and　so　here；　too；　it　is　a　presupposition。　In　accordance　with　that　result　logic　was　defined　as　the
  science　of　pure　thought；　the　principle　of　which　is　pure　knowing；　the　unity　which　is　not　abstract　but
  a　living；　concrete　unity　in　virtue　of　the　fact　that　in　it　the　opposition　in　consciousness　between　a
  self…determined　entity；　a　subject；　and　a　second　such　entity；　an　object；　is　known　to　be　overcome；
  being　is　known　to　be　the　pure　Notion　in　its　own　self；　and　the　pure　Notion　to　be　the　true　being。
  These；　then；　are　the　two　moments　contained　in　logic。　But　now　they　are　known　to　be　inseparable；
  not　as　in　consciousness　where　each　also　has　a　separate　being　of　its　own；　it　is　solely　because　they
  are　at　the　same　time　known　as　distinct　（yet　not　with　an　independent　being）　that　their　unity　is　not
  abstract；　dead　and　inert；　but　concrete。
  This　unity　also　constitutes　the　logical　principle　as　element；　so　that　the　development　of　the
  difference　directly　present　in　that　principle　proceeds　only　within　this　element。　For　since　the
  division　is；　as　we　have　said；　the　judgement　of　the　Notion；　the　positing　of　the　determination　already
  immanent　in　it；　and　therefore　of　the　difference；　we　must　not　understand　this　positing　as　a　resolving
  of　that　concrete　unity　back　into　its　determinations　as　if　these　had　an　independent　self…subsistence；
  for　this　would　be　an　empty　return　to　the　previous　standpoint；　to　the　opposition　of　consciousness。
  This　however　has　vanished；　the　said　unity　remains　the　element；　and　the　distinctions　of　the　division
  and　of　the　development　no　longer　originate　outside　that　element。　Consequently　the　earlier
  determinations　（those　used　on　the　pathway　to　truth）　such　as　subjectivity　and　objectivity；　or　even
  thought　and　being；　or　Notion　and　reality；　no　matter　from　what　standpoint　they　were　determined；
  have　lost　their　independent　and　purely　affirmative　character　and　are　now　in　their　truth；　that　is；　in
  their　unity；　reduced　to　forms。　In　their　difference；　therefore；　they　themselves　remain　implicitly　the
  whole　Notion；　and　this；　in　the　division；　is　posited　only　under　its　own　specifications。
  Thus　what　is　to　be　considered　is　the　whole　Notion；　firstly　as　the　Notion　in　the　form　of　being；
  secondly；　as　the　Notion；　in　the　first　case；　the　Notion　is　only　in　itself；　the　Notion　of　reality　or
  being；　in　the　second　case；　it　is　the　Notion　as　such；　the　Notion　existing　for　itself　（as　it　is；　to　name
  concrete　forms；　in　thinking　man；　and　even　in　the　sentient　animal　and　in　organic　individuality
  generally；　although；　of　course；　in　these　it　is　not　conscious；　still　less　known；　it　is　only　in　inorganic
  nature　that　it　is　in　itself）。　Accordingly；　logic　should　be　divided　primarily　into　the　logic　of　the　Notion
  as　being　and　of　the　Notion　as　Notion　—　or；　by　employing　the　usual　terms　（although　these　as　least
  definite　are　most　ambiguous）　into　'objective'　and　'subjective'　logic。
  But　in　accordance　with　the　fundamental　element　of　the　immanent　unity　of　the　Notion；　and　hence
  with　the　inseparability　of　its　determinations；　these　latter；　when　distinguished　from　each　other　in　the
  positing　of　the　Notion　in　its　difference；　must　at　least　also　stand　in　relation　to　each　other。　There
  results　a　sphere　of　mediation；　the　Notion　as　a　system　of　reflected　determinations；　that　is；　of
  being　in　process　of　transition　into　the　being…within…self　or　inwardness　of　the　Notion。　In　this　way；
  the　Notion　is　not　yet　posited　as　such　for　itself；　but　is　still　fettered　by　the　externality　of　immediate
  being。　This　is　the　doctrine　of　essence　which　stands　midway　between　the　doctrine　of　being　and　that
  of　the　Notion。　In　the　general　division　of　logic　in　the　present　work　it　has　been　included　in　objective
  logic　because　although　essence　is　already　the　inwardness　of　being；　the　character　of　subject　is　to　be
  expressly　reserved　for　the　Notion。
  Recently　Kant　has　opposed　to　what　has　usually　been　called　logic　another；　namely；　a
  transcendental　logic。　What　has　here　been　called　objective　logic　would　correspond　in　part　to
  what　with　him　is　transcendental　logic。　He　distinguishes　it　from　what　he　calls　general　logic　in　this
  way；　（a）　that　it　treats　of　the　notions　which　refer　a　priori　to　objects；　and　consequently　does　not
  abstract　from　the　whole　content　of　objective　cognition；　or；　in　other　words；　it　contains　the　rules　of
  the　pure　thinking　of　an　object；　and　（g）　at　the　same　time　it　treats　of　the　origin　of　our　cognition　so　far
  as　this　cognition　cannot　be　ascribed　to　the　objects。　It　is　to　this　second　aspect　that　Kant's
  philosophical　interest　is　exclusively　directed。
  His　chief　thought　is　to　vindicate　the　categories　for　self…consciousness　as　the　subjective　ego。　By
