the　Idea　has　not　completely　leavened　its　reality；　has　imperfectly　subdued　it　to　the　Notion；　this　is　a
  possibility　arising　from　the　fact　that　the　Idea　itself　has　a　restricted　content；　that　though　it　is
  essentially　the　unity　of　Notion　and　reality；　it　is　no　less　essentially　their　difference；　for　only　the　object
  is　their　immediate；　that　is；　merely　implicit　unity。　But　if　an　object；　for　example　the　state；　did　not
  correspond　at　all　to　its　Idea；　that　is；　if　in　fact　it　was　not　the　Idea　of　the　state　at　all；　if　its　reality；
  which　is　the　self…conscious　individuals；　did　not　correspond　at　all　to　the　Notion；　its　soul　and　its
  body　would　have　parted；　the　former　would　escape　into　the　solitary　regions　of　thought；　the　latter
  would　have　broken　up　into　the　single　individualities。
  But　because　the　Notion　of　the　state　so　essentially　constitutes　the　nature　of　these　individualities；　it　is
  present　in　them　as　an　urge　so　powerful　that　they　are　impelled　to　translate　it　into　reality；　be　it　only　in
  the　form　of　external　purposiveness；　or　to　put　up　with　it　as　it　is；　or　else　they　must　needs　perish。　The
  worst　state；　one　whose　reality　least　corresponds　to　the　Notion；　in　so　far　as　it　still　exists；　is　still
  Idea；　the　individuals　still　obey　a　dominant　Notion　。
  However；　the　Idea　has　not　merely　the　more　general　meaning　of　the　true　being；　of　the　unity　of
  Notion　and　reality；　but　the　more　specific　one　of　the　unity　of　subjective　Notion　and　objectivity。
  That　is　to　say；　the　Notion　as　such　is　itself　already　the　identity　of　itself　and　reality；　for　the　indefinite
  expression　'reality'　means　in　general　nothing　else　but　determinate　being；　and　this　the　Notion
  possesses　in　its　particularity　and　individuality。　Similarly　too；　objectivity　is　the　total　Notion　that　out
  of　its　determinateness　has　withdrawn　into　identity　with　itself。　In　the　former　subjectivity　the
  determinateness　or　difference　of　the　Notion　is　an　illusory　being　＇semblance＇　that　is　immediately
  sublated　and　has　withdrawn　into　being…for…self　or　negative　unity；　it　is　an　inhering　predicate。　But　in
  this　objectivity　the　determinateness　is　posited　as　an　immediate　totality；　as　an　external　whole。　Now
  the　Idea　has　shown　itself　to　be　the　Notion　liberated　again　into　its　subjectivity　from　the　immediacy
  in　which　it　is　submerged　in　the　object；　to　he　the　Notion　that　distinguishes　itself　from　its　objectivity；
  which　however　is　no　less　determined　by　it　and　possesses　its　substantiality　only　in　that　Notion。　'This
  identity　has　therefore　rightly　been　defined　as　the　subject…object；　for　it　is　as　well　the　formal　or
  subjective　Notion　as　it　is　the　object　as　such。　But　this　must　be　understood　more　precisely。　The
  Notion；　having　truly　attained　its　reality；　is　this　absolute　judgement　whose　subject；　as　self…related
  negative　unity；　distinguishes　itself　from　its　objectivity　and　is　the　latter's　being…in…and…for…self；　but
  essentially　relates　itself　to　it　through　itself；　it　is　therefore　its　own　end　and　the　urge　to　realise　it；　but
  for　this　very　reason　the　subject　does　not　possess　objectivity　in　an　immediate　manner；　for　if　it　did　it
  would　be　merely　the　totality　of　the　object　as　such　lost　in　objectivity；　on　the　contrary；　objectivity　is
  the　realisation　of　the　end；　an　objectivity　posited　by　the　activity　of　the　end；　an　objectivity　which；　as
  positedness；　possesses　its　subsistence　and　its　form　only　as　permeated　by　its　subject。　As
  objectivity；　it　has　in　it　the　moment　of　the　externality　of　the　Notion　and　is　therefore　in　general　the
  side　of　finitude；　change　and　Appearance；　a　side；　however；　which　meets　with　extinction　in　its
  retraction　into　the　negative　unity　of　the　Notion；　the　negativity　whereby　its　indifferent　mutual
  externality　exhibits　itself　as　unessential　and　a　positivity；　is　the　Notion　itself。
  The　Idea　is；　therefore；　in　spite　of　this　objectivity　utterly　simple　and　immaterial；　for　the　externality
  exists　only　as　determined　by　the　Notion　and　as　taken　up　into　its　negative　unity；　in　so　far　as　it　exists
  as　indifferent　externality　it　is　not　merely　at　the　mercy　of　mechanism　in　general　but　exists　only　as　the
  transitory　and　untrue。　Although　therefore　the　Idea　has　its　reality　in　a　material　externality；　this　is　not
  an　abstract　being　subsisting　on　its　own　account　over　against　the　Notion；　on　the　contrary；　it　exists
  only　as　a　becoming　through　the　negativity　of　indifferent　being；　as　a　simple　determinateness　of　the
  Notion。
  This　yields　the　following　more　precise　definitions　of　the　Idea。　First；　it　is　the　simple　truth；　the　identity
  of　the　Notion　and　objectivity　as　a　universal　in　which　the　opposition　and　subsistence　of　the
