to　have　an　objectivity　the　same　as　itself；　that　is；　to　have　itself　for　object。　The　part　of　logic　that
  treats　of　this　concrete　side　does　not　belong　to　applied　logic　as　such；　if　it　did；　then　every　science
  would　have　to　be　dragged　into　logic；　for　each　is　an　applied　logic　in　so　far　as　it　consists　in
  apprehending　its　subject　matter　in　forms　of　thought　and　the　Notion。　The　subjective　Notion　has
  presuppositions　which　present　themselves　in　psychological；　anthropological　and　other　forms。　But
  to　logic　belong　only　the　presuppositions　of　the　pure　Notion　in　so　far　as　they　have　the　form　of　pure
  thoughts；　of　abstract　essentialities；　that　is；　the　determinations　of　being　and　essence。　Similarly；　in
  respect　of　cognition；　the　Notion's　apprehension　of　itself；　logic　will　not　deal　with　other　shapes　of　its
  presupposition　but　only　with　that　which　is　itself　Idea；　this　latter；　however；　necessarily　falls　to　be
  dealt　with　in　logic。　Now　this　presupposition　is　the　immediate　Idea；　for　since　cognition　is　the
  Notion　in　so　far　as　this　is　for　itself　but　as　a　subjectivity　is　in　relation　to　an　objectivity；　the　Notion　is
  related　to　the　Idea　as　presupposed　or　immediate　Idea。　But　the　immediate　Idea　is　life。
  To　this　extent　the　necessity　of　treating　of　the　Idea　of　life　in　logic　would　be　based　on　the　necessity；
  otherwise　recognised；　too；　of　treating　here　of　the　concrete　Notion　of　cognition。　But　this　Idea　has
  come　upon　the　scene　through　the　Notion's　own　necessity；　the　Idea；　that　which　is　true　in　and　for
  itself；　is　essentially　the　subject　matter　of　logic；　since　it　is　at　first　to　be　considered　in　its　immediacy；　it
  must　be　apprehended　and　cognised　in　this　determinateness　in　which　it　is　life；　in　order　that　its
  treatment　shall　not　be　an　empty　affair　devoid　of　determinate　content。　All　that　we　need　perhaps　to
  remark　is　how　far　the　logical　view　of　life　differs　from　any　other　scientific　view　of　it；　this　is　not　the
  place；　however；　to　concern　ourselves　with　how　life　is　treated　in　the　unphilosophical　sciences；　but
  only　with　differentiating　logical　life　as　pure　Idea　from　natural　life　which　is　dealt　with　in　the
  philosophy　of　nature；　and　from　life　in　so　far　as　it　stands　in　connection　with　spirit。　The　former　of
  these；　as　the　life　of　nature；　is　life　as　projected　into　the　externality　of　existence　and　having　its
  condition　in　inorganic　nature；　and　where　the　moments　of　the　Idea　are　a　multiplicity　of　actual
  formations。　Life　in　the　Idea　is　without　such　presuppositions　which　are　in　the　form　of　shapes　of
  actuality；　its　presupposition　is　the　Notion　as　we　have　considered　it；　on　the　one　hand　as　subjective；
  on　the　other　hand　as　objective。　In　nature　life　appears　as　the　highest　stage；　a　stage　that　nature's
  externality　attains　by　withdrawing　into　itself　and　sublating　itself　in　subjectivity。　In　Logic　it　is　simple
  inwardness　＇Insichsein＇；　which　in　the　Idea　of　life　has　attained　an　externality　that　genuinely
  corresponds　to　it；　the　Notion　that　earlier　appeared　on　the　scene　as　subjective　Notion　is　the　soul　of
  life　itself；　it　is　the　urge　that　mediates　for　itself　its　reality　throughout　objectivity。　Nature；　having
  reached　this　Idea　from　the　starting　point　of　its　externality；　transcends　itself；　its　end　does　not　appear
  as　its　beginning；　but　as　its　limit；　in　which　it　sublates　itself。　Similarly；　in　the　Idea　of　life　the　moments
  of　its　reality　do　not　receive　the　shape　of　external　actuality　but　remain　enclosed　within　the　form　of
  the　Notion。
  In　spirit；　however；　life　appears　partly　as　opposed　to　it；　partly　as　posited　as　at　one　with　it；　this
  unity　being　reborn　as　the　pure　offspring　of　spirit。　For　here　life　is　to　be　taken　generally　in　its　proper
  sense　as　natural　life；　for　what　is　called　the　life　of　spirit　as　spirit；　is　its　peculiar　nature　that　stands
  opposed　to　mere　life；　just　as　we　speak；　too；　of　the　nature　of　spirit；　although　spirit　is　not　a　natural
  being　and　is　rather　the　opposite　of　nature。　Life　as　such；　then；　is　for　spirit　partly　a　means；　and　as
  such　spirit　opposes　it　to　itself；　partly　spirit　is　a　living　individual　and　life　is　its　body；　and　again；　this
  unity　of　spirit　with　its　living　corporeality　is　born　from　spirit　itself　as　an　ideal。　None　of　these
  relations　to　spirit　concerns　logical　life　and　life　is　to　be　considered　here　neither　as　instrument
  ＇Mittel＇　of　a　spirit；　nor　as　a　moment　of　the　ideal　and　of　beauty。　In　both　cases；　as　natural　life　and
  as　life　standing　in　relation　with　spirit；　life　possesses　a　determinateness　of　its　externality；　in　the
  first　case　through　its　presuppositions　which　are　other　formations　of　nature；　in　the　second　case
  through　the　ends　and　the　activity　of　spirit。　The　Idea　of　life　by　itself　is　free　from　the　former
