of　self…determination　is　nowhere　to　be　found；　determinism　—　the　standpoint　occupied　by
  cognition　when　it　takes　the　object；　just　as　we　have　found　it　here；　to　be　the　truth　—　assigns　for　each
  determination　of　the　object　that　of　another　object；　but　this　other　is　likewise　indifferent　both　to　its
  being　determined　and　to　its　active　determining。　For　this　reason　determinism　itself　is　also
  indeterminate　in　the　sense　that　it　involves　the　progression　to　infinity；　it　can　halt　and　be　satisfied　at
  any　point　at　will；　because　the　object　it　has　reached　in　its　progress；　being　a　formal　totality；　is　shut　up
  within　itself　and　indifferent　to　its　being　determined　by　another。　Consequently；　the　explanation　of
  the　determination　of　an　object　and　the　progressive　determining　of　the　object　made　for　the　purpose
  of　the　explanation；　is　only　an　empty　word；　since　in　the　other　object　to　which　it　advances　there
  resides　no　self…determination。
  3。　Now　as　the　determinateness　of　an　object　lies　in　an　other；　no　determinate　difference　is　to　be
  found　between　them；　the　determinateness　is　merely　doubled；　once　in　one　object　and　again　in　the
  other；　something　utterly　identical；　so　that　the　explanation　or　comprehension　is　tautological。　This
  tautology　is　an　external　futile　see…saw；　since　the　determinateness　obtains　from　the　objects　which
  are　indifferent　to　it　no　peculiar　distinctiveness　and　is　therefore　only　identical；　there　is　before　us　only
  one　determinateness；　and　its　being　doubled　expresses　just　this　externality　and　nullity　of　a
  difference。　But　at　the　same　time　the　objects　are　self…subsistent　in　regard　to　one　another；　therefore
  in　the　identity　above…mentioned　they　remain　absolutely　external　to　one　another。　Here；　then；　we
  have　the　manifest　contradiction　between　the　complete　mutual　indifference　of　the　objects　and　the
  identity　of　their　determinateness；　or　the　contradiction　of　their　complete　externality　in　the
  identity　of　their　determinateness。　This　contradiction　is；　therefore；　the　negative　unity　of　a　number
  of　objects　which；　in　that　unity；　simply　repel　one　another：　this　is　the　mechanical　process。
  B。　The　Mechanical　Process
  If　objects　are　regarded　merely　as　self…enclosed　totalities；　they　cannot　act　on　one　another。　In　this
  determination　they　are　the　same　thing　as　the　monads；　which　for　this　very　reason　were　thought　of
  as　exercising　no　influence　whatever　on　one　another。　But　the　concept　of　a　monad　is；　just　for　this
  reason；　a　defective　reflection。　For　first　it　is　a　determinate　conception　of　the　monad's　merely
  implicit　totality；　as　a　certain　degree　of　the　development　and　positedness　of　its　representation　of
  the　world；　it　is　determinate；　now　while　it　is　a　self…enclosed　totality；　it　is　also　indifferent　to　this
  determinateness；　therefore　the　determinateness　is　not　its　own；　but　one　that　is　posited　by　another
  object。　Secondly　it　is　an　immediate　in　general；　in　so　far　as　it　is　supposed　to　be　merely　a
  mirroring　entity；　its　relation　to　itself　is　therefore　abstract　universality；　hence　it　is　a　determinate
  being　open　to　others。　To　gain　the　freedom　of　substance　it　is　not　sufficient　to　represent　it　as　a
  totality　that　is　complete　within　itself　and　has　nothing　to　receive　from　without。　On　the　contrary；
  the　mechanical　＇begrifflose＇；　merely　mirrored　relation　to　itself　is　precisely　a　passivity　towards
  another。　Similarly　determinateness；　whether　taken　as　the　determinateness　of　something　that　is　or
  of　a　mirroring　entity；　that　is　a　degree　of　the　monad's　own　spontaneous　development；　is　something
  external；　the　degree　that　the　development　reaches　has　its　limit　in　an　other。　To　shift　the　reciprocity
  of　substances　on　to　a　predetermined　harmony　means　nothing　more　than　to　convert　it　into　a
  presupposition；　that　is；　to　withdraw　it　from　the　Notion。　The　need　to　avoid　the　interaction　of
  substances　was　based　on　the　moment　of　absolute　self…subsistence　and　originality　which　was
  made　a　fundamental　assumption。　But　since　the　positedness；　the　degree　of　development；　does　not
  correspond　to　this　in…itself；　it　has　for　that　very　reason　its　ground　in　an　other。
  When　treating　of　the　relationship　of　substantiality；　we　showed　that　it　passes　over　into　the　causal
  relationship。　But　here　what　is；　no　longer　has　the　determination　of　a　substance；　but　of　an　object；
  the　causal　relationship　has　been　superseded　in　the　Notion；　the　originality　of　one　substance　in
  relation　to　the　other　has　shown　itself　to　be　illusory；　its　action　to　be　transition　into　the　opposed
  substance。　This　relationship　therefore　has　no　objectivity。　Hence　in　so　far　as　the　one　object　is
  posited　in　the　form　of　subjective　unity　as　active　cause；　this　no　longer　counts　as　an　original
