absolute；　but　on　the　other　hand；　this　form　of　concrete　existence；　being…for…self；　has　not　yet　the
  form　of　the　in…itself　as　well。　What　thus　appears　in　respect　of　form　as　such；　as　opposition；　appears
  in　the　form　of　the　Notion　reflected　into　simple　identity；　that　is；　appears　in　the　content　as　its　simple
  determinateness；　thus　the　good；　although　valid　in　and　for　itself；　is　some　particular　end；　but　an　end
  that　has　not　to　wait　to　receive　its　truth　through　its　realisation；　but　is　already　on　its　own　account　the
  true。
  The　syllogism　of　immediate　realisation　itself　requires　no　detailed　exposition　here；　it　is　altogether
  the　same　as　the　syllogism　of　external　purposiveness　considered　above；　it　is　only　the　content　that
  constitutes　the　difference。　In　external　as　in　formal　purposiveness；　it　was　an　indeterminate　finite
  content　in　general；　here；　though　it　is　finite　too；　it　is　as　such　at　the　same　time　as　absolutely　valid
  content。　But　in　regard　to　the　conclusion；　to　the　realised　end；　a　further　difference　comes　in。　The
  finite　end　in　its　realisation；　all　the　same；　gets　no　further　than　a　means；　since　in　its　beginning　it　is　not
  an　end　already　determined　in　and　for　itself；　it　remains　even　when　realised　an　end　that　is　not　in　and
  for　itself。　If　the　good　again　is　also　fixed　as　something　finite；　if　it　is　essentially　such；　then
  notwithstanding　its　inner　infinitude　it　cannot　escape　the　destiny　of　finitude　a　destiny　that　manifests
  itself　in　a　number　of　forms。　The　realised　good　is　good　by　virtue　of　what　it　already　is　in　the
  subjective　end；　in　its　Idea；　realisation　gives　it　an　external　existence；　but　since　his　existence　is
  determined　merely　as　an　intrinsically　worthless　externality；　in　it　the　good　has　only　attained　a
  contingent；　destructible　existence；　not　a　realisation　corresponding　to　its　Idea。　Further；　since　in
  respect　of　its　content　the　good　is　restricted；　there　are　several　kinds　of　good；　good　in　its　concrete
  existence　is　not　only　subject　to　destruction　by　external　contingency　and　by　evil；　but　by　the　collision
  and　conflict　of　the　good　itself。　From　the　side　of　the　objective　world　presupposed　for　it；　in　the
  presupposition　of　which　the　subjectivity　and　finitude　of　the　good　consists；　and　which　as　a　different
  world　goes　its　own　way；　the　very　realisation　of　the　good　is　exposed　to　obstacles；　obstacles　which
  may　indeed　even　be　insurmountable。
  In　this　way；　the　good　remains　an　ought…to…be；　it　is　in　and　for　itself；　but　being；　as　the　ultimate
  abstract　immediacy；　remains　also　confronting　is　in　the　form　of　a　not…being。
  The　Idea　of　the　realised　good　is；　it　is　true；　an　absolute　postulate；　but　it　is　no　more　than　a
  postulate；　that　is；　the　absolute　afflicted　with　the　determinateness　of　subjectivity。　There　are　still　two
  worlds　in　opposition；　one　a　realm　of　subjectivity　in　the　pure　regions　of　transparent　thought；　the
  other　a　realm　of　objectivity　in　the　element　of　an　externally　manifold　actuality　that　is　an　undisclosed
  realm　of　darkness。　The　complete　elaboration　of　the　unresolved　contradiction　between　that
  absolute　end　and　the　limitation　of　this　actuality　that　insuperably　opposes　it；　has　been　considered
  in　detail　in　the　Phenomenology　of　Spirit。
  As　the　Idea　contains　within　itself　the　moment　of　complete　determinateness；　the　other　Notion　with
  which　the　Notion　enters　into　relation　in　the　Idea；　possesses　in　its　subjectivity　also　the　moment　of　an
  object；　consequently　the　Idea　enter　here　into　the　shape　of　self…consciousness　and　in　this　one
  aspect　coincides　with　the　exposition　of　the　same。
  But　what　is　still　lacking　in　the　practical　Idea　is　the　moment　of　consciousness　proper　itself；　namely；
  that　the　moment　of　actuality　in　the　Notion　should　have　attained　on　its　own　account　the
  determination　of　external　being。
  Another　way　of　regarding　this　defect　is　that　the　practical　Idea　still　lacks　the　moment　of　the
  theoretical　Idea。　That　is　to　say；　in　the　latter　there　stands　on　the　side　of　the　subjective　Notion　…　the
  Notion　that　is　in　process　of　being　intuited　within　itself　by　the　Notion　only　the　determination　of
  universality；　cognition　knows　itself　only　as　apprehension；　as　the　identity　on　its　own　account
  indeterminate　of　the　Notion　with　itself；　the　filling；　that　is；　the　objectivity　that　is　determined　in　and
  for　itself；　is　for　it　a　datum；　and　what　truly　is　is　the　actuality　there　before　it　independently　of
  subjective　positing。　For　the　practical　Idea；　on　the　contrary；　this　actuality；　which　at　the　same　time
  confronts　it　as　an　insuperable　limitation；　ranks　as　something　intrinsically　worthless　that　must　first
  receive　its　true　determination　and　sole　worth　through　the　ends　of　the　good。　Hence　it　is　only　the　will
