army。　　The　King　of　Chao　first　consulted　Lien　P‘o　on　the
  advisability　of　attempting　a　relief；　but　the　latter　thought　the
  distance　too　great；　and　the　intervening　country　too　rugged　and
  difficult。　　His　Majesty　then　turned　to　Chao　She；　　who　fully
  admitted　the　hazardous　nature　of　the　march；　but　finally　said：
  〃We　shall　be　like　two　rats　fighting　in　a　wholeand　the　pluckier
  one　will　win！〃　　So　he　left　the　capital　with　his　army；　　but　had
  only　gone　a　distance　of　30　LI　when　he　stopped　and　began
  throwing　　　up　　　entrenchments。　　　For　28　　　days　　　he　　　continued
  strengthening　his　fortifications；　and　took　care　that　spies　should
  carry　the　intelligence　to　the　enemy。　　The　Ch‘in　general　was
  overjoyed；　　and　attributed　his　adversary's　tardiness　to　the　fact
  that　the　beleaguered　city　was　in　the　Han　State；　　and　thus　not
  actually　part　of　Chao　territory。　　But　the　spies　had　no　sooner
  departed　than　Chao　She　began　a　forced　march　lasting　for　two　days
  and　one　night；　　and　arrive　on　the　scene　of　action　with　such
  astonishing　rapidity　that　he　was　able　to　occupy　a　commanding
  position　on　the　〃North　hill〃　before　the　enemy　had　got　wind　of　his
  movements。　　A　crushing　defeat　followed　for　the　Ch‘in　forces；　　who
  were　obliged　to　raise　the　siege　of　O…yu　in　all　haste　and　retreat
  across　the　border。＇
  5。　　Maneuvering　with　an　army　is　advantageous；　　with　an
  undisciplined　multitude；　most　dangerous。
  ＇I　adopt　the　reading　of　the　T‘UNG　TIEN；　Cheng　Yu…hsien　and
  the　T‘U　SHU；　since　they　appear　to　apply　the　exact　nuance　required
  in　order　to　make　sense。　　The　commentators　using　the　standard　text
  take　this　line　to　mean　that　maneuvers　may　be　profitable；　or　they
  may　be　dangerous：　　it　all　depends　on　the　ability　of　the　general。＇
  6。　　If　you　set　a　fully　equipped　army　in　march　in　order　to
  snatch　an　advantage；　the　chances　are　that　you　will　be　too　late。
  On　the　other　hand；　to　detach　a　flying　column　for　the　purpose
  involves　the　sacrifice　of　its　baggage　and　stores。
  ＇Some　of　the　Chinese　text　is　unintelligible　to　the　Chinese
  commentators；　　who　paraphrase　the　sentence。　　I　submit　my　own
  rendering　without　much　enthusiasm；　being　convinced　that　there　is
  some　deep…seated　corruption　in　the　text。　　On　the　whole；　　it　is
  clear　that　Sun　Tzu　does　not　approve　of　a　lengthy　march　being
  undertaken　without　supplies。　　Cf。　infra；　ss。　11。＇
  7。　　Thus；　if　you　order　your　men　to　roll　up　their　buff…coats；
  and　make　forced　marches　without　halting　day　or　night；　　covering
  double　the　usual　distance　at　a　stretch；
  ＇The　ordinary　day's　march；　according　to　Tu　Mu；　was　30　LI；
  but　on　one　occasion；　when　pursuing　Liu　Pei；　Ts‘ao　Ts‘ao　is　said
  to　have　covered　the　incredible　distance　of　300　　_li_　　within
  twenty…four　hours。＇
  doing　a　hundred　LI　in　order　to　wrest　an　advantage；　the　leaders　of
  all　your　three　divisions　will　fall　into　the　hands　of　the　enemy。
