but　their　simplicity　in　the　unity　of　the　Notion　is　inadequate　to　the　nature　of　this　unity；　and　the
  Notion　therefore　repels　itself　from　itself。　This　repulsion　is　in　general　the　resolution　＇Entschluss＇　of
  the　relation　of　the　negative　unity　to　itself；　whereby　it　is　exclusive　individuality；　but　by　this
  exclusion　＇Ausschliessen＇　it　resolves　itself　＇sich　entschliesst＇　or　opens　up　itself　＇schliesst　sich
  auf＇；　because　this　exclusion　is　a　self…determining；　as　positing　of　its　own　self。　On　the　one　hand
  subjectivity　in　determining　itself　makes　itself　into　particularity；　gives　itself　a　content　which；　enclosed
  within　the　unity　of　the　Notion；　is　still　an　inner　one；　but　this　positing；　the　simple　reflection…into…self；
  is　immediately；　as　we　have　seen；　also　a　presupposing；　and　in　the　same　moment　in　which　the
  subject　of　the　end　determines　itself；　it　is　related　to　an　indifferent；　external　objectivity　which　is　to　be
  equated　by　it　with　the　said　inner　determinateness；　that　is　to　say；　is　to　be　posited　as　something
  determined　by　the　Notion；　and　in　the　first　instance　as　means。
  B。　The　Means
  The　first　immediate　positing　in　end　is　at　one　and　the　same　time　the　positing　of　an　internality；　that
  is；　of　something　determined　as　posited；　and　the　presupposing　of　an　objective　world　which　is
  indifferent　to　the　determination　of　end。　But　the　subjectivity　of　end　is　absolute　negative　unity：　its
  second　determining　is；　therefore；　the　sublating　of　this　presupposition　altogether；　this　sublating　is　the
  return…into…self　in　so　far　as　by　it　is　sublated　that　moment　of　the　first　negative；　the　positing　of　the
  negative　as　against　the　subject；　the　external　object。　But　as　against　the　presupposition　or　the
  immediacy　of　the　determining；　as　against　the　objective　world；　it　is　as　yet　only　the　first　negation；
  itself　immediate　and　therefore　external。　This　positing　is　therefore　not　yet　the　realised　end　itself；　but
  only　the　initial　step　towards　it。　The　object　thus　determined　is　so　far　only　the　means。
  The　end　unites　itself　through　a　means　with　objectivity；　and　in　objectivity　with　itself。　The　means　is
  the　middle　term　of　the　syllogism。　The　end；　because　it　is　finite；　requires　a　means　for　its　realisation…a
  means；　that　is　a　middle　term；　that　at　the　same　time　has　the　shape　of　an　external　existence
  indifferent　to　the　end　itself　and　its　realisation。　The　absolute　Notion　possesses　mediation　within　itself
  in　such　a　manner　that　its　first　positing　is　not　a　presupposing　whose　object　would　have　indifferent
  externality　for　its　fundamental　determination；　on　the　contrary；　the　world　as　a　creation　has　only　the
  form　of　such　externality；　but　its　fundamental　determination　is　really　constituted　by　its　negativity　and
  positedness。　The　finitude　of　end　consists　accordingly　in　this；　that　its　determining　is　altogether
  external　to　itself；　and　so　its　first　determining；　as　we　have　seen；　divides　itself　into　a　positing　and　a
  presupposing；　therefore　the　negation　of　this　determining；　too；　is　so　far　only　in　one　aspect　already
  a　reflection…into…self；　in　the　other；　it　is　in　fact　merely　a　first　negation；　in　other　words　the　very
  reflection…into…self　is　also　external　to　itself　and　a　reflection　outwards。
  The　means　is　therefore　the　formal　middle　term　of　a　formal　syllogism；　it　is　external　as　against　the
  extreme　of　the　subjective　end；　and　therefore　also　to　the　extreme　of　the　objective　end；　just　as
  particularity　in　the　formal　syllogism　is　an　indifferent　medius　terminus　that　can　be　replaced　by
  others。　Further；　just　as　this　particularity　is　middle　term　only　by　being　determinateness　in　relation　to
  one　extreme　and　a　universal　in　relation　to　the　other；　and　therefore　owes　its　mediating　determination
  to　its　relation　to　other　terms；　so　the　means；　too；　is　only　the　mediating　middle　term；　first　because　it　is
  an　immediate　object；　secondly　because　it　is　a　means　by　virtue　of　the　relation　it　possesses
  externally　to　the　extreme　of　the　end…a　relation　that　is　for　it　a　form　to　which　it　is　indifferent。
  Notion　and　objectivity　are　therefore　only　externally　combined　in　the　means；　which　is　accordingly　a
  merely　mechanical　object。　The　relation　of　the　object　to　the　end　is　a　premise；　or　the　immediate
  relation　which　with　regard　to　the　end　has　been　shown　to　be　reflection　into　itself；　the　means；　is　an
  inhering　predicate；　its　objectivity　is　subsumed　under　the　determination　of　end　which　on　account　of
  its　concretion　is　universality。　By　virtue　of　this　determination　of　end　present　in　the　means；　the　latter
  is　now　also　subsumptive　in　relation　to　the　other　extreme　of　the　initially　still　indeterminate
  objectivity。　Conversely；　in　contrast　to　the　subjective　end；　the　means；　as　immediate　objectivity；
