preference　to　the　comforts　of　home　and　the　admonitions　of　their　father：
  suffering　any　burden　to　be　put　upon　them；　so　long　as　they　may　spite
  their　parents。
  XIV。　Therefore；　although　men　are　generally　governed　in　everything　by　their
  own　lusts；　yet　their　association　in　common　brings　many　more　advantages
  than　drawbacks。　Wherefore　it　is　better　to　bear　patiently　the　wrongs　they
  may　do　us；　and　to　strive　to　promote　whatsoever　serves　to　bring　about
  harmony　and　friendship。
  XV。　Those　things；　which　beget　harmony；　are　such　as　are　attributable　to
  justice；　equity；　and　honourable　living。　For　men　brook　ill　not　only　what　is
  unjust　or　iniquitous；　but　also　what　is　reckoned　disgraceful；　or　that　a　man
  should　slight　the　received　customs　of　their　society。　For　winning　love　those
  qualities　are　especially　necessary　which　have　regard　to　religion　and　piety
  （cf。　IV：xxxvii。Notes。i。；　&。ii。；　IV：xlvi。Note；　and　IV：lxxiii。Note）。
  XVI。　Further；　harmony　is　often　the　result　of　fear：　but　such　harmony　is
  insecure。　Further；　fear　arises　from　infirmity　of　spirit　and　moreover
  belongs　not　to　the　exercise　of　reason：　the　same　is　true　of　compassion；
  though　this　latter　seems　to　bear　a　certain　resemblance　to　piety。
  XVII。　Men　are　also　gained　over　by　liberality；　especially　such　as　have
  not　the　means　to　buy　what　is　necessary　to　sustain　life。　However；　to　give
  aid　to　every　poor　man　is　far　beyond　the　power　and　the　advantage　of　any
  private　person。　For　the　riches　of　any　private　person　are　wholly　inadequate
  to　meet　such　a　call。　Again；　an　individual　man's　resources　of　character
  are　too　limited　for　him　to　be　able　to　make　all　men　his　friends。　Hence
  providing　for　the　poor　is　a　duty；　which　falls　on　the　State　as　a　whole；
  and　has　regard　only　to　the　general　advantage。
  XVIII。　In　accepting　favours；　and　in　returning　gratitude　our　duty　must　be
  wholly　different　（cf。　IV：lxx。Note；　IV：lxxi。　Note）。
  XIX。　Again；　meretricious　love；　that　is；　the　lust　of　generation　arising
  from　bodily　beauty；　and　generally　every　sort　of　love；　which　owns　anything
  save　freedom　of　soul　as　its　cause；　readily　passes　into　hate；　unless　indeed；
  what　is　worse；　it　is　a　species　of　madness；　and　then　it　promotes　discord
  rather　than　harmony　（cf。　III：xxxi。Coroll。）。
  XX。　As　concerning　marriage；　it　is　certain　that　this　is　in　harmony　with
  reason；　if　the　desire　for　physical　union　be　not　engendered　solely　by
  bodily　beauty；　but　also　by　the　desire　to　beget　children　and　to　train　them
  up　wisely；　and　moreover；　if　the　love　of　both；　to　wit；　of　the　man　and　of
  the　woman；　is　not　caused　by　bodily　beauty　only；　but　also　by　freedom　of　soul。
  XXI。　Furthermore；　flattery　begets　harmony；　but　only　by　means　of　the　vile
  offence　of　slavishness　or　treachery。　None　are　more　readily　taken　with
  flattery　than　the　proud；　who　wish　to　be　first；　but　are　not。
  XXII。　There　is　in　abasement　a　spurious　appearance　of　piety　and
  religion。　Although　abasement　is　the　opposite　to　pride；　yet　is　he　that
  abases　himself　most　akin　to　the　proud　（IV：lvii。Note）。
  XXIII。　Shame　also　brings　about　harmony；　but　only　in　such　matters　as　cannot
  be　hid。　Further；　as　shame　is　a　species　of　pain；　it　does　not　concern　the
  exercise　of　reason。
  XXIV。　The　remaining　emotions　of　pain　towards　men　are　directly　opposed
  to　justice；　equity；　honour；　piety；　and　religion；　and；　although
  indignation　seems　to　bear　a　certain　resemblance　to　equity；　yet　is　life
  but　lawless；　where　every　man　may　pass　judgment　on　another's　deeds；　and
  vindicate　his　own　or　other　men's　rights。
  XXV。　Correctness　of　conduct　（modestia）；　that　is；　the　desire　of　pleasing
  men　which　is　determined　by　reason；　is　attributable　to　piety　（as　we　said
  in　IV：xxxvii。Note。i。）。　But；　if　it　spring　from　emotion；　it　is　ambition；
  or　the　desire　whereby；　men；　under　the　false　cloak　of　piety；　generally
  stir　up　discords　and　seditions。　For　he　who　desires　to　aid　his　fellows。
  either　in　word　or　in　deed；　so　that　they　may　together　enjoy　the　highest
  good；　he；　I　say；　will　before　all　things　strive　to；　win　them　over　with
  love：　not　to　draw　them　into　admiration；　so　that　a　system　may　be　called
  after　his　name；　nor　to　give　any　cause　for　envy。　Further；　in　his
  conversation　he　will　shrink　from　talking　of　men's　faults；　and　will　be
  careful　to　speak　but　sparingly　of　human　infirmity：　but　he　will　dwell　at
