stops　at　this…any　more　than　the　ought　is　in　its　own　self　perennial　and；　what　is　the　same　thing；　that
  finitude　is　absolute。　The　philosophy　of　Kant　and　Fichte　sets　up　the　ought　as　the　highest　point　of　the
  resolution　of　the　contradictions　of　Reason；　but　the　truth　is　that　the　ought　is　only　the　standpoint
  which　clings　to　finitude　and　thus　to　contradiction。
  ＇c＇　Transition　of　the　Finite　into　the　Infinite
  C　Infinity
  （a）　The　Infinite　in　General
  （b）　Alternating　Determination　of　the　Finite　and　the　Infinite
  （c）　Affirmative　Infinity
  Transition
  Remark　1：　The　Infinite　Progress
  Remark　2：　Idealism
  The　proposition　that　the　finite　is　ideal　＇ideell＇　constitutes　idealism。　The　idealism　of　philosophy
  consists　in　nothing　else　than　in　recognising　that　the　finite　has　no　veritable　being。　Every　philosophy　is
  essentially　an　idealism　or　at　least　has　idealism　for　its　principle；　and　the　question　then　is　only　how　far
  this　principle　is　actually　carried　out。　This　is　as　true　of　philosophy　as　of　religion；　for　religion　equally
  does　not　recognise　finitude　as　a　veritable　being；　as　something　ultimate　and　absolute　or　as
  something　underived；　uncreated；　eternal。　Consequently　the　opposition　of　idealistic　and　realistic
  philosophy　has　no　significance。　A　philosophy　which　ascribed　veritable；　ultimate；　absolute　being　to
  finite　existence　as　such；　would　not　deserve　the　name　of　philosophy；　the　principles　of　ancient　or
  modern　philosophies；　water；　or　matter；　or　atoms　are　thoughts；　universals；　ideal　entities；　not　things
  as　they　immediately　present　themselves　to　us；　that　is；　in　their　sensuous　individuality　…　not　even　the
  water　of　Thales。　For　although　this　is　also　empirical　water；　it　is　at　the　same　time　also　the　in…itself　or
  essence　of　all　other　things；　too；　and　these　other　things　are　not　self…subsistent　or　grounded　in
  themselves；　but　are　posited　by；　are　derived　from；　an　other；　from　water；　that　is　they　are　ideal
  entities。　Now　above　we　have　named　the　principle　or　the　universal　the　ideal　（and　still　more　must
  the　Notion；　the　Idea；　spirit　be　so　named）；　and　then　again　we　have　described　individual；　sensuous
  things　as　ideal　in　principle；　or　in　their　Notion；　still　more　in　spirit；　that　is；　as　sublated；　here　we　must
  note；　in　passing；　this　twofold　aspect　which　showed　itself　in　connection　with　the　infinite；　namely　that
  on　the　one　hand　the　ideal　is　concrete；　veritable　being；　and　on　the　other　hand　the　moments　of　this
  concrete　being　are　no　less　ideal　…　are　sublated　in　it；　but　in　fact　what　is；　is　only　the　one　concrete
  whole　from　which　the　moments　are　inseparable。
  By　the　ideal　＇dem　Ideellen＇　is　meant　chiefly　the　form　of　figurate　conception　and　imagination；　and
  what　is　simply　in　my　conception；　or　in　the　Notion；　or　in　the　idea；　in　imagination；　and　so　on；　is
  called　ideal；　so　that　even　fancies　are　counted　as　ideals　…　conceptions　which　are　not　only　distinct
  from　the　real　world；　but　are　supposed　to　be　essentially　not　real。　In　point　of　fact；　the　spirit　is　the
  idealist　proper；　in　spirit；　even　as　feeling；　imagination　and　still　more　as　thinking　and　comprehending；
  the　content　is　not　present　as　a　so…called　real　existence；　in　the　simplicity　of　the　ego　such　external
  being　is　present　only　as　sublated；　it　is　for　me；　it　is　ideally　in　me。　This　subjective　idealism；　either　in
  the　form　of　the　unconscious　idealism　of　consciousness　generally；　or　consciously　enunciated　and　set
  up　as　a　principle；　concerns　only　the　form　of　conception　according　to　which　a　content　is　mine；　in
  the　systematic　idealism　of　subjectivity　this　form　is　declared　to　be　the　only　true　exclusive　form　in
  opposition　to　the　form　of　objectivity　or　reality；　of　the　external　existence　of　that　content。　Such
  idealism　is　＇merely＇　formal　because　it　disregards　the　content　of　imagination　or　thought；　which
  content　in　being　imagined　or　thought　can　remain　wholly　in　its　finitude。　In　such　an　idealism　nothing　is
  lost；　just　as　much　because　the　reality　of　such　a　finite　content；　the　existence　filled　with　finitude；　is
  preserved；　as　because；　in　so　far　as　abstraction　is　made　from　such　finite　reality；　the　content　is
  supposed　to　be　of　no　consequence　in　itself；　and　in　it　nothing　is　gained　for　the　same　reason　that
  nothing　is　lost；　because　the　ego；　conception；　spirit；　remains　filled　with　the　same　content　of　finitude。
  The　opposition　of　the　form　of　subjectivity　and　objectivity　is　of　course　one　of　the　finitudes；　but　the
  content；　as　taken　up　in　sensation；　intuition　or　even　in　the　more　abstract　element　of　conception；　of
  thought；　contains　finitudes　in　abundance　and　with　the　exclusion　of　only　one　of　the　modes　of
