Notion；　since　the　latter　is　not　yet　self…determining。
  In　the　said　moments；　which　are　the　form…difference　of　definition；　the　Notion　finds　itself　and　has　in
  them　the　reality　correspondent　to　it。　But　the　reflection　of　the　Notion…moments　into　themselves；
  which　is　individuality；　is　not　yet　contained　in　this　reality；　and　therefore　the　object；　in　so　far　as　it　is　in
  cognition；　is　not　yet　determined　as　subjective。　Whereas；　cognition　on　the　contrary　is　subjective　and
  has　an　external　starting　point；　or　it　is　subjective　by　reason　of　its　external　starting　point　in　the
  individual。　The　content　of　the　Notion　is　therefore　a　datum　and　contingent。　Consequently；　the
  concrete　Notion　itself　is　contingent　in　a　twofold　aspect：　first　it　is　contingent　in　respect　of　its　content
  as　such；　secondly　it　is　contingent　which　determinations　of　the　content　from　among　the　manifold
  qualities　that　the　object　possesses　in　external　existence　are　to　be　selected　for　the　Notion　and　are
  to　constitute　its　moments。
  The　latter　point　requires　closer　consideration。　For　since　individuality；　which　is　determined　in　and
  for　itself；　lies　outside　the　Notion…determination　peculiar　to　synthetic　cognition　there　is　no　principle
  available　for　determining　which　sides　of　the　subject　matter　are　to　be　regarded　as　belonging　to　its
  Notion…determination　and　which　merely　to　the　external　reality。　This　constitutes　a　difficulty　in　the
  case　of　definitions；　a　difficulty　that　for　synthetic　cognition　cannot　be　overcome。　Yet　here　a
  distinction　must　be　made。　In　the　first　place；　the　definition　of　products　of　self…conscious
  purposiveness　is　easily　discovered；　for　the　end　that　they　are　to　serve　is　a　determination　created　out
  of　the　subjective　resolve　and　constituting　the　essential　particularisation；　the　form　of　the　concrete
  existent　thing；　which　is　here　the　sole　concern。　Apart　from　this；　the　nature　of　its　material　and　its
  other　external　properties；　in　so　far　as　they　correspond　to　the　end；　are　contained　in　its
  determination；　the　rest　are　unessential　for　it。
  Secondly；　geometrical　objects　are　abstract　determinations　of　space；　the　underlying　abstraction；
  so…called　absolute　space；　has　lost　all　further　concrete　determinations　and　now　too　possesses　only
  such　shapes　and　configurations　as　are　posited　in　it。　These　objects　therefore　are　only　what　they　are
  meant　to　be；　their　Notion　determination　in　general；　and　more　precisely　the　specific　difference；
  possesses　in　them　its　simple　unhindered　reality。　To　this　extent；　they　resemble　the　products　of
  external　purposiveness；　and　they　also　agree　with　the　subject　matter　of　arithmetic　in　which　likewise
  the　underlying　determination　is　only　that　which　has　been　posited　in　it。　True；　space　has　still　further
  determinations：　its　three…dimensionality；　its　continuity　and　divisibility；　which　are　not　first　posited　in
  it　by　external　determination。　But　these　belong　to　the　accepted　material　and　are　immediate
  presuppositions；　it　is　only　the　combination　and　entanglement　of　the　former　subjective
  determinations　with　this　peculiar　nature　of　the　domain　into　which　they　have　been　imported　that
  produces　synthetic　relationships　and　laws。　In　the　case　of　numerical　determinations；　since　they　are
  based　on　the　simple　principle　of　the　One；　their　combination　and　any　further　determination　is　simply
  and　solely　a　positedness；　on　the　other　hand；　determinations　in　space；　which　is　explicitly　a
  continuous　mutual　externality；　run　a　further　course　of　their　own　and　possess　a　reality　distinct
  from　their　Notion；　but　this　no　longer　belongs　to　the　immediate　definition。
  But；　thirdly；　in　the　case　of　definitions　of　concrete　objects　of　Nature　as　well　as　of　spirit；　the　position
  is　quite　different。　In　general　such　objects　are；　for　representation；　things　of　many　properties。
  Here；　what　we　have　to　do　in　the　first　instance　is　to　apprehend　what　is　their　proximate　genus；　and
  then；　what　is　their　specific　difference。　We　have　therefore　to　determine　which　of　the　many
  properties　belong　to　the　object　as　genus；　and　which　as　species；　and　further　which　among　these
  properties　is　the　essential　one；　this　last　point　involves　the　necessity　of　ascertaining　their
  interrelationship；　whether　one　is　already　posited　with　the　other。　But　for　this　purpose　there　is　so　far
  no　other　criterion　to　hand　than　existence　itself。　The　essentiality　of　the　property　for　the　purpose　of
  the　definition；　in　which　it　is　to　be　posited　as　a　simple；　undeveloped　determinateness；　is　its
  universality。　But　in　existence　universality　is　merely　empirical。　It　may　be　universality　in　time…whether
  the　property　in　question　is　lasting；　while　the　others　show　themselves　transitory　in　the　subsistence　of
