objects　inhere　and　by　which　they　are　bound　together　into　a　genuine　One。
  But　this　central　individual　is　thus　at　first　only　a　middle　term　which　as　yet　has　no　true　extremes；　but
  as　negative　unity　of　the　total　Notion　it　sunders　itself　into　such。　Or　in　other　words　the　previously
  non…self…subsistent；　self…external　objects　are　likewise　by　the　regress　of　the　Notion　determined　into
  individuals；　the　identity　of　the　central　body　with　itself　which　is　still　a　striving；　is　infected　with
  externality　which；　being　taken　up　into　the　centra　body's　objective　individuality；　has　this　latter
  determination　communicated　to　it。　Through　this　centrality　of　their　own；　these　individuals　placed
  outside　that　first　centre；　are　themselves　centres　for　the　non…self…subsistent　objects。　These　second
  centres　and　the　non…self…subsistent　objects　are　brought　into　unity　by　the　above　absolute　middle
  term。
  But　the　relative　individual　centres　themselves　also　constitute　the　middle　term　of　a　second
  syllogism；　a　middle　term　that　on　the　one　hand　is　subsumed　under　a　higher　extreme；　namely　the
  objective　universality　and　power　of　the　absolute　centre；　and　on　the　other　hand　subsumes　under
  itself　the　non…self…subsistent　objects　whose　superficial　or　formal　individualisation　is　supported　by　it。
  Again；　these　non…self…subsistent　objects　are　the　middle　term　of　a　third；　the　formal　syllogism；　in
  that　they　are　the　link　between　the　absolute　and　the　relative　central　individuality　to　the　extent　that
  the　latter　has　in　them　its　externality　by　virtue　of　which　the　relation…to…self　is　at　the　same　time　a
  striving　towards　an　absolute　centre。　The　formal　objects　have　for　their　essence　the　identical
  gravity　of　their　immediate　central　body　in　which　they　inhere　as　in　their　subject　and　the　extreme　of
  individuality；　through　the　externality　which　they　constitute；　that　body　is　subsumed　under　the
  absolute　central　body；　they　are；　therefore；　the　formal　middle　term　of　particularity。　But　the
  absolute　individual　is　the　objectively　universal　middle　term　which　brings　into　unity　and　holds　fast
  the　being…within…self　or　inwardness　of　the　relative　individual　and　its　externality。　Similarly；　too；　the
  government；　the　individual　citizens　and　the　needs　or　external　life　of　the　individuals；　are　three
  terms；　each　of　which　is　the　middle　of　the　other　two。　The　government　is　the　absolute　centre　in
  which　the　extreme　of　the　individuals　is　united　with　their　external　existence；　similarly；　the
  individuals　are　the　middle　term　that　activate　that　universal　individual　into　external　concrete
  existence　and　translate　their　moral　essence　into　the　extreme　of　actuality。　The　third　syllogism　is　the
  formal　syllogism；　that　of　an　illusory　show；　in　which　the　individuals　purport　to　be　linked　to　this
  universal　absolute　individuality　by　their　needs　and　external　existence；　a　syllogism　which；　as　merely
  subjective；　passes　over　into　the　others　and　in　them　has　its　truth。
  This　totality；　whose　moments　are　themselves　the　complete　relationships　of　the　Notion；　the
  syllogisms　in　which　each　of　the　three　different　objects　runs　through　the　determination　of　middle
  term　and　of　extremes；　constitutes　free　mechanism。　In　it　the　different　objects　have　for　their　basic
  determination　the　objective　universality；　the　pervasive　gravity　that　maintains　its　identity　in　the
  particularisation。　The　relations　of　pressure；　thrust；　attraction　and　the　like；　as　also
  aggregations　or　mixtures；　belong　to　the　relationship　of　externality　which　forms　the　basis　of　the
  third　of　this　group　of　syllogisms。　Order；　which　is　the　merely　external　determinateness　of　objects；
  has　passed　over　into　the　determination　that　is　immanent　and　objective；　this　is　Law。
  （b）　Law
  In　law；　the　more　specific　difference　between　the　ideal　reality　of　objectivity　and　its　external
  reality　is　made　prominent。　The　object；　as　immediate　totality　of　the　Notion；　does　not　yet　possess
  externality　as　distinct　from　the　Notion　which　is　not　yet　posited　for　itself。　The　object；　being
  withdrawn　into　itself　through　the　process；　there　has　arisen　the　opposition　of　simple　centrality
  against　an　externality　which　is　now　determined　as　externality；　that　is；　is　posited　as　that　which　is
  not　in　and　for　itself。　That　identical　or　ideal　aspect　of　individuality　is；　on　account　of　the　relation　to
  externality；　an　ought…to…be；　it　is　that　unity　of　the　Notion；　absolutely　determined　and
  self…determining；　to　which　that　external　reality　does　not　correspond；　and　therefore　gets　no　further
  than　a　striving　towards　it。　But　individuality　is　in　and　for　itself　the　concrete　principle　of　negative
  unity；　and　as　such　itself　totality；　a　unity　that　sunders　itself　into　the　specific　differences　of　the