  length　on　human　virtue　or　power；　and　the　way　whereby　it　may　be　perfected。
  Thus　will　men　be　stirred　not　by　fear；　nor　by　aversion；　but　only　by　the
  emotion　of　joy；　to　endeavour；　so　far　as　in　them　lies；　to　live　in
  obedience　to　reason。
  XXVI。　Besides　men；　we　know　of　no　particular　thing　in　nature　in　whose　mind
  we　may　rejoice；　and　whom　we　can　associate　with　ourselves　in　friendship　or
  any　sort　of　fellowship；　therefore；　whatsoever　there　be　in　nature　besides
  man；　a　regard　for　our　advantage　does　not　call　on　us　to　preserve；　but　to
  preserve　or　destroy　according　to　its　various　capabilities；　and　to　adapt
  to　our　use　as　best　we　may。
  XXVII。　The　advantage　which　we　derive　from　things　external　to　us；　besides
  the　experience　and　knowledge　which　we　acquire　from　observing　them；　and
  from　recombining　their　elements　in　different　forms；　is　principally　the
  preservation　of　the　body；　from　this　point　of　view；　those　things　are　most
  useful　which　can　so　feed　and　nourish　the　body；　that　all　its　parts　may
  rightly　fulfil　their　functions。　For；　in　proportion　as　the　body　is　capable
  of　being　affected　in　a　greater　variety　of　ways；　and　of　affecting　external
  bodies　in　a　great　number　of　ways；　so　much　the　more　is　the　mind　capable　of
  thinking　（IV：xxxviii。；　IV：xxxix。）。　But　there　seem　to　be　very　few　things
  of　this　kind　in　nature；　wherefore　for　the　due　nourishment　of　the　body　we
  must　use　many　foods　of　diverse　nature。　For　the　human　body　is　composed　of
  very　many　parts　of　different　nature；　which　stand　in　continual　need　of
  varied　nourishment；　so　that　the　whole　body　may　be　equally　capable　of
  doing　everything　that　can　follow　from　its　own　nature；　and　consequently
  that　the　mind　also　may　be　equally　capable　of　forming　many　perceptions。
  XXVIII。　Now　for　providing　these　nourishments　the　strength　of　each
  individual　would　hardly　suffice；　if　men　did　not　lend　one　another　mutual
  aid。　But　money　has　furnished　us　with　a　token　for　everything：　hence　it　is
  with　the　notion　of　money；　that　the　mind　of　the　multitude　is　chiefly
  engrossed：　nay；　it　can　hardly　conceive　any　kind　of　pleasure；　which　is　not
  accompanied　with　the　idea　of　money　as　cause。
  XXIX。　This　result　is　the　fault　only　of　those；　who　seek　money；　not　from
  poverty　or　to　supply　their　necessary；　wants；　but　because　they；　have
  learned　the　arts　of　gain；　wherewith　they　bring　themselves　to　great
  splendour。　Certainly　they　nourish　their　bodies；　according　to　custom；　but
  scantily；　believing　that　they　lose　as　much　of　their　wealth　as　they　spend　on
  the　preservation　of　their　body。　But　they　who　know　the　true　use　of　money；
  and　who　fix　the　measure　of　wealth　solely　with　regard　to　their　actual　needs；
  live　content　with　little。
  XXX。　As；　therefore；　those　things　are　good　which　assist　the　various　parts
  of　the　body；　and　enable　them　to　perform　their　functions；　and　as　pleasure
  consists　in　an　increase　of；　or　aid　to；　man's　power；　in　so　far　as　he　is
  composed　of　mind　and　body；　it　follows　that　all　those　things　which　bring
  pleasure　are　good。　But　seeing　that　things　do　not　work　with　the　object　of
  giving　us　pleasure；　and　that　their　power　of　action　is　not　tempered　to　suit
  our　advantage；　and；　lastly；　that　pleasure　is　generally　referred　to　one
  part　of　the　body　more　than　to　the　other　parts；　therefore　most　emotions　of
  pleasure　（unless　reason　and　watchfulness　be　at　hand）；　and　consequently　the
  desires　arising　therefrom；　may　become　excessive。　Moreover　we　may　add　that
  emotion　leads　us　to　pay　most　regard　to　what　is　agreeable　in　the　present；
  nor　can　we　estimate　what　is　future　with　emotions　equally　vivid。
  （IV：xliv。Note；　and　IV：lx。Note。）
  XXXI。　Superstition；　on　the　other　hand；　seems　to　account　as　good　all　that
  brings　pain；　and　as　bad　all　that　brings　pleasure。　However；　as　we　said
  above　（IV：xlv。Note）；　none　but　the　envious　take　delight　in　my　infirmity
  and　trouble。　For　the　greater　the　pleasure　whereby　we　are　affected；　the
  greater　is　the　perfection　whereto　we　pass；　and　consequently　the　more　do
  we　partake　of　the　divine　nature：　no　pleasure　can　ever　be　evil；　which　is
  regulated　by　a　true　regard　for　our　advantage。　But　contrariwise　he；　who　is
  led　by　fear　and　does　good　only　to　avoid　evil；　is　not　guided　by　reason。
  Ap。XXXII。　（1）　But　human　power　is　extremely　limited；　and　is　infinitely
  surpassed　by　the　power　of　external　causes；　we　have　not；　therefore；　an
  absolute　power　of　shap