Demos；　of　the　later　Roman　Emperors；　of　the　Russian　Czar；　and　of
  the　Crown　and　Parliament　of　Great　Britain。　Next；　it　is　its
  history；　the　entire　mass　of　its　historical　antecedents；　which　in
  each　community　determines　how　the　Sovereign　shall　exercise　or
  forbear　from　exercising　his　irresistible　coercive　power。　All　that
  constitutes　this　　the　whole　enormous　aggregate　of　opinions；
  sentiments；　beliefs；　superstitions；　and　prejudices；　of　ideas　of
  all　kinds；　hereditary　and　acquired；　some　produced　by　institutions
  and　some　by　the　constitution　of　human　nature　　is　rejected　by
  the　Analytical　Jurists。　And　thus　it　is　that；　so　far　as　the
  restrictions　confined　in　their　definition　of　Sovereignty　are
  concerned；　the　Queen　and　Parliament　of　our　own　country　might
  direct　all　weakly　children　to　be　put　to　death　or　establish　a
  system　of　lettres　de　cachet。
  The　procedure　of　the　Analytical　Jurists　is　closely　analogous
  to　that　followed　in　mathematics　and　political　economy。　It　is
  strictly　philosophical；　but　the　practical　value　of　all　sciences
  founded　on　abstractions　depends　on　the　relative　importance　of　the
  elements　rejected　and　the　elements　retained　in　the　process　of
  abstraction。　Tried　by　this　test；　mathematical　science　is　of
  greatly　more　value　than　political　economy；　and　both　of　them　than
  jurisprudence　as　conceived　by　the　writers　I　am　criticising。
  Similarly；　the　misconceptions　to　which　the　Austinian　analysis
  gives　rise　are　very　similar　to　those　which　might　be　conceived　as
  embarrassing　the　student　of　mixed　mathematics；　and　which　do
  actually　embarrass　the　student　of　political　economy。　Just　as　it
  is　possible　to　forget　the　existence　of　friction　in　nature　and　the
  reality　of　other　motives　in　society　except　the　desire　to　grow
  rich；　so　the　pupil　of　Austin　may　be　tempted　to　forget　that　there
  is　more　in　actual　Sovereignty　than　force；　and　more　in　laws　which
  are　the　commands　of　sovereigns　than　can　be　got　out　of　them　by
  merely　considering　them　as　regulated　force。　I　am　not　prepared　to
  deny　that　Austin　occasionally；　and　Hobbes　frequently；　express
  themselves　as　if　their　system　were　not　limited　throughout　by　the
  limitation　which　is　at　its　base　All　the　great　masters　of
  Abstraction　are；　in　fact；　now　and　then　betrayed　into　speaking　or
  writing　as　if　the　materials　thrown　aside　in　the　purely　mental
  process　were　actually　dross。
  When；　however；　it　has　once　been　seen　that　in　Austin's　system
  the　determination　of　Sovereignty　ought　to　precede　the
  determination　of　Law；　when　it　is　once　understood　that　the
  Austinian　conception　of　Sovereignty　has　been　reached　through
  mentally　uniting　all　forms　of　government　in　a　group　by　conceiving
  them　as　stripped　of　every　attribute　except　coercive　force；　and
  when　it　is　steadily　borne　in　mind　that　the　deductions　from　an
  abstract　principle　are　never　from　the　nature　of　the　case
  completely　exemplified　in　facts；　not　only；　as　it　seems　to　me；　do
  the　chief　difficulties　felt　by　the　student　of　Austin　disappear；
  but　some　of　the　assertions　made　by　him　at　which　the　beginner　is
  most　apt　to　stumble　have　rather　the　air　of　self…evident
  propositions。　I　dare　say　you　are　sufficiently　acquainted　with　his
  treatise　to　make　it　enough　for　me　to　mention　some　of　these
  propositions；　without　the　amplifications　which　are　necessary　for
  their　perfectly　accurate　statement。　Jurisprudence　is　the　science
  of　Positive　Law。　Positive　Laws　are　Commands；　addressed　by
  Sovereigns　to　their　Subjects；　imposing　a　Duty；　or　condition　of
  obligedness；　or　obligation；　on　those　Subjects；　and　threatening　a
  Sanction；　or　Penalty；　in　the　event　of　disobedience　to　the
  Command。　A　Right　is　the　faculty　or　power　conferred　by　the
  Sovereign　on　certain　members　of　the　community　to　draw　down　the
  sanction　on　a　fellow…subject　violating　a　Duty。　Now　all　these
  conceptions　of　Law；　Right；　Duty　and　Punishment　depend　upon　the
  primary　conception　of　Sovereignty；　just　as　the　lower　links　of　a
  chain　hanging　down　depend　upon　the　highest　link。　But　Sovereignty；
  for　the　purposes　of　Austin's　system；　has　no　attribute　but　force；
  and　consequently　the　view　here　taken　of　'law'　'obligation'　and
  'right'　is　a　view　of　them　regarded　exclusively　as　products　of
  coercive　force。　The　'sanction'　thus　becomes　the　primary　and　most
  important　member　of　the　series　of　notions　and　gives　its　colour　to
  all　the　others。　Probably　nobody　ever　found　a　difficulty　in
