the　upper　part；　which　is　farther　off；　would　appear　to　be　out　of
  proportion　in　comparison　with　the　lower；　which　is　nearer；　and　so
  they　give　up　the　truth　in　their　images　and　make　only　the　proportions
  which　appear　to　be　beautiful；　disregarding　the　real　ones。
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　And　that　which　being　other　is　also　like；　may　we　not
  fairly　call
  a　likeness　or　image？
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　And　may　we　not；　as　I　did　just　now；　call　that　part　of　the
  imitative　art　which　is　concerned　with　making　such　images　the　art　of
  likeness　making？
  Theaet。　Let　that　be　the　name。
  Str。　And　what　shall　we　call　those　resemblances　of　the　beautiful；
  which　appear　such　owing　to　the　unfavourable　position　of　the
  spectator；
  whereas　if　a　person　had　the　power　of　getting　a　correct　view　of　works
  of　such　magnitude；　they　would　appear　not　even　like　that　to　which
  they　profess　to　be　like？　May　we　not　call　these　〃appearances；〃　since
  they　appear　only　and　are　not　really　like？
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　There　is　a　great　deal　of　this　kind　of　thing　in
  painting；　and　in
  all　imitation。
  Theaet。　Of　course。
  Str。　And　may　we　not　fairly　call　the　sort　of　art；　which　produces　an
  appearance　and　not　an　image；　phantastic　art？
  Theaet。　Most　fairly。
  Str。　These　then　are　the　two　kinds　of　image　making…the　art　of
  making　likenesses；　and　phantastic　or　the　art　of　making　appearances？
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　I　was　doubtful　before　in　which　of　them　I　should　place　the
  Sophist；　nor　am　I　even　now　able　to　see　clearly；　verily　he　is　a
  wonderful　and　inscrutable　creature。　And　now　in　the　cleverest
  manner　he
  has　got　into　an　impossible　place。
  Theaet。　Yes；　he　has。
  Str。　Do　you　speak　advisedly；　or　are　you　carried　away　at　the　moment
  by　the　habit　of　assenting　into　giving　a　hasty　answer？
  Theaet。　May　I　ask　to　what　you　are　referring？
  Str。　My　dear　friend；　we　are　engaged　in　a　very　difficult
  speculation…there　can　be　no　doubt　of　that；　for　how　a　thing　can
  appear　and　seem；　and　not　be；　or　how　a　man　can　say　a　thing
  which　is　not
  true；　has　always　been　and　still　remains　a　very　perplexing　question。
  Can　any　one　say　or　think　that　falsehood　really　exists；　and
  avoid　being
  caught　in　a　contradiction？　Indeed；　Theaetetus；　the　task　is　a
  difficult
  one。
  Theaet。　Why？
  Str。　He　who　says　that　falsehood　exists　has　the　audacity　to　assert
  the　being　of　not…being；　for　this　is　implied　in　the　possibility　of
  falsehood。　But；　my　boy；　in　the　days　when　I　was　a　boy；　the　great
  Parmenides　protested　against　this　doctrine；　and　to　the　end
  of　his　life
  he　continued　to　inculcate　the　same　lesson…always　repeating　both　in
  verse　and　out　of　verse：
  Keep　your　mind　from　this　way　of　enquiry；　for　never　will　you　show
  that　not…being　is
  Such　is　his　testimony；　which　is　confirmed　by　the　very　expression
  when　sifted　a　little。　Would　you　object　to　begin　with　the
  consideration
  of　the　words　themselves？
  Theaet。　Never　mind　about　me；　I　am　only　desirous　that　you　should
  carry　on　the　argument　in　the　best　way；　and　that　you　should　take　me
  with　you。
  Str。　Very　good；　and　now　say；　do　we　venture　to　utter　the　forbidden
  word　〃not…being〃？
  Theaet。　Certainly　we　do。
  Str。　Let　us　be　serious　then；　and　consider　the　question　neither　in
  strife　nor　play：　suppose　that　one　of　the　hearers　of　Parmenides　was
  asked；　〃To　is　the　term　'not…being'　to　be　applied？〃…do　you　know　what
  sort　of　object　he　would　single　out　in　reply；　and　what　answer　he
  would　make　to　the　enquirer？
  Theaet。　That　is　a　difficult　question；　and　one　not　to　be　answered
  at　all　by　a　person　like　myself。
  Str。　There　is　at　any　rate　no　difficulty　in　seeing　that　the
  predicate
  〃not…being〃　is　not　applicable　to　any　being。
  Theaet。　None；　certainly。
  Str。　And　if　not　to　being；　then　not　to　something。
  Theaet。　Of　course　not。
  Str。　It　is　also　plain；　that　in　speaking　of　something　we　speak　of
  being；　for　to　speak　of　an　abstract　something　naked　and　isolated　from
  all　being　is　impossible。
  Theaet。　Impossible。
  Str。　You　mean　by　assenting　to　imply　that　he　who　says　something
  must　say　some　one　thing？
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　Some　in　the　singular　（ti）　you　would　say　is　the　sign　of　one；
  some　in　the　dual　（tine）　of　two；　some　in　the　plural　（tines）　of　many？
  Theaet。　Exactly。
  Str。　Then　he　who　says　〃not　something〃　must　say　absolutely　nothing。
  Theaet。　Most　assuredly。
  Str。　And　as　we　cannot　admit　that　a　man　speaks　and　says　nothing；　he
  who　says　〃not…being〃　does　not　speak　at　all。
  Theaet。　The　difficulty　of　the　argument　can　no　further　go。
  Str。　Not　yet；　my　friend；　is　the　time　for　such　a　word；　for　there
  still　remains　of　all　perplexities　the　first　and　greatest；
