extreme　is　another　such　object。　The　means　is　effective　and　potent　against　the　latter　because　its
  own　object　is　connected　with　the　self…determining　activity；　while　for　the　other　object　the　immediate
  determinateness　that　it　possesses　is　an　indifferent　one。　Their　process　in　this　relation　is　none　other
  than　the　mechanical　or　chemical　one；　in　this　objective　externality　the　previous　relationships　emerge
  but　under　the　dominance　of　the　end。　These　processes；　however；　as　they　themselves　showed；
  spontaneously　return　into　the　end。　if；　therefore；　in　the　first　instance；　the　relation　of　the　means　to　the
  external　object　it　has　to　work　upon　is　an　immediate　one；　it　has　already　at　an　earlier　stage　exhibited
  itself　as　a　syllogism；　the　end　having　proved　itself　to　be　their　true　middle　term　and　unity。　As；
  therefore；　the　means　is　the　object　that　stands　on　the　side　of　the　end　and　has　within　it　the　activity　of
  the　end；　the　mechanism　that　is　found　here　is　at　the　same　time　the　return　of　objectivity　into　itself；
  into　the　Notion；　which　however　is　already　presupposed　as　the　end；　the　negative　attitude　of
  purposive　activity　towards　the　object　is　thus　not　an　external　attitude；　but　the　alteration　and
  transition　of　objectivity　in　its　own　self　into　the　end。
  That　the　end　relates　itself　immediately　to　an　object　and　makes　it　a　means；　as　also　that　through　this
  means　it　determines　another　object；　may　be　regarded　as　violence　＇Gewalt＇　in　so　far　as　the　end
  appears　to　be　of　quite　another　nature　than　the　object；　and　the　two　objects　similarly　are　mutually
  independent　totalities。　But　that　the　end　posits　itself　in　a　mediate　relation　with　the　object　and
  interposes　another　object　between　itself　and　it；　may　be　regarded　as　the　cunning　of　reason。　The
  finitude　of　rationality　has；　as　remarked；　this　side；　that　the　end　enters　into　relationship　with　the
  presupposition；　that　is；　with　the　externality　of　the　object。　In　the　immediate　relation　to　the　object；
  it　would　itself　enter　into　the　sphere　of　mechanism　or　chemism　and　thereby　be　subject　to
  contingency　and　the　loss　of　its　determination　as　the　Notion　that　is　in　and　for　itself。　But　as　it　is；　it
  puts　forward　an　object　as　means；　allows　it　to　wear　itself　out　in　its　stead；　exposes　it　to　attrition　and
  shields　itself　behind　it　from　mechanical　violence。
  Further；　since　the　end　is　finite　it　has　a　finite　content；　accordingly　it　is　not　an　absolute；　nor　simply
  something　that　in　its　own　nature　is　rational。　But　the　means　is　the　external　middle　term　of　the
  syllogism　which　is　the　realisation　of　the　end；　in　the　means；　therefore；　the　rationality　in　it　manifests
  itself　as　such　by　maintaining　itself　in　this　external　other；　and　precisely　through　this　externality。　To
  this　extent　the　means　is　superior　to　the　finite　ends　of　external　purposiveness：　the　plough　is　more
  honourable　than　are　immediately　the　enjoyments　procured　by　it　and　which　are　ends。　The　tool
  lasts；　while　the　immediate　enjoyments　pass　away　and　are　forgotten。　In　his　tools　man　possesses
  power　over　external　nature；　even　though　in　respect　of　his　ends　he　is；　on　the　contrary；　subject　to　it。
  But　the　end　does　not　merely　keep　outside　the　mechanical　process；　rather　it　maintains　itself　in　it　and
  is　its　determination。　The　end；　as　the　Notion　that　freely　exists　in　face　of　the　object　and　its　process
  and　is　a　self…determining　activity；　is　no　less　the　absolute　truth　of　mechanism；　and　therefore　in
  mechanism　it　is　only　meeting　with　itself。　The　power　of　the　end　over　the　object　is　this　explicit
  identity　and　its　activity　is　the　manifestation　of　it。　The　end　as　content　is　the　determinateness　that
  exists　in　and　for　itself；　which　appears　in　the　object　as　indifferent　and　external；　but　the　activity　of　the
  end　is；　on　the　one　hand；　the　truth　of　the　process　and　as　negative　unity　the　sublating　of　the
  illusory　show　of　externality。　From　the　abstract　point　of　view；　it　is　the　indifferent　determinateness
  of　the　object　that　equally　externally　is　replaced　by　another；　but　the　simple　abstraction　of　the
  determinateness　is　in　its　truth　the　totality　of　the　negative；　the　concrete　Notion　that　posits　externality
  within　itself。
  The　content　of　the　end　is　its　negativity　as　simple　particularity　reflected　into　itself；　distinguished
  from　its　totality　as　form。　On　account　of　this　simplicity　whose　determinateness　is　in　and　for　itself
  the　totality　of　the　Notion；　the　content　appears　as　the　permanently　identical　element　in　the
  realisation　of　the　end。　The　teleological　process　is　the　translation　of　the　Notion　that　has　a　distinct
  concrete　existence　as　Notion　into　objectivity；　this　translation　into　a　presupposed　other　is　seen　to