  particular　is　dissolved　into　its　self…identical　negativity　and　is　equality　with　itself。　Secondly；　it　is　the
  relation　of　the　explicit　subjectivity　of　the　simple　Notion　and　its　objectivity　which　is　distinguished
  therefrom；　the　former　is　essentially　the　urge　to　sublate　this　separation；　and　the　latter　is　the
  indifferent　positedness；　the　subsistence　that　is　in　and　for　itself　null。　As　this　relation；　the　Idea　is　the
  process　of　sundering　itself　into　individuality　and　its　inorganic　nature；　and　again　of　bringing　this
  inorganic　nature　under　the　power　of　the　subject　and　returning　to　the　first　simple　universality。　The
  identity　of　the　Idea　with　itself　is　one　with　the　process；　the　thought　which　liberates　actuality　from
  the　illusory　show　of　purposeless　mutability　and　transfigures　it　into　the　Idea　must　not　represent　this
  truth　of　actuality　as　a　dead　repose；　as　a　mere　picture；　lifeless；　without　impulse　or　movement；　as　a
  genius　or　number；　or　an　abstract　thought；　by　virtue　of　the　freedom　which　the　Notion　attains　in　the
  Idea；　the　Idea　possesses　within　itself　also　the　most　stubborn　opposition；　its　repose　consists　in　the
  security　and　certainty　with　which　it　eternally　creates　and　eternally　overcomes　that　opposition；　in　it
  meeting　with　itself。
  In　the　first　instance；　however；　the　Idea　is　once　again　only　immediate　or　only　in　its　Notion；
  objective　reality　is；　it　is　true；　conformable　to　the　Notion；　but　it　is　not　yet　liberated　into　the　Notion；
  and　the　latter　does　not　exist　explicitly　for　itself　as　Notion。
  Thus　though　the　Notion　is　soul；　it　is　soul　in　the　guise　of　an　immediate；　that　is；　its　determinateness
  does　not　appear　as　soul　itself；　it　has　not　grasped　itself　as　soul；　it　does　not　possess　its　objective
  reality　within　itself；　the　Notion　is　as　a　soul　that　is　not　yet　fully　a　soul。
  At　this　first　stage　the　Idea　is　Life：　the　Notion　that；　distinguished　from　its　objectivity；　simple　within
  itself；　pervades　its　objectivity　and；　as　its　own　end；　possesses　its　means　in　the　objectivity　and　posits
  the　latter　as　its　means；　yet　is　immanent　in　this　means　and　is　therein　the　realised　end　that　is　identical
  with　itself。　This　Idea；　on　account　of　its　immediacy；　has　individuality　for　the　form　of　its　existence。
  But　the　reflection…into…self　of　its　absolute　process　is　the　sublating　of　this　immediate　individuality；
  thereby　the　Notion　which；　as　universality　in　this　individuality；　is　the　inwardness　of　the　latter；
  converts　the　externality　into　universality；　or　posits　its　objectivity　as　being　the　same　as　itself。
  In　this　second　stage；　the　Idea　is　the　Idea　of　the　true　and　the　good　as　cognition　and　volition。　In
  the　first　instance；　it　is　finite　cognition　and　finite　volition；　in　which　the　true　and　the　good　are　still
  distinguished　and　each　appears　as　yet　only　as　a　goal。　The　Notion　has；　in　the　first　instance；
  liberated　itself　into　itself　and　as　yet　given　itself　only　an　abstract　objectivity　for　its　reality。　But　the
  process　of　this　finite　cognition　and　action　converts　the　initially　abstract　universality　into　a　totality；
  whereby　it　becomes　a　complete　objectivity。　Or；　to　consider　it　from　the　other　side；　finite；　that　is；
  subjective　spirit；　makes　for　itself　the　presupposition　of　an　objective　world；　just　as　life　has　such　a
  presupposition；　but　its　activity　consists　in　sublating　this　presupposition　and　converting　it　into　a
  positedness。　In　this　way　its　reality　is　for　it　the　objective　world；　or　conversely；　the　objective　world
  is　the　ideality　in　which　it　cognises　itself。
  Thirdly；　spirit　cognises　the　Idea　as　its　absolute　truth；　as　the　truth　that　is　in　and　for　itself；　the　infinite
  Idea　in　which　cognition　and　action　are　equalised；　and　which　is　the　absolute　knowledge　of　itself。
  Chapter　1　Life
  The　Idea　of　Life　is　concerned　with　a　subject　matter　so　concrete；　and　if　you　will；　so　real；　that　with　it
  we　may　seem　to　have　overstepped　the　domain　of　logic　as　it　is　commonly　conceived。　Certainly；　if
  logic　were　to　contain　nothing　but　empty；　dead　forms　of　thought；　there　could　be　no　mention　init　at
  all　of　such　a　content　as　the　Idea　of　Life。　But　if　absolute　truth　is　the　subject　matter　of　logic；　and
  truth　as　such　is　essentially　in　cognition；　then　cognition　at　least　would　have　to　be　discussed。　So
  called　pure　logic　is　usually　followed　up　with　an　applied　logic　…　a　logic　dealing　with　concrete
  cognition；　not　to　mention　the　mass　of　psychology　and　anthropology　that　it　is　often　deemed
  necessary　to　interpolate　into　logic。　But　the　anthropological　and　psychological　side　of　cognition　is
  concerned　with　its　manifested　aspect；　in　which　the　Notion　on　its　own　account　has　not　yet　come
  to　have　an　objectivity　the　same　as　itself；　that　is；　to　have　itself　for　object。　The　part　o