  determination　but　as　something　mediated；　the　active　object　has　this　its　determination　only　by
  means　of　another　object。　Mechanism；　since　it　belongs　to　the　sphere　of　the　Notion；　has　that
  posited　within　it　which　proved　to　be　the　truth　of　the　causal　relationship；　namely　that　the　cause；
  which　is　supposed　to　be　the　original　and　self…subsistent　factor　is　essentially　effect；　positedness；　as
  well。　In　mechanism　therefore　the　causality　of　the　object　is　immediately　a　non…originality；　it　is
  indifferent　to　this　its　determination；　therefore　its　being　cause　is　for　it　something　contingent。　To　this
  extent；　one　might　indeed　say　that　the　causality　of　substances　is　only　a　subjective　conception。　But
  this　causality　as　thus　represented　is　precisely　mechanism；　for　mechanism　is　this；　that　causality　as
  identical　determinateness　of　different　substances　and　hence　as　the　extinction　of　their
  self…subsistence　in　this　identity；　is　a　mere　positedness；　the　objects　are　indifferent　to　this　unity　and
  maintain　themselves　in　face　of　it。　But；　no　less　is　this　their　indifferent　self…subsistence　also　a　mere
  positedness；　they　are　therefore　capable　of　mixing　and　aggregating　and　of　becoming；　as　an
  aggregate；　one　object。　Through　this　indifference　both　to　their　transition　and　to　their
  self…subistence；　substances　are　objects。
  （a）　The　Formal　Mechanical　Process
  （b）　The　Real　Mechanical　Process
  （c）　The　Product　of　the　Mechanical　Process
  C。　Absolute　Mechanism
  （a）　The　Centre
  In　the　first　place　then　the　empty　manifoldness　of　objects　is　gathered　into　objective　individuality；
  into　the　simple　self…determining　centre。　Secondly；　in　so　far　as　the　object　as　an　immediate　totality
  retains　its　indifference　to　determinateness；　the　latter　is　present　in　it　also　as　unessential　or　as　a
  mutual　externality　of　many　objects。　The　prior；　the　essential　determinateness；　on　the　other　hand；
  constitutes　the　real　middle　term　between　the　many　mechanically　interacting　bodies；　by　which　they
  are　united　in　and　for　themselves；　and　is　their　objective　universality。　Universality　exhibited　itself　at
  first　in　the　relationship　of　communication　as　present　only　through　positing；　but　as　objective
  universality　it　is　the　pervading　immanent　essence　of　the　objects。
  In　the　material　world　it　is　the　central　body　that　is　the　genus；　but　it　is　the　individual　universality　of
  the　single　objects　and　their　mechanical　process。　The　relationship　in　which　the　unessential　single
  bodies　stand　to　one　another　is　one　of　mutual　thrust　and　pressure；　this　kind　of　relationship　does
  not　hold　between　the　central　body　and　the　objects　whose　essence　it　is；　for　their　externality　no
  longer　constitutes　their　basic　determination。　Their　identity　with　the　central　body　is；　therefore；　rather
  rest；　namely；　the　being　in　their　centre；　this　unity　is　their　absolute　Notion。　It　remains；　however；
  merely　an　ought…to…be；　since　the　externality　of　the　objects　which　is　still　also　posited　does　not
  correspond　to　that　unity。　Their　consequent　striving　towards　the　centre　is　their　absolute
  universality；　not　a　universality　posited　by　communication；　it　constitutes　the　true　rest　that　is　itself
  concrete　and　not　posited　from　outside；　into　which　the　process　of　the　non…self…subsistent　bodies
  must　return。　That　is　why　it　is　an　empty　abstraction　to　assume　in　mechanics　that　a　body　set　in
  motion　would　continue　to　move　in　a　straight　line　to　infinity　if　external　resistance　did　not　rob　it　of　its
  motion。　Friction；　or　whatever　other　form　resistance　takes；　is　only　the　manifestation　of　centrality；
  for　it　is　centrality　that　in　an　absolute　manner　brings　the　body　back　to　itself；　for　the　thing　in　contact
  with　which　the　moving　body　meets　friction　has　the　power　of　resistance　solely　through　its　union　with
  the　centre。　In　the　spiritual　sphere　the　centre　and　unity　with　the　centre　assume　higher　forms；　but　the
  unity　of　the　Notion　and　its　reality　which　here；　to　begin　with；　is　mechanical　centrality；　must　there　too
  constitute　the　basic　determination。
  Thus　the　central　body　has　ceased　to　be　a　mere　object；　for　in　the　latter　the　determinateness　is　an
  unessential　element；　for　the　central　body　no　longer　possesses　the　objective　totality　only　implicitly
  but　also　explicitly。　It　can　therefore　be　regarded　as　an　individual。　Its　determinateness　is
  essentially　different　from　a　mere　order　or　arrangement　and　external　connection　of　parts；　as
  determinateness　in　and　for　itself　it　is　an　immanent　form；　a　self…determining　principle　in　which　the
  objects　inhere　and　by　which　they　are　bound　together　into　a　genuine　One。
  But　this　central　individual　is　thus　at　first　only　a　middle　term　which　as　yet　has