  be　the　meeting　of　the　Notion　with　itself　through　itself。
  Now　the　content　of　the　end　is　this　identity　that　has　a　concrete　existence　in　the　form　of　the　identical。
  In　every　transition　the　Notion　maintains　itself；　for　example；　when　cause　becomes　effect　it　is　only
  the　cause　meeting　with　itself　in　the　effect；　but　in　the　teleological　transition　it　is　the　Notion　that　as
  such　already　has　a　concrete　existence　as　cause；　as　the　absolute　concrete　unity　that　is　free　in　the
  face　of　objectivity　and　its　external　determinability。　The　externality　into　which　the　end　translates
  itself　is　itself；　as　we　have　seen；　already　posited　as　moment　of　the　Notion；　as　form　of　its　immanent
  differentiation。　The　end　possesses；　therefore；　in　externality　its　own　moment；　and　the　content；　as
  content　of　the　concrete　unity；　is　its　simple　form；　which　not　merely　remains　implicitly　self…identical
  in　the　distinct　moments　of　the　end…as　subjective　end；　as　means　and　mediating　activity；　and　as
  objective　end…but　also　has　a　concrete　existence　as　the　abiding　self…identical。
  It　can　therefore　be　said　of　the　teleological　activity　that　in　it　the　end　is　the　beginning；　the　consequent
  the　ground；　the　effect　the　cause；　that　it　is　a　becoming　of　what　has　become；　that　in　it　only　what
  already　exists　comes　into　existence；　and　so　forth；　which　means　that　in　general　all　the
  determinations　of　relationship　belonging　to　the　sphere　of　reflection　or　of　immediate　being　have　lost
  their　distinctions；　and　what　was　enunciated　as　an　other；　such　as　end；　consequent；　effect；　etc。；　no
  longer　has　in　the　end　relation　the　determination　of　an　other；　but　on　the　contrary　is　posited　as
  identical　with　the　simple　Notion。
  2。　Now　examining　more　closely　the　product　of　the　teleological　activity；　we　see　that　it　contains　the
  end　only　externally；　in　so　far　as　it　is　an　absolute　presupposition　over　against　the　subjective　end；
  that　is　to　say；　in　so　far　as　we　stop　short　at　the　point　of　view　that　the　purposive　activity　through　its'
  means　is　only　in　a　mechanical　relation　with　the　object；　and　instead　of　positing　one　indifferent
  determinateness　of　the　latter　posits　another　equally　external　to　it。　A　determinateness　of　this　kind；
  which　an　object　possesses　through　the　end；　differs　in　general　from　another　merely　mechanical　one
  by　the　fact　that　the　former　is　moment　of　a　unity；　so　that　although　the　determinateness　is　indeed
  external　to　the　object；　yet　it　is　not　in　its　own　self　something　merely　external。　The　object　that
  exhibits　such　a　unity　is　a　whole；　towards　which　its　parts；　its　own　externality；　is　indifferent；　a
  determinate　concrete　unity　which　unites　within　itself　distinct　relations　and　determinatenesses。　This
  unity　which　cannot　be　comprehended　from　the　specific　nature　of　the　object；　and　as　regards
  determinate　content　is　another　content　than　that　peculiar　to　the　object；　is　not　by　itself　a　mechanical
  determinateness；　but　it　is　still　mechanically　related　to　the　object。　Just　as　in　this　product　of　the
  purposive　activity　the　content　of　the　end　and　the　content　of　the　object　are　external　to　each　other；
  so　a　like　relation　holds　between　the　determinations　of　this　activity　in　the　other　moments　of　the
  syllogism…in　the　unifying　middle　term；　between　the　purposive　activity　and　the　object　which　is
  means；　and　in　the　subjective　end；　the　other　extreme；　between　the　infinite　form　as　totality　of　the
  Notion　and　its　content。　According　to　the　relation　by　which　the　subjective　end　is　united　with
  objectivity；　both　premises　alike…the　relation　of　the　object　determined　as　means　to　the　still　external
  object；　and　the　relation　of　the　subjective　end　to　the　object　which　is　made　means…are　immediate
  relations。　The　syllogism　therefore　suffers　from　the　defect　of　the　formal　syllogism　in　general；　that　the
  relations　of　which　it　consists；　are　not　themselves　conclusions　or　mediations；　but　in　fact　already
  presuppose　the　conclusion　for　whose　production　they　are　supposed　to　serve　as　means。
  If　we　consider　one　of　the　premises；　the　immediate　relation　of　the　subjective　end　to　the　object
  which　thereby　becomes　the　means；　then　the　former　cannot　immediately　relate　itself　to　the　latter；　for
  the　latter　is　no　less　immediate　than　the　object　of　the　other　extreme；　in　which　the　end　is　to　be
  realised　through　mediation。　Since　they　are　thus　posited　as　diverse；　it　is　necessary　to　interpolate
  between　this　objectivity　and　the　subjective　end　a　means　of　their　relation；　but　this　means　is　likewise
  an　object　already　determined　by　the　end；　and　between　that　object's　objectivity　and　the　teleological
  determination　a　new　means　must　be　interpolated；　and　so　on　to　infinity。　Thus　there　is　posited　the
  infinite　progress　of　media