object；　is　on　the　one　hand　a　sublating　of　the　means；　of　the　object　already　posited　as　sublated　and
  is　therefore　a　second　sublating　and　a　reflection…into…self；　while　on　the　other　hand　it　is　a　first
  determining　of　the　external　object。　The　latter；　as　has　been　remarked；　is　the　production　again　in　the
  realised　end　only　of　a　means；　the　subjectivity　of　the　finite　Notion；　contemptuously　rejecting　the
  means；　has　attained　to）　nothing　better　in　its　goal。　But　this　reflection　that　the　end　is　reached　in　the
  means；　and　that　in　the　fulfilled　end；　means　and　mediation　are　preserved；　is　the　last　result　of　the
  external　end…relation；　a　result　in　which　that　relation　has　sublated　itself；　and　which　it　has　exhibited
  as　its　truth。　The　third　syllogism　that　was　considered　last　is　distinguished　by　the　fact　that　it　is；　in　the
  first　place；　the　subjective　purposive　activity　of　the　preceding　syllogisms；　but　is　also　the
  spontaneous　sublation　of　external　objectivity；　and　therewith　of　externality　in　general；　and　hence　is
  the　totality　in　its　positedness。
  First　we　saw　subjectivity；　the　Notion's　being…for…self；　pass　over；　into　its　in…itself；　objectivity；　to
  be　followed　by　the　reappearance　in　the　latter　of　the　negativity　of　the　Notion's　being…for…self；　in　that
  negativity　the　Notion　has　determined　itself　in　such　a　manner　that　its　particularity　is　an　external
  objectivity；　or　it　has　determined　itself　as　a　simple　concrete　unity　whose　externality　is　its
  self…determination。　The　movement　of　the　end　has　now　reached　the　stage　where　the　moment　of
  externality　is　not　merely　posited　in　the　Notion；　where　the　end　is　not　merely　an　ought…to…be　and　a
  striving　to　realise　itself；　but　as　a　concrete　totality　is　identical　with　the；　immediate　objectivity。　This
  identity　is　on　the　one　hand　the　simple　Notion　and　the　equally　immediate　objectivity；　but　on　the
  other　hand；　it　is　just　as　essentially　a　mediation；　and　only　through　the　latter　as　a　self…sublating
  mediation　is　it　that　simple　immediacy；　the　Notion　is　therefore　essentially　this：　to　be　distinct　as　an
  explicit　identity　from　its　implicit　objectivity；　and　thereby　to　possess　externality；　yet　in　this　external
  totality　to　be　the　totality's　self…determining　identity。　As　such；　the　Notion　is　now　the　Idea。
  BOOK　III：　The　Doctrine　of　the　Notion
  Section　Three：　The　Idea
  Life　…　Cognition　…　The　Absolute　Idea
  The　Idea　is　the　adequate　Notion；　that　which　is　objectively　true；　or　the　true　as　such。　When
  anything　whatever　possesses　truth；　it　possesses　it　through　its　Idea；　or；　something　possesses　truth
  only　in　so　far　as　it　is　Idea。　The　expression　'idea'　has　often　been　employed　in　philosophy　as　in
  ordinary　life　for　'notion'；　indeed；　even　for　a　mere　ordinary　conception：　'I　have　no　idea　yet　of　this
  lawsuit；　building；　neighbourhood'；　means　nothing　more　than　the　ordinary　conception。　Kant　has
  reclaimed　the　expression　Idea　for　the　notion　of　reason。　Now　according　to　Kant；　the　notion　of
  reason　is　supposed　to　be　the　notion　of　the　unconditioned；　but　a　notion　transcendent　in　regard　to
  phenomena；　that　is；　no　empirical　use　can　be　made　of　such　notion　that　is　adequate　to　it。　The
  notions　of　reason　are　to　serve　for　the　comprehension　of　perceptions；　the　notions　of　the
  understanding　for　understanding　them。　But　in　fact；　if　the　latter　really　are　Notions；　then　they　are
  Notions　…　they　enable　one　to　comprehend　；　and　an　understanding　of　perceptions　by　means　of
  notions　of　the　understanding　will　be　a　comprehension　of　them。
  But　if　understanding　is　only　a　determining　of　perceptions　by　such　categories　as　for　example　whole
  and　parts；　force；　cause；　and　the　like；　it　signifies　only　a　determining　by　reflection；　and　similarly；　by
  understanding　can　be　meant　only　the　specific　representation　of　a　completely　determined　sensuous
  content；　thus　when　someone；　having　been　directed　that　at　the　end　of　the　wood　he　must　turn　left；
  replies　'I　understand'；　understanding　means　nothing　more　than　the　grasping　of　something　in
  pictorial　thought　and　in　memory。　'Notion　of　reason'；　too；　is　a　somewhat　clumsy　expression；　for
  the　Notion　is　something　altogether　rational；　and　in　so　far　as　reason　is　distinguished　from
  understanding　and　the　Notion　as　such；　it　is　the　totality　of　the　Notion　and　of　objectivity。　In　this
  sense　the　Idea　is　the　rational；　it　is　the　unconditioned；　because　only　that　has　conditions　which
  essentially　relates　itself　to　an　objectivity；　but　an　objectivity　that　it　has　not　itself　determined　but
  which　still　confronts　it　in　the　form　of　indifference　and　externality；　just　as　the　external　end　still　had
  conditions。
  Reserving　then　the　expression　'Idea'　for　the　objective　or　real　Notion　and　distinguishing　it　from　the
