appellation　of
  not…being；　we　were　in　the　greatest　difficulty：…do　you　remember？
  Theaet。　To　be　sure。
  Str。　And　are　we　not　now　in　as　a　difficulty　about　being？
  Theaes。　I　should　say；　Stranger；　that　we　are　in　one　which　is；　if
  possible；　even　greater。
  Str。　Then　let　us　acknowledge　the　difficulty；　and　as　being　and
  not…being　are　involved　in　the　same　perplexity；　there　is　hope
  that　when
  the　one　appears　more　or　less　distinctly；　the　other　will　equally
  appear；　and　if　we　are　able　to　see　neither　there　may　still　be　a
  chance　of　steering　our　way　in　between　them；　without　any　great
  discredit。
  Theaet。　Very　good。
  Str。　Let　us　enquire；　then；　how　we　come　to　predicate　many　names　of
  the　same　thing。
  Theaet。　Give　an　example。
  Str。　I　mean　that　we　speak　of　man；　for　example；　under　many
  names…that
  we　attribute　to　him　colours　and　forms　and　magnitudes　and　virtues　and
  vices；　in　all　of　which　instances　and　in　ten　thousand　others　we　not
  only　speak　of　him　as　a　man；　but　also　as　good；　and　having　number…less
  other　attributes；　and　in　the　same　way　anything　else　which　we
  originally　supposed　to　be　one　is　described　by　us　as　many；　and　under
  many　names。
  Theaet。　That　is　true。
  Str。　And　thus　we　provide　a　rich　feast　for　tyros；　whether　young　or
  old；　for　there　is　nothing　easier　than　to　argue　that　the　one　cannot
  be　many；　or　the　many　one；　and　great　is　their　delight　in
  denying　that　a
  man　is　good；　for　man；　they　insist；　is　man　and　good　is　good。
  I　dare　say
  that　you　have　met　with　persons　who　take…an　interest　in　such
  matters…they　are　often　elderly　men；　whose　meagre　sense　is　thrown
  into　amazement　by　these　discoveries　of　theirs；　which　they　believe　to
  be　the　height　of　wisdom。
  Theaet。　Certainly；　I　have。
  Str。　Then；　not　to　exclude　any　one　who　has　ever　speculated　at　all
  upon　the　nature　of　being；　let　us　put　our　questions　to　them　as　well
  as　to　our　former　friends。
  Theaet。　What　questions？
  Str。　Shall　we　refuse　to　attribute　being　to　motion　and　rest；　or
  anything　to　anything；　and　assume　that　they　do　not　mingle；　and　are
  incapable　of　participating　in　one　another？　Or　shall　we
  gather　all　into
  one　class　of　things　communicable　with　one　another？　Or　are　some
  things　communicable　and　others　not？…Which　of　these　alternatives；
  Theaetetus；　will　they　prefer？
  Theaet。　I　have　nothing　to　answer　on　their　behalf。　Suppose　that　you
  take　all　these　hypotheses　in　turn；　and　see　what　are　the　consequences
  which　follow　from　each　of　them。
  Str。　Very　good；　and　first　let　us　assume　them　to　say　that　nothing
  is　capable　of　participating　in　anything　else　in　any　respect；　in　that
  case　rest　and　motion　cannot　participate　in　being　at　all。
  Theaet。　They　cannot。
  Str。　But　would　either　of　them　be　if　not　participating　in　being？
  Theaet。　No。
  Str。　Then　by　this　admission　everything　is　instantly　overturned；　as
  well　the　doctrine　of　universal　motion　as　of　universal　rest；　and　also
  the　doctrine　of　those　who　distribute　being　into　immutable　and
  everlasting　kinds；　for　all　these　add　on　a　notion　of　being；　some
  affirming　that　things　〃are〃　truly　in　motion；　and　others　that　they
  〃are〃　truly　at　rest。
  Theaes。　Just　so。
  Str。　Again；　those　who　would　at　one　time　compound；　and　at　another
  resolve　all　things；　whether　making　them　into　one　and　out　of　one
  creating　infinity；　or　dividing　them　into　finite　clements；　and
  forming　compounds　out　of　these；　whether　they　suppose　the　processes
  of　creation　to　be　successive　or　continuous；　would　be　talking
  nonsense　in　all　this　if　there　were　no　admixture。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　Most　ridiculous　of　all　will　the　men　themselves　be　who　want　to
  carry　out　the　argument　and　yet　forbid　us　to　call　anything；　because
  participating　in　some　affection　from　another；　by　the　name　of　that
  other。
  Theaet。　Why　so？
  Str。　Why；　because　they　are　compelled　to　use　the　words　〃to　be；〃
  〃apart；〃　〃from　others。　〃in　itself；〃　and　ten　thousand　more；　which
  they　cannot　give　up；　but　must　make　the　connecting　links　of
  discourse；　and　therefore　they　do　not　require　to　be　refuted　by
  others；　but　their　enemy；　as　the　saying　is；　inhabits　the　same　house
  with　them；　they　are　always　carrying　about　with　them　an
  adversary；　like
  the　wonderful　ventriloquist；　Eurycles；　who　out　of　their　own　bellies
  audibly　contradicts　them。
  Theaet。　Precisely　so；　a　very　true　and　exact　illustration。
  Str。　And　now；　if　we　suppose　that　all　things　have　the　power　of
  communion　with　one　another　…what　will　follow？
  Theaet。　Even　I　can　solve　that　riddle。
  Str。　How？
  Theaet。　Why；　because　motion　itself　would　be　at　rest；　and　rest
  again　in　motion；　if　they　could　be　attributed　to　one　another。
  Str。　But　this　is　utterly　impossible。
  Theaet。　Of　course。
