and　the　two　concrete　＇realen＇　sciences；　the　Philosophy　of　Nature　and　the　Philosophy　of　Spirit；
  which　would　complete　the　System　of　Philosophy。　But　the　necessary　expansion　which　logic　itself
  has　demanded　has　induced　me　to　have　this　part　published　separately；　it　thus　forms　the　first　sequel
  to　the　Phenomenology　of　Spirit　in　an　expanded　arrangement　of　the　system。　It　will　later　be
  followed　by　an　exposition　of　the　two　concrete　philosophical　sciences　mentioned。　This　first　volume
  of　the　Logic　contains　as　Book　One　the　Doctrine　of　Being；　Book　Two；　the　Doctrine　of　Essence；
  which　forms　the　second　part　of　the　first　volume；　is　already　in　the　press；　the　second　volume　will
  contain　Subjective　Logic　or　the　Doctrine　of　the　Notion。
  Nuremberg；　March　22；　1812。
  Preface　to　the　Second　Edition
  When　I　undertook　this　fresh　elaboration　of　the　Science　of　Logic　of　which　this　is　the　first　volume；　I
  was　fully　conscious…not　only　of　the　inherent　difficulty　of　the　subject　matter　and　of　its　exposition；　but
  also　of　the　imperfection　of　its　treatment　in　the　first　edition；　earnestly　as　I　have　tried　after　many
  years　of　further　occupation　with　this　science　to　remedy　this　imperfection；　I　feel　I　still　have　reason
  enough　to　claim　the　indulgence　of　the　reader。　One　title　to　such　claim　in　the　first　instance　may　well
  be　based　on　the　fact　that　in　the　main　there　was　available　for　the　contents　of　the　science　only
  external　material　in　the　older　metaphysics　and　logic。　Though　these　two　sciences　have　been
  universally　and　abundantly　cultivated；　the　latter　even　up　to　our　own　day；　the　interest　taken　in　the
  speculative　side　has　been　only　slight；　in　fact；　on　the　whole；　the　same　material　has　been　just
  repeated　over　and　over　again；　sometimes　being　thinned　out　to　the　point　of　being　trivial　and
  superficial　and　sometimes　more　of　the　old　ballast　has　been　hauled　out　afresh　and　trailed　along　with
  logic。　From　such　efforts；　often　purely　mechanical；　the　philosophical　import　of　the　science　could
  gain　nothing。
  To　exhibit　the　realm　of　thought　philosophically；　that　is；　in　its　own　immanent　activity　or　what　is　the
  same；　in　its　necessary　development；？　had　therefore　to　be　a　fresh　undertaking；　one　that　had　to　be
  started　right　from　the　beginning；　but　this　traditional　material；　the　familiar　forms　of　thought；　must　be
  regarded　as　an　extremely　important　source；　indeed　as　a　necessary　condition　and　as　a
  presupposition　to　be　gratefully　acknowledged　even　though　what　it　offers　is　only　here　and　there　a
  meagre　shred　or　a　disordered　heap　of　dead　bones　？。
  The　forms　of　thought　are；　in　the　first　instance；　displayed　and　stored　as　human　language。
  Nowadays　we　cannot　be　too　often　reminded　that　it　is　thinking　which　distinguishes　man　from　the
  beasts。　Into　all　that　becomes　something　inward　for　men；　an　image　or　conception　as　such；　into　all
  that　he　makes　his　own；　language　has　penetrated；　and　everything　that　he　has　transformed　into
  language　and　expresses　in　it　contains　a　category…concealed；　mixed　with　other　forms　or　clearly
  determined　as　such；　so　much　is　Logic　his　natural　element；　indeed　his　own　peculiar　nature。　If
  nature　as　such；　as　the　physical　world；　is　contrasted　with　the　spiritual　sphere；　then　logic　must
  certainly　be　said　to　be　the　supernatural　element　which　permeates　every　relationship　of　man　to
  nature；　his　sensation；　intuition；　desire；　need；　instinct；　and　simply　by　so　doing　transforms　it　into
  something　human；　even　though　only　formally　human；　into　ideas　and　purposes。　It　is　an　advantage
  when　a　language　possesses　an　abundance　of　logical　expressions；　that　is；　specific　and　separate
  expressions　for　the　thought　determinations　themselves；　many　prepositions　and　articles　denote
  relationships　based　on　thought；　the　Chinese　language　is　supposed　not　to　have　developed　to　this
  stage　or　only　to　an　inadequate　extent。　These　particles；　however；　play　quite　a　subordinate　part
  having　only　a　slightly　more　independent　form　than　the　prefixes　and　suffixes；　inflections　and　the　like。
  It　is　much　more　important　that　in　a　language　the　categories　should　appear　in　the　form　of
  substantives　and　verbs　and　thus　be　stamped　with　the　form　of　objectivity。　In　this　respect　German
  has　many　advantages　over　other　modern　languages；　some　of　its　words　even　possess　the　further
  peculiarity　of　having　not　only　different　but　opposite　meanings　so　that　one　cannot　fail　to　recognise　a
  speculative　spirit　of　the　language　in　them：　it　can　delight　a　thinker　to　come　across　such　words　and　to
  find　the　union　of　opposites　naively　shown　in　the　dictionary　as　one　word　with　opposite　meanings；
  although　this　result　of　speculative　thinking　is　nonsensical　to　the　understanding。　Philosophy　therefore