  the　whole；　or　it　may　be　a　universality　resulting　from　comparison　with　other　concrete　wholes　and　in
  that　case　it　goes　no　further　than　community。　Now　if　comparison　indicates　as　the　common　basis　the
  total　habitue　as　empirically　presented；　reflection　has　to　bring　this　together　into　a　simple　thought
  determination　and　to　grasp　the　simple　character　of　such　a　totality。　But　the　only　possible　attestation
  that　a　thought　determination；　or　a　single　one　of　the　immediate　properties；　constitutes　the　simple　and
  specific　essence　of　the　object；　is　the　derivation　of　such　a　determination　from　the　concrete
  properties　of　the　subject　matter。　But　this　would　demand　an　analysis　transforming　the　immediate
  properties　into　thoughts　and　reducing　what　is　concrete　to　something　simple。　Such　an　analysis；
  however；　would　be　higher　than　the　one　already　considered；　for　it　could　not　be　abstractive；　but
  would　have　to　preserve　in　the　universal　what　is　specific　in　the　concrete；　unify　it　and　show　it　to　be
  dependent　on　the　simple　thought　determination。
  The　relations　of　the　manifold　determinations　of　immediate　existence　to　the　simple　Notion　would
  however　be　theorems　requiring　proof。　But　definition　is　the　first；　still　undeveloped　Notion；
  therefore；　when　it　has　to　apprehend　the　simple　determinateness　of　the　subject　matter；　which
  apprehension　has　to　be　something　immediate；　it　can　only　employ　for　the　purpose　one　of　its
  immediate　so…called　properties…a　determination　of　sensuous　existence　or　representation。　The
  isolation；　then；　of　this　property　by　abstraction；　constitutes　simplicity；　and　for　universality　and
  essentiality　the　Notion　has　to　fall　back　onto　empirical　universality；　the　persistence　in　altered
  circumstances；　and　the　reflection　that　seeks　the　Notion…determination　in　external　existence　and　in
  picture　thinking；　that　is；　seeks　it　where　it　is　not　to　be　found。　Definition；　therefore；　automatically
  renounces　the　Notion…determinations　proper；　which　would　be　essentially　principles　of　the　subject
  matter；　and　contents　itself　with　marks；　that　is；　determinations　in　which　essentiality　for　the　object
  itself　is　a　matter　of　indifference；　and　which　are　intended　merely　to　be　distinguishing　marks　for　an
  external　reflection。　A　single；　external　determinateness　of　this　kind　is　too　inadequate　to　the　concrete
  totality　and　to　the　nature　of　its　Notion；　to　justify　its　selection　for　its　own　sake；　nor　could　it　be　taken
  for　the　true　expression　and　determination　of　a　concrete　whole。　According　to　Blumenbach's'
  observation；　for　example；　the　lobe　of　the　ear　is　absent　in　all　other　animals；　and　therefore　in　the
  usual　phraseology　of　common　and　distinguishing　marks　it　could　quite　properly　be　used　as　the
  distinctive　characteristic　in　the　definition　of　physical　man。　But　how　inadequate　such　a　completely
  external　determination　at　once　appears　when　compared　with　the　conception　of　the　total　habitue　of
  physical　man；　and　with　the　demand　that　the　Notion　determination　shall　be　something　essential！　It　is
  quite　contingent　whether　the；　marks　adopted　in　the　definition　are　pure　makeshifts　like　this；　or　on
  the　other　hand　approximate　more　to　the　nature　of　a　principle。　It　is　also　to　be　observed　that；　on
  account　of　their　externality；　they　have　not　been　the　starting　point　in　the　cognition　of　the　Notion　of
  the　object；　on　the　contrary；　an　obscure　feeling；　an　indefinite　but　deeper　sense；　an　inkling　of　what　is
  essential；　has　preceded　the　discovery　of　the　genera　in　nature　and　in　spirit；　and　only　afterwards　has
  a　specific　externality　been　sought　to　satisfy　the　understanding。　In　existence　the　Notion　has　entered
  into　externality　and　is　accordingly　explicated　into　its　differences　and　cannot　be　attached　simply　to　a
  single　one　of　such　properties。　The　properties；　as　the　externality　of　the　thing；　are　external　to
  themselves；　that　is　why；　as　we　pointed　'　out　in　the　sphere　of　Appearance　when　dealing　with　the
  thing　of　many　properties；　properties　essentially　become　even　self…subsistent　matters；　spirit；
  regarded　from　the　same　standpoint　of　Appearance；　becomes　an　aggregate　of　a　number　of
  self…subsistent　forces。　Through　this　standpoint；　the　single　property　or　force；　even　where　it　is
  posited　as　indifferent　to　the　others；　ceases　to　be　a　characterising　principle；　with　the　result　that　the
  determinateness；　as　determinateness　of　the　Notion；　vanishes　altogether。
  Into　concrete　things；　along　with　the　diversity　of　the　properties　among　themselves；　there　enters　also
  the　difference　between　the　Notion　and　its　actualisation。　The　Notion　in　nature　and　in　spirit　has　an
  external　presentation　in　which　its　determinateness　shows　itself　as　depe