  8。　　The　stronger　men　will　be　in　front；　the　jaded　ones　will
  fall　behind；　and　on　this　plan　only　one…tenth　of　your　army　will
  reach　its　destination。
  ＇The　moral　is；　as　Ts‘ao　Kung　and　others　point　out：　　　Don't
  march　a　hundred　LI　to　gain　a　tactical　advantage；　either　with　or
  without　impedimenta。　　Maneuvers　of　this　description　should　be
  confined　to　short　distances。　　Stonewall　Jackson　said：　　　〃The
  hardships　of　forced　marches　are　often　more　painful　than　the
  dangers　of　battle。〃　　He　did　not　often　call　upon　his　troops　for
  extraordinary　exertions。　　It　was　only　when　he　intended　　　a
  surprise；　　or　when　a　rapid　retreat　was　imperative；　　that　he
  sacrificed　everything　for　speed。　＇1＇　＇
  9。　　If　you　march　fifty　LI　in　order　to　outmaneuver　the　enemy；
  you　will　lose　the　leader　of　your　first　division；　and　only　half
  your　force　will　reach　the　goal。
  ＇Literally；　　〃the　leader　of　the　first　division　will　be
  TORN　AWAY。〃＇
  10。　　If　you　march　thirty　LI　with　the　same　object；　two…thirds
  of　your　army　will　arrive。
  ＇In　the　T‘UNG　TIEN　is　added：　　〃From　this　we　may　know　the
  difficulty　of　maneuvering。〃＇
  11。　　We　may　take　it　then　that　an　army　without　its　baggage…
  train　is　lost；　without　provisions　it　is　lost；　without　bases　of
  supply　it　is　lost。
  ＇I　think　Sun　Tzu　meant　〃stores　accumulated　in　depots。〃　　　But
  Tu　Yu　says　　〃fodder　and　the　like；〃　Chang　Yu　says　　〃Goods　in
  general；〃　and　Wang　Hsi　says　〃fuel；　salt；　foodstuffs；　etc。〃＇
  12。　　We　cannot　enter　into　alliances　until　we　are　acquainted
  with　the　designs　of　our　neighbors。
  13。　　We　are　not　fit　to　lead　an　army　on　the　march　unless　we
  are　familiar　with　the　face　of　the　countryits　mountains　and
  forests；　its　pitfalls　and　precipices；　its　marshes　and　swamps。
  14。　　We　shall　be　unable　to　turn　natural　advantage　to　account
  unless　we　make　use　of　local　guides。
  ＇ss。　12…14　are　repeated　in　chap。　XI。　ss。　52。＇
  15。　　In　war；　practice　dissimulation；　and　you　will　succeed。
  ＇In　the　tactics　of　Turenne；　　deception　of　the　　　enemy；
  especially　as　to　the　numerical　strength　of　his　troops；　　took　a
  very　prominent　position。　＇2＇　＇
  16。　　Whether　to　concentrate　or　to　divide　your　troops；　　must
  be　decided　by　circumstances。
  17。　　Let　your　rapidity　be　that　of　the　wind；
  ＇The　simile　is　doubly　appropriate；　because　the　wind　is　not
  only　swift　but；　　as　Mei　Yao…ch‘en　points　out；　　〃invisible　and
  leaves　no　tracks。〃＇
  your　compactness　that　of　the　forest。
  ＇Meng　Shih　comes　nearer　to　the　mark　in　his　note：　　　〃When
  slowly　marching；　　order　and　ranks　must　be　preserved〃so　as　to
  guard　against　surprise　attacks。　　But　natural　forest　do　not　grow
  in　rows；　whereas　they　do　generally　possess　the　quality　of　density
  or　compactness。＇
  18。　　In　raiding　and　plundering　be　like　fire；
  ＇Cf。　　SHIH　CHING；　IV。　3。　iv。　6：　　〃Fierce　as　a　blazing　fire
  which　no　man　can　check。〃＇
  is　immovability　like　a　mountain。
  ＇That　is；　when　holding　a　position　from　which　the　enemy　is
