ideas　and　letters；　for　that　is　the　direction　in　which　the　answer　may
  be　expected。
  Theaet。　And　what　is　the　question　at　issue　about　names？
  Str。　The　question　at　issue　is　whether　all　names　may　be　connected
  with　one　another；　or　none；　or　only　some　of　them。
  Theaet。　Clearly　the　last　is　true。
  Str。　I　understand　you　to　say　that　words　which　have　a
  meaning　when　in
  sequence　may　be　connected；　but　that　words　which　have　no　meaning　when
  in　sequence　cannot　be　connected？
  Theaet。　What　are　you　saying？
  Str。　What　I　thought　that　you　intended　when　you　gave　your
  assent；　for
  there　are　two　sorts　of　intimation　of　being　which　are　given　by　the
  voice。
  Theaet。　What　are　they？
  Str。　One　of　them　is　called　nouns；　and　the　other　verbs。
  Theaet。　Describe　them。
  Str。　That　which　denotes　action　we　call　a　verb。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And　the　other；　which　is　an　articulate　mark　set　on　those　who
  do　the　actions；　we　call　a　noun。
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　A　succession　of　nouns　only　is　not　a　sentence　any　more　than　of
  verbs　without　nouns。
  Theaet。　I　do　not　understand　you。
  Str。　I　see　that　when　you　gave　your　assent　you　had　something　else
  in　your　mind。　But　what　I　intended　to　say　was；　that　a　mere　succession
  of　nouns　or　of　verbs　is　not　discourse。
  Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？
  Str。　I　mean　that　words　like　〃walks；〃　〃runs；〃　〃sleeps；〃　or　any
  other　words　which　denote　action；　however　many　of　them　you　string
  together；　do　not　make　discourse。
  Theaet。　How　can　they？
  Str。　Or；　again；　when　you　say　〃lion；〃　〃stag；〃　〃horse；〃　or　any　other
  words　which　denote　agents　…neither　in　this　way　of　stringing　words
  together　do　you　attain　to　discourse；　for　there　is　no　expression　of
  action　or　inaction；　or　of　the　existence　of　existence　or
  non…existence　indicated　by　the　sounds；　until　verbs　are　mingled　with
  nouns；　then　the　words　fit；　and　the　smallest　combination　of　them
  forms　language；　and　is　the　simplest　and　least　form　of　discourse。
  Theaet。　Again　I　ask；　What　do　you　mean？
  Str。　When　any　one　says　〃A　man　learns；〃　should　you　not　call　this
  the　simplest　and　least　of　sentences？
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　Yes；　for　he　now　arrives　at　the　point　of　giving　an　intimation
  about　something　which　is；　or　is　becoming；　or　has　become；　or　will　be。
  And　he　not　only　names；　but　he　does　something；　by　connecting
  verbs　with
  nouns；　and　therefore　we　say　that　he　discourses；　and　to　this
  connection
  of　words　we　give　the　name　of　discourse。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And　as　there　are　some　things　which　fit　one　another；　and　other
  things　which　do　not　fit；　so　there　are　some　vocal　signs　which　do；　and
  others　which　do　not；　combine　and　form　discourse。
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　There　is　another　small　matter。
  Theaet。　What　is　it？
  Str。　A　sentence　must　and　cannot　help　having　a　subject。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And　must　be　of　a　certain　quality。
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　And　now　let　us　mind　what　we　are　about。
  Theaet。　We　must　do　so。
  Str。　I　will　repeat　a　sentence　to　you　in　which　a　thing　and　an
  action　are　combined；　by　the　help　of　a　noun　and　a　verb；　and　you　shall
  tell　me　of　whom　the　sentence　speaks。
  Theaet。　I　will；　to　the　best　my　power。
  Str。　〃Theaetetus　sits〃…not　a　very　long　sentence。
  Theaet。　Not　very。
  Str。　Of　whom　does　the　sentence　speak；　and　who　is　the
  subject　that　is
  what　you　have　to　tell。
  Theaet。　Of　me；　I　am　the　subject。
  Str。　Or　this　sentence；　again…
  Theaet。　What　sentence？
  Str。　〃Theaetetus；　with　whom　I　am　now　speaking；　is　flying。〃
  Theaet。　That　also　is　a　sentence　which　will　be　admitted　by　every
  one　to　speak　of　me；　and　to　apply　to　me。
  Str。　We　agreed　that　every　sentence　must　necessarily　have　a　certain
  quality。
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　And　what　is　the　quality　of　each　of　these　two　sentences？
  Theaet。　The　one；　as　I　imagine；　is　false；　and　the　other　true。
  Str。　The　true　says　what　is　true　about　you？
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　And　the　false　says　what　is　other　than　true？
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　And　therefore　speaks　of　things　which　are　not　as　if　they　were？
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And　say　that　things　are　real　of　you　which　are　not；　for；　as　we
  were　saying；　in　regard　to　each　thing　or　person；　there　is　much　that
  is　and　much　that　is　not。
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　The　second　of　the　two　sentences　which　related　to　you　was
  first　of　all　an　example　of　the　shortest　form　consistent　with　our
  definition。
  Theaet。　Yes；　this　was　implied　in　recent　admission。
  Str。　And；　in　the　second　place；　it　related　to　a　subject？
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　Who　must　be　you；　and　can　be　nobody　else？
