Lecture　XII
  Sovereignty
  The　historical　theories　commonly　received　among　English
  lawyers　have　done　so　much　harm　not　only　to　the　study　of　law　but
  to　the　study　of　history；　that　an　account　of　the　origin　and　growth
  of　our　legal　system；　founded　on　the　examination　of　new　materials
  and　the　re…examination　of　old　ones；　is　perhaps　the　most　urgently
  needed　of　all　additions　to　English　knowledge。　But　next　to　a　new
  history　of　law；　what　we　most　require　is　a　new　philosophy　of　law。
  If　our　country　ever　gives　birth　to　such　a　philosophy；　we　shall
  probably　owe　it　to　two　advantages。　The　first　of　them　is　our
  possession　of　a　legal　system　which　for　many　purposes　may　be
  considered　indigenous。　Our　national　pride；　which　has　sometimes
  retarded　or　limited　our　advance　in　juridical　enquiry；　has　kept
  our　law　singularly　pure　from　mixture　with　the　stream　of　legal
  rules　flowing　from　the　great　fountain　of　the　Roman　Corpus　Juris；
  and　thus；　when　we　place　it　in　juxtaposition　with　any　other
  European　legal　system；　the　results　of　the　comparison　are　far　more
  fruitful　of　instruction　than　those　obtained　by　contrasting　the
  various　Continental　bodies　of　law　with　one　another。　The　second
  advantage　I　believe　to　consist　in　the　growing　familiarity　of
  Englishmen　with　the　investigations　of　the　so…called　Analytical
  Jurists；　of　whom　the　most　considerable　are　Jeremy　Bentham　and
  John　Austin。　Of　this　advantage　we　have　a　monopoly。　Bentham　seems
  to　be　exclusively　known　in　France　and　Germany　as　the　author　of　an
  unpopular　system　of　morals。　Austin　is　apparently　not　known　at
  all。　Yet　to　Bentham；　and　even　in　a　higher　degree　to　Austin；　the
  world　is　indebted　for　the　only　existing　attempt　to　construct　a
  system　of　jurisprudence　by　strict　scientific　process　and　to　found
  it；　not　on　*　priori　assumption；　but　on　the　observation；
  comparison；　and　analysis　of　the　various　legal　conceptions。　There
  is　not　the　smallest　necessity　for　accepting　all　the　conclusions
  of　these　great　writers　with　implicit　deference；　but　there　is　the
  strongest　necessity　for　knowing　what　those　conclusions　are。　They
  are　indispensable；　if　for　no　other　object；　for　the　purpose　of
  clearing　the　head。
  An　important　distinction　between　Bentham　and　Austin　is　not　as
  often　recognised　as　it　ought　to　be。　Bentham　in　the　main　is　a
  writer　on　legislation。　Austin　in　the　main　is　a　writer　on
  jurisprudence；　Bentham　is　chiefly　concerned　with　law　as　it　might
  be　and　ought　to　be。　Austin　is　chiefly　concerned　with　law　as　it
  is。　Each　trespasses　occasionally　on　the　domain　of　the　other。
  Unless　Bentham　had　written　the　treatise　called　the　'Fragment　on
  Government；'　Austin's　'Province　of　Jurisprudence　Determined；'
  which　sets　forth　the　basis　of　his　system；　would　never　probably
  have　been　composed。　On　the　other　hand；　Austin；　in　his　singular
  discussion　of　the　theory　of　utility　as　an　index　to　the　Law　of
  God；　has　entered　on　an　investigation　of　the　class　followed　by
  Bentham。　Still　the　description　which　I　have　given　of　their
  objects　is　sufficiently　correct　as　a　general　description；　and
  those　objects　are　widely　different。　Bentham　aims　at　the
  improvement　of　the　law　to　be　effected　by　the　application　of　the
  principles　now　indissolubly　associated　with　his　name。　Almost　all
  of　his　more　important　suggestions　have　been　adopted　by　the
  English　Legislature；　but　the　process　of　engrafting　on　the　law
  what　to　each　successive　generation　seem　to　be　improvements　is　in
  itself　of　indefinite　duration；　and　may　go　on；　and　possibly　will
  go　on；　as　long　as　the　human　race　lasts。　Austin's　undertaking　is
  more　modest。　It　would　be　completed；　if　a　Code　were　produced
  perfectly　logical　in　order　of　arrangement　and　perfectly　lucid　in
  statement　of　rule　Jurisprudence；　the　science　of　positive　law；　is
  sometimes　spoken　of　nowadays　as　if　it　would　bring　the　substance
  of　the　law　into　a　state　of　indefinite　perfection。　It　would
  doubtless；　if　it　were　carried　far；　lead　indirectly　to　great　legal
  reforms　by　dispelling　obscurities　and　dissipating　delusions；　but
  the　investigation　of　the　principles　on　which　the　direct
  improvement　of　substantive　legal　rules　should　be　conducted
  belongs　nevertheless　not　to　the　theorist　on　jurisprudence　but　to
  the　theorist　on　legislation。
  The　portion　of　Austin's　Lectures　which　sets　forth　the　basis
  of　his　system；　and　which　was　published　several　years　ago　as　the
