14。　　By　means　of　these　seven　considerations　I　can　forecast
  victory　or　defeat。
  15。　　The　general　that　hearkens　to　my　counsel　and　acts　upon
  it；　will　conquer：　　　let　such　a　one　be　retained　in　command！　　The
  general　that　hearkens　not　to　my　counsel　nor　acts　upon　it；　　will
  suffer　defeat：　　let　such　a　one　be　dismissed！
  ＇The　form　of　this　paragraph　reminds　us　that　Sun　Tzu's
  treatise　was　composed　expressly　for　the　benefit　of　his　patron　Ho
  Lu；　king　of　the　Wu　State。＇
  16。　　While　heading　the　profit　of　my　counsel；　avail　yourself
  also　of　any　helpful　circumstances　over　and　beyond　the　ordinary
  rules。
  17。　　According　as　circumstances　are　favorable；　　one　should
  modify　one's　plans。
  ＇Sun　Tzu；　　as　a　practical　soldier；　will　have　none　of　the
  〃bookish　theoric。〃　　He　cautions　us　here　not　to　pin　our　faith　to
  abstract　principles；　〃for；〃　as　Chang　Yu　puts　it；　〃while　the　main
  laws　of　strategy　can　be　stated　clearly　enough　for　the　benefit　of
  all　and　sundry；　you　must　be　guided　by　the　actions　of　the　enemy　in
  attempting　to　secure　a　favorable　position　in　actual　warfare。〃　　On
  the　eve　of　the　battle　of　Waterloo；　Lord　Uxbridge；　commanding　the
  cavalry；　　went　to　the　Duke　of　Wellington　in　order　to　learn　what
  his　plans　and　calculations　were　for　the　morrow；　because；　　as　he
  explained；　he　might　suddenly　find　himself　Commander…in…chief　and
  would　be　unable　to　frame　new　plans　in　a　critical　moment。　　The
  Duke　listened　quietly　and　then　said：　　〃Who　will　attack　the　first
  tomorrow　　I　or　Bonaparte？〃　　〃Bonaparte；〃　replied　Lord　Uxbridge。
  〃Well；〃　continued　the　Duke；　〃Bonaparte　has　not　given　me　any　idea
  of　his　projects；　and　as　my　plans　will　depend　upon　his；　　how　can
  you　expect　me　to　tell　you　what　mine　are？〃　＇1＇　＇
  18。　　All　warfare　is　based　on　deception。
  ＇The　truth　of　this　pithy　and　profound　saying　will　be
  admitted　by　every　soldier。　　Col。　　Henderson　tells　us　　　that
  Wellington；　　great　in　so　many　military　qualities；　was　especially
  distinguished　by　〃the　extraordinary　skill　with　which　he　concealed
  his　movements　and　deceived　both　friend　and　foe。〃＇
  19。　　Hence；　when　able　to　attack；　we　must　seem　unable；　　when
  using　our　forces；　we　must　seem　inactive；　when　we　are　near；　　we
  must　make　the　enemy　believe　we　are　far　away；　when　far　away；　　we
  must　make　him　believe　we　are　near。
  20。　　Hold　out　baits　to　entice　the　enemy。　　Feign　disorder；
  and　crush　him。
  ＇All　commentators；　　except　Chang　Yu；　say；　〃When　he　is　in
  disorder；　crush　him。〃　　It　is　more　natural　to　suppose　that　Sun　Tzu
  is　still　illustrating　the　uses　of　deception　in　war。＇
  21。　　If　he　is　secure　at　all　points；　be　prepared　for　him。　　If
  he　is　in　superior　strength；　evade　him。
  22。　　If　your　opponent　is　of　choleric　temper；　　seek　to
  irritate　him。　　Pretend　to　be　weak；　that　he　may　grow　arrogant。
  ＇Wang　Tzu；　　quoted　by　Tu　Yu；　says　that　the　good　tactician
  plays　with　his　adversary　as　a　cat　plays　with　a　mouse；　　first
  feigning　weakness　and　immobility；　and　then　suddenly　pouncing　upon
  him。＇
  23。　　If　he　is　taking　his　ease；　give　him　no　rest。
  ＇This　is　probably　the　meaning　though　Mei　Yao…ch‘en　has　the
  note：　　〃while　we　are　taking　our　ease；　wait　for　the　enemy　to　tire
  himself　out。〃　　The　YU　LAN　has　〃Lure　him　on　and　tire　him　out。〃＇
  If　his　forces　are　united；　separate　them。
  ＇Less　plausible　is　the　interpretation　favored　by　most　of　the
  commentators：　　　〃If　sovereign　and　subject　are　in　accord；　　put
  division　between　them。〃＇
  24。　　Attack　him　where　he　is　unprepared；　appear　where　you　are
  not　expected。
  25。　　These　military　devices；　leading　to　victory；　must　not　be
  divulged　beforehand。
  26。　　　Now　the　general　who　wins　a　battle　makes　　　many
  calculations　in　his　temple　ere　the　battle　is　fought。
  ＇Chang　Yu　tells　us　that　in　ancient　times　it　was　customary
  for　a　temple　to　be　set　apart　for　the　use　of　a　general　who　was
  about　to　take　the　field；　in　order　that　he　might　there　elaborate
  his　plan　of　campaign。＇
  The　general　who　loses　a　battle　makes　but　few　calculations
  beforehand。　　Thus　do　many　calculations　lead　to　victory；　and　few
  calculations　to　defeat：　　how　much　more　no　calculation　at　all！　　It
  is　by　attention　to　this　point　that　I　can　foresee　who　is　likely　to
  win　or　lose。
  ＇1＇　　〃Words　on　Wellington；〃　by　Sir。　W。　Fraser。
  …
  II。　　WAGING　WAR
  ＇Ts‘ao　Kung　has　the　note：　　〃He　who　wishes　to　fight　must
  first　count　the　cost；〃　which　prepares　us　for　the　discovery　that