  finitude；　namely；　of　the　said　form　of　subjective　and　objective；　these　finitudes　are　certainly　not
  eliminated；　still　less　have　they　spontaneously　fallen　away。
  Chapter　3　Being…for…self
  In　being…for…self；　qualitative　being　finds　its　consummation；　it　is　infinite　being。　The　being　of　the
  beginning　lacks　all　determination。　Determinate　being　is　sublated　but　only　immediately　sublated
  being。　It　thus　contains；　to　begin　with；　only　the　first　negation；　which　is　itself　immediate；　it　is　true　that
  being；　too；　is　preserved　in　it　and　both　are　united　in　determinate　being　in　a　simple　unity；　but　for　that
  very　reason　they　are　in　themselves　still　unequal　to　each　other　and　their　unity　is　not　yet　posited。
  Determinate　being　is　therefore　the　sphere　of　difference；　of　dualism；　the　field　of　finitude。
  Determinateness　is　determinateness　as　such；　in　which　being　is　only　relatively；　not　absolutely
  determined。　In　being…for…self；　the　difference　between　being　and　determinateness　or　negation　is
  posited　and　equalised；　quality；　otherness；　limit　…　like　reality；　being…in…itself；　the　ought；　and　so
  on…are　the　imperfect　embodiments　of　the　negation　in　being　in　which　the　difference　of　both　still　lies
  at　the　base。　Since；　however；　in　finitude　the　negation　has　passed　into　infinity；　into　the　posited
  negation　of　negation；　it　is　simple　self…relation　and　consequently　in　its　own　self　the　equalisation　with
  being；　absolutely　determined　being。
  Being…for…self　is　first；　immediately　a　being…for…self　—　the　One。
  Secondly；　the　One　passes　into　a　plurality　of　ones　…　repulsion　—　and　this　otherness　of　the　ones　is
  sublated　in　their　ideality　—　attraction。
  Thirdly；　we　have　the　alternating　determination　of　repulsion　and　attraction　in　which　they　collapse
  into　equilibrium；　and　quality；　which　in　being…for…self　reached　its　climax；　passes　over　into　quantity。
  A　Being…for…self　as　Such
  （a）　Determinate　Being　and　Being…for…self
  （b）　Being…for…one
  Remark：　The　German　Expression；　'What　For　a　Thing'　（Meaning　'What　Kind　of　a　Thing'）
  （c）　The　One
  B　The　One　and　the　Many
  （a）　The　One　in　its　own　self
  （b）　The　One　and　the　Void
  Remark：　Atomism
  （c）　Many　Ones　—　Repulsion
  Remark：　The　Monad　of　Leibniz
  C　Repulsion　and　Attraction
  （a）　Exclusion　of　the　One
  Remark：　The　unity　of　the　One　and　the　Many
  （b）　The　one　One　of　Attraction
  （c）　The　Relation　of　Repulsion　and　Attraction
  Remark：　The　Kantian　Construction　of　Matter　from　the　Forces　of　Attraction
  and　Repulsion
  Attraction　and　repulsion；　as　we　know；　are　usually　retarded　as　forces。　This　determination　of　them
  and　—　the　relationships　connected　with　it　have　to　be　compared　with　the　Notions　which　have
  resulted　from　our　consideration　of　them。　Conceived　as　forces；　they　are　regarded　as　self…subsistent
  and　therefore　as　not　connected　with　each　other　through　their　own　nature；　that　is；　they　are
  considered　not　as　moments；　each　of　which　is　supposed　to　pass　into　the　other；　but　rather　as　fixed　in
  their　opposition　to　each　other。　Further；　they　are　imagined　as　meeting　in　a　third；　in　matter；　but　in
  such　a　manner；　that　this　unification　is；　counted；　as　their　truth。；　on　the　contrary；　each　is　regarded
  also　as　a　first；　as　being　in　and　for　itself；　and　matter；　or　its　determinations；　are　supposed　to　be
  realised　and　produced　by　them。　When　it　is　said　that　matter　has　the　forces　within　itself；　they　are
  understood　to　be　so　conjoined　in　this　unity　that　they　are　at　the　same　time　presupposed　as
  intrinsically　free　and　independent　of　each　other。
  Kant；　as　we　know；　constructed　matter　from　the　forces　of　attraction　and　repulsion；　or　at　least　he
  has；　to　use　his　own　words；　set　up　the　metaphysical　elements　of　this　construction。　It　will　not　be
  without　interest　to　examine　this　construction　more　closely。　This　metaphysical　exposition　of　a
  subject　matter　which　not　only　itself　but　also　in　its　determinations　seemed　to　belong　only　to
  experience　is　noteworthy；　partly　because　as　an　experiment　with　the　Notion　it　at　least　gave　the
  impulse　to　the　more　recent　philosophy　of　nature；　to　a　philosophy　which　does　not　make　nature　as
  given　in　sense…perception　the　basis　of　science；　but　which　goes　to　the　absolute　Notion　for　its
  determinations；　and　partly　because　in　many　cases　no　advance　is　made　beyond　the　Kantian
  construction　which　is　held　to　be　a　philosophical　beginning　and　foundation　for　physics。
  Now　it　is　true　that　matter　as　it　exists　for　sense　perception　is　no　more　a　subject　matter　of　logic　than
  are　space　and　its　determinations。　But　the　forces　of　attraction　and　repulsion；　in　so　far　as　they　are
  regarded　as　forces　of　empirical　matter；　are　also　based　on　the　pure　determinations　h