　was　to　join　it；　and　the　united　force　was　to
  crash　the　enemy。　　Thus　there　is　no　question　as　to　whether　the
  Prussian　army　saved　the　English　by　their　arrival；　or　whether　the
  English　saved　the　Prussians　by　their　resistance　at　Waterloo。　　Each
  army　executed　well　and　gallantly　its　part　in　a　concerted　operation。
  The　English　would　never　have　fought　at　Waterloo　if　they　had　not
  relied　on　the　arrival　of　the　Prussians。　　Had　the　Prussians　not　come
  up　on　the　afternoon　of　the　18th　of　June　the　English　would　have　been
  exposed　to　the　same　great　peril　of　having　alone　to　deal　with　the
  mass　of　the　French　army；　as　the　Prussians　would　have　had　to　face　if
  they　had　found　the　English　in　full　retreat。　　To　investigate　the
  relative　performances　of　the　two　armies　is　lunch　the　same　as　to
  decide　the　respective　merits　of　the　two　Prussian　armies　at　Sadowa；
  where　one　held　the　Austrians　until　the　other　arrived。　　Also　in
  reading　the　many　interesting　personal　accounts　of　the　campaign　it
  most　be　remembered　that　opinions　about　the　chance　of　success　in　a
  defensive　struggle　are　apt　to　warp　with　the　observer's　position；　as
  indeed　General　Grant　has　remarked　in　answer　to　criticisms　on　his
  army's　state　at　the　end　of　the　first　day　of　the　battle　of　Shiloh　or
  'Pittsburg　Landing。　　The　man　placed　in　the　front　rank　or　fighting
  line　sees　attack　after　attack　beaten　off。　　He　sees　only　part　of　his
  own　losses；　am　most　of　the　wounded　disappear；　and　he　also　knows
  something　of　the　enemy's　loss　by　seeing　the　dead　in　front　of　him。
  Warmed　by　the　contest；　he　thus　believes　in　success。　　The　man　placed
  in　rear　or　advancing　with　reinforcements；　having　nothing　of　the
  excitement　of　the　struggle；　sees　only　the　long　and　increasing　column
  of　wounded；　stragglers；　and　perhaps　of　fliers。　　He　sees　his
  companion　fall　without　being　able　to　answer　the　fire。　　He　sees
  nothing　of　the　corresponding　loss　of　the　enemy；　and　he　is　apt　to
  take　a　most　desponding　view　of　the　situation。　　Thus　Englishmen
  reading　the　accounts　of　men　who　fought　at　Waterloo　are　too　ready　to
  disbelieve　representations　of　what　was　taking　place　in　the　rear　of
  the　army；　and　to　think　Thackeray's　life…like　picture　in　Vanity　Fair
  of　the　state　of　Brussels　must　be　overdrawn。　　Indeed；　in　this　very
  battle　of　Waterloo；　Zieten　began　to　retreat　when　his　help　was　most
  required；　because　one　of　his　aides　de　camp　told　him　that　the　right
  wing　of　the　English　was　in　full　retreat。　　〃This　inexperienced　young
  man；〃　says　Muffling；　p。　248；　〃had　mistaken　the　great　number　of
  wounded　going；　or　being　taken；　to　the　rear　to　be　dressed；　for
  fugitives；　and　accordingly　made　a　false　report。〃　　Further；　reserves
  do　not　say　much　of　their　part　or；　sometimes；　no　part　of　the　fight；
  and　few　people　know　that　at　least　two　English　regiments　actually
  present　on　the　field　of　Waterloo　hardly　fired　a　shot　till　the　last
  advance。
  The　Duke　described　the　army　as　the　worst　he　ever　commanded；　and　said
  that　if　he　had　had　his　Peninsular　men；　the　fight　would　have　been
  over　much　sooner。　　But　the　Duke；　sticking　to　ideas　now　obsolete；　had
  no　picked　corps。　　Each　man；　trusting　in　and　trusted　by　his　comrades；
  fought　under　his　own　officers　and　under　his　own　regimental　colours。
  Whatever　they　did　not　know；　the　men　knew　how　to　die；　and　at　the　end
  of　the　day　a　heap　of　dead　told　where　each　regiment　and　battery　had
  stood。＇
  the　career　of　both　had　been　marked　by　signal　victory；　Napoleon　had
  carried　his　triumphant　legions