  the　subject　of　the　chapter　is　not　what　we　might　expect　from　the
  title；　but　is　primarily　a　consideration　of　ways　and　means。＇
  1。　　Sun　Tzu　said：　　In　the　operations　of　war；　where　there　are
  in　the　field　a　thousand　swift　chariots；　as　many　heavy　chariots；
  and　a　hundred　thousand　mail…clad　soldiers；
  ＇The　　〃swift　chariots〃　were　lightly　built　and；　according　to
  Chang　Yu；　used　for　the　attack；　the　〃heavy　chariots〃　were　heavier；
  and　designed　for　purposes　of　defense。　　Li　Ch‘uan；　it　is　true；
  says　that　the　latter　were　light；　but　this　seems　hardly　probable。
  It　is　interesting　to　note　the　analogies　between　early　Chinese
  warfare　and　that　of　the　Homeric　Greeks。　　In　each　case；　the　war…
  chariot　was　the　important　factor；　forming　as　it　did　the　nucleus
  round　which　was　grouped　a　certain　number　of　foot…soldiers。　　With
  regard　to　the　numbers　given　here；　we　are　informed　that　each　swift
  chariot　was　accompanied　by　75　footmen；　and　each　heavy　chariot　by
  25　footmen；　　so　that　the　whole　army　would　be　divided　up　into　a
  thousand　battalions；　　each　consisting　of　two　chariots　and　a
  hundred　men。＇
  with　provisions　enough　to　carry　them　a　thousand　LI；
  ＇2。78　modern　LI　go　to　a　mile。　　The　length　may　have　varied
  slightly　since　Sun　Tzu's　time。＇
  the　expenditure　at　home　and　at　the　front；　including　entertainment
  of　guests；　small　items　such　as　glue　and　paint；　and　sums　spent　on
  chariots　and　armor；　will　reach　the　total　of　a　thousand　ounces　of
  silver　per　day。　　Such　is　the　cost　of　raising　an　army　of　100；000
  men。
  2。　　When　you　engage　in　actual　fighting；　if　victory　is　long
  in　coming；　then　men's　weapons　will　grow　dull　and　their　ardor　will
  be　damped。　　If　you　lay　siege　to　a　town；　you　will　exhaust　your
  strength。
  3。　　Again；　if　the　campaign　is　protracted；　the　resources　of
  the　State　will　not　be　equal　to　the　strain。
  4。　　Now；　when　your　weapons　are　dulled；　your　ardor　damped；
  your　strength　exhausted　and　your　treasure　spent；　other　chieftains
  will　spring　up　to　take　advantage　of　your　extremity。　　Then　no　man；
  however　wise；　will　be　able　to　avert　the　consequences　that　must
  ensue。
  5。　　Thus；　　though　we　have　heard　of　stupid　haste　in　war；
  cleverness　has　never　been　seen　associated　with　long　delays。
  ＇This　concise　and　difficult　sentence　is　not　well　explained
  by　any　of　the　commentators。　　Ts‘ao　Kung；　Li　Ch‘uan；　Meng　Shih；　Tu
  Yu；　　Tu　Mu　and　Mei　Yao…ch‘en　have　notes　to　the　effect　that　a
  general；　　though　naturally　stupid；　　may　nevertheless　　　conquer
  through　sheer　force　of　rapidity。　　Ho　Shih　says：　　〃Haste　may　be
  stupid；　　but　at　any　rate　it　saves　expenditure　of　energy　and
  treasure；　　protracted　operations　may　be　very　clever；　　but　they
  bring　calamity　in　their　train。〃　　Wang　Hsi　evades　the　difficulty
  by　remarking：　　　〃Lengthy　operations　mean　an　army　growing　old；
  wealth　being　expended；　an　empty　exchequer　and　distress　among　the
  people；　　true　cleverness　insures　against　the　occurrence　of　such
  calamities。〃　　　Chang　Yu　says：　　　〃So　long　as　victory　can　be
  attained；　　stupid　haste　is　preferable　to　clever　dilatoriness。〃
  Now　　　Sun　　　Tzu　says　nothing　whatever；　　except　　　possibly　　　by
  implication；　　　about　ill…considered　haste　being　better　　　than
  ingenious　but　lengthy　operations。　　What　he　does　say　is　something
  much　more　guarded；　namely　that；　while　speed　may　sometimes　be
  injudicious；　　tardiness　can　never　be　anything　but　foolish　　　if
  only　　　because　it　means　impoverishment　to　the　nation。　　　In
  considering　the　point　raised　here　by　Sun　Tzu；　the　classic　example
  of　Fabius　Cunctator　will　inevitably　occur　to　the　mind。　　That
  general　deliberately　measured　the　endurance　of　Rome　against　that
  of　Hannibals's　isolated　army；　because　it　seemed　to　him　that　the
  latter　was　more　likely　to　suffer　from　a　long　campaign　in　a
  strange　country。　　But　it　is　quite　a　moot　question　whether　his
  tactics　would　have　proved　successful　in　the　long　run。　　Their
  reversal　it　is　true；　led　to　Cannae；　but　this　only　establishes　a
  negative　presumption　in　their　favor。＇
  6。　　There　is　no　instance　of　a　country　having　benefited　from
  prolonged　warfare。
  7。　　It　is　only　one　who　is　thoroughly　acquainted　with　the
  evils　of　war　that　can　thoroughly　understand　the　profitable　way　of
  carrying　it　on。
  ＇That　is；　with　rapidity。　　Only　one　who　knows　the　disastrous
  effects　of　a　long　war　can　realize　the　supreme　importance　of