the　urge　outwards　that　sunders　itself　and　posits　tension　in　its　object　and　in　another　object　in　order
  to　have　something　with　which　it　can　enter　into　a　relation　of　difference　and　in　which　it　can　neutralise
  itself　and　give　to　its　simple　determinateness　an　existent　reality。　Consequently；　on　the　one　hand
  chemism　has　returned　into　its　beginning　in　which　objects　in　a　state　of　reciprocal　tension　seek　one
  another　and　then　by　a　formal；　external　middle　term；　unite　to　form　a　neutral　product。　On　the　other
  hand；　chemism　by　this　return　into　its　Notion　sublates　itself　and　has　passed　over　into　a　higher
  sphere。
  C。　TRANSITION　OF　CHEMISM
  Even　ordinary　chemistry　shows　examples　of　chemical　alterations　in　which　a　body；　for　example；
  imparts　a　higher　oxidation　to　one　part　of　its　mass　and　thereby　reduces　another　part　to　a　lower
  degree　of　oxidation；　in　which　lower　degree　alone　it　can　enter　into　a　neutral　combination　with
  another　＇chemically＇　different　body　brought　into　contact　with　it；　a　combination　for　which　it　would
  not　have　been　receptive　in　that　first　immediate　degree。　What　happens　here　is　that　the　object　does
  not　relate　itself　to　another　in　accordance　with　an　immediate；　one…sided　determinateness；　but　that　in
  accordance　with　the　inner　totality　of　an　original　relation　it　posits　the　presupposition　which　it
  requires　for　a　real　relation　and　thereby　gives　itself　a　middle　term　through　which　it　unites　its　Notion
  with　its　reality；　it　is　absolutely　determined　individuality；　the　concrete　Notion　as　principle　of　the
  disjunction　into　extremes　whose　re…union　is　the　activity　of　the　same　negative　principle；　which
  thereby　returns　to　its　first　determination；　but　returns　objectified。
  Chemism　itself　is　the　first　negation　of　indifferent　objectivity　and　of　the　externality　of
  determinateness；　it　is　therefore　still　infected　with　the　immediate　self…subsistence　of　the　object　and
  with　externality。　Consequently　it　is　not　yet　for　itself　that　totality　of　self…determination　that　proceeds
  from　it　and　in　which　rather　it　is　sublated。　The　three　syllogisms　yielded　by　the　foregoing　exposition
  constitute　its　totality；　the　first　has　for　middle　term　formal　neutrality　and　for　extremes　the　objects　in
  tension；　the　second　has　for　middle　term　the　product　of　the　first；　real　neutrality；　and　for　extremes
  the　sundering　activity　and　its　product；　the　indifferent　element；　while　the　third　is　the　self…realising
  Notion；　which　posits　for　itself　the　presupposition　by　which　the　process　of　its　realisation　is
  conditioned　—　a　syllogism　that　has　the　universal　for　its　essence。　On　account；　however；　of　the
  immediacy　and　externality　attaching　to　chemical　objectivity；　these　syllogisms　still　fall　apart。　The
  first　process　whose　product　is　the　neutrality　of　the　objects　in　tension　is　extinguished　in　its　product；
  and　it　is　an　externally　applied　differentiation　that　re…kindles　it；　conditioned　by　an　immediate
  presupposition；　it　exhausts　itself　in　it。　Similarly；　the　separation　of　the　＇chemically＇　different　extremes
  out　of　the　neutral　product；　as　also　their　decomposition　into　their　abstract　elements；　must　proceed
  from　conditions　and　stimulations　of　activity　externally　brought　into　play。　Also；　although　the　two
  essential　moments　of　the　process；　on　the　one　side　neutralisation；　on　the　other　separation　and
  reduction；　are　combined　in　one　and　the　same　process；　and　the　union　of　the　extremes　by
  weakening　of　the　tension　between　them　is　also　a　sundering　into　such　extremes；　yet　on　account　of
  the　still　underlying　externality　they　constitute　two　different　sides；　the　extremes　that　are　separated
  in　that　same　process　are　different　objects　or　materials　from　those　that　unite　in　it；　in　so　far　as　the
  former　emerge　again　from　the　process　as　＇chemically＇　different　they　must　turn　outwards；　their　new
  neutralisation　is　a　different　process　from　the　neutralisation　that　took　place　in　the　first　process。
  But　these　various　processes；　which　have　proved　themselves　necessary；　are　so　many　stages　by
  which　externality　and　conditionedness　are　sublated　and　from　which　the　Notion　emerges　as　a
  totality　determined　in　and　for　itself　and　not　conditioned　by　externality。　In　the　first　process；　the
  mutual　externality　of　the　different　extremes　that　constitute　the　whole　reality；　or　the　distinction
  between　the　implicitly　determinate　Notion　and　its　existent　determinateness；　is　sublated；　in　the
  second；　the　externality　of　the　real　unity；　the　union　as　merely　neutral；　is　sublated；　more　precisely；
  the　formal　activity　in　the　first　instance　sublates　itself　in　equally　formal　bases　or　indifferent
  determinatenesses；　whose　inner　Notion　is　now　the　indrawn　absolute　activity　as　inwardly
