are　again　related　to　each　other　as　others；　for　each　has　a　being；　an　immediacy；　and　these　are
  indifferent　to　each　other；　and　with　respect　to　this　being；　being　and　essence　are　equal　in　value。
  But　at　the　same　time；　being；　as　contrasted　with　essence；　is　the　unessential；　in　relation　to　essence；　it
  has　the　determination　of　sublated　being。　Yet　in　so　far　as　it　is　only　related　to　essence　simply　as　an
  other；　essence　is　not　strictly　essence　but　only　a　differently　determined　being；　the　essential。
  The　distinction　of　essential　and　unessential　has　caused　essence　to　relapse　into　the　sphere　of
  determinate　being；　since　essence　in　its　initial　phase　is　determined　as　immediate；　simply　affirmative
  ＇seiendes＇　essence　and　hence　only　as　other　over　against　being。　The　sphere　of　determinate　being　is
  thereby　made　the　base；　and　the　fact　that　the　being　in　this　determinate　being　is
  being…in…and…for…itself；　is　a　further　determination　external　to　determinate　being　itself；　and
  conversely；　while　essence　is　indeed　being…in…and…for…itself；　it　is　so　only　in　relation　to　an　other；　in　a
  specific　reference。　Accordingly；　in　so　far　as　the　distinction　is　made　of　an　essential　and　an
  unessential　side　in　something　＇Dasein＇；　this　distinction　is　externally　posited；　a　separation　of　one
  part　of　it　from　another　that　does　not　affect　the　something　itself；　a　division　which　has　its　origin　in　a
  third。　Such　a　division　does　not　settle　what　is　essential　and　what　is　unessential。　It　originates　in　some
  external　standpoint　and　consideration　and　the　same　content　can　therefore　be　regarded　now　as
  essential　and　again　as　unessential。
  Closer　consideration　shows　that　when　essence　is　characterised　as　essential　only　relatively　to　what
  is　unessential；　it　is　because　it　is　taken　only　as　sublated　being　or　determinate　being。　In　this　way；
  essence　is　only　the　first　negation；　or　the　negation　which　is　a　determinateness　through　which　being
  becomes　only　determinate　being；　or　the　latter　becomes　only　an　other。　But　essence　is　the　absolute
  negativity　of　being；　it　is　being　itself；　but　not　determined　only　as　an　other；　but　being　that　has　sublated
  itself　both　as　immediate　being　and　also　as　immediate　negation；　as　negation　that　is　infected　with
  otherness。　Thus　being；　or　determinate　being；　has　not　preserved　itself　as　an　other…for　we　are　in　the
  sphere　of　essence　…　and　the　immediate　that　is　still　distinguished　from　essence　is　not　merely　an
  unessential　determinate　being　but　the　immediate　that　is　in　and　for　itself　a　nullity；　it　is　only　a
  non…essence；　illusory　being。
  B　ILLUSORY　BEING
  1。　Being　is　illusory　being。　The　being　of　illusory　being　consists　solely　in　the　sublatedness　of　being；
  in　its　nothingness；　this　nothingness　it　has　in　essence　and　apart　from　its　nothingness；　apart　from
  essence；　illusory　being　is　not。　It　is　the　negative　posited　as　negative。
  Illusory　being　is　all　that　still　remains　from　the　sphere　of　being。　But　it　seems　still　to　have　an
  immediate　side　that　is　independent　of　essence　and　to　be　simply　an　other　of　essence。　The　other
  contains　in　general　the　two　moments　of　determinate　being　and　negated　determinate　being。　Since
  the　unessential　no　longer　has　a　being；　all　that　remains　to　it　of　otherness　is　the　pure　moment　of
  negated　determinate　being；　illusory　being　is　this　immediate；　negated　determinate　being　in　the
  determinateness　of　being；　in　such　wise　that　it　has　determinate　being　only　in　relation　to　an　other；
  only　in　its　negated　determinate　being；　the　non…self…subsistent　which　is　only　in　its　negation。　All　that　is
  left　to　it；　therefore；　is　the　pure　determinateness　of　immediacy；　it　is　reflected　immediacy；　that　is；
  immediacy　which　is　only　by　means　of　its　negation　and　which；　when　contrasted　with　its　mediation；
  is　nothing　but　the　empty　determination　of　the　immediacy　of　negated　determinate　being；
  Thus　illusory　being　is　the　phenomenon　of　scepticism；　and　the　Appearance　of　idealism；　too；　is
  such　an　immediacy　which　is　not　a　something　or　a　thing；　in　general；　not　an　indifferent　being　that
  would　still　be；　apart　from　its　determinateness　and　connection　with　the　subject。　Scepticism　did　not
  permit　itself　to　say　'It　is'；　modern　idealism　did　not　permit　itself　to　regard　knowledge　as　a　knowing
  of　the　thing…in…itself；　the　illusory　being　of　scepticism　was　supposed　to　lack　any　foundation　of　being；
  and　in　idealism　the　thing…in…itself　was　not　supposed　to　enter　into　knowledge。　But　at　the　same　time
  scepticism　admitted　a　multitude　of　determinations　of　its　illusory　being；　or　rather　its　illusory　being
  had　for　content　the　entire　manifold　wealth　of　the　world。　In　idealism；　too；　Appearance　embraces
  within　itself　the　range　of　these　manifold　determinatenesses。
