shows　that　the　abstract　product　itself　is　a　unity　of　the　individual　content　and　abstract　universality；
  and　is；　therefore；　a　concrete　…　and　the　opposite　of　what　it　aims　to　be。
  2。　But　Individuality　is　not　only　the　return　of　the　Notion　into　itself；　it　immediately　its　loss。　Through
  individuality；　where　the　Notion　is　internal　to　itself；　it　becomes　external　to　itself　and　enters　into
  actuality。　Abstraction　which；　as　the　soul　of　individuality　is　the　relation　of　the　negative　to　the
  negative；　and；　as　we　have　shown　not　external　to　the　universal　and　the　particular　but　immanent　in
  them；　and　through　it　they　are　concrete；　content；　an　individual。　But　as　this　negativity；　individuality　is
  the　determinate　determinateness；　is　differentiation　as　such；　through　this　reflection　of　the　difference
  into　itself；　the　difference　becomes　fixed；　it　is　only　through　individuality　that　the　determining　of　the
  particular　takes　place；　for　individuality　is　that　abstraction　which　simply　as　individuality；　is　now
  posited　abstraction。
  The　individual；　therefore；　as　self…related　negativity；　is　immediate　identity　of　the　negative　with　itself；
  it　is　a　being…for…self。　Or　it　is　the　abstraction　that　determines　the　Notion；　according　to　its　ideal
  moment　of　being；　as　an　immediate。　In　this　way；　the　individual　is　a　qualitative　one　or　this。　With
  this　quality　it　is；　first；　repulsion　of　itself　from　itself；　whereby　the　many　other　ones　are　presupposed；
  secondly；　it　is　now　a　negative　relation　towards　these　presupposed　others；　and；　the　individual　is　in
  so　far　exclusive。
  When　one　understands　by　the　universal；　that　which　is　common　to　several　individuals；　one　is
  starting　from　the　indifferent　subsistence　of　these　individuals　and　confounding　the　immediacy　of
  being　with　the　determination　of　the　Notion。　The　lowest　possible　conception　of　the　universal　in　its
  connection　with　the　individual　is　this　external　relation　of　it　as　merely　a　common　element。
  Chapter　2　The　Judgment
  The　judgment　is　the　determinateness　of　the　Notion　posited　in　the　Notion　itself。　The　Notion's
  determinations；　or　what　we　have　seen　to　be　the　same　thing；　the　determinate　Notions；　have　already
  been　considered　on　their　own；　but　this　consideration　was　more　a　subjective　reflection　or
  subjective　abstraction。　But　the　Notion　is　itself　this　abstractive　process；　the　opposing　of　its
  determinations　is　its　own　determining　activity。　The　judgment　is　this　positing　of　the　determinate
  Notions　by　the　Notion　itself。　Judging　is　thus　another　function　than　comprehension；　or　rather　it　is
  the　other　function　of　the　Notion　as　the　determining　of　the　Notion　by　itself；　and　the　further
  progress　of　the　judgment　into　the　diversity　of　judgments　is　the　progressive　determination　of　the
  Notion。　What　kinds　of　determinate　Notions　there　are；　and　how　these　determinations　of　the
  Notion　are　arrived　at；　has　to　reveal　itself　in　the　judgment。
  The　judgment　can　therefore　be　called　the　proximate　realisation　of　the　Notion；　inasmuch　as　reality
  denotes　in　general　entry　into　existence　as　a　determinate　being。　More　precisely；　the　nature　of　this
  realisation　has　presented　itself　in　such　a　manner　that；　on　the　one　hand；　the　moments　of　the　Notion
  through　its　reflection…into…self　or　its　individuality　are　self…subsistent　totalities；　while　on　the　other
  hand　the　unity　of　the　Notion　is　their　relation。　The　determinations　reflected　into　themselves　are
  determinate　totalities；　no　less　essentially　in　their　indifferent　and　disconnected　subsistence　as
  through　their　reciprocal　mediation　with　one　another。　The　determining　itself　is　only　totality　in　that　it
  contains　these　totalities　and　their　connection。　This　totality　is　the　judgment。　It　contains；　therefore；
  first；　the　two　self…subsistents　which　are　called　subject　and　predicate。　What　each　is　cannot　yet
  really　be　said；　they　are　still　indeterminate；　for　it　is　only　through　the　judgment　that　they　are　to　be
  determined。　The　judgment；　being　the　Notion　as　determinate；　the　only　distinction　present　is　the
  general　one　that　the　judgment　contains　the　determinate　Notion　over　against　the　still
  indeterminate　Notion。　The　subject　can　therefore；　in　the　first　instance；　be　taken　in　relation　to　the
  predicate　as　the　individual　over　against　the　universal；　or　even　as　the　particular　over　against　the
  universal；　or　as　the　individual　over　against　the　particular；　so　far；　they　confront　each　other　only　in
  general；　as　the　more　determinate　and　the　more　universal。
  It　is　therefore　appropriate　and　necessary　to　have　these　names；　subject　and　predicate　for　the
  determinations　of　the　judgment；　as　names；　they　are　something　indeterminate　that　still　awaits　its