  self…realising；　that　is；　the　activity　that　posits　the　determinate　differences　within　itself　and　through　this
  mediation　constitutes　itself　as　real　unity　—　a　mediation　which　is　thus　the　Notion's　own　mediation；　its
  self…determination；　and　in　respect　of　its　reflection　thence　into　itself；　an　immanent　presupposing。
  The　third　syllogism；　which　on　the　one　hand　is　the　restoration　of　the　preceding　processes；　on　the
  other　hand　sublates　the　last　remaining　moment　of　indifferent　bases　the　wholly　abstract　external
  immediacy；　which　in　this　way　becomes　the　Notion's　own　moment　of　self…mediation。　The　Notion
  which　has　thus　sublated　all　the　moments　of　its　objective　existence　as　external；　and　posited　them
  within　its　simple　unity；　is　thereby　completely　liberated　from　objective　externality；　to　which　it　relates
  itself　only　as　to　an　unessential　reality。　This　objective　free　Notion　is　end。
  THE　DOCTRINE　OF　THE　NOTION
  Section　Two：　Objectivity；　continued
  Chapter　3　Teleology
  Subjective　End　…　The　Means　…　The　Realised　End
  Where　purposiveness　is　discerned；　an　intelligence　＇Verstand＇　is　assumed　as　its　author；　and　for
  the　end　we　therefore　demand　the　Notion's　own　free　Existence。　Teleology　is　especially　contrasted
  with　mechanism；　in　which　the　determinateness　posited　in　the　object；　being　external；　is　essentially
  one　in　which　no　self…determination　is　manifested。　The　opposition　between　causae　efficientes
  and　causae　finalis；　between　merely　efficient　and　final　causes；　relates　to　this　distinction；　and　this
  distinction；　taken　in　a　concrete　form；　is　also　made　the　criterion　for　deciding　whether　the　absolute
  essence　of　the　world　is　to　be　conceived　as　blind　natural　mechanism　or　as　an　intelligence　that
  determines　itself　in　accordance　with　ends。　The　antinomy　between　fatalism；　along　with
  determinism　and　freedom；　is　likewise　concerned　with　the　opposition　of　mechanism　and
  teleology；　for　the　free　is　the　Notion　in　its　Existence。
  Earlier　metaphysics　has　treated　these　concepts　as　it　has　treated　others；　it　has　for　one　thing
  presupposed　a　certain　conception　of　the　world　and　laboured　to　show　that　one　or　the　other
  concept　fitted　it；　while　the　opposite　one　was　defective　because　it　failed　to　explain　that　conception；
  and　again；　while　doing　this；　it　has　not　examined　the　concept　of　mechanical　cause　and　of　end；　to　see
  which　possesses　truth　in　and　for　itself。　When　this　has　been　established　independently；　the
  objective　world　may　present　us　with　mechanical　and　final　causes；　but　their　existence　is　not　the
  standard　of　truth：　on　the　contrary；　truth　is　the　criterion　that　decides　which　of　these　existences　is
  the　true　one。　just　as　the　subjective　understanding　also　exhibits　errors　in　itself；　so　the　objective
  world　also　exhibits　aspects　and　stages　of　truth　that　by　themselves　are　still　one…sided；　incomplete
  and　only　relationships　in　the　sphere　of　Appearance。　If　mechanism　and　purposiveness　stand
  opposed　to　one　another；　they　cannot　for　that　very　reason　be　taken　as　indifferent　concepts；　each
  of　which　is　correct　on　its　own　account；　possessing　as　much　validity　as　the　other；　the　only　question
  being　where　one　or　the　other　may　be　applied。　This　equal　validity　of　both　rests　merely　on　the　fact
  that　they　are；　that　is　to　say；　that　we　have　them　both。　But　since　they　are　opposed；　the　necessary
  preliminary　question　is；　which　of　the　two　is　the　true　one；　and　the　higher　and　real　question　is；
  whether　their　truth　is　not　a　third　concept；　or　whether　one　of　them　is　the　truth　of　the　other。
  But　the　relation　of　end　has　proved　to　be　the　truth　of　mechanism　—　what　exhibited　itself　as
  chemism　is　included　with　mechanism　in　so　far　as　end　is　the　Notion　in　free　Existence；　and　to　end
  stands　opposed　in　general　the　unfreedom　of　the　Notion；　its　submergence　in　externality；　both　of
  them；　therefore；　mechanism　and　chemism；　are　included　under　natural　necessity；　for　in　the　former
  the　Notion　does　not　exist　in　the　object。　Since　the　object　as　mechanical　does　not　contain
  self…determination；　while　in　chemism　the　Notion　either　has　a　one…sided　Existence　in　a　state　of
  tension；　or；　in　emerging　as　the　unity　that　disjoins　the　neutral　object　into　tensed　extremes；　is　external
  to　itself　in　so　far　as　it　sublates　this　disjunction。
  The　more　the　teleological　principle　was　linked　with　the　concept　of　an　extramundane　intelligence
  and　to　that　extent　was　favoured　by　piety；　the　more　it　seemed　to　depart　from　the　true　investigation
  of　nature；　which　aims　at　cognising　the　properties　of　nature　not　as　extraneous；　but　as　immanent
  determinatenesses　and　accepts　only　such　cognition　as　a　valid　comprehension。　As　end　is　the
  Notion　itself