  has　a　universality　of　existence　that　the　subjective　individuality　of　the　end　still　lacks。　The　end
  being　thus　in　the　first　instance　only　an　external　determinateness　in　the　means；　it　is　itself；　as　a
  negative　unity；　outside　it；　just　as　the　means　is　a　mechanical　object　that　possesses　the　end　only　as　a
  determinateness；　not　as　simple　concretion　of　the　totality。　As　the　unifying　element；　however；　the
  middle　term　must　itself　be　the　totality　of　the　end。　It　has　been　seen　that　the　determination　of　end　in
  the　means　is　at　the　same　time　reflection…into…self；　it　is　in　so　far　formal　self…relation；　since　the
  determinateness；　as　real　indifference；　is　posited　as　the　objectivity　of　the　means。　But　for　this
  very　reason；　this；　in　one　respect；　pure　subjectivity；　is　at　the　same　time　also　activity。　In　the
  subjective　end　the　negative　relation…to…self　is　still　identical　with　determinateness　as　such；　with
  content　and　externality。　But　in　the　incipient　objectification　of　the　end；　in　the　becoming…other　of　the
  simple　Notion；　these　moments　separate　themselves；　or　conversely；　it　is　in　such　separation　that　this
  becoming…other　or　externality　consists。
  Consequently；　this　whole　middle　term　is　itself　the　totality　of　the　syllogism；　in　which　the　abstract
  activity　and　the　external　means　constitute　the　extremes；　and　their　middle　term　is　constituted　by　that
  determinateness　of　the　object　by　the　end；　which　makes　it　a　means。　But　further；　universality　is　the
  relation　of　the　activity　of　the　end　and　the　means。　The　means　is　an　object；　in　itself　the　totality　of
  the　Notion；　it　has　no　power　of　resistance　against　the　end；　as　it　has　in　the　first　instance　against
  another　immediate　object。　To　the　end；　therefore；　which　is　the　posited　Notion；　it　is　absolutely
  penetrable；　and　receptive　of　this　communication；　because　it　is　in　itself　identical　with　the　end。　But
  now　it　is　also　posited　as　penetrable　by　the　Notion；　for　in　centrality　it　is　an　object　striving　towards
  the　negative　unity；　similarly　in　chemism；　it　is　as　a　neutral　and　also　as　a　different　object；　no　longer
  self…subsistent。　Its　lack　of　self…subsistence　consists　precisely　in　its　being　only　in　itself　the　totality　of
  the　Notion；　but　the　latter　is　a　being…for…self。　Consequently　the　object　has　the　character　of　being
  powerless　against　the　end　and　of　serving　it；　the　end　is　the　object's　subjectivity　or　soul；　that　has　in
  the　object　its　external　side。
  The　object；　being　in　this　manner　immediately　subjected　to　the　end；　is　not　an　extreme　of　the
  syllogism；　but　this　relation　constitutes　one　of　its　premises。　But　the　means　has　also　a　side　from
  which　it　still　has　self…subsistence　as　against　the　end。　The　objectivity　that　is　connected　with　the　end
  in　the　means　is　still　external　to　it；　because　it　is　only　immediately　so　connected；　and　therefore　the
  presupposition　still　persists。　The　activity　of　the　end　through　the　means　is　for　that　reason　still
  directed　against　this　presupposition；　and　the　end　is　activity　and　no　longer　merely　an　urge　and　a
  striving；　precisely　because　the　moment　of　objectivity　is　posited　in　the　means　in　its　determinateness
  as　something　external；　and　the　simple　unity　of　the　Notion　now　has　this　objectivity　as　such　in　itself。
  C。　The　Realised　End
  1。　The　end　in　its　relation　to　the　means　is　already　reflected　into　itself；　but　its　objective　return　into
  itself　is　not　yet　posited。　The　activity　of　the　end　through　its　means　is　still　directed　against　objectivity
  as　an　original　presupposition；　the　nature　of　this　activity　is　precisely　this；　to　be　indifferent　to　the
  determinateness。　Were　the　activity　again　to　consist　in　merely　determining　the　immediate　objectivity；
  the　product　would　again　be　merely　a　means；　and　so　on　to　infinity；　the　outcome　would　be　only　a
  means　suitable　to　the　end；　but　not　the　objectivity　of　the　end　itself。　Therefore　the　end　which　is　active
  in　its　means；　in　determining　the　immediate　object　must　not　do　so　as　a　determinant　external　to　it；
  and　consequently　the　object　must　spontaneously　conform　to　the　unity　of　the　Notion；　in　other
  words；　the　former　external　activity　of　the　end　through　its　means　must　determine　itself　as　mediation
  and　sublate　its　own　self。
  The　relation　of　the　activity　of　the　end　through　the　means　to　the　external　object　is　in　the　first　instance
  the　second　premise　of　the　syllogism　—　an　immediate　relation　of　the　middle　term　to　the　other
  extreme。　It　is　immediate　because　the　middle　term　has　an　external　object　in　it　and　the　other
  extreme　is　another　such　object。　The　means　is　effective　and　potent　against　the　latter　because　its
  own　object　is　connected　with　the　self…determining　activity；　while