  itself　that　stands　in　the　way　of　attainment　of　its　goal；　for　it　separates　itself　from　cognition；　and
  external　reality　for　the　will　does　not　receive　the　form　of　a　true　being；　the　Idea　of　the　good　can
  therefore　find　its　integration　only　in　the　Idea　of　the　true。
  But　it　makes　this　transition　through　itself。　In　the　syllogism　of　action；　one　premise　is　the　immediate
  relation　of　the　good　end　to　actuality　which　it　seizes　on；　and　in　the　second　premise　directs　it　as
  an　external　means　against　the　external　actuality。
  For　the　subjective　Notion　the　good　is　the　objective；　actuality　in　its　existence　confronts　is　as　an
  insuperable　limitation　only　in　so　far　as　it　still　has　the　character　of　immediate　existence；　not　of
  something　objective　in　the　sense　of　a　being　that　is　in　and　for　itself；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　wither　the
  evil　if　the　indifferent；　the　merely　determinable；　whose　worth　does　not　reside　within　it。　This　abstract
  being　that　confronts　the　good　in　the　second　premise　has；　however；　already　been　sublated　by　the
  practical　Idea　itself；　the　first　premise　of　the　latter's　action　is　the　immediate　objectivity　of　the
  Notion；　according　to　which　the　end　communicates　itself　to　actuality　without　meeting　any　resistance
  and　is　in　simple　identical　relation　with　it。　Thus　all　that　remains　to　be　done　is　to　bring　together　the
  thoughts　of　its　two　premises。　To　what　has　been　already　immediately　accomplished　by　the
  objective　Notion　in　the　first　premise；　the　only　addition　made　in　the　second　premise　is　that　it　is
  posited　through　mediation；　and　hence　posited　for　the　objective　Notion。　Now　just　as　in　the　end
  relation　in　general；　the　realised　end　is　also　again　merely　a　means；　while　conversely　the　means　is
  also　the　realised　end；　so　similarly　in　the　syllogism　of　the　good；　the　second　premise　is　immediately
  already　present　implicitly　in　the　first；　but　this　immediacy　is　not　sufficient；　and　the　second　premise
  is　already　postulated　for　the　first　…　the　realisation　of　the　good　in　the　face　of　another　actuality
  confronting　it　is　the　mediation　which　is　essentially　necessary　for　the　immediate　relation　and　the
  accomplished　actualisation　of　the　good。
  For　it　is　only　the　first　negation　or　the　otherness　of　the　Notion；　an　objectivity　that　would　be　a
  submergence　of　the　Notion　in　the　externality；　the　second　negation　is　the　sublating　of　this　otherness；
  whereby　the　immediate　realisation　of　the　end　first　becomes　the　actuality　the　Notion　is　posited　as
  identical　with　itself；　not　with　an　other；　and　thus　alone　is　posited　as　the　free　Notion。
  Now　if　it　is　supposed　that　the　end　of　the　good　is　after　all　not　realised　through　this　mediation；　this
  signifies　a　relapse　of　the　Notion　to　the　standpoint　occupied　by　it　before　its　activity　the　standpoint
  of　an　actuality　determined　as　worthless　and　yet　presupposed　as　real。　This　relapse；　which　becomes
  the　progress　to　the　spurious　infinity；　has　its　sole　ground　in　the　fact　that　in　the　sublating　of　that
  abstract　reality　this　sublating　is　no　less　immediately　forgotten；　or　it　is　forgotten　that　this　reality　is　in
  fact　already　presupposed　as　an　actuality　that　is　intrinsically　worthless　and　not　objective。
  This　repetition　of　the　presupposition　of　the　end　consequently　assumes　this　character；　that　the
  subjective　bearing　of　the　objective　Notion　is　reproduced　and　made　perpetual；　with　the　result　that
  the　finitude　of　the　good　in　respect　of　its　content　as　well　as　its　form　appears　as　the　abiding　truth；
  and　its　actualisation　appears　as　a　merely　individual　act；　and　not　as　a　universal　one。　As　a　matter　of
  fact　this　determinateness　has　sublated　itself　in　the　actualisation　of　the　good；　what　still　limits　the
  objective　Notion　is　its　own　view　of　itself；　which　vanishes　by　reflection　on　what　its　actualisation　is
  in　itself。　Through　this　view　it　is　only　standing　in　its　own　way；　and　thus　what　it　has　to　do　is　to　turn；
  not　against　an　outer　actuality；　but　against　itself。
  In　other　words；　the　activity　in　the　second　premise　produces　only　a　one…sided　being…for…self；　and
  its　product　therefore　appears　as　something　subjective　and　individual；　and　consequently　the　first
  presupposition　is　repeated　in　it。　But　this　activity　is　in　truth　no　less　the　positing　of　the　implicit
  identity　of　the　objective　Notion　and　the　immediate　actuality。　This　latter　is　determined　by　the
  presupposition　as　having　a　phenomenal　reality　only；　as　being　intrinsically　worthless　and　simply　and
  solely　determinable　by　the　objective　Notion。　When　external　actuality　is　altered　by　the　activity　of
  the　objective　Notion　and　it　determination　therewith　sublated；　by　that　very　fact　the　merely
  phenomenal