examine　the　sole　question　to　which　philosophic　interest　demands　an　answer；　namely；　which　of　the
  two　principles　possesses　truth　in　and　for　itself；　but　for　this　point　of　view　it　makes　no　difference
  whether　the　principles　are　to　be　regarded　as　objective；　which　means　here；　externally　existing
  determinations　of　nature；　or　as　mere　maxims　of　a　subjective　cognition；　rather；　that　is　a　subjective；
  that　is；　a　contingent　conjunction　which；　as　the　occasion　demands；　applies　one　or　the　other　maxim
  according　as　it　holds　it　to　be　appropriate　to　the　given　objects；　but　without　further　enquiry　into　the
  truth　of　these　determinations　themselves；　whether　these　are　determinations　of　the　objects　or　of
  cognition。
  However　unsatisfactory；　therefore；　the　discussion　of　the　teleological　principle　is　in　respect　of　its
  essential　point　of　view；　nevertheless　the　position　that　Kant　gives　to　it　is　worthy　of　note。　In　ascribing
  it　to　a　reflective　judgment；　he　makes　it　a　connecting　middle　term　between　the　universal　of
  reason　and　theindividual　of　intuition；　further；　he　distinguishes　this　reflective　judgment　from　the
  determining　judgment；　the　latter　merely　subsuming　the　particular　under　the　universal。　Such　a
  universal　which　merely　subsumes；　is　an　abstraction　which　only　becomes　concrete　in　something
  else；　in　the　particular。　End；　on　the　contrary；　is　the　concrete　universal；　which　possesses　in　its　own
  self　the　moment　of　particularity　and　externality　and　is　therefore　active　and　the　urge　to　repel　itself
  from　itself。　The　Notion；　as　end；　is　of　course　an　objective　judgment　in　which　one　determination；
  the　subject；　namely　the　concrete　Notion；　is　selfdetermined；　while　the　other　is　not　merely　a
  predicate　but　external　objectivity。　But　the　end　relation　is　not　for　that　reason　a　reflective　judging
  that　considers　external　objects　only　according　to　a　unity；　as　though　an　intelligence　had　given　this
  unity　for　the　convenience　of　our　cognitive　faculty；　on　the　contrary　it　is　the　absolute　truth　that
  judges　objectively　and　determines　external　objectivity　absolutely。　Thus　the　end　relation　is　more
  than　judgment；　it　is　the　syllogism　of　the　self…subsistent　free　Notion　that　unites　itself　with　itself
  through　objectivity。
  End　has　shown　itself　to　be　the　third　to　mechanism　and　chemism　it　is　their　truth。　Since　it　still　stands
  within　the　sphere　of　objectivity；　or　of　the　immediacy　of　the　total　Notion；　it　is　still　affected　by
  externality　as　such　and　is　confronted　by　an　objective　world　to　which　it　relates　itself。　From　this　side；
  mechanical　causality；　which　in　general　is　to　be　taken　as　including　chemism；　still　makes　its
  appearance　in　this　end　relation　which　is　the　external　one；　but　as　subordinate　to　it　and　as
  sublated　in　and　for　itself。　As　regards　the　more　precise　relationship；　the　mechanical　object　is；　as　an
  immediate　totality；　indifferent　to　its　being　determined；　and　on　the　other　hand　is　equally　indifferent　to
  being　a　determinant。　This　external　determinedness　has　now　developed　into　self…determination　and
  accordingly　the　Notion；　which　in　the　object　was　merely　the　inner；　or　what　is　the　same　thing；
  merely　the　outer　Notion；　is　now　posited；　end　is；　in　the　first　instance；　just　this　very　Notion　that　is
  external　to　the　Notion　of　mechanism。　Thus　for　chemism　too；　end　is　the　self…determining　principle
  which　brings　back　into　the　unity　of　the　Notion　the　external　determinedness　by　which　it　is
  conditioned。　From　this　can　be　seen　the　nature　of　the　subordination　of　the　two　previous　forms　of
  the　objective　process；　the　other；　which　in　them　lies　in　the　infinite　progress；　is　the　Notion　posited　at
  first　as　external　to　them；　which　is　end；　not　only　is　the　Notion　their　substance；　but　externality；　too；　is
  for　them　an　essential　moment　constituting　their　determinateness。　Thus　mechanical　or　chemical
  technique；　through　its　character　of　being　externally　determined；　offers　itself　spontaneously　to　the
  end　relation；　which　we　have　now　to　consider　more　closely。
  A。　The　Subjective　End
  In　the　centrality　of　the　objective　sphere；　which　is　an　indifference　to　determinateness；　the
  subjective　Notion　has　first　rediscovered　and　posited　the　negative　point　of　unity；　but　in　chemism
  it　has　posited　the　objectivity　of　the　Notion　determinations　by　which　it　is　first　posited　as
  concrete　objective　Notion。　Its　determinateness　or　simple　difference　now　possesses　within　itself
  the　determinateness　of　externality；　and　its　simple　unity　is　consequently　the　unity　that　repels　itself
  from　itself　and　in　so　doing　maintains　itself。　End　therefore　is　the　subjective　Notion　as　an　essential
  effort　and　urge　to　posit　itself　externally。　In　this　process　it　is　exempt　from　transition。　It　is　neither　a