  Theaet。　Unquestionably。
  Str。　And　it　would　be　no　sentence　at　all　if　there　were　no　subject；
  for；　as　we　proved；　a　sentence　which　has　no　subject　is　impossible。
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　When　other；　then；　is　asserted　of　you　as　the　same；　and
  not…being
  as　being；　such　a　combination　of　nouns　and　verbs　is　really　and　truly
  false　discourse。
  Theaet。　Most　true。
  Str。　And　therefore　thought；　opinion；　and　imagination　are　now
  proved　to　exist　in　our　minds　both　as　true　and　false。
  Theaet。　How　so？
  Str。　You　will　know　better　if　you　first　gain　a　knowledge　of
  what　they
  are；　and　in　what　they　severally　differ　from　one　another。
  Theaet。　Give　me　the　knowledge　which　you　would　wish　me　to　gain。
  Str。　Are　not　thought　and　speech　the　same；　with　this　exception；
  that　what　is　called　thought　is　the　unuttered　conversation　of　the
  soul　with　herself？
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　But　the　stream　of　thought　which　flows　through　the　lips　and　is
  audible　is　called　speech？
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And　we　know　that　there　exists　in　speech。。。
  Theaet。　What　exists？
  Str。　Affirmation。
  Theaet。　Yes；　we　know　it。
  Str。　When　the　affirmation　or　denial　takes　Place　in　silence　and　in
  the　mind　only；　have　you　any　other　name　by　which　to　call　it　but
  opinion？
  Theaet。　There　can　be　no　other　name。
  Str。　And　when　opinion　is　presented；　not　simply；　but　in　some　form
  of　sense；　would　you　not　call　it　imagination？
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　And　seeing　that　language　is　true　and　false；　and　that
  thought　is
  the　conversation　of　the　soul　with　herself；　and　opinion　is　the　end　of
  thinking；　and　imagination　or　phantasy　is　the　union　of　sense　and
  opinion；　the　inference　is　that　some　of　them；　since　they　are　akin　to
  language；　should　have　an　element　of　falsehood　as　well　as　of　truth？
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　Do　you　perceive；　then；　that　false　opinion　and　speech　have
  been　discovered　sooner　than　we　expected？…For　just　now　we　seemed　to
  be　undertaking　a　task　which　would　never　be　accomplished。
  Theaet。　I　perceive。
  Str。　Then　let　us　not　be　discouraged　about　the　future；　but
  now　having
  made　this　discovery；　let　us　go　back　to　our　previous　classification。
  Theaet。　What　classification？
  Str。　We　divided　image…making　into　two　sorts；　the　one
  likeness…making；　the　other　imaginative　or　phantastic。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And　we　said　that　we　were　uncertain　in　which　we　should
  place　the
  Sophist。
  Theaet。　We　did　say　so。
  Str。　And　our　heads　began　to　go　round　more　and　more　when　it　was
  asserted　that　there　is　no　such　thing　as　an　image　or　idol　or
  appearance；　because　in　no　manner　or　time　or　place　can　there　ever　be
  such　a　thing　as　falsehood。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And　now；　since　there　has　been　shown　to　be　false　speech　and
  false　opinion；　there　may　be　imitations　of　real　existences；　and　out
  of　this　condition　of　the　mind　an　art　of　deception　may　arise。
  Theaet。　Quite　possible。
  Str。　And　we　have：　already　admitted；　in　what　preceded；　that　the
  Sophist　was　lurking　in　one　of　the　divisions　of　the　likeness…making
  art？
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　Let　us；　then；　renew　the　attempt；　and　in　dividing　any　class；
  always　take　the　part　to　the　right；　holding　fast　to　that　which　holds
  the　Sophist；　until　we　have　stripped　him　of　all　his　common
  properties；　and　reached　his　difference　or　peculiar。　Then　we　may
  exhibit　him　in　his　true　nature；　first　to　ourselves　and　then
  to　kindred
  dialectical　spirits。
  Theaet。　Very　good。
  Str。　You　may　remember　that　all　art　was　originally　divided
  by　us　into
  creative　and　acquisitive。
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　And　the　Sophist　was　flitting　before　us　in　the　acquisitive
  class；　in　the　subdivisions　of　hunting；　contests；　merchandise；　and
  the　like。
  Theaet。　Very　true。
  Str。　But　now　that　the　imitative　art　has　enclosed　him；　it　is　clear
  that　we　must　begin　by　dividing　the　art　of　creation；　for
  imitation　is　a
  kind　of　creation　of　images；　however；　as　we　affirm；　and　not　of　real
  things。
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　In　the　first　place；　there　are　two　kinds　of　creation。
  Theaet。　What　are　they？
  Str。　One　of　them　is　human　and　the　other　divine。
  Theaet。　I　do　not　follow。
  Str。　Every　power；　as　you　may　remember　our　saying　originally；　which
  causes　things　to　exist；　not　previously　existing；　was　defined　by　us
  as　creative。
  Theaet。　I　remember。
  Str。　Looking；　now；　at　the　world　and　all　the　animals　and　plants；　at
  things　which　grow　upon　the　earth　from　seeds　and　roots；　as　well　as　at
  inanimate　substances　which　are　formed　within　the　earth；　fusile　or
  non…fusile；　shall　we　say　that　they　come　into　existence…not　having
  e