  This　illusory　being　and　this　Appearance　are　immediately　thus　manifoldly　determined。　This　content；
  therefore；　may　well　have　no　being；　no　thing…in…itself　at　its　base；　it　remains　on　its　own　account　as　it
  is；　the　content　has　only　been　transferred　from　being　into　an　illusory　being；　so　that　the　latter　has
  within　itself　those　manifold　determinatenesses；　which　are　immediate；　simply　affirmative；　and
  mutually　related　as　others。　Illusory　being　is；　therefore；　itself　immediately　determinate。　It　can　have
  this　or　that　content；　whatever　content　it　has；　illusory　being　does　not　posit　this　itself　but　has　it
  immediately。　The　various　forms　of　idealism；　Leibnizian；　Kantian；　Fichtean；　and　others；　have　not
  advanced　beyond　being　as　determinateness；　have　not　advanced　beyond　this　immediacy；　any　more
  than　scepticism　did。　Scepticism　permits　the　content　of　its　illusory　being　to　be　given　to　it；　whatever
  content　it　is　supposed　to　have；　for　scepticism　it　is　immediate。　The　monad　of　Leibnitz　evolves　its
  ideas　and　representations　out　of　itself；　but　it　is　not　the　power　that　generates　and　binds　them
  together；　rather　do　they　arise　in　the　monad　like　bubbles；　they　are　indifferent　and　immediate　over
  against　one　another　and　the　same　in　relation　to　the　monad　itself。　Similarly；　the　Kantian　Appearance
  is　a　given　content　of　perception；　it　presupposes　affections；　determinations　of　the　subject；　which
  are　immediate　relatively　to　themselves　and　to　the　subject。　It　may　well　be　that　the　infinite　obstacle　of
  Fichte's　idealism　has　no　underlying　thing…in…itself；　so　that　it　becomes　purely　a　determinateness　in
  the　ego；　but　for　the　ego；　this　determinateness　which　it　appropriates　and　whose　externality　it
  sublates　is　at　the　same　time　immediate；　a　limitation　of　the　ego；　which　it　can　transcend　but　which
  has　in　it　an　element　of　indifference；　so　that　although　the　limitation　is　on　the　ego；　it　contains　an
  immediate　non…being　of　the　ego。
  2。　Illusory　being；　therefore；　contains　an　immediate　presupposition；　a　side　that　is　independent　of
  essence。　But　it　does　not　have　to　be　shown　that　illusory　being；　in　so　far　as　it　is　distinct　from
  essence；　sublates　itself　and　withdraws　into　essence；　for　being　in　its　totality　has　withdrawn　into
  essence；　illusory　being　is　in　itself　a　nullity；　all　that　has　to　be　shown　is　that　the　determinations　which
  distinguish　it　from　essence　are　determinations　of　essence　itself；　and　further；　that　this
  determinateness　of　essence　which　illusory　being　is；　is　sublated　in　essence　itself。
  It　is　the　immediacy　of　non…being　that　constitutes　illusory　being；　but　this　non…being　is　nothing　else
  but　the　negativity　of　essence　present　within　it。　In　essence；　being　is　non…being。　Its　intrinsic
  nothingness　is　the　negative　nature　of　essence　itself。　But　the　immediacy　or　indifference　which
  this　non…being　contains　is　essence's　own　absolute　being…in…itself。　The　negativity　of　essence　is　its
  equality　with　itself　or　its　simple　immediacy　and　indifference。　Being　has　preserved　itself　in　essence　in
  so　far　as　the　latter　in　its　infinite　negativity　has　this　equality　with　itself；　it　is　through　this　that　essence
  itself　is　being。　The　immediacy　of　the　determinateness　in　illusory　being　over　against　essence　is
  consequently　nothing　other　than　essence's　own　immediacy；　but　the　immediacy　is　not　simply
  affirmative　＇seiend＇；　but　is　the　purely　mediated　or　reflected　immediacy　that　is　illusory　being…being；
  not　as　being；　but　only　as　the　determinateness　of　being　as　opposed　to　mediation；　being　as　a
  moment。
  These　two　moments；　namely　the　nothingness　which　yet　is　and　the　being　which　is　only　a　moment；　or
  the　implicit　negativity　and　the　reflected　immediacy　that　constitute　the　moments　of　illusory　being；
  are　thus　the　moments　of　essence　itself。　What　we　have　here　is　not　an　illusory　show　of　being　in
  essence；　or　an　illusory　show　of　essence　in　being；　the　illusory　being　in　essence　is　not　the　illusory
  being　of　an　other；　but　is　illusory　being　per　se；　the　illusory　being　of　essence　itself
  What　we　have　here　is　not　an　illusory　show　of　being　in　essence；　or　an　illusory　show　of　essence　in
  being；　the　illusory　being　in　essence　is　not　the　illusory　being　of　an　other；　but　is　illusory　being　per　se；
  the　illusory　being　of　essence　itself。
  Illusory　being　is　essence　itself　in　the　determinateness　of　being。　Essence　has　an　illusory　being
  because　it　is　determinate　within　itself　and　thereby　distinguished　from　its　absolute　unity。　But　equally
  this　determinateness　is　absolutely　sublated　in　its　own　self。　For　essence　is　the　self…subsistent；　which
  is　as　self…mediated　through　its　negation；　which　negation　essence　itself　is；　it　is　therefore　the