is　as　self…mediated　through　its　negation；　which　negation　essence　itself　is；　it　is　therefore　the　identical
  unity　of　absolute　negativity　and　immediacy。　The　negativity　is　negativity　per　se；　it　is　its　relation　to
  itself　and　is　thus　in　itself　immediacy；　but　it　is　negative　self…relation；　a　negating　that　is　a　repelling　of
  itself；　and　the　intrinsic　immediacy　is　thus　negative　or　determinate　in　regard　to　it。　But　this
  determinateness　is　itself　absolute　negativity；　and　this　determining　which　is；　as　determining；
  immediately　the　sublating　of　itself；　is　a　return…into…self。
  Illusory　being　is　the　negative　that　has　a　being；　but　in　an　other；　in　its　negation；　it　is　a
  non…self…subsistent　being　which　is　in　its　own　self…sublated　and　null。　As　such；　it　is　the　negative
  returned　into　itself；　non…self…subsistent　being　as　in　its　own　self　not　self…subsistent。　This　self…relation
  of　the　negative　or　of　non…self…subsistent　being　is　its　immediacy；　it　is　an　other　than　the　negative
  itself；　it　is　its　determinateness　over　against　itself；　or　it　is　the　negation　directed　against　the　negative。
  But　negation　directed　against　the　negative　is　purely　self…related　negativity；　the　absolute　sublating　of
  the　determinateness　itself。
  The　determinateness；　therefore；　which　illusory　being　is　in　essence　is　infinite　determinateness；　it　is
  the　purely　self…coincident　negative；　it　is　thus　the　determinateness　which　as　such　is　self…subsistent
  and　indeterminate。　Conversely；　the　self…subsistent；　as　self…related　immediacy；　is　equally　sheer
  determinateness　and　moment　and　is　only　as　self…related　negativity。　This　negativity　that　is　identical
  with　immediacy　and　immediacy　that　is　thus　identical　with　negativity；　is　essence。　Illusory　being；
  therefore；　is　essence　itself；　but　essence　in　a　determinateness；　in　such　a　manner；　however；　that　this
  is　only　a　moment　of　essence　and　essence　is　the　reflection　of　itself　within　itself。
  In　the　sphere　of　being；　there　arises　over　against　being　as　an　immediacy；　non…being；　which　is
  likewise　an　immediacy；　and　their　truth　is　becoming。　In　the　sphere　of　essence；　we　have　first
  essence　opposed　to　the　unessential；　then　essence　opposed　to　illusory　being；　that　is；　to　the
  unessential　and　to　illusory　bel　rig　as　the　remainder　of　being。　But　both　essence　and　illusory　being；
  and　also　the　difference　of　essence　from　them；　derive　solely　from　the　fact　that　essence　is　at　first
  taken　as　an　immediate；　not　as　it　is　in　itself；　namely；　not　as　an　immediacy　that　is　as　pure　mediation
  or　absolute　negativity。　The　first　immediacy　is　thus　only　the　determinateness　of　immediacy。　The
  sublating　of　this　determinateness　of　essence；　therefore；　consists　simply　and　solely　in　showing　that
  the　unessential　is　only　illusory　being　and　that　the　truth　is　rather　that　essence　contains　the　illusory
  being　within　itself　as　the　infinite　immanent　movement　that　determines　its　immediacy　as　negativity
  and　its　negativity　as　immediacy；　and　is　thus　the　reflection　of　itself　within　itself。　Essence　in　this　its
  self…movement　is　reflection
  C　REFLECTION
  （a）　Positing　Reflection
  （b）　External　Reflection
  （c）　Determining　Reflection
  Chapter　2　The　Essentialities　or　Determinations　of　Reflection
  Reflection　is　determinate　reflection；　hence　essence　is　determinate　essence；　or　it　is　an　essentiality。
  Reflection　is　the　showing　of　the　illusory　being　of　essence　within　essence　itself。　Essence；　as
  infinite　return…into…self；　is　not　immediate　but　negative　simplicity；　it　is　a　movement　through　distinct
  moments；　absolute　self…mediation。　But　it　reflects　itself　into　these　its　moments　which　consequently
  are　themselves　determinations　reflected　into　themselves。
  Essence　is　at　first；　simple　self…relation；　pure　identity。　This　is　its　determination；　but　as　such　it　is
  rather　the　absence　of　any　determination。
  Secondly；　the　proper　determination　is　difference；　a　difference　that　is；　on　the　one　hand；　external　or
  indifferent；　diversity　in　general；　and　on　the　other　hand；　is　opposed　diversity　or　opposition。
  Thirdly；　as　contradiction；　the　opposition　is　reflected　into　itself　and　withdrawn　into　its　ground。
  Remark：　The　Categories　of　Reflection
  A　IDENTITY
  B　DIFFERENCE
  （a）　Absolute　Difference
  （b）　Diversity
  Remark：　The　Law　of　Diversity
  Diversity；　like　identity；　is　expressed　in　its　own　law。　And　both　these　laws　are　held　apart　as
  indifferently　different；　so　that　each　is　valid　on　its　own　without　respect　to　the　other。
  All　things　are　different；　or：　there　are　no　two　things　like　each　other。　This　proposition　is；　in　fact；
  opposed　to　the　law　of　identity；　for　it　declares：　A　is　distinctive；　therefore　A　is　also　not　A；　or：　A　is
