（In　I：xxxiii。note。i。；　I　drew　no　distinction　between　possible　and
  contingent；　because　there　was　in　that　place　no　need　to　distinguish
  them　accurately。）
  V。　By　conflicting　emotions　I　mean　those　which　draw　a　man　in　different
  directions；　though　they　are　of　the　same　kind；　such　as　luxury　and
  avarice；　which　are　both　species　of　love；　and　are　contraries；　not
  by　nature；　but　by　accident。
  VI。　What　I　mean　by　emotion　felt　towards　a　thing；　future；　present；　and
  past；　I　explained　in　III：xviii。；notes。i。；&ii。；　which　see。
  （But　I　should　here　also　remark；　that　we　can　only　distinctly　conceive
  distance　of　space　or　time　up　to　a　certain　definite　limit；　that　is；　all
  objects　distant　from　us　more　than　two　hundred　feet；　or　whose　distance
  from　the　place　where　we　are　exceeds　that　which　we　can　distinctly　conceive；
  seem　to　be　an　equal　distance　from　us；　and　all　in　the　same　plane；　so　also
  objects；　whose　time　of　existing　is　conceived　as　removed　from　the　present
  by　a　longer　interval　than　we　can　distinctly　conceive；　seem　to　be　all
  equally　distant　from　the　present；　and　are　set　down；　as　it　were；　to　the
  same　moment　of　time。）
  VII。　By　an　end；　for　the　sake　of　which　we　do　something；　I　mean　a　desire。
  VIII。　By　virtue　（virtus）　and　power　I　mean　the　same　thing；　that　is
  （III：vii。）；　virtue；　in　so　far　as　it　is　referred　to　man；　is　a　man's
  nature　or　essence；　in　so　far　as　it　has　the　power　of　effecting　what
  can　only　be　understood　by　the　laws　of　that　nature。
  AXIOM。
  There　is　no　individual　thing　in　nature；　than　which　there　is　not
  another　more　powerful　and　strong。　Whatsoever　thing　be　given；　there　is
  something　stronger　whereby　it　can　be　destroyed。
  PROPOSITIONS。
  Prop。　I。　No　positive　quality　possessed　by　a
  false　idea　is　removed　by　the　presence　of
  what　is　true；　in　virtue　of　its　being　true。
  Proof。…　Falsity　consists　solely　in　the　privation　of　knowledge　which
  inadequate　ideas　involve　（II：xxxv。）；　nor　have　they　any　positive
  quality　on　account　of　which　they　are　called　false　（II：xxxiii。）；　　　contrariwise；　in　so　far　as　they
  are　referred　to　God；　they　are　true
  （II：xxxii。）。　　Wherefore；　if　the　positive　quality　possessed　by　a　false
  idea　were　removed　by　the　presence　of　what　is　true；　in　virtue　of　its
  being　true；　a　true　idea　would　then　be　removed　by　itself；　which
  （IV：iii。）　is　absurd。　Therefore；　no　positive　quality　possessed　by　a
  false　idea；　&c。　Q。E。D。
  Note。…　This　proposition　is　more　clearly　understood　from　II：xvi。Coroll。ii。
  For　imagination　is　an　idea；　which　indicates　rather　the　present　disposition
  of　the　human　body　than　the　nature　of　the　external　body；　not　indeed
  distinctly；　but　confusedly；　whence　it　comes　to　pass；　that　the　mind　is
  said　to　err。　For　instance；　when　we　look　at　the　sun；　we　conceive　that　it
  is　distant　from　us　about　two　hundred　feet；　in　this　judgment　we　err；　so
  long　as　we　are　in　ignorance　of　its　true　distance；　when　its　true　distance
  is　known；　the　error　is　removed；　but　not　the　imagination；　or；　in　other
  words；　the　idea　of　the　sun；　which　only　explains　tho　nature　of　that
  luminary；　in　so　far　as　the　body　is　affected　thereby：　wherefore；　though
  we　know　the　real　distance；　we　shall　still　nevertheless　imagine　the　sun
  to　be　near　us。　For；　as　we　said　in　III：xxxv。note；　we　do　not　imagine　the　sun
  to　be　so　near　us；　because　we　are　ignorant　of　its　true　distance；　but　because
  the　mind　conceives　the　magnitude　of　the　sun　to　the　extent　that　the　body　is
  affected　thereby。　　Thus；　when　the　rays　of　the　sun　falling　on　the　surface　of
  water　are　reflected　into　our　eyes；　we　imagine　the　sun　as　if　it　were　in　the
  water；　though　we　are　aware　of　its　real　position；　and　similarly　other
  imaginations；　wherein　the　mind　is　deceived　whether　they　indicate　the
  natural　disposition　of　the　body；　or　that　its　power　of　activity　is
  increased　or　diminished；　are　not　contrary　to　the　truth；　and　do　not　vanish
  at　its　presence。　It　happens　indeed　that；　when　we　mistakenly　fear　an　evil；
  the　fear　vanishes　when　we　hear　the　true　tidings；　but　the　contrary　also
  happens；　namely；　that　we　fear　an　evil　which　will　certainly　come；　and　our
  fear　vanishes　when　we　hear　false　tidings；　thus　imaginations　do　not　vanish
  at　the　presence　of　the　truth；　in　virtue　of　its　being　true；　but　because
  other　imaginations；　stronger　than　the　first；　supervene　and　exclude　the
  present　existence　of　that　which　we　imagined；　as　I　have　shown　in　II：。xvii。