  force　expressing　itself　nor　a　substance　and　cause　manifesting　itself　in　accidents　and　effects。　Force
  that　has　not　expressed　itself　is　only　an　abstract　inner；　that　is；　it　is　only　in　its　expression；　to　which　it
  must　be　solicited；　that　it　has　a　determinate　being。
  Similarly　with　cause　and　substance；　since　they　have　actuality　only　in　the　accidents　and　the　effect；
  their　activity　is　transition；　against　which　they　do　not　maintain　themselves　in　freedom。　End　may
  indeed　also　be　defined　as　force　and　cause；　but　these　expressions　fulfil　only　an　incomplete　side　of
  its　significance；　if　they　are　to　be　predicated　of　it　as　it　truly　is；　they　can　be　predicated　only　in　a　way
  that　sublates　their　Notion：　as　a　force　that　solicits　itself　to　expression；　as　a　cause　that　is　cause　of
  itself；　or　whose　effect　is　immediately　cause。
  When　purposiveness　is　ascribed　to　an　intelligence；　as　was　mentioned　above；　then　in　doing　so
  regard　is　had　to　the　specific　element　of　the　content。　But　in　general　end　is　to　be　taken　as　the
  rational　in　its　concrete　existence。　It　manifests　rationality　because　it　is　the　concrete　Notion；
  which　holds　the　objective　difference　within　its　absolute　unity。　It　is　therefore　essentially　in　its
  own　self　syllogism。　It　is　the　self…equal　universal　and　this；　as　containing　self…repellent　negativity；　is　in
  the　first　instance　universal；　and　therefore　as　yet　indeterminate；　activity；　but　because　this　is
  negative　relation…to…self　it　determines　itself　immediately；　giving　itself　the　moment　of　particularity；
  which；　as　likewise　the　totality　of　the　form　reflected　into　itself；　is　content　as　against　the
  posited　differences　of　the　form。　Equally　immediately　this　negativity；　through　its　relation…to…self；　is
  absolute　reflection　of　the　form　into　itself　and　individuality。　On　the　one　hand　this　reflection　is　the
  inner　universality　of　the　subject；　while　on　the　other　it　is　a　reflection　outwards；　and　to　this　extent
  end　is　still　a　subjective　end　and　its　activity　is　directed　against　external　objectivity。
  For　end　is　the　Notion　that　has　come　to　itself　in　objectivity；　the　determinateness　it　has　given　itself　in
  that　sphere　is　that　of　objective　indifference　to　and　externality　of　its　determinedness；　its
  self…repellent　negativity　is；　therefore；　one　whose　moments；　being　determinations　only　of　the　Notion
  itself；　also　have　the　form　of　objective　indifference　to　one　another。　Even　in　the　formal　judgement；
  subject　and　predicate　are　determined　as　self…subsistent　in　their　relationship；　but　their
  self…subsistence　is　so　far　only　abstract　universality。　It　has　now　attained　the　determination　of
  objectivity；　but　as　moment　of　the　Notion；　this　complete　difference　is　enclosed　within　the　simple
  unity　of　the　Notion。　Now　in　so　far　as　end　is　this　total　reflection　of　objectivity　into　itself　and　is　so
  immediately；　in　the　first　place；　the　self…determination　or　particularity　as　simple　reflection　into　self
  is　distinct　from　the　concrete　form；　and　is　a　determinate　content。　From　this　side；　end　is　finite；
  although　in　respect　of　its　form　it　is　infinite　subjectivity。　Secondly；　because　its　determinateness　has
  the　form　of　subjective　indifference；　it　has　the　shape　of　a　presupposition；　and　from　this　side　its
  finitude　consists　in　its　being　confronted　by　an　objective；　mechanical　and　chemical　world　to　which
  its　activity　relates　itself　as　to　something　already　there；　its　self…determining　activity　is　thus；　in　its
  identity；　immediately　external　to　itself　and　as　much　reflection　outwards　as　reflection…into…self。　To
  this　extent　end　still　has　a　genuinely　extramundane　existence　—　to　the　extent；　namely；　that　it　is
  confronted　by　this　objectivity；　just　as　the　latter　on　the　other　hand　confronts　it　as　a　mechanical　and
  chemical　whole　not　yet　determined　and　pervaded　by　the　end。
  Accordingly；　the　movement　of　end　can　now　be　expressed　as　having　for　its　aim　to　sublate　its
  presupposition；　that　is　the　immediacy　of　the　object；　and　to　posit　the　object　as　determined　by　the
  Notion。　This　negative　attitude　towards　the　object　is　just　as　much　a　negative　attitude　towards　itself；
  a　sublating　of　the　subjectivity　of　the　end。　Positively；　it　is　the　realisation　of　the　end；　namely；　the
  union　of　objective　being　with　it；　so　that　this　being；　which；　as　a　moment　of　the　end　is　immediately
  the　determinateness　identical　with　it；　shall　appear　as　external　determinateness；　and　conversely　the
  objective　as　presupposition　shall　instead　be　posited　as　determined　by　the　Notion。　End　is　in　its
  own　self　the　urge　to　realise　itself；　the　determinateness　of　the　moments　of　the　Notion　is　externality；
  but　their　simplicity　in　the　unity　of　the　Noti