  'Province　of　Jurisprudence　Determined；'　has　long　been　one　of　the
  higher　classbooks　in　this　University；　and；　taken　together　with
  the　other　lectures　more　recently　given　to　the　world　（though
  unhappily　in　a　fragmentary　shape）；　it　must　always；　or　for　a　long
  time　to　come；　be　the　mainstay　of　the　studies　prosecuted　in　this
  Department。　Making　the　utmost　acknowledgment　of　the　value　of　the
  book；　I　find　it　impossible　not　to　recognise　the　magnitude　of　the
  difficulties　which　it　occasions　to　the　beginner。　Those　which　have
  their　origin　in　peculiarities　of　style　and　which　seem　to　be
  attributable　to　the　perpetual　commerce　of　thought　in　which　the
  writer　lived　with　his　precursors；　Bentham　and　Hobbes；　I　find　to
  be　practically　less　grave　than　difficulties　of　another　sort　which
  arise　from　the　repulsion　created　in　the　mind　by　the　shape　in
  which　the　conceptions　of　law；　right；　and　duty　are　presented　to　it
  by　Austin's　analysis。　Of　course；　so　far　as　this　distaste　is
  caused　by　unpalatable　truth；　any　tenderness　shown　to　it　would　be
  wasted；　but　even　thus　it　is　a　misfortune；　and；　if　it　be　in　any
  degree　provoked　by　avoidable　causes；　such　as　methods　of　statement
  or　arrangement；　no　pains　bestowed　on　the　attempt　to　remove　it　to
  this　extent　would　be　thrown　away。　A　very　frequent　effect　of
  forcing　on　students　of　active　mind　and　industrious　habits　a
  system　or　subject　which　for　some　reason　or　other　is　repugnant　to
  them　is　to　make　them　regard　it　as　so　much　dogma；　as　something
  resting　on　the　personal　authority　of　the　writer　with　whose　name
  it　happens　to　be　associated。　Now　nothing　could　be　more
  unfortunate　for　the　philosophy　of　law　than　that　the　system　of　the
  'Province　of　Jurisprudence　Determined'　should　come　to　be　regarded
  simply　as　Austin's　system　　as　standing　by　the　side。　of
  Blackstone's　or　Hegel's　or　any　other　system　　as　interchangeable
  with　it　or　equivalent　to　it。　For；　when　certain　assumptions　or
  postulates　have　been　made；　I　am　fully　convinced　that　the　great
  majority　of　Austin's　positions　follow　as　of　course　and　by
  ordinary　logical　process。　These　assumptions　do　not　appear　to　me
  to　be　stated　and　described　by　Austin　with　sufficient　fulness
  possibly　because；　though　he　is　a　comparatively　modern　writer；　a
  part　of　the　enquiries　necessary　for　such　statement　had　in　his　day
  been　barely　commenced　　but；　whatever　the　cause；　the　result　is
  that　he　seems　to　me　open　to　the　same　charge　as　some　of　the
  greatest　writers　on　Political　Economy　who　have　omitted　to　set
  forth　at　the　outset　with　adequate　distinctness　the　limited
  objects　of　their　science；　and　who　have　thus　attracted　to　it　a
  mass　of　prejudice　of　which　it　may　never　possibly　get　rid。　The
  present　Lecture　is　an　attempt　to　show　what　a　certain　number　of
  these　assumptions　or　postulates　are；　in　that　which　follows　it；　I
  endeavour　to　show　how　these　assumptions　are　affected　by　some
  conclusions　which　we　have　arrived　at　in　former　Lectures　during
  our　investigation　of　the　early　history　of　society。　（Supra；
  Lectures　I　to　XI）　I　think　it　best　for　my　purpose　to　begin　with
  calling　attention　to　the　definition　of　Sovereignty。　Beyond　all
  doubt　this　is　the　logical　order　of　the　discussion　undertaken　by
  Austin；　and　I　find　it　difficult　to　understand；　except　on　one
  hypothesis；　why；　deserting　the　arrangement　of　Hobbes；　he　began
  the　discussion　of　this　part　of　his　subject　by　the　analysis　of
  Law；　Right　and　Duty；　and　ended　it　with　an　account　of　Sovereignty
  which　it　seems　to　me　should　have　come　first。　I　imagine；　however；
  that　Blackstone　influenced　him；　as　he　did　Bentham；　so　to　speak；
  by　repulsion。　Blackstone；　following　Roman　Institutional　writers；
  begins　with　a　definition　of　law　and　proceeds　to　give　a　theory　of
  the　connection　of　the　various　legal　conceptions。　The　desire　to
  expose　the　fallacies　of　this　portion　of　the　Commentaries
  furnished　Bentham　with　his　principal　motive　for　writing　the
  Fragment　on　Government；　and　Austin　with　his　chief　inducement　to
  determine　the　Province　of　Jurisprudence；　and　the　latter　seems　to
  me　to　have　thought　that　the　propositions　he　disputed　would　be
  most　effectually　disposed　of；　if　they　were　contradicted　in　the
  order　given　them　by　their　author。　However　that　may　be；　the　branch
  of　my　subject　on　which　I　shall　first　have　to　enter　may　be
  described　as　an　enquiry　into　the　probable　mode　in　which　Austin's
  analysis　would　have　been　affected；　if　he　had　begun　in