once　more　from　beginning　to　end；　all；　with　the　exception　of　5；　　6
  and　7；　being　different　from　those　previously　given。　　Though　it　is
  impossible　to　account　for　the　present　state　of　Sun　Tzu's　text；　　a
  few　suggestive　facts　maybe　brought　into　prominence：　　　（1）　　Chap。
  VIII；　　according　to　the　title；　should　deal　with　nine　variations；
  whereas　only　five　appear。　　（2）　It　is　an　abnormally　short　chapter。
  （3）　Chap。　XI　is　entitled　The　Nine　Grounds。　　Several　of　these　are
  defined　twice　over；　besides　which　there　are　two　distinct　lists　of
  the　corresponding　variations。　　（4）　The　length　of　the　chapter　is
  disproportionate；　being　double　that　of　any　other　except　IX。　　I　do
  not　propose　to　draw　any　inferences　from　these　facts；　beyond　the
  general　conclusion　that　Sun　Tzu's　work　cannot　have　come　down　to
  us　in　the　shape　in　which　it　left　his　hands：　　　chap。　　VIII　is
  obviously　defective　and　probably　out　of　place；　while　XI　seems　to
  contain　matter　that　has　either　been　added　by　a　later　hand　or
  ought　to　appear　elsewhere。＇
  51。　　For　it　is　the　soldier's　disposition　to　offer　an
  obstinate　resistance　when　surrounded；　to　fight　hard　when　he
  cannot　help　himself；　and　to　obey　promptly　when　he　has　fallen　into
  danger。
  ＇Chang　Yu　alludes　to　the　conduct　of　Pan　Ch‘ao's　devoted
  followers　in　73　A。D。　　The　story　runs　thus　in　the　HOU　HAN　SHU；　ch。
  47：　　〃When　Pan　Ch‘ao　arrived　at　Shan…shan；　Kuang；　the　King　of　the
  country；　received　him　at　first　with　great　politeness　and　respect；
  but　shortly　afterwards　his　behavior　underwent　a　sudden　change；
  and　he　became　remiss　and　negligent。　　Pan　Ch‘ao　spoke　about　this
  to　the　officers　of　his　suite：　　'Have　you　noticed；'　he　said；　'that
  Kuang's　polite　intentions　are　on　the　wane？　　This　must　signify
  that　envoys　have　come　from　the　Northern　barbarians；　　and　that
  consequently　he　is　in　a　state　of　indecision；　not　knowing　with
  which　side　to　throw　in　his　lot。　　That　surely　is　the　reason。　　The
  truly　wise　man；　we　are　told；　can　perceive　things　before　they　have
  come　to　pass；　　how　much　more；　then；　　those　that　are　already
  manifest！'　　　Thereupon　he　called　one　of　the　natives　who　had　been
  assigned　to　his　service；　and　set　a　trap　for　him；　saying：　　　'Where
  are　those　envoys　from　the　Hsiung…nu　who　arrived　some　day　ago？'
  The　man　was　so　taken　aback　that　between　surprise　and　fear　he
  presently　blurted　out　the　whole　truth。　　Pan　Ch‘ao；　　keeping　his
  informant　carefully　under　lock　and　key；　then　summoned　a　general
  gathering　of　his　officers；　thirty…six　in　all；　and　began　drinking
  with　them。　　When　the　wine　had　mounted　into　their　heads　a　little；
  he　tried　to　rouse　their　spirit　still　further　by　addressing　them
  thus：　　　'Gentlemen；　　here　we　are　in　the　heart　of　an　isolated
  region；　　anxious　to　achieve　riches　and　honor　by　some　great
  exploit。　　Now　it　happens　that　an　ambassador　from　the　Hsiung…no
  arrived　in　this　kingdom　only　a　few　days　ago；　and　the　result　is
  that　the　respectful　courtesy　extended　towards　us　by　our　royal
  host　has　disappeared。　　Should　this　envoy　prevail　upon　him　to
  seize　our　party　and　hand　us　over　to　the　Hsiung…no；　our　bones　will
  become　food　for　the　wolves　of　the　desert。　　What　are　we　to　do？'
  With　one　accord；　the　officers　replied：　　'Standing　as　we　do　in
  peril　of　our　lives；　we　will　follow　our　commander　through　life　and
  death。'　　For　the　sequel　of　this　adventure；　see　chap。　XII。　ss。　　1；
  note。＇
  52。　　We　cannot　enter　into　alliance　with　neighboring　princes
  until　we　are　acquainted　with　their　designs。　　We　are　not　fit　to
  lead　an　army　on　the　march　unless　we　are　familiar　with　the　face　of
  the　　　countryits　mountains　and　forests；　　its　pitfalls　　　and
  precipices；　　its　marshes　and　swamps。　　We　shall　be　unable　to　turn
  natural　advantages　to　account　unless　we　make　use　of　local　guides。
  ＇These　three　sentences　are　repeated　from　VII。　SS。　12…14
  in　order　to　emphasize　their　importance；　the　commentators　seem　to
  think。　　I　prefer　to　regard　them　as　interpolated　here　in　order　to
  form　an　antecedent　to　the　following　words。　　With　regard　to　local
  guides；　Sun　Tzu　might　have　added　that　there　is　always　the　risk　of
  going　　　wrong；　　　either　　　through　　　their　　　treachery　　　or　　　some
  misunderstanding　such　as　Livy　records　（XXII。　13）：　　Hannibal；　　we
  are　told；　ordered　a　guide　to　lead　him　into　the　neighborhood　of
  Casinum；　　where　there　was　an　important　pass　to　be　occupied；　　but
  his　Carthaginian　accent；　unsuited　to　the　pronunciation　of　Latin