  determination；　and　are；　therefore；　no　more　than　names。　It　is　partly　for　this　reason　that　the　Notion
  determinations　themselves　could　not　be　used　for　the　two　sides　of　the　judgment；　but　a　stronger
  reason　is　because　the　nature　of　the　Notion　determination　is　emphatically　to　be；　not　something
  abstract　and　fixed；　but　to　have　and　to　posit　its　opposite　within　it；　since　the　sides　of　the　judgment
  are　themselves　Notions　and　therefore　the　totality　of　its　determinations；　each　side　must　run　through
  all　these　determinations　and　exhibit　them　within　itself；　whether　in　abstract　or　concrete　form。　Now
  in　order　to　fix　the　sides　of　the　judgment　in　a　general　way　when　their　determination　is　altered；　those
  names　are　most　serviceable　which　remain　the　same　throughout　the　alteration。　The　name　however
  stands　over　against　the　matter　in　hand　or　the　Notion；　this　distinction　presents　itself　in　the　judgment
  as　such；　now　the　subject　is　in　general　the　determinate；　and　is　therefore　more　that　which
  immediately　is；　whereas　the　predicate　expresses　the　universal；　the　essential　nature　or　the　Notion；
  therefore　the　subject　as　such　is；　in　the　first　instance；　only　a　kind　of　name；　for　what　it　is　is　first
  enunciated　by　the　predicate　which　contains　being　in　the　sense　of　the　Notion。　In　the　question：　what
  is　this？　or：　what　kind　of　a　plant　is　this？　what　is　often　understood　by　the　being　enquired　after；　is
  merely　the　name；　and　when　this　is　learned　one　is　satisfied　and　now　knows　what　the　thing　is。　This　is
  being　in　the　sense　of　the　subject。　But　the　Notion；　or　at　least　the　essence　and　the　universal　in
  general；　is　first　given　by　the　predicate；　and　it　is　this　that　is　asked　for　in　the　sense　of　the　judgment。
  Consequently；　God；　spirit；　nature；　or　whatever　it　may　be；　is　as　the　subject　of　a　judgment　at　first
  only　the　name；　what　such　a　subject　is　as　regards　its　Notion　is　first　enunciated　in　the　predicate。
  When　enquiry　is　made　as　to　the　kind　of　predicate　belonging　to　such　subject；　the　act　of　judgment
  necessarily　implies　an　underlying　Notion。　But　this　Notion　is　first　enunciated　by　the　predicate　itself。
  Properly　speaking；　therefore；　it　is　the　mere　general　idea　that　constitutes　the　presupposed　meaning
  of　the　subject　and　that　leads　to　the　naming　of　it；　and　in　doing　this　it　is　contingent　and　a　historical
  fact；　what　is；　or　is　not；　to　be　understood　by　a　name。　So　many　disputes　about　whether　a　predicate
  does　or　does　not　belong　to　a　certain　subject　are　therefore　nothing　more　than　verbal　disputes；
  because　they　start　from　the　form　above　mentioned；　what　lies　at　the　base　is　so　far　nothing　more
  than　the　name。
  We　have　now　to　examine；　secondly；　how　the　relation　of　subject　and　predicate　in　the　judgment　is
  determined　and　how　subject　and　predicate　themselves　are　at　first　determined　through　this　very
  relation。　The　judgment　has　in　general　for　its　sides　totalities　which　to　begin　with　are　essentially
  self…subsistent。　The　unity　of　the　Notion　is；　therefore；　at　first　only　a　relation　of　self…subsistents；　not
  as　yet　the　concrete　and　pregnant　unity　that　has　returned　into　itself　from　this　reality；　but　only　a
  unity　outside　which　the　self…subsistent　sides　persist　as　extremes　that　are　not　sublated　in　it。　Now
  consideration　of　the　judgment　can　begin　from　the　original　unity　of　the　Notion；　or　from　the
  self…subsistence　of　the　extremes。　The　judgment　is　the　self…diremption　of　the　Notion；　this　unity　is；
  therefore；　the　ground　from　which　the　consideration　of　the　judgment　in　accordance　with　its　true
  objectivity　begins。　It　is　thus　the　original　division　＇Teilung＇　of　what　is　originally　one；　thus　the
  word　Urteil　refers　to　what　judgment　is　in　and　for　itself。　But　regarded　from　the　side　of　externality；
  the　Notion　is　present　in　the　judgment　as　Appearance；　since　its　moments　therein　attain
  self…subsistence；　and　it　is　on　this　external　side　that　ordinary　thinking　tends　to　fasten。
  From　this　subjective　standpoint；　then；　subject　and　predicate　are　considered　to　be　complete；　each
  on　its　own　account；　apart　from　the　other：　the　subject　as　an　object　that　would　exist　even　if　it　did　not
  possess　this　predicate；　the　predicate　as　a　universal　determination　that　would　exist　even　if　it　did　not
  belong　to　this　subject。　From　this　standpoint；　the　act　of　judgment　involves　the　reflection；　whether
  this　or　that　predicate　which　is　in　someone's　head　can　and　should　be　attached　to　the　object　which
  exists　on　its　own　account　outside；　the　very　act　of　judging　consists　in　this；　that　only　through　it　is　a
  predicate　combined　with　a　subject；　so　that；　if　this　combination　did　not　take　place；　each　on　its　own
  would　still　remain　what　it　is；　the　latter　an　existent　object；　the　former　an　idea　in　someone's