  Prop。　II。　We　are　only　passive；　in　so　far　as
  we　are　apart　of　Nature；　which　cannot　be
  conceived　by　itself　without　other　parts。
  Proof。…　We　are　said　to　be　passive；　when　something　arises　in　us；　whereof
  we　are　only　a　partial　cause　（III：Def。ii。）；　that　is　（III：Def。i。）；　something
  which　cannot　be　deduced　solely　from　the　laws　of　our　nature。　We　are　passive
  therefore　in　so　far　as　we　are　a　part　of　Nature；　which　cannot　be　conceived
  by　itself　without　other　parts。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。　III。　The　force　whereby　a　man　persists
  in　existing　is　limited；　and　is　infinitely
  surpassed　by　the　power　of　external　causes。
  Proof。…This　is　evident　from　the　axiom　of　this　part。　For；　when　man　is
  given；　there　is　something　else　…　say　A　…　more　powerful；　when　A　is　given；
  there　is　something　else　…　say　B　…　more　powerful　than　A；　and　so　on　to
  infinity；　thus　the　power　of　man　is　limited　by　the　power　of　some　other
  thing；　and　is　infinitely　surpassed　by　the　power　of　external　causes。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。　IV。　It　is　impossible；　that　man　should
  not　be　a　part　of　Nature；　or　that　he　should
  be　capable　of　undergoing　no　changes；　save
  such　as　can　be　understood　through　his　nature
  only　as　their　adequate　cause。
  Proof。…　The　power；　whereby　each　particular　thing；　and　consequently　man；
  preserves　his　being；　is　the　power　of　God　or　of　Nature　（I：xxiv。Coroll。）；
  not　in　so　far　as　it　is　infinite；　but　in　so　far　as　it　can　be　explained　by
  the　actual　human　essence　（III：vii。）。　Thus　the　power　of　man；　in　so　far
  as　it　is　explained　through　his　own　actual　essence；　is　a　part　of　the
  infinite　power　of　God　or　Nature；　in　other　words；　of　the　essence　thereof
  （I：xxxiv。）。　This　was　our　first　point。　Again；　if　it　were　possible；　that　man
  should　undergo　no　changes　save　such　as　can　be　understood　solely　through
  the　nature　of　man；　it　would　follow　that　he　would　not　be　able　to　die；　but
  would　always　necessarily　exist；　this　would　be　the　necessary　consequence
  of　a　cause　whose　power　was　either　finite　or　infinite；　namely；　either　of
  man's　power　only；　inasmuch　as　he　would　be　capable　of　removing　from　himself
  all　changes　which　could　spring　from　external　causes；　or　of　the　infinite
  power　of　Nature；　whereby　all　individual　things　would　be　so　ordered；　that
  man　should　be　incapable　of　undergoing　any　changes　save　such　as　tended
  towards　his　own　preservation。　But　the　first　alternative　is　absurd　（by　the
  last　Prop。；　the　proof　of　which　is　universal；　and　can　be　applied　to　all
  individual　things）。　Therefore；　if　it　be　possible；　that　man　should　not　be
  capable　of　undergoing　any　changes；　save　such　as　can　be　explained　solely
  through　his　own　nature；　and　consequently　that　he　must　always　（as　we　have
  shown）　necessarily　exist；　such　a　result　must　follow　from　the　infinite
  power　of　God；　and　consequently　（I：xvi。）　from　the　necessity　of　the　divine
  nature；　in　so　far　as　it　is　regarded　as　affected　by　the　idea　of　any　given
  man；　the　whole　order　of　nature　as　conceived　under　the　attributes　of
  extension　and　thought　must　be　deducible。　It　would　therefore　follow　（I：xxi。）
  that　man　is　infinite；　which　（by　the　first　part　of　this　proof）　is　absurd。
  It　is；　therefore；　impossible；　that　man　should　not　undergo　any　changes　save
  those　whereof　he　is　the　adequate　cause。　Q。E。D。
  Corollary。…　Hence　it　follows；　that　man　is　necessarily　always　a　prey　to
  his　passions；　that　he　follows　and　obeys　the　general　order　of　nature；　and
  that　he　accommodates　himself　thereto；　as　much　as　the　nature　of　things
  demands。
  Prop。　V。　The　power　and　increase　of　every
  passion；　and　its　persistence　in　existing
  are　not　defined　by　the　power；　whereby　we
  ourselves　endeavour　to　persist　in　existing；
  but　by　the　power　of　an　external　cause
  compared　with　our　own。
  Proof。…　The　essence　of　a　passion　cannot　be　explained　through　our
  essence　alone　（III：Def。i。&。ii。）；　that　is　（III：vii。）；　the　power　of
  a　passion　cannot　be　defined　by　the　power；　whereby　we　ourselves
  endeavour　to　persist　in　existing；　but　（as　is　shown　in　II：xvi。）　must
  necessarily　be　defined　by　the　power　of　an　external　cause　compared
  with　our　own。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。　VI。　The　force　of　any　passion　or　emotion
  can　overcome　the　rest　of　a　man's　activities　or
  power；　so　that　the　emotion　b