it　is　not　a　certain　number　of　men…　no；　nor　their　meeting；　unless
  they　have　also　freedom　of　debating　and　leisure　of　perfecting　what　is
  for　the　good　of　the　society；　wherein　the　legislative　consists；　when
  these　are　taken　away；　or　altered；　so　as　to　deprive　the　society　of
  the　due　exercise　of　their　power；　the　legislative　is　truly　altered。　For
  it　is　not　names　that　constitute　governments；　but　the　use　and
  exercise　of　those　powers　that　were　intended　to　accompany　them；　so　that
  he　who　takes　away　the　freedom；　or　hinders　the　acting　of　the
  legislative　in　its　due　seasons；　in　effect　takes　away　the
  legislative；　and　puts　an　end　to　the　government。
  216。　Thirdly；　when；　by　the　arbitrary　power　of　the　prince；　the
  electors　or　ways　of　election　are　altered　without　the　consent　and
  contrary　to　the　common　interest　of　the　people；　there　also　the
  legislative　is　altered。　For　if　others　than　those　whom　the　society　hath
  authorised　thereunto　do　choose；　or　in　another　way　than　what　the
  society　hath　prescribed；　those　chosen　are　not　the　legislative
  appointed　by　the　people。
  217。　Fourthly；　the　delivery　also　of　the　people　into　the　subjection
  of　a　foreign　power；　either　by　the　prince　or　by　the　legislative；　is
  certainly　a　change　of　the　legislative；　and　so　a　dissolution　of　the
  government。　For　the　end　why　people　entered　into　society　being　to　be
  preserved　one　entire；　free；　independent　society　to　be　governed　by
  its　own　laws；　this　is　lost　whenever　they　are　given　up　into　the　power
  of　another。
  218。　Why；　in　such　a　constitution　as　this；　the　dissolution　of　the
  government　in　these　cases　is　to　be　imputed　to　the　prince　is　evident；
  because　he；　having　the　force；　treasure；　and　offices　of　the　State　to
  employ；　and　often　persuading　himself　or　being　flattered　by　others；
  that；　as　supreme　magistrate；　he　is　incapable　of　control；　he　alone　is
  in　a　condition　to　make　great　advances　towards　such　changes　under
  pretence　of　lawful　authority；　and　has　it　in　his　hands　to　terrify　or
  suppress　opposers　as　factious；　seditious；　and　enemies　to　the
  government；　whereas　no　other　part　of　the　legislative；　or　people；　is
  capable　by　themselves　to　attempt　any　alteration　of　the　legislative
  without　open　and　visible　rebellion；　apt　enough　to　be　taken　notice
  of；　which；　when　it　prevails；　produces　effects　very　little　different
  from　foreign　conquest。　Besides；　the　prince；　in　such　a　form　of
  government；　having　the　power　of　dissolving　the　other　parts　of　the
  legislative；　and　thereby　rendering　them　private　persons；　they　can
  never；　in　opposition　to　him；　or　without　his　concurrence；　alter　the
  legislative　by　a　law；　his　consent　being　necessary　to　give　any　of　their
  decrees　that　sanction。　But　yet　so　far　as　the　other　parts　of　the
  legislative　any　way　contribute　to　any　attempt　upon　the　government；　and
  do　either　promote；　or　not；　what　lies　in　them；　hinder　such　designs；
  they　are　guilty；　and　partake　in　this；　which　is　certainly　the
  greatest　crime　men　can　be　guilty　of　one　towards　another。
  219。　There　is　one　way　more　whereby　such　a　government　may　be
  dissolved；　and　that　is：　When　he　who　has　the　supreme　executive　power
  neglects　and　abandons　that　charge；　so　that　the　laws　already　made　can
  no　longer　be　put　in　execution；　this　is　demonstratively　to　reduce　all
  to　anarchy；　and　so　effectively　to　dissolve　the　government。　For　laws
  not　being　made　for　themselves；　but　to　be；　by　their　execution；　the
  bonds　of　the　society　to　keep　every　part　of　the　body　politic　in　its　due
  place　and　function。　When　that　totally　ceases；　the　government　visibly
  ceases；　and　the　people　become　a　confused　multitude　without　order　or
  connection。　Where　there　is　no　longer　the　administration　of　justice　for
  the　securing　of　men's　rights；　nor　any　remaining　power　within　the
  community　to　direct　the　force；　or　provide　for　the　necessities　of　the
  public；　there　certainly　is　no　government　left。　Where　the　laws　cannot
  be　executed　it　is　all　one　as　if　there　were　no　laws；　and　a　government
  without　laws　is；　I　suppose；　a　mystery　in　politics　inconceivable　to
  human　capacity；　and　inconsistent　with　human　society。
  220。　In　these；　and　the　like　cases；　when　the　government　is　dissolved；
  the　people　are　at　liberty　to　provide　for　themselves　by　erecting　a
  new　legislative　differing　from　the　other　by　the　change　of　persons；
  or　form；　or　both；　as　they　shall　find　it　most　for　their　safety　and
  good。　For　the　society　can　never；　by　the　fault　of　another；　lose　the
  native　and　original　right　it　has　to　preserve　itself；　which　can　only　be
  done　by　a　settled　legislative　and　a　fair　and　impartial　execution　of
  the　laws　made　by　it。　But　the　state　of　mankind　is　not　so　miserable　that
