that　all　other　causes　of　hatred　depend　solely　on　differences；　and　not　on
  the　agreement　between　men's　natures。
  Prop。　XXXV。　In　so　far　only　as　men　live
  in　obedience　to　reason；　do　they　always
  necessarily　agree　in　nature。
  Proof。…　In　so　far　as　men　are　assailed　by　emotions　that　are　passions；　they
  can　be　different　in　nature　（IV：xxxiii。）；　and　at　variance　one　with　another。
  But　men　are　only　said　to　be　active；　in　so　far　as　they　act　in　obedience　to
  reason　（III：iii。）；　therefore；　what　so　ever　follows　from　human　nature　in　so
  far　as　it　is　defined　by　reason　must　（III：Def。ii。）　be　understood　solely
  through　human　nature　as　its　proximate　cause。　But；　since　every　man　by　the
  laws　of　his　nature　desires　that　which　he　deems　good；　and　endeavours　to
  remove　that　which　he　deems　bad　（IV：xix。）；　and　further；　since　that　which　we；
  in　accordance　with　reason；　deem　good　or　bad；　necessarily　is　good
  or　bad　（II：xli。）；　it　follows　that　men；　in　so　far　as　they　live　in　obedience
  to　reason；　necessarily　do　only　such　things　as　are　necessarily　good　for
  human　nature；　and　consequently　for　each　individual　man　（IV：xxxi。Coroll。）；
  in　other　words；　such　things　as　are　in　harmony　with　each　man's　nature。
  Therefore；　men　in　so　far　as　they　live　in　obedience　to　reason；　necessarily
  live　always　in　harmony　one　with　another。　Q。E。D。
  Corollary　I　…　There　is　no　individual　thing　in　nature；　which　is
  more　useful　to　man；　than　a　man　who　lives　in　obedience　to　reason。　For　that
  thing　is　to　man　most　useful；　which　is　most　in　harmony　with　his　nature
  （IV：xxxi。Coroll。）；　that　is；　obviously；　man。　But　man　acts　absolutely
  according　to　the　laws　of　his　nature；　when　he　lives　in　obedience　to　reason
  （III：Def。ii。）；　and　to　this　extent　only　is　always　necessarily　in　harmony
  with　the　nature　of　another　man　（by　the　last　Prop。）；　wherefore　among
  individual　things　nothing　is　more　useful　to　man；　than　a　man　who　lives　in
  obedience　to　reason。　Q。E。D。
  Corollary　II。…　As　every　man　seeks　most　that　which　is　useful　to　him；　so　are
  men　most　useful　one　to　another。　For　the　more　a　man　seeks　what　is　useful　to
  him　and　endeavours　to　preserve　himself；　the　more　is　he　endowed　with　virtue
  （IV：xx。）；　or；　what　is　the　same　thing　（IV：Def。viii。）；　the　more　is　he　endowed
  with　power　to　act　according　to　the　laws　of　his　own　nature；　that　is　to　live
  in　obedience　to　reason。　But　men　are　most　in　natural　harmony；　when　they　live
  in　obedience　to　reason　（by　the　last　Prop。）；　therefore　（by　the　foregoing
  Coroll。）　men　will　be　most　useful　one　to　another；　when　each　seeks　most　that
  which　is　useful　to　him。　Q。E。D。
  Note。…　What　we　have　just　shown　is　attested　by　experience　so　conspicuously；
  that　it　is　in　the　mouth　of　nearly　everyone：　〃Man　is　to　man　a　God。〃　Yet　it
  rarely　happens　that　men　live　in　obedience　to　reason；　for　things　are　so
  ordered　among　them；　that　they　are　generally　envious　and　troublesome　one　to
  another。　Nevertheless　they　are　scarcely　able　to　lead　a　solitary　life；
  so　that　the　definition　of　man　as　a　social　animal　has　met　with　general
  assent；　in　fact；　men　do　derive　from　social　life　much　more　convenience　than
  injury。　Let　satirists　then　laugh　their　fill　at　human　affairs；　let
  theologians　rail；　and　let　misanthropes　praise　to　their　utmost　the　life　of
  untutored　rusticity；　let　them　heap　contempt　on　men　and　praises　on　beasts；
  when　all　is　said；　they　will　find　that　men　can　provide　for　their　wants　much
  more　easily　by　mutual　help；　and　that　only　by　uniting　their　forces　can　they
  escape　from　the　dangers　that　on　every　side　beset　them：　not　to　say　how　much
  more　excellent　and　worthy　of　our　knowledge　it　is；　to　study　the　actions　of
  men　than　the　actions　of　beasts。　But　I　will　treat　of　this　more　at
  length　elsewhere。
  Prop。　XXXVI。　The　highest　good　of　those
  who　follow　virtue　is　common　to　all；
  and　therefore　all　can　equally　rejoice
  therein。
  Proof。…　To　act　virtuously　is　to　act　in　obedience　with　reason　（IV：xxiv。）；
  and　whatsoever　we　endeavour　to　do　in　obedience　to　reason　is　to　understand
  （IV：xxvi。）；　therefore　（IV：xxviii。）　the　highest　good　for　those　who　follow
  after　virtue　is　to　know　God；　that　is　（II：xlvii。&Note）　a　good　which　is
  common　to　all　and　can　be　possessed。　by　all　men　equally；　in　so　far　as　they
  are　of　the　same　nature。　Q。E。D。
  Note。…　Someone　may　ask　how　it　would　be；　if　the　highest　good　of　those　who