  Notion　itself　and　still　more　from　mere　pictorial　thought；　we　must　also　reject　even　more　vigorously
  that　estimate　of　the　Idea　according　to　which　it　is　not　anything　actual；　and　true　thoughts　are　said　to
  be　only　ideas。　If　thoughts　are　merely　subjective　and　contingent；　they　certainly　have　no　further
  value；　but　in　this　respect　they　are　not　inferior　to　temporal　and　contingent　actualities　which　likewise
  have　no　further　value　than　that　of　contingencies　and　phenomena。　On　the　other　hand　if；　conversely；
  the　Idea　is　not　to　have　the　value　of　truth；　because　in　regard　to　phenomena　it　is　transcendent；　and
  no　congruent　object　can　be　assigned　to　it　in　the　world　of　sense；　this　is　an　odd　misunderstanding
  that　would　deny　objective　validity　to　the　Idea　because　it　lacks　that　which　constitutes　Appearance；
  namely；　the　untrue　being　of　the　objective　world。　In　regard　to　practical　Ideas；　Kant　recognises
  that　'nothing　can　be　more　harmful　and　unworthy　of　a　philosopher　than　the　vulgar　appeal　to　an
  experience　that　allegedly　conflicts　with　the　Idea。　This　very　experience　would　not　even　exist　if；　for
  example；　political　institutions　had　been　established　at　the　proper　time　in　conformity　with　Ideas；　and
  if　crude　conceptions；　crude　just　because　they　had　been　drawn　from　experience；　had　not　taken　the
  place　of　Ideas　and　so　nullified　every　good　intention。'　Kant　regards　the　Idea　as　a　necessity　and　as
  the　goal　which；　as　the　archetype；　it　must　be　our　endeavour　to　set　up　for　a　maximum　and　to　which
  we　must　strive　to　bring　the　condition　of　the　actual　world　ever　nearer。
  But　having　reached　the　result　that　the　Idea　is　the　unity　of　the　Notion　and　objectivity；　is　the　true；　it
  must　not　be　regarded　merely　as　a　goal　to　which　we　have　to　approximate　but　which　itself　always
  remains　a　kind　of　beyond；　on　the　contrary；　we　must　recognise　that　everything　actual　is　only　in　so
  far　as　it　possesses　the　Idea　and　expresses　it。　It　is　not　merely　that　the　object；　the　objective　and
  subjective　world　in　general；　ought　to　be　congruous　with　the　Idea；　but　they　are　themselves　the
  congruence　of　Notion　and　reality；　the　reality　that　does　not　correspond　to　the　Notion　is　mere
  Appearance；　the　subjective；　contingent；　capricious　element　that　is　not　the　truth。
  When　it　is　said　that　no　object　is　to　be　found　in　experience　that　is　perfectly　congruous　with　the
  Idea；　one　is　opposing　the　Idea　as　a　subjective　standard　to　the　actual；　but　what　anything　actual　is
  supposed　in　truth　to　be；　if　its　Notion　is　not　in　it　and　if　its　objectivity　docs　not　correspond　to　its
  Notion　at　all；　it　is　impossible　to　say；　for　it　would　be　nothing。　It　is　true　that　the　mechanical　and
  chemical　object；　like　the　nonspiritual　subject　and　the　spirit　that　is　conscious　only　of　the　finite；　not　of
  its　essence；　do　not；　according　to　their　various　natures；　have　their　Notion　existent　in　them　in　its
  own　free　form。　But　they　can　only　be　true　at　all　in　so　far　as　they　are　the　union　of　their　Notion　and
  reality；　of　their　soul　and　their　body。　Wholes　like　the　state　and　the　church　cease　to　exist　when　the
  unity　of　their　Notion　and　their　reality　is　dissolved；　man；　the　living　being；　is　dead　when　soul　and
  body　are　parted　in　him；　dead　nature；　the　mechanical　and　chemical　world　…　taking；　that　is；　the　dead
  world　to　mean　the　inorganic　world；　otherwise　it　would　have　no　positive　meaning　at　all　…　dead
  nature；　then；　if　it　is　separated　into　its　Notion　and　its　reality；　is　nothing　but　the　subjective　abstraction
  of　a　thought　form　and　a　formless　matter。　Spirit　that　was　not　Idea；　was　not　the　unity　of　the　Notion
  with　its　own　self；　or　the　Notion　that　did　not　have　the　Notion　itself　for　its　reality　would　be　dead；
  spiritless　spirit；　a　material　object。
  The　Idea　being　the　unity　of　Notion　and　reality；　being　has　attained　the　significance　of　truth；
  therefore　what　now　is　is　only　what　is　Idea。　Finite　things　are　finite　because　they　do　not　possess　the
  complete　reality　of　their　Notion　within　themselves；　but　require　other　things　to　complete　it　…　or；
  conversely；　because　they　are　presupposed　as　objects；　hence　possess　the　Notion　as　an　external
  determination。　The　highest　to　which　they　attain　on　the　side　of　this　finitude　is　external　purposiveness。
  That　actual　things　are　not　congruous　with　the　Idea　is　the　side　of　their　finitude　and　untruth；　and　in
  accordance　with　this　side　they　are　objects；　determined　in　accordance　with　their　various　spheres
  and　in　the　relationships　of　objectivity；　either　mechanically；　chemically　or　by　an　external　end。　That
  the　Idea　has　not　completely　leavened　its　reality；　has　imperfectly　subdued　it　to　the　Notion；　this　is　a
  possi