  Str。　Then　only　the　third　hypothesis　remains。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　For；　surely；　either　all　things　have　communion　with　all；　or
  nothing　with　any　other　thing；　or　some　things　communicate　with　some
  things　and　others　not。
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　And　two　out　of　these　three　suppositions　have　been　found　to　be
  impossible。
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　Every　one　then；　who　desires　to　answer　truly；　will　adopt　the
  third　and　remaining　hypothesis　of　the　communion　of　some　with　some。
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　This　communion　of　some　with　some　may　be　illustrated
  by　the　case
  of　letters；　for　some　letters　do　not　fit　each　other；　while　others　do。
  Theaet。　Of　course。
  Str。　And　the　vowels；　especially；　are　a　sort　of　bond　which　pervades
  all　the　other　letters；　so　that　without　a　vowel　one　consonant
  cannot　be
  joined　to　another。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　But　does　every　one　know　what　letters　will　unite　with　what？　Or
  is　art　required　in　order　to　do　so？
  Theaet。　What　is　required。
  Str。　What　art？
  Theaet。　The　art　of　grammar。
  Str。　And　is　not　this　also　true　of　sounds　high　and　low？…Is
  not　he　who
  has　the　art　to　know　what　sounds　mingle；　a　musician；　and　he　who　is
  ignorant；　not　a　musician？
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　And　we　shall　find　this　to　be　generally　true　of　art　or　the
  absence　of　art。
  Theaet。　Of　course。
  Str。　And　as　classes　are　admitted　by　us　in　like　manner　to　be　some
  of　them　capable　and　others　incapable　of　intermixture；　must　not　he
  who　would　rightly　show　what　kinds　will　unite　and　what　will　not；
  proceed　by　the　help　of　science　in　the　path　of　argument？　And　will　he
  not　ask　if　the　connecting　links　are　universal；　and　so　capable　of
  intermixture　with　all　things；　and　again；　in　divisions；　whether　there
  are　not　other　universal　classes；　which　make　them　possible？
  Theaet。　To　be　sure　he　will　require　science；　and；　if　I　am　not
  mistaken；　the　very　greatest　of　all　sciences。
  Str。　How　are　we　to　call　it？　By　Zeus；　have　we　not　lighted
  unwittingly
  upon　our　free　and　noble　science；　and　in　looking　for　the　Sophist　have
  we　not　entertained　the　philosopher　unawares？
  Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？
  Str。　Should　we　not　say　that　the　division　according　to
  classes；　which
  neither　makes　the　same　other；　nor　makes　other　the　same；　is　the
  business　of　the　dialectical　science？
  Theaet。　That　is　what　we　should　say。
  Str。　Then；　surely；　he　who　can　divide　rightly　is　able　to　see
  clearly　one　form　pervading　a　scattered　multitude；　and　many　different
  forms　contained　under　one　higher　form；　and　again；　one　form　knit
  together　into　a　single　whole　and　pervading　many　such　wholes；　and
  many　forms；　existing　only　in　separation　and　isolation。　This　is　the
  knowledge　of　classes　which　determines　where　they　can　have　communion
  with　one　another　and　where　not。
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　And　the　art　of　dialectic　would　be　attributed　by　you
  only　to　the
  philosopher　pure　and　true？
  Theaet。　Who　but　he　can　be　worthy？
  Str。　In　this　region　we　shall　always　discover　the　philosopher；　if
  we　look　for　him；　like　the　Sophist；　he　is　not　easily　discovered；　but
  for　a　different　reason。
  Theaet。　For　what　reason？
  Str。　Because　the　Sophist　runs　away　into　the　darkness　of　not…being；
  in　which　he　has　learned　by　habit　to　feel　about；　and　cannot　be
  discovered　because　of　the　darkness　of　the　place。　is　not　that　true？
  Theaet。　It　seems　to　be　so。
  Str。　And　the　philosopher；　always　holding　converse　through　reason
  with　the　idea　of　being；　is　also　dark　from　excess　of　light；　for　the
  souls　of　the　many　have　no　eye　which　can　endure　the　vision　of　the
  divine。
  Theaet。　Yes；　that　seems　to　be　quite　as　true　as　the　other。
  Str。　Well；　the　philosopher　may　hereafter　be　more　fully
  considered　by
  us；　if　we　are　disposed；　but　the　Sophist　must　clearly　not　be
  allowed　to
  escape　until　we　have　had　a　good　look　at　him。
  Theaet。　Very　good。
  Str。　Since；　then；　we　are　agreed　that　some　classes　have　a　communion
  with　one　another；　and　others　not；　and　some　have　communion　with　a　few
  and　others　with　many；　and　that　there　is　no　reason　why　some　should
  not　have　universal　communion　with　all；　let　us　now　pursue　the
  enquiry；　as　the　argument　suggests；　not　in　relation　to　all　ideas；
  lest　the　multitude　of　them　should　confuse　us；　but　let　us　select　a
  few　of　those　which　are　reckoned　to　be　the　principal　ones；
  and　consider
  their　several　natures　and　their　capacity　of　communion　with　one
  another；　in　order　that　if　we　are　not　able　to　apprehend　with　perfect
  clearness　the