  they　are　not　capable　of　using　this　remedy　till　it　be　too　late　to
  look　for　any。　To　tell　people　they　may　provide　for　themselves　by
  erecting　a　new　legislative；　when；　by　oppression；　artifice；　or　being
  delivered　over　to　a　foreign　power；　their　old　one　is　gone；　is　only　to
  tell　them　they　may　expect　relief　when　it　is　too　late；　and　the　evil
  is　past　cure。　This　is；　in　effect；　no　more　than　to　bid　them　first　be
  slaves；　and　then　to　take　care　of　their　liberty；　and；　when　their　chains
  are　on；　tell　them　they　may　act　like　free　men。　This；　if　barely　so；　is
  rather　mockery　than　relief；　and　men　can　never　be　secure　from　tyranny
  if　there　be　no　means　to　escape　it　till　they　are　perfectly　under　it；
  and；　therefore；　it　is　that　they　have　not　only　a　right　to　get　out　of
  it；　but　to　prevent　it。
  221。　There　is；　therefore；　secondly；　another　way　whereby
  governments　are　dissolved；　and　that　is；　when　the　legislative；　or　the
  prince；　either　of　them　act　contrary　to　their　trust。
  For　the　legislative　acts　against　the　trust　reposed　in　them　when　they
  endeavour　to　invade　the　property　of　the　subject；　and　to　make
  themselves；　or　any　part　of　the　community；　masters　or　arbitrary
  disposers　of　the　lives；　liberties；　or　fortunes　of　the　people。
  222。　The　reason　why　men　enter　into　society　is　the　preservation　of
  their　property；　and　the　end　while　they　choose　and　authorise　a
  legislative　is　that　there　may　be　laws　made；　and　rules　set；　as　guards
  and　fences　to　the　properties　of　all　the　society；　to　limit　the　power
  and　moderate　the　dominion　of　every　part　and　member　of　the　society。　For
  since　it　can　never　be　supposed　to　be　the　will　of　the　society　that
  the　legislative　should　have　a　power　to　destroy　that　which　every　one
  designs　to　secure　by　entering　into　society；　and　for　which　the　people
  submitted　themselves　to　legislators　of　their　own　making：　whenever
  the　legislators　endeavour　to　take　away　and　destroy　the　property　of　the
  people；　or　to　reduce　them　to　slavery　under　arbitrary　power；　they　put
  themselves　into　a　state　of　war　with　the　people；　who　are　thereupon
  absolved　from　any　farther　obedience；　and　are　left　to　the　common　refuge
  which　God　hath　provided　for　all　men　against　force　and　violence。
  Whensoever；　therefore；　the　legislative　shall　transgress　this
  fundamental　rule　of　society；　and　either　by　ambition；　fear；　folly；　or
  corruption；　endeavour　to　grasp　themselves；　or　put　into　the　hands　of
  any　other；　an　absolute　power　over　the　lives；　liberties；　and　estates　of
  the　people；　by　this　breach　of　trust　they　forfeit　the　power　the
  people　had　put　into　their　hands　for　quite　contrary　ends；　and　it
  devolves　to　the　people；　who　have　a　right　to　resume　their　original
  liberty；　and　by　the　establishment　of　a　new　legislative　（such　as　they
  shall　think　fit）；　provide　for　their　own　safety　and　security；　which
  is　the　end　for　which　they　are　in　society。　What　I　have　said　here
  concerning　the　legislative　in　general　holds　true　also　concerning　the
  supreme　executor；　who　having　a　double　trust　put　in　him；　both　to　have　a
  part　in　the　legislative　and　the　supreme　execution　of　the　law；　acts
  against　both；　when　he　goes　about　to　set　up　his　own　arbitrary　will　as
  the　law　of　the　society。　He　acts　also　contrary　to　his　trust　when　he
  employs　the　force；　treasure；　and　offices　of　the　society　to　corrupt　the
  representatives　and　gain　them　to　his　purposes；　when　he　openly
  pre…engages　the　electors；　and　prescribes；　to　their　choice；　such　whom
  he　has；　by　solicitation；　threats；　promises；　or　otherwise；　won　to　his
  designs；　and　employs　them　to　bring　in　such　who　have　promised
  beforehand　what　to　vote　and　what　to　enact。　Thus　to　regulate　candidates
  and　electors；　and　new　model　the　ways　of　election；　what　is　it　but　to
  cut　up　the　government　by　the　roots；　and　poison　the　very　fountain　of
  public　security？　For　the　people　having　reserved　to　themselves　the
  choice　of　their　representatives　as　the　fence　to　their　properties；
  could　do　it　for　no　other　end　but　that　they　might　always　be　freely
  chosen；　and　so　chosen；　freely　act　and　advise　as　the　necessity　of　the
  commonwealth　and　the　public　good　should；　upon　examination　and　mature
  debate；　be　judged　to　require。　This；　those　who　give　their　votes
  before　they　hear　the　debate；　and　have　weighed　the　reasons　on　all
  sides；　are　not　capable　of　doing。　To　prepare　such　an　assembly　as
  this；　and　endeavour　to　set　up　the　declared　abettors　of　his　own　will；
  for　the　true　representatives　of　the　people；　and　the　law…makers　of
  the　society；　is　certainly　as　great　a　breach　of　trust；　and　as　perfect　a
  declaration　of　a　design　to　subvert　the　government；　as　is　possible　to