determinatenesses　and　accepts　only　such　cognition　as　a　valid　comprehension。　As　end　is　the
  Notion　itself　in　its　Existence；　it　may　seem　strange　that　the　cognition　of　objects　from　their　Notion
  appears　rather　as　an　unjustified　trespass　into　a　heterogeneous　element；　whereas　mechanism；　for
  which　the　determinateness　of　an　object　is　a　determinateness　posited　in　it　externally　and　by　another
  object；　is　held　to　be　a　more　immanent　point　of　view　than　teleology。　Of　course　mechanism；　at
  least　the　ordinary　unfree　mechanism；　and　also　chemism。；　must　be　regarded　as　an　immanent
  principle　in　so　far　as　the　external　determinant　is　itself　again　just　such　another　object；　externally
  determined　and　indifferent　to　such　determining；　or；　in　the　case　of　chemism；　the　other　object　is　one
  likewise　chemically　determined；　in　general；　an　essential　moment　of　the　totality　always　lies　in
  something　outside　it。　These　principles　therefore　remain　confined　within　the　same　natural　form　of
  finitude；　yet　though　they　do　not　seek　to　go　beyond　the　finite　and　lead　only　to　finite　causes　in　their
  explanation　of　phenomena；　which　themselves　demand　a　further　progress；　at　the　same　time　they
  expand　themselves；　partly　into　a　formal　totality　in　the　concept　of　force；　cause；　and　similar
  determinations　of　reflection　which　are　supposed　to　denote　a　primariness；　and　partly　also　through
  the　abstract　universality　of　a　sum　total　of　forces；　a　whole　of　reciprocal　causes。　Mechanism
  shows　itself　to　be　a　striving　for　totality　in　the　fact　that　it　seeks　to　grasp　nature　by　itself　as　a　whole
  that　for　its　Notion　does　not　require　any　other…a　totality　that　is　not　found　in　end　and　the
  extra…mundane　intelligence　associated　with　it。
  Now　purposiveness　shows　itself　in　the　first　instance　as　a　higher　being　in　general；　as　an
  intelligence　that　externally　determines　the　multiplicity　of　objects　by　a　unity　that　exists　in　and　for
  itself；　so　that　the　indifferent　determinatenesses　of　the　objects　become　essential　through　this
  relation。　In　mechanism　they　become　so　through　the　mere　form　of　necessity；　their　content　being
  indifferent；　for　they　are　supposed　to　remain　external；　and　it　is　only　understanding　as　such　that　is
  supposed　to　find　satisfaction　in　cognising　its　own　connective　principle；　abstract　identity。　In
  teleology；　on　the　contrary；　the　content　becomes　important；　for　teleology　presupposes　a　Notion；
  something　absolutely　determined　and　therefore　self…determining；　and　so　has　made　a　distinction
  between　the　relation　of　the　differences　and　their　reciprocal　determinedness；　that　is　the　form；　and
  the　unity　that　is　reflected　into　itself；　a　unity　that　is　determined　in　and　for　itself　and　therefore
  a　content。　But　when　the　content　is　otherwise　a　finite　and　insignificant　one；　it　contradicts　what　it　is
  supposed　to　be；　for　end；　according　to　its　form；　is　a　totality　infinite　within　itself…especially　when
  the　activity　that　operates　in　accordance　with　ends　is　assumed　to　be　an　absolute　will　and
  intelligence。　The　reason　why　teleology　has　incurred　so　much　the　reproach　of　triviality　is　that　the
  ends　that　it　exhibited　are　more　important　or　more　trivial；　as　the　case　may　be；　and　it　was　inevitable
  that　the　end　relation　of　objects　should　so　often　appear　trifling；　since　it　appears　to　be　so　external
  and　therefore　contingent。　Mechanism；　on　the　contrary；　leaves　to　the　determinatenesses　of　objects；
  as　regards　their　import；　their　contingent　status；　to　which　the　object　is　indifferent；　and　these
  determinatenesses　are　not　supposed　to　have；　either　for　the　objects　or　for　the　subjective
  intelligence；　any　higher　validity。　This　principle；　therefore；　in　its　context　of　external　necessity　gives
  the　consciousness　of　infinite　freedom　as　compared　with　teleology；　which　sets　up　for　something
  absolute　what　is　trivial　and　even　contemptible　in　its　content；　in　which　the　more　universal　thought
  can　only　find　itself　infinitely　cramped　and　even　feel　disgusted。
  The　formal　disadvantage　from　which　this　teleology　immediately　suffers　is　that　it　only　goes　as　far　as
  external　purpositeness。　The　Notion　being　thus　posited　as　something　formal；　then　for　such
  teleology　the　content　is　also　something　that　for　the　Notion　is　given　externally　in　the　manifoldness　of
  the　objective　world…in　those　very　determinatenesses　which　are　also　the　content　of　mechanism；　but
  appearing　there　as　something　external　and　contingent。　On　account　of　this　community　of　content；　it
  is　solely　the　form　of　purposiveness　by　itself　that　constitutes　what　is　essential　in　this　teleology。　In
  this　respect；　without　as　yet　attending　to　the　difference　of　outer　and　inner　purposiveness；　the
  end…relation　in　general　has　proved　itself　to　be　in　and　for　itself　the　truth　of　mechanism。　Teleology