  touching　the
  very　foundation　of　the　matter。
  Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？　Do　not　be　afraid　to　speak。
  Str。　To　that　which　is；　may　be　attributed　some　other　thing　which　is？
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　But　can　anything　which　is；　be　attributed　to　that　which　is　not？
  Theaet。　Impossible。
  Str。　And　all　number　is　to　be　reckoned　among　things　which　are？
  Theaet。　Yes；　surely　number；　if　anything；　has　a　real　existence。
  Str。　Then　we　must　not　attempt　to　attribute　to　not…being　number
  either　in　the　singular　or　plural？
  Theaet。　The　argument　implies　that　we　should　be　wrong　in　doing　so。
  Str。　But　how　can　a　man　either　express　in　words　or　even　conceive　in
  thought　things　which　are　not　or　a　thing　which　is　not　without　number？
  Theaet。　How　indeed？
  Str。　When　we　speak　of　things　which　are　not　attributing　plurality
  to　not…being？
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　when　we　say　〃what　is　not；〃　do　we　not
  attribute　unity？
  Theaet。　Manifestly。
  Str。　Nevertheless；　we　maintain　that　you　may　not　and　ought　not　to
  attribute　being　to　not…being？
  Theaet。　Most　true。
  Str。　Do　you　see；　then；　that　not…being　in　itself　can　neither　be
  spoken；　uttered；　or　thought；　but　that　it　is　unthinkable；
  unutterable；　unspeakable；　indescribable？
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　But；　if　so；　I　was　wrong　in　telling　you　just　now　that　the
  difficulty　which　was　coming　is　the　greatest　of　all。
  Theaet。　What！　is　there　a　greater　still　behind？
  Str。　Well；　I　am　surprised；　after　what　has　been　said　already；　that
  you　do　not　see　the　difficulty　in　which　he　who　would　refute　the
  notion　of　not…being　is　involved。　For　he　is　compelled　to　contradict
  himself　as　soon　as　he　makes　the　attempt。
  Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？　Speak　more　clearly。
  Str。　Do　not　expect　clearness　from　me。　For　I；　who　maintain　that
  not…being　has　no　part　either　in　the　one　or　many；　just　now
  spoke　and　am
  still　speaking　of　not…being　as　one；　for　I　say　〃not…being。〃　Do　you
  understand？
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　And　a　little　while　ago　I　said　that　not…being　is　unutterable；
  unspeakable；　indescribable：　do　you　follow？
  Theaet。　I　do　after　a　fashion。
  Str。　When　I　introduced　the　word　〃is；〃　did　I　not　contradict　what　I
  said　before？
  Theaet。　Clearly。
  Str。　And　in　using　the　singular　verb；　did　I　not　speak　of
  not…being　as
  one？
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　And　when　I　spoke　of　not…being　as　indescribable　and
  unspeakable　and　unutterable；　in　using　each　of　these　words　in　the
  singular；　did　I　not　refer　to　not…being　as　one？
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　And　yet　we　say　that；　strictly　speaking；　it　should　not　be
  defined　as　one　or　many；　and　should　not　even　be　called　〃it；〃　for　the
  use　of　the　word　〃it〃　would　imply　a　form　of　unity。
  Theaet。　Quite　true。
  Str。　How；　then；　can　any　one　put　any　faith　in　me？　For　now；
  as　always；
  I　am　unequal　to　the　refutation　of　not…being。　And　therefore；　as　I　was
  saying；　do　not　look　to　me　for　the　right　way　of　speaking　about
  not…being；　but　come；　let　us　try　the　experiment　with　you。
  Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？
  Str。　Make　a　noble　effort；　as　becomes　youth；　and　endeavour　with　all
  your　might　to　speak　of　not…being　in　a　right　manner；　without
  introducing　into　it　either　existence　or　unity　or　plurality。
  Theaet。　It　would　be　a　strange　boldness　in　me　which　would
  attempt　the
  task　when　I　see　you　thus　discomfited。
  Str。　Say　no　more　of　ourselves；　but　until　we　find　some　one　or　other
  who　can　speak　of　not…being　without　number；　we　must　acknowledge　that
  the　Sophist　is　a　clever　rogue　who　will　not　be　got　out　of　his　hole。
  Theaet。　Most　true。
  Str。　And　if　we　say　to　him　that　he　professes　an　art　of　making
  appearances；　he　will　grapple　with　us　and　retort　our　argument　upon
  ourselves；　and　when　we　call　him　an　image…maker　he　will　say；
  〃Pray　what
  do　you　mean　at　all　by　an　image？〃　…and　I　should　like　to　know；
  Theaetetus；　how　we　can　possibly　answer　the　younker's　question？
  Theaet。　We　shall　doubtless　tell　him　of　the　images　which　are
  reflected　in　water　or　in　mirrors；　also　of　sculptures；　pictures；　and
  other　duplicates。
  Str。　I　see；　Theaetetus；　that　you　have　never　made　the
  acquaintance　of
  the　Sophist。
  Theaet。　Why　do　you　think　so？
  Str。　He　will　make　believe　to　have　his　eyes　shut；　or　to　have　none。
  Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？
  Str。　When　you　tell　him　of　something　existing　in　a　mirror；　or　in
  sculpture；　and　address　him　as　though　he　had　eyes；　he　will
  laugh　you　to
  scorn；　and　will　pretend　that　he　knows　nothing　of　mirrors　and
  streams；　or　of　sight　at　all；　he　wi