第 33 节
作者:
打倒一切 更新:2021-02-21 15:40 字数:9322
that levels the parties; cancels all former relation of reverence;
respect; and superiority; and then the odds that remains is… that he
who opposes the unjust aggressor has this superiority over him; that
he has a right; when he prevails; to punish the offender; both for the
breach of the peace and all the evils that followed upon it。
Barclay; therefore; in another place; more coherently to himself;
denies it to be lawful to resist a king in any case。 But he there
assigns two cases whereby a king may unking himself。 His words are:
〃Quid ergo; nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese
erigere atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere et
invadere jure suo suaque authoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex
manet。 Semper enim ex divinis id obstat; Regem honorificato; et qui
potestati resistit; Dei ordinationi resistit; non alias igitur in
eum populo potestas est quam si id committat propter quod ipso jure
rex esse desinat。 Tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis
constituit liber; hoc modo populus et superior efficitur; reverso ad
eum scilicet jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno
habuit。 At sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae hunc
effectum pariunt。 At ego cum plurima animo perlustrem; duo tantum
invenio; duos; inquam; casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege non regem
se facit et omni honore et dignitate regali atque in subditos
potestate destituit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus。 Horum unus est; si
regnum disperdat; quemadmodum de Nerone fertur; quod is nempe
senatum populumque Romanum atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque
vastare; ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset。 Et de Caligula;
quod palam denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui
amplius fore; inque animo habuerit; interempto utriusque ordinis
electissimo; quoque Alexandriam commigrare; ac ut populum uno ictu
interimeret; unam ei cervicem optavit。 Talia cum rex aliquis meditatur
et molitur serio; omnem regnandi curam et animum ilico abjicit; ac
proinde imperium in subditos amittit; ut dominus servi pro derelicto
habiti; dominium。
236。 〃Arlter casus est; si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit;
ac regnum quod liberum a majoribus et populo traditum accepit; alienae
ditioni mancipavit。 Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo
plane ut incommodet; tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae
dignitatis amisit; ut summus scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit; et
solo Deo inferior; atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum;
cujus libertatem sartam et tectam conservare debuit; in alterius
gentis ditionem et potestatem dedidit; hac velut quadam rengi
abalienatione effecit; ut nec quod ipse in regno imperium habuit
retineat; nec in eum cui collatum voluit; juris quicquam transferat;
atque ita eo facto liberum jam et suae potestatis populum relinquit;
cujus rei exemplum unum annales Scotici suppeditant。〃… Barclay; Contra
Monarchomachos; I。 iii。; c。 16。
Which may be thus Englished:
237。 〃What; then; can there no case happen wherein the people may of
right; and by their own authority; help themselves; take arms; and set
upon their king; imperiously domineering over them? None at all whilst
he remains a king。 'Honour the king;' and 'he that resists the
power; resists the ordinance of God;' are Divine oracles that will
never permit it。 The people; therefore; can never come by a power over
him unless he does something that makes him cease to be a king; for
then he divests himself of his crown and dignity; and returns to the
state of a private man; and the people become free and superior; the
power which they had in the interregnum; before they crowned him king;
devolving to them again。 But there are but few miscarriages which
bring the matter to this state。 After considering it well on all
sides; I can find but two。 Two cases there are; I say; whereby a king;
ipso facto; becomes no king; and loses all power and regal authority
over his people; which are also taken notice of by Winzerus。 The first
is; if he endeavour to overturn the government… that is; if he have
a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth; as it is
recorded of Nero that he resolved to cut off the senate and people
of Rome; lay the city waste with fire and sword; and then remove to
some other place; and of Caligula; that he openly declared that he
would be no longer a head to the people or senate; and that he had
it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks; and
then retire to Alexandria; and he wished that the people had but one
neck that he might dispatch them all at a blow。 Such designs as these;
when any king harbours in his thoughts; and seriously promotes; he
immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth; and;
consequently; forfeits the power of governing his subjects; as a
master does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath abandoned。
238。 〃The other case is; when a king makes himself the dependent
of another; and subjects his kingdom; which his ancestors left him;
and the people put free into his hands; to the dominion of another。
For however; perhaps; it may not be his intention to prejudice the
people; yet because he has hereby lost the principal part of regal
dignity… viz。; to be next and immediately under God; supreme in his
kingdom; and also because he betrayed or forced his people; whose
liberty he ought to have carefully preserved; into the power and
dominion of a foreign nation。 By this; as it were; alienation of his
kingdom; he himself loses the power he had in it before; without
transferring any the least right to those on whom he would have
bestowed it; and so by this act sets the people free; and leaves
them at their own disposal。 One example of this is to be found in
the Scotch annals。〃
239。 In these cases Barclay; the great champion of absolute
monarchy; is forced to allow that a king may be resisted; and ceases
to be a king。 That is in short… not to multiply cases… in whatsoever
he has no authority; there he is no king; and may be resisted: for
wheresoever the authority ceases; the king ceases too; and becomes
like other men who have no authority。 And these two cases that he
instances differ little from those above mentioned; to be
destructive to governments; only that he has omitted the principle
from which his doctrine flows; and that is the breach of trust in
not preserving the form of government agreed on; and in not
intending the end of government itself; which is the public good and
preservation of property。 When a king has dethroned himself; and put
himself in a state of war with his people; what shall hinder them from
prosecuting him who is no king; as they would any other man; who has
put himself into a state of war with them; Barclay; and those of his
opinion; would do well to tell us。 Bilson; a bishop of our Church; and
a great stickler for the power and prerogative of princes; does; if
I mistake not; in his treatise of 〃Christian Subjection;〃
acknowledge that princes may forfeit their power and their title to
the obedience of their subjects; and if there needed authority in a
case where reason is so plain; I could send my reader to Bracton;
Fortescue; and the author of the 〃Mirror;〃 and others; writers that
cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our government; or enemies to
it。 But I thought Hooker alone might be enough to satisfy those men
who; relying on him for their ecclesiastical polity; are by a
strange fate carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it。
Whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen; to pull
down their own fabric; they were best look。 This I am sure; their
civil policy is so new; so dangerous; and so destructive to both
rulers and people; that as former ages never could bear the
broaching of it; so it may be hoped those to come; redeemed from the
impositions of these Egyptian under…taskmasters; will abhor the memory
of such servile flatterers; who; whilst it seemed to serve their turn;
resolved all government into absolute tyranny; and would have all
men born to what their mean souls fitted them… slavery。
240。 Here it is like the common question will be made: Who shall
be judge whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their
trust? This; perhaps; ill…affected and factious men may spread amongst
the people; when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative。
To this I reply; The people shall be judge; for who shall be judge
whether his trustee or deputy acts well and according to the trust
reposed in him; but he who deputes him and must; by having deputed
him; have still a power to discard him when he fails in his trust?
If this be reasonable in particular cases of private men; why should
it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment; where the welfare of
millions is concerned and also where the evil; if not prevented; is
greater; and the redress very difficult; dear; and dangerous?
241。 But; farther; this question; Who shall be judge? cannot mean
that there is no judge at all。 For where there is no judicature on
earth to decide controvers