  allowing　that　laws　have　the　character　given　to　them　by　Austin；　so
  far　as　such　laws　have　proceeded　from　formal　Legislatures。　But
  many　persons；　and　among　them　some　men　of　powerful　mind；　have
  struggled　against　the　position　that　the　great　mass　of　legal　rules
  which　have　never　been　prescribed　by　the　organ　of　State；
  conventionally　known　as　the　Legislature；　are　commands　of　the
  Sovereign。　The　customary　law　of　all　countries　which　have　not
  included　their　law　in　Codes；　and　specially　the　English　Common
  law；　have　often　had　an　origin　claimed　for　them　independently　of
  the　Sovereign；　and　theories　have　been　propounded　on　the　subject
  which　Austin　scouts　as　mysterious　and　unintelligible。　The　way　in
  which　Hobbes　and　he　bring　such　bodies　of　rules　as　the　Common　law
  under　their　system　is　by　insisting　on　a　maxim　which　is　of　vital
  importance　to　it　　'Whatever　the　Sovereign　permits；　he
  commands。'　Until　customs　are　enforced　by　Courts　of　Justice；　they
  are　merely　'positive　morality；'　rules　enforced　by　opinion；　but；
  as　soon　as　Courts　of　Justice　enforce　them；　they　become　commands
  of　the　Sovereign；　conveyed　through　the　Judges　who　are　his
  delegates　or　deputies。　It　is　a　better　answer　to　this　theory　than
  Austin　would　perhaps　have　admitted　that　it　is　founded　on　a　mere
  artifice　of　speech；　and　that　it　assumes　Courts　of　Justice　to　act
  in　a　way　and　from　motives　of　which　they　are　quite　unconscious。
  But；　when　it　is　clearly　comprehended　that；　in　this　system；　there
  are　no　associations　with　the　Sovereign　but　force　or　power；　the
  position　that　what　Sovereigns　permit　they　command　becomes　more
  easily　intelligible。　They　command　because；　being　by　the
  assumption　possessed　of　uncontrollable　force；　they　could　innovate
  without　limit　at　any　moment。　The　Common　law　consists　of　their
  commands　because　they　can　repeal　or　alter　or　re…state　it　at
  pleasure。　The　theory　is　perfectly　defensible　as　a　theory；　but　its
  practical　value　and　the　degree　in　which　it　approximates　to　truth
  differ　greatly　in　different　ages　and　countries。　There　have　been
  independent　political　communities；　and　indeed　there　would　still
  prove　to　be　some　of　them　if　the　world　were　thoroughly　searched；
  in　which　the　Sovereign；　though　possessed　of　irresistible　power；
  never　dreams　of　innovation；　and　believes　the　persons　or　groups；
  by　whom　laws　are　declared　and　applied；　to　be　as　much　part　of　the
  necessary　constitution　of　society　as　he　is　himself。　There　have
  again　been　independent　political　societies　in　which　the　Sovereign
  has　enjoyed　irresistible　coercive　power　and　has　carried
  innovation　to　the　farthest　point；　but　in　which　every　single
  association　connected　with　law　would　have　violence　done　to　it　if
  laws　were　regarded　as　his　commands。　The　Tyrant　of　a　Greek　city
  often　satisfied　every　one　of　Austin's　tests　of　Sovereignty；　yet
  it　was　part　of　the　accepted　definition　of　a　Tyrant　that　'he
  subverted　the　laws。'　Let　it　be　understood　that　it　is　quite
  possible　to　make　the　theory　fit　in　with　such　cases；　but　the
  process　is　a　mere　straining　of　language。　It　is　carried　on　by
  taking　words　and　propositions　altogether　out　of　the　sphere　of　the
  ideas　habitually　associated　with　them。
  Before　proceeding　to　speak　at　some　length　in　my　next　Lecture
  of　these　historical　limitations　on　the　practical　value　of
  Austin's　theories；　let　me　repeat　my　opinion　that　if　the　method　of
  discussion　which　seems　to　me　correct　had　been　followed　in　his
  treatise；　and　if　the　examination　of　Sovereignty　had　preceded　the
  examination　of　the　conceptions　dependent　on　it；　a　considerable
  number　of　the　statements　which　he　has　made　respecting　these
  latter　conceptions　would　have　appeared　not　merely　innocent　but
  self…evident。　Law　is　here　regarded　as　regulated　force；　simply
  because　force　is　the　one　element　which　has　been　allowed　to　enter
  into　the　primary　notion　upon　which　all　the　others　depend。　The　one
  doctrine　of　this　school　of　jurists　which　is　repugnant　to　lawyers
  would　lose　its　air　of　paradox　if　an　assumption　were　made　which；
  in　itself　theoretically　unobjectionable；　manifestly　approximates
  to　practical　truth　as　the　course　of　history　proceeds　　the
  assumption　that　what　the　Sovereign　might　alter；　but　does　not
  alter；　he　commands。　The　same　arrangement　would　have　a　further
  advantage；　as　it　seems　to　me；　through　the　modifications　it　would
  necessitate　in　Austin's　manner　of　discussing　Morality；　though　the