  follow　after　virtue　were　not　common　to　all？　Would　it　not　then　follow；　as
  above　（IV：xxxiv。）；　that　men　living　in　obedience　to　reason；　that　is
  （IV：xxxv。）；　men　in　so　far　as　they　agree　in　nature；　would　be　at　variance
  one　with　another？　To　such　an　inquiry；　I　make　answer；　that　it　follows　not
  accidentally　but　from　the　very　nature　of　reason；　that　main's　highest　good
  is　common　to　all；　inasmuch　as　it　is　deduced　from　the　very　essence　of　man；
  in　so　far　as　defined　by　reason；　and　that　a　man　could　neither　be；　nor　be
  conceived　without　the　power　of　taking　pleasure　in　this　highest　good。　For
  it　belongs　to　the　essence　of　the　human　mind　（II：xlvii。）；　to　have　an
  adequate　knowledge　of　the　eternal　and　infinite　essence　of　God。
  Prop。　XXXVII。　The　good　which　every　man；
  who　follows　after　virtue；　desires　for
  himself　he　will　also　desire　for　other
  men；　and　so　much　the　more；　in　proportion
  as　he　has　a　greater　knowledge　of　God。
  Proof。…　Men；　in　so　far　as　they　live　in　obedience　to　reason；　are　most
  useful　to　their　fellow　men　（IV：xxxv；Coroll。i。）；　therefore　（IV：xix。）；
  we　shall　in　obedience　to　reason　necessarily　endeavour　to　bring　about　that
  men　should　live　in　obedience　to　reason。　But　the　good　which　every　man；　in
  so　far　as　he　is　guided　by　reason；　or；　in　other　words；　follows　after　virtue；
  desires　for　himself；　is　to　understand　（IV：xxvi。）；　wherefore　the　good；　which
  each　follower　of　virtue　seeks　for　himself；　he　will　desire　also　for　others。
  Again；　desire；　in　so　far　as　it　is　referred　to　the　mind；　is　the　very
  essence　of　the　mind　（Def。　of　the　Emotions；　i。）；　now　the　essence　of　the
  mind　consists　in　knowledge　（III：xi。）；　which　involves　the　knowledge　of　God
  （II：xlvii。）；　and　without　it　（I：xv。）；　can　neither　be；　nor　be　conceived；
  therefore；　in　proportion　as　the　mind's　essence　involves　a　greater　knowledge
  of　God；　so　also　will　be　greater　the　desire　of　the　follower　of　virtue；　that
  other　men　should　possess　that　which　he　seeks　as　good　for　himself。　Q。E。D。
  Another　Proof。…　The　good；　which　a　man　desires　for　himself　and　loves；　he
  will　love　more　constantly；　if　he　sees　that　others　love　it　also　（III：xxxi。）；
  he　will　therefore　endeavour　that　others　should　love　it　also；　and　as　the
  good　in　question　is　common　to　all；　and　therefore　all　can　rejoice　therein；
  he　will　endeavour；　for　the　same　reason；　to　bring　about　that　all　should
  rejoice　therein；　and　this　he　will　do　the　more　（III：xxxvii。）；　in　proportion
  as　his　own　enjoyment　of　the　good　is　greater。
  Note　1…　He　who；　guided　by　emotion　only；　endeavours　to　cause　others　to　love
  what　he　loves　himself；　and　to　make　the　rest　of　the　world　live　according　to
  his　own　fancy；　acts　solely　by　impulse；　and　is；　therefore；　hateful；
  especially；　to　those　who　take　delight　in　something　different；　and
  accordingly　study　and；　by　similar　impulse；　endeavour；　to　make　men　live　in
  accordance　with　what　pleases　themselves。　Again；　as　the　highest　good　sought
  by　men　under　the　guidance　of　emotion　is　often　such；　that　it　can　only　be
  possessed　by　a　single　individual；　it　follows　that　those　who　love　it　are　not
  consistent　in　their　intentions；　but；　while　they　delight　to　sing　its　praises；
  fear　to　be　believed。　But　he；　who　endeavours　to　lead　men　by　reason；　does　not
  act　by　impulse　but　courteously　and　kindly；　and　his　intention　is　always
  consistent。　Again；　whatsoever　we　desire　and　do；　whereof　we　are　the　cause
  in　so　far　as　we　possess　the　idea　of　God；　or　know　God；　I　set　down　to
  Religion。　The　desire　of　well…doing；　which　is　engendered　by　a　life
  according　to　reason；　I　call　piety。　Further；　the　desire；　whereby　a
  man　living　according　to　reason　is　bound　to　associate　others　with
  himself　in　friendship；　I　call　honour　（Honestas）；　by　honourable　I　mean
  that　which　is　praised　by　men　living　according　to　reason；　and　by　base
  I　mean　that　which　is　repugnant　to　the　gaining　of　friendship。　I　have　also
  shown　in　addition　what　are　the　foundations　of　a　state；　and　the　difference
  between　true　；virtue　and　infirmity　may　be　readily　gathered　from　what　I
  have　said；　namely；　that　true　virtue　is　nothing　else　but　living　in
  accordance　with　reason；　while　infirmity　is　nothing　else　but　man's
  allowing　himself　to　be　led　by　things　which　are　external　to　himself；
  and　to　be　by　them　determined　to　act　in　a　manner　demanded　by　the　general
  disposition　of　things　rather　than　by　his　own　nature　considered　solely
  in　its