  stands　in　no　need　of　a　special　terminology；　true；　some　words　have　to　be　taken　from　foreign
  languages　but　these　have　already　acquired　through　usage　the　right　of　citizenship　in　the　philosophical
  realm…and　an　affected　purism　would　be　most　inappropriate　where　it　was　the　distinctive　meaning
  which　was　of　decisive　importance。　The　advance　of　culture　generally；　and　of　the　sciences　in
  particular；　gradually　brings　into　use　higher　relationships　of　thought；　or　at　least　raises　them　to　greater
  universality　and　they　have　thus　attracted　increased　attention。　This　applies　even　to　the　empirical　and
  natural　sciences　which　in　general　employ　the　commonest　categories；　for　example；　whole　and　parts；
  a　thing　and　its　properties；　and　the　like。
  In　physics；　for　example；　the　category　of　force　has　become　predominant；　but　more　recently　the
  category　of　polarity　which　is　the　determination　of　a　difference　in　which　the　different　terms　are
  inseparably　conjoined；　has　played　the　leading　part　although　it　has　been　used　inordinately　in
  connection　with　all　phenomena；　even　with　light。
  It　is　a　matter　of　infinite　importance　that　in　this　way　an　advance　has　been　made　beyond　the　form　of
  abstraction；　of　identity；　by　which　a　specific　concept；　as；　for　example；　force；　acquires　an
  independent　self…subsistence；　and　that　prominence　and　currency　have　been　given　to　the
  determinate　form；　the　difference；　which　is　at…the　same　time　an　inseparable　element　in　the　identity。
  Because　of　the　fixed　reality　of　natural　objects　the　study　of　nature　compels　us　to　fix　the　categories
  which　can　no　longer　be　ignored　in　her；　although　with　complete　inconsistency　towards　other
  categories　which　are　also　allowed　to　remain　valid；　and　such　study　does　not　permit　the　further　step
  of　abstracting　from　the　opposition　and　indulging　in　generalities　as　so　easily　happens　in　the
  intellectual　sphere。
  But　while　logical　objects　and　their　expressions　may　be　thoroughly　familiar　to　educated　people　it
  does　not　follow；　as　I　have　said　elsewhere；　that　they　are　intelligently　apprehended；　and　to　have　to
  occupy　oneself　with　what　is　familiar　can　even　arouse　impatience　—　and　what　is　more　familiar　than
  just　those　determinations　of　thought　which　we　employ　on　every　occasion；　which　pass　our　lips　in
  every　sentence　we　speak？
  It　is　the　purpose　of　this　foreword　to　indicate　the　general　features　of　the　course　followed　by
  knowing　in　its　advance　beyond　a　mere　acquaintance　with　its　objects；　of　the　relation　of
  philosophical　＇wissenschaftlichen＇　thinking　to　this　natural　thinking。　This　much；　together　with　what
  was　contained　in　the　earlier　Introduction；　will　be　sufficient　to　give　a　general　idea　of　what　is　meant
  by　logical　cognition；　the　kind　of　preliminary　general　idea　which　is　demanded　in　the　case　of　any
  science　prior　to　its　exposition；　that　is；　prior　to　the　import　of　the　science　itself。
  In　the　first　place；　we　must　regard　it　as　an　infinite　step　forward　that　the　forms　of　thought　have　been
  freed　from　the　material　in　which　they　are　submerged　in　self…conscious　intuition；　figurate　conception；
  and　in　our　desiring　and　willing；　or　rather　in　ideational　desiring　and　willing　—　and　there　is　no　human
  desiring　or　willing　without　ideation　—　and　that　these　universalities　have　been　brought　into
  prominence　for　their　own　sake　and　made　objects　of　contemplation　as　was　done　by　Plato　and　after
  him　especially　by　Aristotle；　this　constitutes　the　beginning　of　the　intelligent　apprehension　of　them。
  'It　was　only'；　says　Aristotle；　'after　almost　everything　necessary　and　everything　requisite　for　human
  comfort　and　intercourse　was　available；　that　man　began　to　concern　himself　with　philosophical
  knowledge'　'In　Egypt'；　he　had　previously　remarked；　'there　was　an　early　development　of　the
  mathematical　sciences　because　there　the　priestly　caste　at　an　early　stage　were　in　a　position　to　have
  leisure'。
  As　a　matter　of　fact；　the　need　to　occupy　oneself　with　pure　thought　presupposes　that　the　human
  spirit　must　already　have　travelled　a　long　road；
  In　the　silent　regions　of　thought　which　has　come　to　itself　and　communes　only　with　itself；　the　interests
  which　move　the　lives　of　races　and　individuals　are　hushed。？　it　is；　one　may　say；　the　need　of　the
  already　satisfied　need　for　the　necessities　to　which　it　must　have　attained；　the　need　of　a　condition
  free　from　needs；　of　abstraction　from　the　material　of　intuition；　imagination；　and　so　on；　of　the
  concrete　interests　of　desire；　instinct；　will；　in　which　material　the　determinations　of　thought　are　veiled
  and　hidden。　In　the　silent　regions　of　thought　which　has　come　to　itself　and　communes　only　with　itself；
  the　interests　w