  names；　　caused　the　guide　to　understand　Casilinum　instead　of
  Casinum；　　and　turning　from　his　proper　route；　he　took　the　army　in
  that　direction；　the　mistake　not　being　discovered　until　they　had
  almost　arrived。＇
  53。　　To　be　ignored　of　any　one　of　the　following　four　or　five
  principles　does　not　befit　a　warlike　prince。
  54。　　When　a　warlike　prince　attacks　a　powerful　state；　　his
  generalship　shows　itself　in　preventing　the　concentration　of　the
  enemy's　forces。　　He　overawes　his　opponents；　and　their　allies　are
  prevented　from　joining　against　him。
  ＇Mei　Tao…ch‘en　constructs　one　of　the　chains　of　reasoning
  that　are　so　much　affected　by　the　Chinese：　　　〃In　attacking　a
  powerful　state；　　if　you　can　divide　her　forces；　you　will　have　a
  superiority　in　strength；　if　you　have　a　superiority　in　strength；
  you　will　overawe　the　enemy；　if　you　overawe　the　enemy；　　the
  neighboring　states　will　be　frightened；　and　if　the　neighboring
  states　are　frightened；　the　enemy's　allies　will　be　prevented　from
  joining　her。〃　　The　following　gives　a　stronger　meaning：　　〃If　the
  great　state　has　once　been　defeated　（before　she　has　had　time　to
  summon　her　allies）；　then　the　lesser　states　will　hold　aloof　and
  refrain　from　massing　their　forces。〃　　Ch‘en　Hao　and　Chang　Yu　take
  the　sentence　in　quite　another　way。　　The　former　says：　　　〃Powerful
  though　a　prince　may　be；　if　he　attacks　a　large　state；　he　will　be
  unable　to　raise　enough　troops；　and　must　rely　to　some　extent　on
  external　aid；　　if　he　dispenses　with　this；　and　with　overweening
  confidence　in　his　own　strength；　simply　tries　to　intimidate　the
  enemy；　he　will　surely　be　defeated。〃　　Chang　Yu　puts　his　view　thus：
  〃If　we　recklessly　attack　a　large　state；　our　own　people　will　be
  discontented　and　hang　back。　　But　if　（as　will　then　be　the　case）
  our　display　of　military　force　is　inferior　by　half　to　that　of　the
  enemy；　　the　other　chieftains　will　take　fright　and　refuse　to　join
  us。〃＇
  55。　　Hence　he　does　not　strive　to　ally　himself　with　all　and
  sundry；　nor　does　he　foster　the　power　of　other　states。　　He　carries
  out　his　own　secret　designs；　keeping　his　antagonists　in　awe。
  ＇The　train　of　thought；　as　said　by　Li　Ch‘uan；　appears　to　be
  this：　　　Secure　against　a　combination　of　his　enemies；　　〃he　can
  afford　to　reject　entangling　alliances　and　simply　pursue　his　own
  secret　designs；　his　prestige　enable　him　to　dispense　with　external
  friendships。〃＇
  Thus　he　is　able　to　capture　their　cities　and　overthrow　their
  kingdoms。
  ＇This　paragraph；　though　written　many　years　before　the　Ch‘in
  State　became　a　serious　menace；　is　not　a　bad　summary　of　the　policy
  by　which　the　famous　Six　Chancellors　gradually　paved　the　way　for
  her　final　triumph　under　Shih　Huang　Ti。　　Chang　Yu；　　following　up
  his　previous　note；　　thinks　that　Sun　Tzu　is　condemning　this
  attitude　of　cold…blooded　selfishness　and　haughty　isolation。＇
  56。　　Bestow　rewards　without　regard　to　rule；
  ＇Wu　Tzu　（ch。　3）　less　wisely　says：　　〃Let　advance　be　richly
  rewarded　and　retreat　be　heavily　punished。〃＇
  issue　orders
  ＇Literally；　〃hang〃　or　post　up。〃＇
  without　regard　to　previous　arrangements；
  ＇〃In　order　to　prevent　treachery；〃　　says　Wang　Hsi。　　The
  general　meaning　is　made　clear　by　Ts‘ao　Kung's　quotation　from　the
  SSU…MA　FA：　　〃Give　instructions　only　on　sighting　the　enemy；　　give
  rewards　when　you　see　deserving　deeds。〃　　Ts‘ao　Kung's　paraphrase：
  〃The　final　instructions　you　give　to　your　army　should　not
  correspond　with　those　that　have　been　previously　posted　up。〃
  Chang　Yu　simplifies　this　into　〃your　arrangements　should　not　be
  divulged　beforehand。〃　　And　Chia　Lin　says：　　〃there　should　be　no
  fixity　in　your　rules　and　arrangements。〃　　Not　only　is　there　danger
  in　letting　your　plans　be　known；　but　war　often　necessitates　the
  entire　reversal　of　them　at　the　last　moment。＇
  and　you　will　be　able　to　handle　a　whole　army　as　though　you　had　to
  do　with　but　a　single　man。
  ＇Cf。　supra；　ss。　34。＇
  57。　　Confront　your　soldiers　with　the　deed　itself；　never　let
  them　know　your　design。
  ＇Literally；　〃do　not　tell　them　words；〃　i。e。　do　not　give　your
  reasons　for　any　order。　　Lord　Mansfield　once　told　a　junior
  colleague　to　〃give　no　reasons〃　for　his　decisions；　and　the　maxim
  is　even　more　applicable　to　a　general　than　to　a　judge。＇
  When　the　outlook　is　bright；　bring　it　before　their　eyes；　but　tell
  them　nothing　when　the　situation　is　gloomy。
  58。　　Place　your　army　in　deadly　peril；　and　it　will　survive；
  plun