  trying　to　dislodge　you；　or　perhaps；　as　Tu　Yu　says；　when　he　is
  trying　to　entice　you　into　a　trap。＇
  19。　　Let　your　plans　be　dark　and　impenetrable　as　night；　　and
  when　you　move；　fall　like　a　thunderbolt。
  ＇Tu　Yu　quotes　a　saying　of　T‘ai　Kung　which　has　passed　into　a
  proverb：　　〃You　cannot　shut　your　ears　to　the　thunder　or　your　eyes
  to　the　lightingso　rapid　are　they。〃　　Likewise；　an　attack　should
  be　made　so　quickly　that　it　cannot　be　parried。＇
  20。　　When　you　plunder　a　countryside；　　let　the　spoil　be
  divided　amongst　your　men；
  ＇Sun　Tzu　wishes　to　lessen　the　abuses　of　indiscriminate
  plundering　by　insisting　that　all　booty　shall　be　thrown　into　a
  common　stock；　　which　may　afterwards　be　fairly　divided　amongst
  all。＇
  when　you　capture　new　territory；　cut　it　up　into　allotments　for　the
  benefit　of　the　soldiery。
  ＇Ch‘en　Hao　says　〃quarter　your　soldiers　on　the　land；　and　let
  them　sow　and　plant　it。〃　　It　is　by　acting　on　this　principle；　　and
  harvesting　the　lands　they　invaded；　　that　the　Chinese　　　have
  succeeded　in　carrying　out　some　of　their　most　memorable　and
  triumphant　expeditions；　such　as　that　of　Pan　Ch‘ao　who　penetrated
  to　the　Caspian；　and　in　more　recent　years；　those　of　Fu…k‘ang…an
  and　Tso　Tsung…t‘ang。＇
  21。　　Ponder　and　deliberate　before　you　make　a　move。
  ＇Chang　Yu　quotes　Wei　Liao　Tzu　as　saying　that　we　must　not
  break　camp　until　we　have　gained　the　resisting　power　of　the　enemy
  and　the　cleverness　of　the　opposing　general。　　Cf。　　the　　〃seven
  comparisons〃　in　I。　ss。　13。＇
  22。　　He　will　conquer　who　has　learnt　the　artifice　of
  deviation。
  ＇See　supra；　SS。　3；　4。＇
  Such　is　the　art　of　maneuvering。
  ＇With　these　words；　the　chapter　would　naturally　come　to　an
  end。　　But　there　now　follows　a　long　appendix　in　the　shape　of　an
  extract　from　an　earlier　book　on　War；　now　lost；　　but　apparently
  extant　at　the　time　when　Sun　Tzu　wrote。　　The　style　of　this
  fragment　is　not　noticeable　different　from　that　of　Sun　Tzu
  himself；　　　but　　　no　commentator　raises　a　doubt　as　　　to　　　its
  genuineness。＇
  23。　　The　Book　of　Army　Management　says：
  ＇It　is　perhaps　significant　that　none　of　the　　　earlier
  commentators　give　us　any　information　about　this　work。　　Mei　Yao…
  Ch‘en　calls　it　〃an　ancient　military　classic；〃　and　Wang　Hsi；　　〃an
  old　book　on　war。〃　　Considering　the　enormous　amount　of　fighting
  that　had　gone　on　for　centuries　before　Sun　Tzu's　time　between　the
  various　kingdoms　and　principalities　of　China；　it　is　not　in　itself
  improbable　that　a　collection　of　military　maxims　should　have　been
  made　and　written　down　at　some　earlier　period。＇
  On　the　field　of　battle；
  ＇Implied；　though　not　actually　in　the　Chinese。＇
  the　spoken　word　does　not　carry　far　enough：　　hence　the　institution
  of　gongs　and　drums。　　Nor　can　ordinary　objects　be　seen　clearly
  enough：　　hence　the　institution　of　banners　and　flags。
  24。　　Gongs　and　drums；　banners　and　flags；　are　means