day　on　which　they　will　join　battle；　our　unity　will　be　forfeited
  through　our　preparations　for　defense；　and　the　positions　we　hold
  will　be　insecure。　　Suddenly　happening　upon　a　powerful　foe；　　we
  shall　be　brought　to　battle　in　a　flurried　condition；　and　no　mutual
  support　will　be　possible　between　wings；　　vanguard　or　rear；
  especially　if　there　is　any　great　distance　between　the　foremost
  and　hindmost　divisions　of　the　army。〃＇
  21。　　Though　according　to　my　estimate　the　soldiers　of　Yueh
  exceed　our　own　in　number；　that　shall　advantage　them　nothing　in
  the　matter　of　victory。　　I　say　then　that　victory　can　be　achieved。
  ＇Alas　for　these　brave　words！　　The　long　feud　between　the　two
  states　ended　in　473　B。C。　with　the　total　defeat　of　Wu　by　Kou　Chien
  and　its　incorporation　in　Yueh。　　This　was　doubtless　long　after　Sun
  Tzu's　death。　　With　his　present　assertion　compare　IV。　　ss。　　4。
  Chang　Yu　is　the　only　one　to　point　out　the　seeming　discrepancy；
  which　he　thus　goes　on　to　explain：　　〃In　the　chapter　on　Tactical
  Dispositions　it　is　said；　'One　may　KNOW　how　to　conquer　without
  being　able　to　DO　it；'　whereas　here　we　have　the　statement　that
  'victory'　　can　be　achieved。'　　The　explanation　is；　　that　in　the
  former　chapter；　　where　the　offensive　and　defensive　are　under
  discussion；　　it　is　said　that　if　the　enemy　is　fully　prepared；　　one
  cannot　make　certain　of　beating　him。　　But　the　present　passage
  refers　particularly　to　the　soldiers　of　Yueh　who；　according　to　Sun
  Tzu's　calculations；　　will　be　kept　in　ignorance　of　the　time　and
  place　of　the　impending　struggle。　　That　is　why　he　says　here　that
  victory　can　be　achieved。〃＇
  22。　　Though　the　enemy　be　stronger　in　numbers；　we　may　prevent
  him　from　fighting。　　Scheme　so　as　to　discover　his　plans　and　the
  likelihood　of　their　success。
  ＇An　alternative　reading　offered　by　Chia　Lin　is：　　　〃Know
  beforehand　all　plans　conducive　to　our　success　and　to　the　enemy's
  failure。〃
  23。　　Rouse　him；　and　learn　the　principle　of　his　activity　or
  inactivity。
  ＇Chang　Yu　tells　us　that　by　noting　the　joy　or　anger　shown　by
  the　enemy　on　being　thus　disturbed；　we　shall　be　able　to　conclude
  whether　his　policy　is　to　lie　low　or　the　reverse。　　He　instances
  the　action　of　Cho…ku　Liang；　who　sent　the　scornful　present　of　a
  woman's　head…dress　to　Ssu…ma　I；　in　order　to　goad　him　out　of　his
  Fabian　tactics。＇
  Force　him　to　reveal　himself；　so　as　to　find　out　his　vulnerable
  spots。
  24。　　Carefully　compare　the　opposing　army　with　your　own；　　so
  that　you　may　know　where　strength　is　superabundant　and　where　it　is
  deficient。
  ＇Cf。　IV。　ss。　6。＇
  25。　　In　making　tactical　dispositions；　the　highest　pitch　you
  can　attain　is　to　conceal　them；
  ＇The　piquancy　of　the　paradox　evaporates　in　translation。
  Concealment　is　perhaps　not　so　much　actual　invisibility　（see　supra
  ss。　9）　as　〃showing　no　sign〃　of　what　you　mean　to　do；　of　the　plans
  that　are　formed　in　your　brain。＇
  conceal　your　dispositions；　and　you　will　be　safe　from　the　prying
  of　the　subtlest　spies；　from　the　machinations　of　the　wisest
  brains。
  ＇Tu　Mu　explains：　　〃Though　the　enemy　may　have　clever　and
  capable　officers；　they　will　not　be　able　to　lay　any　plans　against
  us。〃＇
  26。　　How　victory　may　be　produced　for　them　out　of　the　enemy's
  own　tacticsthat　is　what　the　multitude　cannot　comprehend。
  27。　　All　men　can　see　the　tactics　whereby　I　conquer；　but　what
  none　can　see　is　the　strategy　out　of　which　victory　is　evolved。
  ＇I。e。；　everybody　can　see　superficially　how　a　battle　is　won；
  what　they　cannot　see　is　the　long　series　of　plans　and　combinations
  which　has　preceded　the　battle。＇
  28。　　Do　not　repeat　the　tactics　which　have　gained　you　one
  victory；　　but　let　your　methods　be　regulated　by　the　infinite
  variety　of　circumstances。
  ＇As　Wang　Hsi　sagely　remarks：　　〃There　is　but　one　root…
  principle　underlying　victory；　but　the　tactics　which　lead　up　to　it
  are　infinite　in　number。〃　　With　this　compare　Col。　Henderson：　　〃The
  rules　of　strategy　are　few　and　simple。　　They　may　be　learned　in　a
  week。　　They　may　be　taught　by　familiar　illustrations　or　a　dozen
  diagrams。　　But　such　knowledge　will　no　more　teach　a　man　to　lead　an
  army　like　Napoleon　than　a　knowledge　of　grammar　will　teach　him　to
  write　like　Gibbon。〃＇
  29。　　Military　tactics　are　like　unto　water；　for　water　in　its
  natural　course　runs　away　from　high　places　and　hastens　downwards。