  possesses　in　general　the　higher　principle；　the　Notion　in　its　Existence；　which　is　in　and　for　itself　the
  infinite　and　absolute…a　principle　of　freedom　that　in　the　utter　certainty　of　its　self…determination　is
  absolutely　liberated　from　the　external　determining　of　mechanism。
  One　of　Kant's　great　services　to　philosophy　consists　in　the　distinction　he　has　made　between　relative
  or　external；　and　internal　purposiveness；　in　the　latter　he　has　opened　up　the　Notion　of　life；　the
  Idea；　and　by　so　doing　has　done　positively　for　philosophy　what　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　did
  but　imperfectly；　equivocally；　and　only　negatively；　namely；　raised　it　above　the　determinations　of
  reflection　and　the　relative　world　of　metaphysics。　It　has　been　remarked　that　the　opposition　of
  teleology　and　mechanism　is　in　the　first　instance　the　more　general　opposition　of　freedom　and
  necessity。　Kant　has　exhibited　the　opposition　in　this　form　among　the　antinomies　of　reason；　namely；
  as　the　third　conflict　of　the　transcendental　ideas。　His　exposition；　which　was　referred　to　earlier；　I
  cite　quite　briefly；　as　the　gist　of　it　is　so　simple　as　to　require　no　detailed　analysis；　and　the　peculiar
  features　of　the　Kantian　antinomies　have　been　elucidated　in　more　detail　elsewhere。
  The　thesis　of　the　antinomy　here　to　be　considered　runs　thus：　Causality　according　to　natural　laws　is
  not　the　sole　causality　from　which　the　phenomena　of　the　world　can　one　and　all　be　derived。　For　their
  explanation　a　causality　through　freedom　must　be　assumed　as　well。
  The　antithesis　is：　There　is　no　freedom；　but　everything　in　the　world　happens　solely　according　to
  natural　laws。
  As　in　the　case　of　the　other　antinomies；　the　proof　first　sets　to　work　apagogically；　the　opposite　of
  each　thesis　being　assumed；　secondly　and　conversely　in　order　to　show　the　contradictory　nature　of
  this　assumption；　its　opposite；　which　is　accordingly　the　proposition　to　be　proved；　is　assumed　and
  presupposed　as　valid。　The　whole　roundabout　method　of　proof　could　therefore　be　spared；　the
  proof　consists　in　nothing　but　the　assertorical　affirmation　of　the　two　opposed　propositions。
  Thus　in　order　to　prove　the　thesis　we　have　first　to　assume　that　there　is　no　other　causality　than　that
  according　to　natural　laws；　that　is；　according　to　the　necessity　of　mechanism　in　general；　including
  chemism。　This　proposition　w　e　find　to　be　selfcontradictory；　because　we　take　natural　law　to　consist
  just　in　this；　that　nothing　happens　without　a　cause　sufficiently　determined　a　priori；　which　cause
  therefore　must　contain　an　absolute　spontaneity　within　itself；　that　is；　the　assumption　opposed　to　the
  thesis　is　contradictory　because　it　contradicts　the　thesis。
  In　order　to　prove　the　antithesis；　we　are　to　postulate　that　there　exists　a　freedom；　as　a　particular
  kind　of　causality；　that　absolutely　initiates　a　state　of　things　and　therefore　also　a　series　of
  consequences　of　that　state。　But　now；　since　such　a　beginning　presupposes　a　state　that　has　no
  causal　connection　whatever　with　its　predecessor；　it　contradicts　the　law　of　causality　which　alone
  makes　unity　of　experience；　and　experience　at　all；　possible；　in　other　words　the　assumption　of
  freedom；　which　is　opposed　to　the　antithesis；　cannot　be　made　because　it　contradicts　the　antithesis。
  What　is　essentially　the　same　antinomy　recurs　in　the　Critique　of　Teleological　judgment　as　the
  opposition　between　the　assertion　that　all　production　of　material　things　takes　place　according
  to　merely　mechanical　laws　and　the　assertion　that　some　cases　of　production　of　material　things
  according　to　such　laws　are　not　possible。　The　Kantian　solution　of　this　antinomy　is　the　same　as
  the　general　solution　of　the　others；　namely　that　reason　can　prove　neither　the　one　proposition　nor　the
  other；　because　we　cannot　have　a　priori　any　determining　principle　of　the　possibility　of　things
  according　to　merely　empirical　natural　laws；　that　further；　therefore；　both　must　be　regarded　not　as
  objective　propositions　but　as　subjective　maxims；　that　on　the　one　hand　I　am　always　to　reflect
  on　all　natural　events　according　to　the　principle　of　natural　mechanism　alone；　but　that　this　does　not
  prevent　me；　when　occasion　demands　it；　from　investigating　certain　natural　forms　in　accordance
  with　another　maxim；　namely；　on　the　principle　of　final　causes；　as　though　now　these　two　maxims；
  which　moreover　are　supposed　to　be　necessary　only　for　human　reason；　did　not　stand　in　the　same
  opposition　as　the　propositions　in　question。　As　was　remarked　before；　this　whole　standpoint　fails　to
  examine　the　sole　question　to　which　philosophic　interest　demands　an　answer；　namely；　which　of　the
  two　p