  virtue　of　this　determination　and　its　opposition；　and　besides　the　empirical　element　of　feeling　and
  intuition　it　has　something　else　left　over　which　is　not　posited　and　determined　by　thinking
  self…consciousness；　a　thing…in…itself；　something　alien　and　external　to　thought　—　although　it　is　easy
  to　perceive　that　such　an　abstraction　as　the　thing…in…itself　is　itself　only　a　product　of　thought；　and　of
  merely　abstractive　thought　at　that。　If　other　disciples　of　Kant　have　expressed　themselves　concerning
  the　determining　of　the　object　by　the　ego　in　this　way；　that　the　objectifying　of　the　ego　is　to　be
  regarded　as　an　original　and　necessary　act　of　consciousness；　so　that　in　this　original　act　there　is　not
  yet　the　idea　of　the　ego　itself　—　which　would　be　a　consciousness　of　that　consciousness　or　even　an
  objectifying　of　it　—　then　this　objectifying　act；　in　its　freedom　from　the　opposition　of　consciousness；
  is　nearer　to　what　may　be　taken　simply　for　thought　as　such。　＇2＇
  ＇footnote＇
  1。　I　would　mention　that　in　this　work　I　frequently　refer　to　the　Kantian　philosophy　（which　to　many　may　seem
  superfluous）　because　whatever　may　be　said；　both　in　this　work　and　elsewhere；　about　the　precise　character　of
  this　philosophy　and　about　particular　parts　of　its　exposition；　it　constitutes　the　base　and　the　starting　point　of
  recent　German　philosophy　and　that　its　merit　remains　unaffected　by　whatever　faults　may　be　found　in　it。　The
  reason　too　why　reference　must　often　be　made　to　it　in　the　objective　logic　is　that　it　enters　into　detailed
  consideration　of　important；　more　specific　aspects　of　logic；　whereas　later　philosophical　works　have　paid　little
  attention　to　these　and　in　some　instances　have　only　displayed　a　crude　—　not　unavenged　—　contempt　for　them。
  The　philosophising　which　is　most　widespread　among　us　does　not　go　beyond　the　Kantian　results；　that　Reason
  cannot　acquire　knowledge　of　any　true　content　or　subject　matter　and　in　regard　to　absolute　truth　must　be
  directed　to　faith。　But　what　with　Kant　is　a　result；　forms　the　immediate　starting…point　in　this　philosophising；　so
  that　the　preceding　exposition　from　which　that　result　issued　and　which　is　a　philosophical　cognition；　is　cut　away
  beforehand。　The　Kantian　philosophy　thus　serves　as　a　cushion　for　intellectual　indolence　which　soothes　itself
  with　the　conviction　that　everything　is　already　proved　and　settled。　Consequently　for　genuine　knowledge；　for　a
  specific　content　of　thought　which　is　not　to　be　found　in　such　barren　and　arid　complacency；　one　must　turn　to
  that　preceding　exposition。
  2。　If　the　expression　'objectifying　act　of　the　ego'　suggests　other　products　of　spirit；　e。g。　fantasy；　it　is　to　be
  observed　that　we　are　speaking　of　a　determining　of　an　object　in　so　far　as　the　elements　of　its　content　do　not
  belong　to　feeling　and　intuition。　Such　an　object　is　a　thought；　and　to　determine　it　means　partly；　first　to　produce　it；
  partly；　in　so　far　as　it　is　something　presupposed；　to　have　further　thoughts　about　it；　to　develop　it　further　by
  thought。
  But　this　act　should　no　longer　be　called　consciousness；　consciousness　embraces　within　itself　the
  opposition　of　the　ego　and　its　object　which　is　not　present　in　that　original　act。　The　name
  consciousness　gives　it　a　semblance　of　subjectivity　even　more　than　does　the　term　thought；　which
  here；　however；　is　to　be　taken　simply　in　the　absolute　sense　as　infinite　thought　untainted　by　the
  finitude　of　consciousness；　in　short；　thought　as　such。
  Now　because　the　interest　of　the　Kantian　philosophy　was　directed　to　the　so…called　transcendental
  aspect　of　the　categories；　the　treatment　of　the　categories　themselves　yielded　a　blank　result；　what
  they　are　in　themselves　without　the　abstract　relation　to　the　ego　common　to　all；　what　is　their　specific
  nature　relatively　to　each　other　and　their　relationship　to　each　other；　this　has　not　been　made　an
  object　of　consideration。　Hence　this　philosophy　has　not　contributed　in　the　slightest　to　a　knowledge
  of　their　nature；　what　alone　is　of　interest　in　this　connection　occurs　in　the　Critique　of　Ideas。　But　if
  philosophy　was　to　make　any　real　progress；　it　was　necessary　that　the　interest　of　thought　should　be
  drawn　to　a　consideration　of　the　formal　side；　to　a　consideration　of　the　ego；　of　consciousness　as
  such；　i。e。　of　the　abstract　relation　of　a　subjective　knowing　to　an　object；　so　that　in　this　way　the
  cognition　of　the　infinite　form；　that　is；　of　the　Notion；　would　be　introduced。　But　in　order　that　this
  cognition　may　be　reached；　that　form　has　still　to　be　relieved　of　the　finite　determinateness　in　which　it
  is　ego；　or　consciousness。　The　form；　when　thus　thought　out　into　its　purity；　will　have　within　itself　the
  cap