  presupposed　and　conditioning　objectivity　as　well　as　from　relation　to　the　latter　subjectivity。
  Life；　considered　now　more　closely　in　its　Idea；　is　in　and　for　itself　absolute　universality；　the
  objectivity　that　it　possesses　is　permeated　throughout　by　the　Notion　and　has　the　Notion　alone　for
  substance。　What　is　distinguished　as　part；　or　in　accordance　with　some　other　external　reflection；　has
  within　itself　the　whole　Notion；　the　Notion　is　the　omnipresent　soul　in　it；　which　remains　simple
  self…relation　and　remains　a　one　in　the　multiplicity　belonging　to　objective　being。　This　multiplicity；　as
  self…external　objectivity；　has　an　indifferent　subsistence；　which　in　space　and　time；　if　these　could
  already　be　mentioned　here；　is　a　mutual　externality　of　wholly　diverse　and　self…subsistent　elements。
  But　in　life　externality　is　at　the　same　time　present　as　the　simple　determinateness　of　its　Notion；　thus
  the　soul　is　an　omnipresent　outpouring　of　itself　into　this　multiplicity　and　at　the　same　remains
  absolutely　the　simple　oneness　of　the　concrete　Notion　with　itself。　The　thinking　that　clings　to　the
  determinations　of　the　relationships　of　reflection　and　of　the　formal　Notion；　when　it　comes　to
  consider　life；　this　unity　of　its　Notion　in　the　externality　of　objectivity；　in　the　absolute　multiplicity　of
  atomistic　matter；　finds　all　its　thoughts　without　exception　are　of　no　avail；　the　omnipresence　of　the
  simple　in　manifold　externality　is　for　reflection　an　absolute　contradiction；　and　as　reflection　must　at
  the　same　time　apprehend　this　omnipresence　from　its　perception　of　life　and　therefore　admit　the
  actuality　of　this　Idea；　it　is　an　incomprehensible　mystery　for　it；　because　it　does　not　grasp　the
  Notion；　and　the　Notion　as　the　substance　of　life。　This　simple　life；　however；　is　not　only　omnipresent；
  it　is　absolutely　the　subsistence　and　immanent　substance　of　its　objectivity；　but　as　subjective
  substance　it　is　the　urge；　and　moreover　t　'　he　specific　urge；　of　the　particular　difference；　and　no
  less　essentially　the　one　and　universal　urge　of　the　specialised　difference　that　reduces　this　its
  particularisation　into　unity　and　maintains　it　therein。　It　is　only　as　this　negative　unity　of　its　objectivity
  and　particularisation　that　life　is　a　self…related　life　that　is　for　itself；　a　soul。　As　such　it　is　essentially　an
  individual；　which　relates　itself　to　objectivity　as　to　an　other；　to　a　non…living　nature。
  Consequently　the　original　judgment　of　life　consists　in　this；　that　it　detaches　itself　as　an　individual
  subject　from　objectivity；　and　in　constituting　itself　the　negative　unity　of　the　Notion；　makes　the
  presupposition　of　an　immediate　objectivity。
  Life　is　therefore　first　to　be　considered　as　a　living　individual　that　is　for　itself　the　subjective　totality
  and　is　presupposed　as　indifferent　to　an　objectivity　that　confronts　it　as　indifferent。
  Secondly；　it　is　the　life　process；　the　process　of　sublating　its　presupposition；　positing　as　negative　the
  objectivity　that　is　indifferent　to　it　and　actualising　itself　as　that　objectivity's　power　and　negative　unity。
  By　so　doing　it　makes　itself　into　the　universal　that　is　the　unity　of　itself　and　its　other。
  Hence　life　is　thirdly　the　genus　process；　the　process　of　sublating　its　individualisation　and　relating
  itself　to　its　objective　existence　as　to　itself。　Accordingly；　this　process　is　on　the　one　hand　the　return
  to　its　Notion　and　the　repetition　of　the　first　diremption；　the　becoming　of　a　new　individuality　and　the
  death　of　the　first；　immediate　one；　but　on　the　other　hand；　the　Notion　of　life　that　has　withdrawn
  into　itself　is　the　becoming　of　the　Notion　that　is　in　relationship　with　itself　and　exists　universally　and
  freely　for　itself…the　transition　into　cognition。
  A　The　Living　Individual
  B　The　Life　Process
  C　The　Genus　＇Kind＇
  Chapter　2　The　Idea　of　Cognition
  Life　is　the　immediate　Idea；　or　the　Idea　as　its　Notion　not　yet　realised　in　its　own　self。　In　its
  judgement；　the　Idea　is　cognition　in　general。
  The　Notion　is；　as　Notion；　for　itself　in　so　far　as　it　freely　exists　as　abstract　universality　or　as　genus。
  As　such；　it　is　its　pure　self…identity；　which　inwardly　differentiates　itself　in　such　a　manner　that　the
  differentiated　moment　is　not　an　objectivity；　but　is　likewise　liberated　into　subjectivity　or　the　form　of
  simple　selflikeness；　and　hence　the　object　of　the　Notion　is　the　Notion　itself。　Its　reality　in　general　is
  the　form　of　its　determinate　being　and　the　point　of　interest　is　the　determination　this　form；　on　this
  determination　rests　the　difference　between　what　the　Notion　is　in　itself　or　as　subjective　and　what
  it　is　when　submerged　in　objectivity；　and　then