  Notion　and　abides　within　its　self…identical　universality；　it　s　thus　the　centre　expanded　within　its　pure
  ideality　by　difference。
  This　reality　which　corresponds　to　the　Notion　is　the　ideal　reality　that　is　distinct　from　the　reality　that
  was　merely　a　striving；　it　is　the　difference；　not　as　in　the　first　instance　a　plurality　of　objects；　but
  difference　in　its　essential　nature　and　taken　up　into　pure　universality。　This　real　ideality　is　the　soul　of
  the　previously　developed　objective　totality；　the　absolutely　determined　identity　of　the　system。
  The　objective　being…in…and…for…self　appears　therefore　more　specifically　in　its　totality　as　the
  negative　unity　of　the　centre；　which　divides　itself　into　subjective　individuality　and　external
  objectivity；　maintains　the　former　in　the　latter　and　determines　it　in　an　ideal　difference。　This
  self…determining　unity　that　absolutely　reduces　external　objectivity　to　ideality　is　the　principle　of
  self…movement　the　determinateness　of　this　animating　principle；　which　is　the　difference　of　the
  Notion　itself；　is　law。　Dead　mechanism　was　the　mechanical　process　considered　above　of　objects
  that　appeared　immediately　as　self…subsistent　but　which　for　that　very　reason　are；　in　truth；　not
  self…subsistent　and　have　their　centre　outside　themselves；　this　process；　which　passes　over　into　rest；
  exhibits　either　contingency　and　indeterminate　dissimilarity　or　formal　uniformity。　This　uniformity　is
  indeed　a　rule；　but　not　a　law。　Only　free　mechanism　has　a　law；　the　spontaneous　determination　of
  pure　individuality　or　of　the　explicated　Notion；　as　difference；　it　is　in　its　own　self　the　imperishable
  source　of　self…kindling　movement；　and　since　in　the　ideality　of　its　difference　it　relates　itself　to　itself
  alone；　it　is　free　necessity。
  （c）　Transition　of　Mechanism
  This　soul；　however；　is　still　submerged　in　its　body：　the　Notion　of　the　objective　totality；　determinate
  now　but　inner；　is　free　necessity　—　the　law　has　not　yet　confronted　its　object；　it　is　the　concrete
  centrality　as　universality　immediately　expanded　into　its　objectivity。　This　ideality；　therefore；　has　not
  the　objects　themselves　for　its　determinate　difference；　these　are　self…subsistent　individuals　of　the
  totality；　or　also；　if　we　look　back　to　the　formal　stage；　non…individual；　external　objects。　Law　is
  indeed　immanent　in　them　and　constitutes　their　nature　and　power；　but　its　difference　is　confined
  within　its　ideality；　and　the　objects　are　not　themselves　differentiated　into　the　ideal　difference　of　the
  law。　But　it　is　solely　in　the　ideal　centrality　and　its　laws　that　the　object　possesses　its　essential
  self…subsistence；　it　is　therefore　powerless　to　resist　the　judgment　of　the　Notion　and　to　maintain　itself
  in　abstract；　indeterminate　self…subsistence　and　aloofness。
  By　virtue　of　the　ideal　difference　immanent　in　it；　its　existence　is　a　determinateness　posited　by　the
  Notion。　Its　lack　of　self…subsistence　is　in　this　way　no　longer　merely　a　striving　towards　the　centre；
  as　against　which；　just　because　its　relation　to　it　is　only　a　striving；　it　still　has　the　appearance　of　a
  self…subsistent　external　object；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　a　striving　towards　the　object　specifically
  opposed　to　it；　and　similarly　the　centre　itself　has　in　consequence　fallen　asunder　and　its　negative
  unity　passed　has　over　into　objectified　opposition。　Centrality　is；　therefore；　now　a　relation　of　these
  reciprocally　negative　objectivities　in　a　state　of　mutual　tension。　Thus　free　mechanism　determines
  itself　into　chemism。
  Chapter　2　Chemism
  Chemism　constitutes　in　objectivity　as　a　whole；　the　moment　of　judgment；　of　the　difference　that　has
  become　objective；　and　of　the　process。　Since　it　already　begins　with　determinateness　and
  positedness　and　the　chemical　object　is　at　the　same　time　an　objective　totality；　its　immediate　course
  is　simple　and　is　completely　determined　by　its　presupposition。
  A。　THE　CHEMICAL　OBJECT
  The　chemical　object　is　distinguished　from　the　mechanical　by　the　fact　that　the　latter　is　a　totality
  indifferent　to　determinateness；　whereas　in　the　case　of　the　chemical　object　the　determinateness；
  and　consequently　the　relation　to　other　and　the　kind　and　manner　of　this　relation；　belong　to　its
  nature。　This　determinateness　is　at　the　same　time　essentially　a　particularisation；　that　is；　it　is　taken
  up　into　universality；　thus　it　is　a　principle　—　universal　determinateness；　the　determinateness　not
  only　of　the　one　individual　object　but　also　of　the　other。　In　the　chemical　object；　therefore；　we　now
  have　the　distinction　between　its　Notion　as　the　inner　totality　of　the　two　determinatenesses；　and　the
  determinateness　that　constitutes　the