  30。　　So　in　war；　the　way　is　to　avoid　what　is　strong　and　to
  strike　at　what　is　weak。
  ＇Like　water；　taking　the　line　of　least　resistance。＇
  31。　　Water　shapes　its　course　according　to　the　nature　of　the
  ground　over　which　it　flows；　the　soldier　works　out　his　victory　in
  relation　to　the　foe　whom　he　is　facing。
  32。　　Therefore；　just　as　water　retains　no　constant　shape；　　so
  in　warfare　there　are　no　constant　conditions。
  33。　　He　who　can　modify　his　tactics　in　relation　to　his
  opponent　and　thereby　succeed　in　winning；　may　be　called　a　heaven…
  born　captain。
  34。　　The　five　elements　（water；　fire；　wood；　metal；　earth）　are
  not　always　equally　predominant；
  ＇That　　　is；　　　as　　　Wang　　　Hsi　　　says：　　　　〃they　　　predominate
  alternately。〃＇
  the　four　seasons　make　way　for　each　other　in　turn。
  ＇Literally；　〃have　no　invariable　seat。〃＇
  There　are　short　days　and　long；　the　moon　has　its　periods　of　waning
  and　waxing。
  ＇Cf。　　V。　　ss。　6。　　The　purport　of　the　passage　is　simply　to
  illustrate　the　want　of　fixity　in　war　by　the　changes　constantly
  taking　place　in　Nature。　　The　comparison　is　not　very　happy；
  however；　　because　the　regularity　of　the　phenomena　which　Sun　Tzu
  mentions　is　by　no　means　paralleled　in　war。＇
  ＇1＇　　　See　Col。　Henderson's　biography　of　Stonewall　Jackson；　　1902
  ed。；　vol。　II；　p。　490。
  …
  VII。　　MANEUVERING
  1。　　Sun　Tzu　said：　　In　war；　the　general　receives　his　commands
  from　the　sovereign。
  2。　　Having　collected　an　army　and　concentrated　his　forces；　he
  must　blend　and　harmonize　the　different　elements　thereof　before
  pitching　his　camp。
  ＇〃Chang　　　Yu　says：　　　〃the　establishment　of　harmony　　　and
  confidence　between　the　higher　and　lower　ranks　before　venturing
  into　the　field；〃　and　he　quotes　a　saying　of　Wu　Tzu　（chap。　　1　ad
  init。）：　　　〃Without　harmony　in　the　State；　no　military　expedition
  can　be　undertaken；　without　harmony　in　the　army；　no　battle　array
  can　be　formed。〃　　In　an　historical　romance　Sun　Tzu　is　represented
  as　saying　to　Wu　Yuan：　　〃As　a　general　rule；　those　who　are　waging
  war　should　get　rid　of　all　the　domestic　troubles　before　proceeding
  to　attack　the　external　foe。〃＇
  3。　　After　that；　comes　tactical　maneuvering；　than　which　there
  is　nothing　more　difficult。
  ＇I　　　　have　　　departed　　　slightly　　　from　　　the　　　　traditional
  interpretation　of　Ts‘ao　Kung；　who　says：　　　〃From　the　time　of
  receiving　the　sovereign's　instructions　until　our　encampment　over
  against　the　enemy；　the　tactics　to　be　pursued　are　most　difficult。〃
  It　seems　to　me　that　the　tactics　or　maneuvers　can　hardly　be　said
  to　begin　until　the　army　has　sallied　forth　and　encamped；　　and
  Ch‘ien　Hao's　note　gives　color　to　this　view：　　　〃For　levying；
  concentrating；　　harmonizing　and　entrenching　an　army；　　there　are
  plenty　of　old　rules　which　will　serve。　　The　real　difficulty　comes
  when　we　engage　in　tactical　operations。〃　　Tu　Yu　also　observes　that
  〃the　great　difficulty　is　to　be　beforehand　with　the　enemy　in
  seizing　favorable　position。〃＇
  The　difficulty　of　tactical　maneuvering　consists　in　turning　the
  devious　into　the　direct；　and　misfortune　into　gain。
  ＇This　sentence　contains　one　of　those　highly　condensed　and
  somewhat　enigmatical　expressions　of　which　Sun　Tzu　is　so　fond。
  This　is　how　it　is　explained　by　Ts‘ao　Kung：　　〃Make　it　appear　that
  you　are　a　long　way　off；　then　cover　the　distance　rapidly　and
  arrive　on　the　scene　before　your　opponent。〃　　　Tu　Mu　　　says：
  〃Hoodwink　the　enemy；　so　that　he　may　be　remiss　and　leisurely　while
  you　are　dashing　along　with　utmost　speed。〃　　　Ho　Shih　gives　a
  slightly　different　turn：　　〃Although　you　may　have　difficult　ground
  to　traverse　and　natural　obstacles　to　encounter　this　is　a　drawback
  which　can　be　turned　into　actual　advantage　by　celerity　of
  movement。〃　　　Signal　examples　of　this　saying　are　afforded　by　the
  two　famous　passages　across　the　Alpsthat　of　Hannibal；　which　laid
  Italy　at　his　mercy；　and　that　of　Napoleon　two　thousand　years
  later；　which　resulted　in　the　great　victory　of　Marengo。＇
  4。　　Thus；　　to　take　a　long　and　circuitous　route；　　after
  enticing　the　enemy　out　of　the　way；　and　though　starting　after　him；
  to　contrive　to　reach　the　goal　before　him；　shows　knowledge　of　the
  artifice　of　DEVIATION。
  ＇Tu　Mu　cites　the　famous　march　of　Chao　She　in　270　B。C。　　to
  relieve　the　town　of　O…yu；　which　was　closely　invested　by　a　Ch‘in
  army。　　The　King　of　Chao　first　consulted　Lien　P‘o　on　the
  advisability　of　at