  unlike　something　else；　so　that　it　is　not　simply　A　but　rather　a　specific　A。　A's　place　in　the　law　of
  identity　can　be　taken　by　any　other　substrate；　but　A　as　distinctive　＇als　Ungleiches＇　can　no　longer
  be　exchanged　with　any　other。　True；　it　is　supposed　to　be　distinctive；　not　from　itself；　but　only　from
  another；　but　this　distinctiveness　is　its　own　determination。　As　self…identical　A；　it　is　indeterminate；
  but　as　determinate　it　is　the　opposite　of　this；　it　no　longer　has　only　self…identity；　but　also　a　negation
  and　therefore　a　difference　of　itself　from　itself　within　it。
  That　everything　is　different　from　everything　else　is　a　very　superfluous　proposition；　for　things　in　the
  plural　immediately　involve　manyness　and　wholly　indeterminate　diversity。　But　the　proposition　that
  no　two　things　are　completely　like　each　other；　expresses　more；　namely；　determinate　difference。
  Two　things　are　not　merely　two　—　numerical　manyness　is　only　one…and…the…sameness　—　but　they
  are　different　through　a　determination。　Ordinary　thinking　is　struck　by　the　proposition　that　no　two
  things　are　like　each　other　—　as　in　the　story　of　how　Leibniz　propounded　it　at　court　and　caused　the
  ladies　to　look　at　the　leaves　of　trees　to　see　whether　they　could　find　two　alike。　Happy　times　for
  metaphysics　when　it　was　the　occupation　of　courtiers　and　the　testing　of　its　propositions　called　for
  no　more　exertion　than　to　compare　leaves！　The　reason　why　this　proposition　is　striking　lies　in　what
  has　been　said；　that　two；　or　numerical　manyness；　does　not　contain　any　determinate　difference　and
  that　diversity　as　such；　in　its　abstraction；　is　at　first　indifferent　to　likeness　and　unlikeness。　Ordinary
  thinking；　even　when　it　goes　on　to　a　determination　of　diversity；　takes　these　moments　themselves　to
  be　mutually　indifferent；　so　that　one　without　the　other；　the　mere　likeness　of　things　without
  unlikeness；　suffices　to　determine　whether　the　things　are　different　even　when　they　are　only　a
  numerical　many；　not　unlike；　but　simply　different　without　further　qualification。　The　law　of　diversity；
  on　the　other　hand；　asserts　that　things　are　different　from　one　another　through　unlikeness；　that　the
  determination　of　unlikeness　belongs　to　them　just　as　much　as　that　of　likeness；　for　determinate
  difference　is　constituted　only　by　both　together。
  Now　this　proposition　that　unlikeness　must　be　predicated　of　all　things；　surely　stands　in　need　of
  proof；　it　cannot　be　set　up　as　an　immediate　proposition；　for　even　in　the　ordinary　mode　of　cognition
  a　proof　is　demanded　of　the　combination　of　different　determinations　in　a　synthetic　proposition；　or
  else　the　indication　of　a　third　term　in　which　they　are　mediated。　This　proof　would　have　to　exhibit　the
  passage　of　identity　into　difference；　and　then　the　passage　of　this　into　determinate　difference；　into
  unlikeness。　But　as　a　rule　this　is　not　done。　We　have　found　that　diversity　or　external　difference　is；　in
  truth；　reflected　into　itself；　is　difference　in　its　own　self；　that　the　indifferent　subsistence　of　the　diverse
  is　a　mere　positedness　and　therefore　not　an　external；　indifferent　difference；　but　a　single　relation　of
  the　two　moments。
  This　involves　the　dissolution　and　nullity　of　the　law　of　diversity。　Two　things　are　not　perfectly　alike；
  so　they　are　at　once　alike　and　unlike；　alike；；simply　because　they　are　things；　or　just　two；　without
  further　qualification…for　each　is　a　thing　and　a　one；　no　less　than　the　other…but　they　are　unlike　ex
  hypothesi。　We　are　therefore　presented　with　this　determination；　that　both　moments；　likeness　and
  unlikeness；　are　different　in　one　and　the　same　thing；　or　that　the　difference；　while　falling　asunder；　is　at
  the　same　time　one　and　the　same　relation。　This　has　therefore　passed　over　Into　opposition。
  The　togetherness　of　both　predicates　is　held　asunder　by　the　'in　so　far'；　namely；　when　it　is　said　that
  two　things　are　alike　in　so　far　as　they　are　not　unlike；　or　on　the　one　side　or　in　one　respect　are　alike；
  but　on　another　side　or　in　another　respect　are　unalike。　The　effect　of　this　is　to　remove　the　unity　of
  likeness　and　unlikeness　from　the　thing；　and　to　adhere　to　what　would　be　the　thing's　own　reflection
  and　the　merely　implicit　reflection　of　likeness　and　unlikeness；　as　a　reflection　external　to　the　thing。
  But　it　is　this　reflection　that；　in　one　and　the　same　activity；　distinguishes　the　two　sides　of　likeness
  and　unlikeness；　hence　contains　both　in　one　activity；　lets　the　one　show；　be　reflected；　in　the　other。
  But　the　usual　tenderness　for　things；　whose　only　care　is　that　they　do　not　contradict　themselves；
  forgets　here　as　elsewhere　that　in　this　way　the　contradiction　is　not　resolved　but　merely　shifted
  elsewhere；　i